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This dissertation argues that Aristotle’s philosophy of praxis (i.e., ethics and politics) can 
contribute to our understanding of the contemporary question concerning the 
environment. Thinking seriously about the environment today calls for resisting the 
temptation to jump to conclusions about Aristotle’s irrelevance to the environment on  
historicist grounds of incommensurability or the fact that Aristotle did not write 
specifically on environmental issues as we know them. It is true that environmental 
problems are basically twentieth-century phenomena, but the larger normative discourses 
in which the terms “environmental” and “ecological” and their cognates are situated 
should be approached philosophically, namely, as cross-cultural and trans-historical 
phenomena that touch human experience at a deeper level. The philosophical 
perspective exploring the discursive meaning behind contemporary environmental praxis 
can reveal to us that certain aspects of Aristotle’s thought are relevant, or can be adapted, 
to the ends of environmentalists concerned with developmental problems. I argue that 
Aristotle’s views are already accepted and adopted in political theory and the praxis of 
  
the environment in many respects. In the first half of the dissertation, I explore the 
common ground between contemporary theorizing on the ethical and political aspects of 
environmental issues and Aristotelian ethics and politics. The second half of the 
dissertation locates the contemporary relevance of Aristotle in the recently emerging 
studies of “environmental virtue ethics” as well as “environmental citizenship” and 
“conservative environmentalism.”   
 









































FOR THE END IS A LIMIT:  













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor Charles E. Butterworth, Co-Chair 
Professor Ken Conca, Co-Chair 
Professor Ronald Terchek 
Professor Jillian Schwedler  










































To my parents,  
Leman and Bedrettin Orhan, 
and to my sister and brother, 
Evrim and Devrim,  







This dissertation would not have seen the light of day without the constant support, 
encouragement, and guidance of my co-chairs Charles Butterworth and Ken Conca. I 
would like to extend my deepest gratitude to both of them. Professor Butterworth has 
relentlessly provided all the possible support that a graduate student could wish for. I 
was inspired to choose the topic of my dissertation after taking his class on the ancients. 
Professor Conca has been very understanding, patient, helpful, and supportive before, 
during, and after the writing process. He has contributed much to my learning and 
growth as a scholar. I owe special thanks to Jillian Schwedler. She graciously offered help 
and agreed to join my committee without hesitation despite the short notice. I am 
grateful to Professors Ronald Terchek, Miranda Schreurs, and Lillian Doherty for 
reading, discussing, and giving me valuable and timely feedback on my dissertation 
chapters. 
 
I also thank my friends Waseem El-Rayes, Fenghsi Wu, Rima Pavalko, and Kerem Ozan 
Kalkan for providing me with intellectual and emotional support. I also appreciate all 
kinds of administrative help I have received over the years from Ann Marie Clark and 
Cissy Abu Rumman. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank the Earhart Foundation for providing me with a generous 
Fellowship Research Grant for 2005-06 and 2006-07 in writing this dissertation.  
 





Table of  Contents 
 
 
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents......................................................................................................................... iv 
Abbreviations of Works by Aristotle .........................................................................................v 
Chapter 1: Recovering Aristotle for Nature ..............................................................................1 
1.1 Introduction: The Question Concerning the “Environment” .............................1 
1.2 Contemporary Environmentalism..........................................................................13 
1.3 Skeptics on Aristotle’s Relevance to the Environment .......................................21 
1.4 Aristotle’s Contemporary Relevance......................................................................27 
1.5 Survey of Environmental Theory Literature on Aristotle...................................41 
Chapter 2: Nature or History?...................................................................................................51 
2.1 Nature, Harmony, and Limits .................................................................................55 
2.2 Modernity and History .............................................................................................69 
2.3 Historicizing Nature .................................................................................................85 
Chapter 3: Aristotle’s Conception of Nature ..........................................................................94 
3.1 Aristotle’s Anthropocentrism................................................................................100 
3.2 The Manifold Senses of Nature ............................................................................114 
3.3 Energeia and Entelecheia.......................................................................................115 
3.4 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Conception of Phusis......................117 
Chapter 4: Aristotle’s Conception of Praxis..........................................................................129 
4.1 What is Praxis?.........................................................................................................137 
4.2 The Psychological Underpinnings of Praxis .......................................................147 
Chapter 5:  Virtue and Nature.................................................................................................173 
5.1 A New Environmental Ethic?...............................................................................178 
5.2 Environmental Virtue Ethics ................................................................................196 
5.3 The Critique of Environmental Virtue Ethics ....................................................213 
5.4 Values or Virtues? ...................................................................................................222 
Chapter 6:  The Civic Approach to the Environment.........................................................251 
6.1 Civic Environmentalism and Environmental Citizenship ................................252 
6.1.1 Environmental Citizenship ...............................................................................264 
6.1.2 Civic Environmentalism....................................................................................286 
6.1.3 The Civic Approach to the Environment.......................................................291 
6.2 The Political Conjuncture of the Civic Approach..............................................297 
6.2.1 Environmentalism in Crisis? .............................................................................301 
Chapter 7:  Conclusion.............................................................................................................318 
7.1 Reconciling Conservative and Environmental Sensibilities..............................322 






Abbreviations of  Works by Aristotle 
 
De An.  De Anima (Peri Psychēs): On the Soul 
 
EE  Ethica Eudemia (Ethika Eudēmeia): Eudemian Ethics 
 
GA  De Generatione Animalium (Peri zōōn geneseōs): Generation of Animals 
 
HA  Historia Animalium (Peri tōn zōōn historiai): History of Animals 
 
NE   Ethica Nicomachea (Ethika Nikomacheia): Nicomachean Ethics 
 
Meta.  Metaphysica (Ta meta ta physika): Metaphysics 
 
Ph.  Physica (Physikē akroasis): Physics 
 
Pol.   Politica (Politika): Politics 
 






Chapter 1: Recovering Aristotle for Nature 
It is necessary to leave everything open and questionable; only thus will we 
be capable of freeing and keeping alive Aristotle’s unresolved innermost 
questioning, and thereby the questioning of ancient philosophy and 
accordingly our own.1 
 
1.1 Introduction: The Question Concerning the “Environment” 
 
This dissertation revisits Aristotle’s philosophy of praxis to provide insight into our 
understanding of the contemporary question concerning the “environment.” I challenge the 
opinion that Aristotle has nothing significant to contribute to the contemporary theorizing 
of the “environment” by showing how Aristotelian insights can actually illuminate the 
current debates among environmental scholars and activists on the meaning and significance 
of the conceptual category of the “environment.” Rather than trying to locate environmental 
awareness in Aristotle’s writings, I shall execute my task somewhat indirectly. The nature of 
the question of the environment can be better grasped, I argue, if we situate it within a larger 
socio-cultural context of “modernity.” Hence, I shall discuss the environmental significance 
of Aristotle’s writings in relation to the rise and development of “modernity,” and urge a 
more thoughtful reflection on the Aristotelian account of the human condition as opposed 
to the one built on the premises of the modern scientific view.  
To this purpose, I shall explore Aristotle’s discussions of the concepts of praxis 
(action), phusis (nature), and technē (art) spread through his writings on ethics, politics, 
physics, metaphysics, and biology and show that reading Aristotle through the lenses of 
these three organizing concepts, while considering his practical philosophy in relation to the 
critique mounted against it in the modern era, can bring out the philosophical import of the 
                                                 
     1 Martin Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: 




contemporary question concerning the “environment.” In Aristotle’s view, phusis is superior 
to techne, and poiesis (making) is subordinate to praxis (NE 1106b13-4). The transformation of 
this nexus in modernity, I argue, is fundamental to conceptualize the contemporary question 
of the “environment” and Aristotle’s relationship to it.2  
To avoid any misunderstanding concerning the purpose of this inquiry, let me state 
at this point that I do not intend to portray Aristotle as a proto-environmentalist. As one 
scholar observed, “It is a common practice for philosophers who wish to involve themselves 
in environmental affairs to write apologies on behalf of one or another historical figure, 
defending him or her for the environmentalist cause.”3 My treatment of Aristotle in relation 
to contemporary environmentalism tries to avoid this apologetic pitfall. The present inquiry 
is not concerned with portraying Aristotle as an ancient environmentalist or precursor of 
environmentalism, but to make the more modest claim that Aristotle’s philosophy of praxis 
can improve our understanding of the normative basis of contemporary environmentalism 
and, in certain ways, can help re-orient it.  
Central to this reorientation is the realization that the contemporary question of the 
environment cannot be understood apart from the perennial quest for the “good life” and 
happiness in and through “religion,” “philosophy,” and more recently “ideology.” My 
                                                 
     2 I shall occasionally use the transliterations of these three terms and a few other Greek terms that will 
frequently appear in the text in place of their English equivalents. I shall omit their diacritic marks after the first 
occurrence. My rationale for this practice is that most of these terms have been part of the Western 
philosophical terminology and that the originals can conjure certain connotations unlike their English 
equivalents. An example is the translation of the term techne as “art” into English. Today, the English term “art” 
(derived from Latin ars) is used more often than not in the sense of “fine arts” as opposed to “mechanical 
arts.” Techne is better than “art” as it reminds us of both “technology” (which is an outgrowth of “mechanical 
arts”) and its original meaning in Aristotle—the mental faculty employed in the process of making things, be it 
a statue or a hammer. The word “praxis” is similarly richer than its English equivalent “action” (derived from 
the Latin actus which translates the two central terms of Aristotle’s philosophy energeia and entelecheia). For this 
reason, praxis will be frequently used in the original and without italics since it has now become part of the 
English vocabulary. I shall say more on the richer connotations of praxis and phusis in Chapter 3. 
 
     3 Robert Kirkman, Skeptical Environmentalism: The Limits of Philosophy and Science (Bloomington: Indiana 




working assumption is that this quest is both cross-cultural and trans-historical and that 
every literate human society in history, in one way or another, grappled with the underlying 
reasons of this quest. The aforementioned three categories are outcomes and mediums of 
this quest and the question of the environment cannot be studied in isolation from the 
history of this quest. This question has a special relationship with the premises and ends of 
modernity. This is no accident as the degradation of the physical environment(s) are by and 
large the unintentional by-products of the industrial mode of production, which in turn has 
become possible and sustained by modern science and technology. Although pre-modern 
societies also had an environmental impact—and some quite possibly had collapsed due to 
their impact, the scale of modern impact on the environment is incomparably higher.4 For 
one thing, the scope of the affected area is no longer local or regional but global.  
The ethos of modernity rests on the physicalist conception of reality or being and the 
historicist view of society and human being. The former sets the goal of the scientific 
enterprise as “objective” knowledge of reality. Hence, the epistemological concept of 
“objectivity” and the ontological category of “reality” are correlated, and the practical status 
of “subjectivity” is consigned to limbo. The culture of modernity is further defended and 
justified on the basis of the historicist notion of “progress.” Historical progress promises 
quantitative “increase” in four dimensions: theoretical knowledge, technological 
sophistication, material prosperity, and morals. All four, it is assumed, works in tandem to 
deliver the human condition from bondage to caprice (of fate and nature) as well as necessity 
(of scarcity or authority). The universal historical process in which this has taken place and 
will continue or ought to continue is called “progress.” As I shall argue, the question 
concerning the environment sits at the intersection of these two pillars of modernity: the 
                                                 
     4 See Richard York, Eugene A. Rosa, and Thomas Dietz, “Footprints on the Earth: The Environmental 




modern scientific view of reality and its technological application to relieve the human 
estate.5  
As Jared Diamond notes, “all of our current environmental problems are 
unanticipated harmful consequences of our existing technology.”6 Fair enough, but how can 
we guard ourselves against the harmful consequences of existing technology? Would it be 
sufficient to invent environmentally friendly technology and replace the old with the new? 
This would be the least complicated route to take but it would ignore the socio-cultural 
situated-ness of what we conveniently call “technology.” What is “technology”? Can we 
explain the genus of technology by pointing at its instances, that is, the artificial products and 
the whole manufacturing infrastructure of these products, and manage their undesirable 
effects on an individual basis? What about the intellectual “software” that sustains them all? 
One apt exponent of technology is the German philosopher Martin Heidegger whose work I 
shall draw on in later chapters to illuminate the question concerning the environment via his 
discussion of modern science and technology. If the nature of modern technology is 
fundamentally implicated with “the modern physical theory of nature,” as Heidegger 
suggests, then we must understand the premises and implications of the modern scientific 
project.7 Our attitude toward this project must be subtler than taking a pro or con position. I 
will take up this theme in the fourth section of this chapter and again in the next chapter.  
Statements regularly issued by environmental organizations and scientists regarding a 
particular environmental problem or the state of the environment in general often evoke a 
                                                 
     5 See also David W. Orr, “In the Tracks of the Dinosaur: Modernization and the Ecological Perspective, 
Polity 11.4 (1979): 562-87. 
 
     6 Jared Diamond, “The Last Americans: Environmental Collapse and the End of Civilization,” Harper’s 
Magazine (June 2003): 44.  
 
     7 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 




sense of urgency. In a sense, environmentalists share the impassioned Marxist impulse for 
change: the point is not to interpret the world but to change it. The general feeling is that 
there is not much time left for idle speculation.8 The sentiment that we are running out of 
time with respect to issues such as global warming may not be unwarranted, but we also 
need to understand that environmental problems are not discrete “technical” problems 
awaiting readily available solutions. “The so-called environmental crisis,” notes one 
environmental scholar, is “a visible manifestation of a much deeper and broader problem 
involving nearly every facet of modern life.”9 If this is true, environmental problems or the 
“so-called environmental crisis” cannot be resolved simply by a combination of 
administrative rationality and technological innovation. Worse, no one can know or 
guarantee whether it can be resolved at all. Simply focusing on practical solutions would hide 
the “much deeper and broader problem involving nearly every facet of modern life.” 
The larger normative dimension is beginning to be understood in environmental 
theory literature. In a recent collection of essays on environmentalism, for instance, it is 
recognized that environmentalism is not purely concerned with solving environmental 
problems, but is also “concerned with an analysis of the nature of such problems.”10 Some 
even go further and suggest that “the ecologist patterns of thought (diagnoses, values, 
                                                 
     8 Max Oelschlaeger, an environmental scholar, explicitly invokes Marx while questioning the usefulness of 
Habermas’s theoretical bent toward the environment: “Does Habermas’s political theory make a practical 
difference . . . . Does it help citizens engage the consequential environmental issues that threaten sustainable 
living in particular places? . . . [or] does Habermas’s theorizing succumb to the criticism of philosophy . . . that 
Marx made, namely, being little more than speculation that changes nothing in the world? . . . . Pragmatism 
makes me impatient with theory that does not have (perhaps too obvious) potential for transforming the 
problematized contexts in which human beings live and move and have their being.” See Max Oelschlaeger, 
“Habermas in the ‘Wild, Wild West,’ ” in Perspectives on Habermas, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 
2000), 388-89. 
 
     9 Lynton K. Caldwell, “Is Humanity Destined to Self-Destruct?” Perspectives, September 4, 1998, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~speaweb/perspectives/humanity.pdf, 3.  
 
     10 Marcel Wissenburg and Yoram Levy, eds., Liberal Democracy and Environmentalism: The End of 




strategies) have become outdated and have been abandoned” as “late modern societies 
neither can, nor really want to, remove” their unsustainable mode of life.11 Environmental 
indicators of many industrialized countries have shown considerable improvement, possibly 
as a result of a combination of public awareness, political action, legislative changes, and 
ecological modernization. This should not blind us, however, to the fact that, in the context 
of a globalizing world, improvement in one locale can be gained at the expense of 
deterioration in other parts of the world. Indeed, despite positive gains recorded in 
industrially advanced countries, the high domestic consumption rates in these countries have 
an increasing impact on less industrialized countries.12 The overall result of the 
environmental efforts of the last few decades can at best be characterized as a mixed bag.13  
Whether environmental problems can be eradicated or merely managed, thinking 
about them still requires a thoughtful framework of analysis, as any in-depth discussion on 
the “environment” soon goes beyond the physical dimension and veers into social, political, 
ethical, and psychological dimensions. Hence, the “normative and moral dimension 
determining the way in which the whole environmental issue makes sense to us” is prior to 
its technical dimension of solving environmental problems.14 If there is any hope for the 
latter, the former holds the key. Environmental problems can perhaps be mitigated and 
                                                 
     11 Ingolfur Blühdorn, “Unsustainability as a Frame of Mind and How We Disguise It,” Trumpeter 18.1 
(2002), http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v18.1/bluhdorn.pdf, 2. See also his Post-Ecologist Politics: Social 
Theory and the Abdication of the Ecologist Paradigm (London: Routledge, 2000); and “Post-ecologism and the Politics 
of Simulation,” in Liberal Democracy and Environmentalism: The End of Environmentalism?, eds., Marcel Wissenburg 
and Yoram Levy (New York: Routledge, 2004), 35-47. Blühdorn’s thesis—unsustainability is a permanent 
feature of modern societies—is the main theme of Environmental Politics 16.2 (2007). 
 
     12 See Mary M. Berlik, David B. Kittredge, and David R. Foster, “The Illusion of Preservation: A Global 
Environmental Argument for the Local Production of Natural Resources,” Journal of Biogeography 29 (2002): 
1557-68. 
 
     13 For these results and predictions of probable shortages in life sustaining elements of water, land, and 
forests in the future, see United Nations Environment Programme, One Planet, Many People: Atlas of Our Changing 
Environment (Nairobi: UNEP, 2005).  
 




managed by sound scientific analysis, technological innovation, and legislative reforms, but 
these can neither show us the best way to deal with them nor help us in making sense of 
what we are doing by fighting environmental crisis or problems. What is needed for this 
purpose is practical understanding traditionally known as “prudence.” Prudence is especially 
needed to communicate environmental ideas effectively to those who need more convincing 
and guide those who are convinced. For, as I shall discuss in Chapter 6, environmentalists 
need to revise their naive view that “the provision of information” alone will “promote 
sensitivity to environmental degradation.”15  
Those who are already persuaded by the mounting evidence of environmental 
degradation are still in need of finding the right language to frame, justify, and defend their 
endeavors to protect the natural environment. Despite years of environmental ethics 
literature, leading environmentalists observe the inadequacy of the moral vision of American 
environmentalism. American environmentalists have been reluctant to incorporate “values” 
into their public discourse because they have associated this discourse with conservatism:  
Environmental groups have spent the last 40 years defining themselves against 
conservative values like cost-benefit accounting, smaller government, fewer 
regulations, and free trade, without ever articulating a coherent morality we can call 
our own. Most of the intellectuals who staff environmental groups are so repelled by 
the right’s values that we have assiduously avoided examining our own in a serious 
way. Environmentalists and other liberals tend to see values as a distraction from 
“the real issues”—environmental problems like global warming.16 (emphasis original) 
 
In addition to developing practical solutions to environmental problems, communicating the 
larger discursive context of the question of the environment in the public sphere is equally 
important. This is especially needed to sustain and nurture the beneficial actions of public in 
                                                 
     15 James G. Cantrill, “Perceiving Environmental Discourse: The Cognitive Playground,” in The Symbolic 
Earth: Discourse and Our Creation of the Environment, eds. James G. Cantrill and Christine L. Oravec (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 79.  
 
     16 Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, “The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in 





general or more committed environmental agents toward the environment. Once we leave 
behind the assurance of natural science and the technocratic view of politics, we begin to 
face the dilemmas of normative thinking. Environmental problems are caused by human 
factors, but which factors are most relevant? We can certainly deal with environmental 
problems in different ways, but which responses are most desirable? Most environmental 
scholars agree that the question of the environment is one with social, political, ethical, and 
psychological implications, but disagree as to the specific nature of these implications and 
what needs to be done about them. Consequently, there have come to be competing ways of 
theorizing the “environment” or “ecology” as a socio-political issue.17 I shall discuss these 
competing approaches in the next section. 
The non-technical dimension of the question concerning the environment is implicit 
in the link between “ecological” issues on the one hand and other social and political issues 
on the other. Murray Bookchin, for instance, is well-known for his view that “our present 
ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems.”18 This viewpoint, shared in 
broad terms by all environmental theorists, suggests that environmental problems are 
fundamentally symptomatic of more general human aspirations and activities. Hence, a deep 
response to ecological problems must deal with those aspirations and activities.  This view is 
intimated in the commonly used phrase “environmental values” and is also presupposed by 
those who urge that we need to change our values to deal adequately with environmental 
problems. Even though this is not the most dominant strain of contemporary 
environmentalism, the values dimension of environmental problems has been emphasized 
                                                 
     17 See, for instance, John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
 
     18 See Murray Bookchin, “What is Social Ecology?” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical 




throughout the history of contemporary environmental movement. Dale Jamieson observes 
that a persistent minority position in the contemporary environmental movement has 
interpreted the environmental problems as “fundamental problems of the human heart and 
spirit.” They “pivot not on new technologies or the reform of economic or legal systems, 
but rather on fundamental human values.”  To fully understand “the behavior that produces 
these problems,” notes Jamieson, we need to appreciate “the value systems that generated 
them.”19  
Two former Greenpeace activists similarly emphasize the priority of “values 
change,” which they call a “shift of consciousness,” about “the way that our species relates 
to the Earth and all her creatures (including ourselves).”20 They further add that “this shift 
will never be accomplished through legislative, policy or regulatory victories—rather it is this 
shift that will enable those tangible, political gains.”21 The present inquiry shares this 
normative orientation in contrast to the technical approach and claims that the question 
concerning the environment cannot be understood apart from the perennial question of 
political philosophy—the “good life” and the “good regime.” The philosophical 
investigation of the question of the environment in relation to the theme of the good life is 
opposed to two inter-related ways of thinking about the environment. One is historicist 
which I shall consider at length in Chapter 2, and the other is sociological or structural which 
I shall discuss here briefly.  
                                                 
     19 Jamieson goes on to give Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, E. F. Schumacher, and Vaclav Hável as examples 
to these “small voices” championing values. See Carnegie Council, “Can Cultural Values Save the 
Environment?,” September  13, 2006, http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5393.html.  
 
     20 Steve Kretzmann and John Sellers, “Environmentalism’s Winter of Discontent,” Social Policy 35 (Spring 
2005): 38.  
 




The proposition that environmental problems and sensibilities must be viewed 
normatively as matters of human agency is denied by the strain of environmental theory 
employing sociological or structural analysis. This type of analysis overemphasizes the 
structural dimension of human action prior to individual human choice and human nature.22 
When this analysis is used to study environmentalism, the objective element, environmental 
problems, can be simply represented as an unintentional by-product of a flawed mega-
structure or framework—be it industrialism, capitalism, over-population, or technology. The 
subjective element of agency, environmentalism or environmentalists, in turn may be 
interpreted sociologically as a frivolous middle-class preoccupation. This view looks 
plausible especially considering that there are many more serious problems in the world 
today, such as hunger, poverty, oppression, discrimination, and ethno-religious conflict.23 In 
this macro-level analysis, environmental damage would appear to be stemming from the way 
economic and political institutions are designed. The solution would then point toward a 
combination of technological innovation, institutional reforms, and social 
change/transformation. A corollary of this view is the belief that it is futile, or at best 
inadequate, to invoke personal virtue in the public sphere since what is first and foremost 
needed is structural social change. Jamieson takes note of this dilemma in relation to 
contemporary environmental politics: 
                                                 
     22 This is a form of the classic agent/structure problem debated in the social sciences. The Marxist 
infrastructure/super-structure problem which downplays the role of human agency is one variant. See Dennis 
H. Wrong, “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology,” American Sociological Review 26.2 
(1961): 183-93.  
 
     23 See, for instance, the left critique of the early ecology movement by Richard Neuhaus, In Defense of People: 
Ecology and the Seduction of Radicalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971); and Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger, “A Critique of Political Ecology,” in Critical Essays, ed. Reinhold Grimm and Bruce Armstrong 
(New York: Continuum, 1982), 186-223. A similar view is presented affirmatively and/or neutrally in the “new 
social movements” literature and the affiliated post-materialist values thesis of Ronald Inglehart; see Luke 




One consequence of framing the problems in this way [as technical problems] is that 
ordinary citizens are excluded as responsible agents from this discourse. If the problem 
is seen as the tragedy of the commons, for example, then there is no question of individual 
responsibility in producing the problem, because, after all, people are simply behaving as people do; 
it’s a structural problem. Similarly, when problems are framed in this way, the idea that 
human agency may be involved in finding solutions to these problems also tends to 
drop out. When we talk about the possibilities of hydrogen cars or of sequestering 
carbon, where are people in this story?24 (emphasis added) 
 
The major problem with the macro-level analysis of environmental problems and 
environmentalism is its neglect of the subtle interplay between ethics and politics. Yes, 
structural factors, situations, and collective action problems such as the “tragedy of 
commons” or the structural conditions underlying population increase play a role in the 
creation of environmental problems, but human beings continually make decisions, which 
are partially voluntary, that lead to, support, and reproduce these structures and situations. In 
a city which is not designed to promote biking, walking, or reliable public transportation, one 
would be forced to own a private car regardless of one’s environmental sensibilities. Still, 
those living conditions are created and sustained by human decisions and can in turn be 
modified through individual agency. The extent to which this individual agency can be 
effective will still depend on external factors but the relevant structural factors should not 
distract our attention away from motives or ends inspiring action.  
Another insight we can gain from viewing the question of the environment 
philosophically and normatively is showing healthy skepticism toward technical solutions. 
Being an environmental technophile would perpetuate the mistaken belief that all we need is 
a keen eye for the right technical “solution” in tackling environmental problems. A research 
program in environmental sociology called “ecological modernization” argues, for instance, 
that “environmental problems can best be solved through further advancement of technology 
                                                 




and industrialization.”25 Technological innovation can certainly be helpful to an extent, but 
promoting it as the solution obviates even raising the question of the “environment.” For the 
technological way of thinking does not tell us what course of action needs to be taken. 
Neither does it satisfy the longing for understanding the question of the environment. 
The usefulness of the technological option for environmental problems has been 
questioned by various environmental scholars. William Ophuls, for instance, openly 
positions himself against technological optimists when he bluntly remarks that “those 
seeking merely practical cures to our collective ills are doomed to frustration, because the 
real remedy is political, not technological.”26 Another environmental scholar, David Orr, 
similarly questions the viability of “technology” as a long-term solution. Orr observes that 
the physical disorder which has been called “environmental problems” or more gravely as 
“ecological crisis” is actually indicative of a more subtle disorder in the intellectual priorities 
and commitments of the present age, and he questions the widespread hope that 
“environmental problems” can be coped with through further technological innovation:  
It is widely assumed that environmental problems will be solved by technology of 
one sort or another. Better technology can certainly help, but the crisis is not first 
and foremost one of technology. Rather, it is a crisis within the minds that develop 
and use technology. The disordering of ecological systems and of the great bio-
geochemical cycles of the earth reflects a prior disorder in the thought, perception, 
imagination, intellectual priorities, and loyalties inherent in the industrial mind. 
Ultimately, then, the ecological crisis concerns how we think and the institutions that 
purport to shape and refine the capacity to think.27 
 
                                                 
     25 Dana R. Fisher and William R. Freudenburg, “Ecological Modernization and its Critics: Assessing the 
Past and Looking Toward the Future,” Society and Natural Resources 14.8 (2001): 701-09.  
 
     26 William Ophuls, “The Rousseauean Moment,” The Good Society 11.3 (2002): 91. 
 
     27 David W. Orr, Earth in Mind: On Education, Environment and the Human Prospect (Washington, DC: Island 




Orr’s emphasis on thought rather than technology is “motivated by an ethical view 
of the world and our obligations to it.”28 This view requires “to recognize limits.” The next 
section outlines the contours of contemporary environmentalism and the specific cross 
section of environmental issues that the present inquiry takes as a reference point. In the 
third section I examine the views that are either dismissive toward Aristotle or argue for his 
incompatibility with contemporary environmental sensibilities. I develop my response to this 
critique in the forth section arguing that the theme of the good life is the best way to 
conceptualize Aristotle’s relevance to the question of the environment. The fifth and the last 
section is a review of the existing literature on the Aristotle-environment connection.  
1.2 Contemporary Environmentalism  
 
The term “environmentalism” and its cognates in this dissertation denote “the ideas 
and activities of those concerned with the protection or proper use of the natural 
environment or natural resources.”29 This is a broad enough definition to cover a whole 
range of positions from environmental scholarship to environmental advocacy and from 
“radical environmentalism” to its mainstream cousin “reform environmentalism.” We must 
also note that the term environmentalism “has referred in the past to the many varieties of 
geographical determinism” but it has now “firmly established itself . . . as referring 
principally to questions concerning the physical environment.”30 Even though the term 
environmentalism in this latter sense is relatively new as it dates back to the 1950s, 
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     29 For this definition, see Joseph M. Petulla, American Environmentalism: Values, Tactics, Priorities (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), x.  
 




environmental historians have suggested that the roots of environmental sensibilities go back 
to the nineteenth century and even earlier.31  
To be sure, environmental ideas and activities vary so much that a single catchall 
term such as “environmentalism” and the “environment” is insufficient to capture a wide 
range of different ideas, intentions, and activities. Both “environmentalism” and “the 
environment” can at best serve as shorthand for a number of (and often competing) 
narratives which have a family resemblance to one another. To make the diversity of 
environmental terrain somewhat manageable for the purposes of my inquiry, I will primarily 
be engaging with environmental theory literature that has grown out of the overlapping sub-
fields of environmental studies: “environmental ethics,” “environmental philosophy,” and 
“environmental political theory.”32 None of these disciplines subscribe to a definite position. 
What is common to much of the work in these fields is their non-technical approach the 
question concerning the environment which emphasizes the important role of ideas in 
bringing about both negative and positive environmental change. 
An important distinction that needs to be mentioned at the outset is the relationship 
between the cognates of the term “environment” and those of the term “ecology.” There is 
no convention in environmental theory literature on this issue as some scholars emphatically 
distinguish the two terms while others use them interchangeably. I will be consistently using 
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the term “environment” throughout the dissertation without necessarily implying that they 
are identical or different. For I believe that behind the terminological disagreement lies a 
more substantive issue. Those who prefer to see a distinction between “environment” and 
“ecology” use the term “ecology” and its cognates “ecological” and “ecologism” for 
“radical” or “revolutionary” stance on the question concerning the environment. It is the 
nature of this stance that we must focus on. We should ask what makes a stance “radical” or 
“revolutionary” rather than how “ecology” is “radical.” For what makes “ecology” radical is 
not anything inherent to the scientific discipline known as “ecology.” It is rather the ideas of 
those who seize on the term “ecology” to communicate their radicalism to public. 
The term “ecology” appears in the schools of thought “deep ecology”—associated 
with the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess and adopted by his followers in the US—and 
“social ecology”—associated with the left-wing activist and author Murray Bookchin—in 
this radical sense.33 Although these two approaches disagree about many things, they are at 
one in their opposition to and critique of managerial and technical approach to 
environmental problems which are common in mainstream environmentalism. These two 
competing approaches similarly believe that environmental problems are not merely 
technical matters that can be resolved with the tools of science, conventional politics, policy-
making, and legislation, let alone mere technological ingenuity. What is important to them is 
effecting a fundamental change in values, attitudes, and institutions.34  
Like other modern social movements and ideologies, environmentalism comes in 
various shades. There are numerous forms of environmental, ecological, or green politics in 
                                                 
     33 See, for instance, Murray Bookchin, “Ecology and Revolutionary Thought,” in Post-Scarcity Anarchism 
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both theory and praxis. To illustrate the diversity in contemporary environmental theory 
literature, let me enumerate a dizzying number of approaches which are at times competing 
and at times overlapping: deep ecology, social ecology, political ecology, ecofeminism, 
ecosocialism, ecoliberalism, ecoanarchism, ecocentrism, ecohumanism, eco-authoritarianism, 
ecofascism, animal liberation, conservationism, preservationism, bioregionalism, survivalism, 
free market environmentalism, civic environmentalism, environmental justice, ecological 
democracy, sustainable development, and ecological modernization.35  
A number of spectrums, taxonomies, and typologies have been constructed by 
environmental scholars to make intelligible the diversity of environmental theory and praxis. 
Among them are several variations of the aforementioned contrast between radical and 
reformist stances on the question of the environment: dark-green versus light-green; Green 
versus green (with lower case “g”); ecologism versus environmentalism; and radical 
environmentalism versus reform/mainstream environmentalism.36 The following figure37 
neatly captures these variations on a spectrum ranging from denying the salience of 
environmental problems on the one end (left) to judicious use and management of 
environmental values at the center to their interpretation as a civilizational challenge on the 
other end (right): 
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The Spectrum of Environmentalism  
Those who use these distinctions often value the opinions and actions that gravitate to the 
right end of the spectrum. The common dichotomy between the “reform” and “radical,” 
which rests on a normative presupposition (i.e., the latter is better than the former), has led 
to the criticism that these abstract ideal types distort the more nuanced reality on the ground. 
The critique is warranted as it is too often forgotten that the map is not the territory. For 
single-spectrum binary theoretical constructs such as these cannot truly account for the 
geographical differences, temporal changes, and rhetorical nuances of real people and groups 
which all together make up the “environmental movement” or its different streams.  
What we find in the real world are often hybrid cases of these ideal type constructs. 
Some of these hybrids may combine features of the very same dichotomous pair and others 
may require a second or even a third point of comparison such as “spiritual” versus 
“materialist” and “localist” versus “globalist” to be truly distinguished from one another.38 
For instance, both “deep ecology” and “social ecology” are considered schools of radical 
ecology or environmentalism but the former is non-materialist whereas the latter is 
materialist.39 If one goes further and examines the views of “deep ecologists” and “social 
                                                 
     38 For a critique of this spectrum, see Nadasdy, 295-301. 
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ecologists,” one can even find many differences among those who are lumped together 
under the same category.40  
As “environmentalism” is constituted by diverse strands of thought and praxis, so 
are environmental problems and issues. There is a large variety of them: land, air, water 
pollution, deforestation, erosion, desertification, deforestation, species extinction, global 
warming, depletion of natural resources, epidemics, urban sprawl, mistreatment of animals, 
genetically modified crops and so on and so forth. Grouping all these socio-ecological 
phenomena wholesale under a single category of “environmental problems” or 
“environmental issues” is admittedly a gallant oversimplification. Theoretical categorizations 
naturally compromise the vividness and distinctiveness of empirical conditions on the 
ground. Despite this great variety of environmental issues, it is desirable to discern common 
features that apply to at least some of them. For the present inquiry, environmental issues 
and problems will be limited to those that I believe to emerge from the interface of conflicts 
between the exigencies of “progress” and “conservation,” that is, between social interests 
advancing “progress” or “development” on the basis of growth in material production and 
consumption per capita (either nationally or globally) and those defending the conservation 
of cultural and ecological heritage (either nationally or globally). I will hereafter refer to this 
subset of environmental issues as “developmental,” which will serve as the backdrop of my 
argument for the environmental relevance and significance of Aristotle.  
A few words on what is meant by “environmental problems.” As John Passmore 
notes, environmental or ecological problems are not like scientific or mathematical 
problems. An environmental problem is rather similar to a social problem such as 
                                                 
     40 See, for instance, Andrew Light, ed., Social Ecology After Bookchin (New York: Guilford Press, 1998); and 
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alcoholism, crime, and traffic accidents which “we believe that our society would be better 
off without it.” 41 Hence, there is an immediate normative implication in identifying certain 
things in the world as “problems.” There is an assumption that societies can be arranged in 
such a way that we can live without them, that they are not our fate. Passmore is certainly 
right about the normative implication of framing “features of our society, arising out of our 
dealings with nature, from which we do not regard as inevitable consequences of what is 
good in that society” as “ecological problems.”42 But there is always an inherent danger in 
using an inherently mathematical idiom for matters of praxis. One critic of 
environmentalism notes that framing these features as “problems” can mislead us into 
technocratic or social engineering view of environmental politics: 
speaking of “solutions” to environmental problems is a kind of category mistake. It 
treats environmental problems as if they were problems in mathematics or 
engineering: if we know the right technique, or if we have the proper information, 
we can find a finite and definitive solution. Of course, environmental policies do 
have large scientific and technical components, and it is absolutely necessary to 
develop policies with the best such information available—including knowledge of 
the disagreements on the science. But at root, environmental problems are political 
problems, involving divergent priorities and diverse or competing visions of the kind of world we want 
to live in.43 (emphasis original) 
 
We cannot possibly know at present (and it is doubtful whether we can ever know) if 
it will ever be possible to actualize the open-ended promise of modernity—freedom and 
equality for all—without causing serious environmental problems. As I have mentioned 
earlier, the research project of ecological modernization is an attempt to prove that this is 
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possible based on the evidence gathered from some advanced industrialized societies.44 
Modern societies can perhaps retain and even keep increasing their material wealth via 
technological innovation without forsaking their material comforts and amenities along the 
way. This has been the classic Enlightenment proposition as well. Today this position is 
known as “technological optimisim” and is premised on the thesis that a win-win situation is 
conceivable. According to this position, progress does not have to involve a trade-off. We 
can have our cake and eat it. The critic of technology, Ivan Illich, observed this trend in 
1973: “It has become fashionable to say that where science and technology have created 
problems, it is only more scientific understanding and better technology that can carry us 
past them. The cure for bad management is more management. The cure for specialized 
research is more costly interdisciplinary research, just as the cure for polluted rivers is more 
costly nonpolluting detergents.”45 A proponent of this view affirms that “scientific or 
technological remedies can be found for most of the hateful and unintended misadventures 
or miscarriages associated with the advance of technology.”46 
The California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has recently committed himself to 
demonstrate the truth of this view. He aims to show that environmentalism and hedonism 
can coexist, that environmentalism can attain its ends without marketing “guilt and limits,” 
that environmentalism can rather be “muscular” and “sexy.” Having converted one of his 
two hummers to biofuel and the other to hydrogen, Schwarzenegger embraces the 
technology option enthusiastically: 
                                                 
     44 For a sympathetic discussion of ecological modernization by its foremost proponents, see Arthur P. J. 
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Protecting the environment does not require us to be against large SUVs or trucks. 
Instead we should develop technology to cut down greenhouse gas emissions 
because that is where the action is—it’s not about what the size of the car is. We just 
have to redo the vehicles.47  
 
This sort of technological optimism, as I have alluded to above, is recently called into 
question.48 Technological tools can certainly solve some of our problems. There is no doubt 
about that. The question is “is this what we all need?” There is also an ignored aspect of the 
increasing use of science and technology to fight off environmental and other kinds of 
problems. The definitive solution of environmental problems necessitates the increase of 
scientists’ and technical experts’ political influence as the aforementioned scientist implies: “I 
have more faith in scientific than in political man if only because the solution of the 
scientific element of the problem is much easier, being so much less handicapped by the 
inertia of bigotry and self-interest.”49 This is a sentiment many environmental scientists 
would share today. However, the increasing dependence on expert knowledge contradicts 
other cherished ideals of modernity: democratization and individual autonomy.50 This very 
dilemma is a good reason to turn to Aristotle for insight. 
1.3 Skeptics on Aristotle’s Relevance to the Environment 
 
Yet, there are certain obstacles to seeking insight into a subject that was almost a 
non-issue to the ancients. Although Aristotle has been recognized through the ages as a great 
philosopher, what can he possibly have to say on the contemporary issue of the 
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“environment”? Although environmental problems surely had existed then and even much 
earlier, they were nowhere near as serious and complex as those we experience today. 
Furthermore, Aristotle never wrote on the issue of the “environment” or “ecology,” worse, 
he held that the word and species were eternal. We now know that both Earth and species 
were non-existent about five billion years ago. A skeptic would be naturally inclined to think 
that with their meager knowledge of ecology and geology and little experience of 
environmental problems the ancients cannot reasonably be expected to be of much help to 
us today with respect to our environmental predicaments.  
Richard E. Hart, for instance, dismisses the relevance of classical ethics and Aristotle 
to the question of the environment because the ancients do not even possess the right 
vocabulary and orientation to deal with them. Theirs was oriented to the individual:  
The thrust of classical ethics was on the self, on its personal excellence and on its 
happiness and fulfillment. And even though, for Aristotle, ethics was a branch of 
politics, his ethics centered on ways for the individual to achieve “eudaimonia” or 
specifically human excellence. 51  
 
“In sharp contrast,” Hart goes on to argue, “Environmental Ethics is a group ethics, 
centered not on the self but on the human community as it interacts with a shared physical 
world. Its central concern is with the results of group choices which fall on all collectively.” 
52 By “group choices,” Hart probably means “policies” and uses “choice” in a metaphorical 
sense otherwise societies hardly make consensual choices as a single entity. Seen this way, it 
is clear that Hart means “laws” by “group ethics.” To continue, Hart further claims that 
environmental ethics differs from ancient ethics in that the former “forgoes the luxury of 
pursuing happiness, recognizing the stark fact that physical survival takes precedence over all 
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else in the order of ethical concerns.”53 Hart encapsulates the fatal flaw of environmentalists 
looking up to the motivation of fear, after Hobbes, to control or guide praxis. Hart’s 
objection, which I shall address more extensively in Chapter 5, is flawed for assuming that 
we can speak of “ethics” without touching on the question of human excellence and 
perfection—a common problem with all environmental ethicists who single out 
anthropocentrism as a moral vice and insist on creating a new environmental ethics or ethic.  
Another scholar, John Poulakos, on the other hand, notes that “the Greek thinkers” 
did not address the issue of physis in the modern sense possibly because they did not 
experience environmental degradation.54 Hence, “the notion of responsibility” stemming 
from environmental problems cannot be expected to be found in their philosophy. Primarily 
for this reason, “the Greeks cannot be said to have developed a philosophy of ecology or an 
environmental ethics in the contemporary sense.” Although Poulakos is far from claiming 
the total irrelevance of the ancients—as he finds an alternative “point of entry into the 
Greek understanding of the natural environment” and “clues that can lead us to a sound 
environmental awareness” in the physis/nomos debate—his remark that the ancients lacked  
“the notion of responsibility” nonetheless casts doubts on the relevance of Aristotle. True, 
environmental degradation was less of a nuisance for the ancients.55 But what is 
“responsibility” if not a new substitute term for the traditional notions of “duty” and 
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“virtue”? It is well-known that the lack of a specific term in another culture is not 
tantamount to the absence of the concept itself. Responsibility is merely the precondition of 
virtue and vice. Furthermore, Poulakos treats the “philosophy of ecology or an 
environmental ethics in the contemporary sense” as monolithic and uncontested, ignoring 
the frequent disagreements among environmental philosophers and scientists on several 
points, and the further possibility that the notion of responsibility may be the wrong concept 
in conceptualizing the question of the environment.56 The present inquiry differs from that 
of Poulakos less in offering an alternative point of entry—mine is Aristotle’s reflections on 
the triad of praxis, phusis, and techne—than in claiming that the contemporary environmental 
theorists too are in need of correction in certain ways. 
In a similar vein, Daryl M. Tress vitiates her otherwise insightful comparison of the 
classical view of nature with contemporary ecology.57 She notes certain points of contact 
between ancients and contemporary ecology/environmentalism but then concludes that “the 
classical views of Plato and Aristotle differ markedly from contemporary ecology in several 
important respects.” Despite the shared elements, Tress enumerates three major differences:   
[1] From the classical point of view, nature’s unity is the result of psyche and formal 
and final causes. Ecology, on the other hand, explains nature’s interconnection by 
way of an evolutionary framework and modern material causality. [2] Furthermore, 
their characterizations of holism differ: From the classical perspective, nature is a 
stable, everlasting whole of (more or less) stable kinds arranged hierarchically. 
Ecology views nature and natural entities as shifting populations in a benign, non-
hierarchical “network” of relations, forced into a constant process of struggle for 
survival—a struggle that now is primarily against the damage inflicted by human 
beings. [3] And while ecology and environmentalism share with classical philosophy 
a deep respect for the intrinsic value of nature, their views diverge about the 
responsibility for the maintenance of nature’s integrity.58 (emphasis original) 
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All three points—nature’s unity, holism, and responsibility—may well be true. But both 
Poulakos and Tress commit a historicist-positivistic error by failing to raise questions over 
the validity of ecology and the popular discourse on the environment. Why do we need to 
understand the question of the environment according to the most recent opinions of 
ecologists? What if they are wrong? Tress exemplifies the error of assuming unity among 
contemporary environmentalists and ecologists as if there is a mutually agreed set of 
scientific principles guiding human relationship with nature. If this were true, there would be 
no need for calls for a new environmental ethic. 
The preceding objections to Aristotle’s or ancient Greeks’ relevance on the basis of 
the cultural and historical specificity of environmental issues miss the point that 
environmental issues are not merely “technical” problems awaiting scientific solutions. 
Things that we identify as “environmental” issues or problems actually possess a non-
technical aspect of human experience transcending the particularity of disparate cultures and 
historical periods. The question of the “environment” invites us to reflect not only on how 
to tackle it but more importantly on why environmental degradation occurs in the first place 
and why we should care. Human beings do not destroy their environments for pleasure. 
They do it indirectly when they engage in productive and consumptive activities, leisure, or 
wars. Without considering these everyday activities, technical solutions will remain 
ineffective in the long term. Hence, the question of “how” is secondary to and dependent on 
the questions of “why.” The “why” question on the other hand is not simply specific to the 
present time or modern culture.  
True, we should not underestimate the difficulties attending the introduction of ideas 
from one historical period, culture, or language into another. I will discuss in Chapters 2 




gained ground in the modern era. The ancient and modern conceptions of nature are indeed 
different:  
The nature to be mastered [in the modern era] was no longer the Greek physis, or the 
living and even reasonable center of order in man and the world, but a lifeless and so 
unreasonable extension in the void, moving in accordance with the laws of 
mechanics but blind to the rational purpose of the human soul. Nature in the sense 
of matter was thus sundered from soul or mind in God and man.59 (emphasis 
original) 
 
Yet, we cannot affirm the truth of the modern conception of “nature” without considering 
its ancient alternative. Aristotle, unlike the modern discourse on nature, does not reify nature 
as matter. All natural beings for Aristotle are ensouled. The Greek physis is not an extended 
realm of objects to be conquered or dominated. “Physis is never that ‘nature’ out there where 
people make Sunday excursions, ‘in’ which this and that occurs or this and that is such and 
such.”60 Aristotle treats nature rather as an indestructible source of motion and speaks of 
entities which move on their own as natural. In this regard, nature is an agent and different 
from the modern scientific interpretation of nature as the totality of everything material or as 
an extended realm of landscape. As I discuss in Chapter 3, Aristotle’s account of “natural 
beings” allows agency or subjectivity to non-human beings and can be at an advantage to 
deal with environmental issues for this reason. 
A premise of this dissertation is that there is today need for deep thinking on the 
philosophical import of environmental matters which will pay heed to the psychological and 
the socio-political response to the empirical dimension of the environment. It is this need 
for reflection that justifies re-visiting Aristotle in search of practical wisdom in our dealings 
with the rest of nature. It is a persisting dimension of human experience that elicits our 
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thinking beyond the day-to-day environmental problems and solutions, and raises the meta-
physical questions with respect to ethics and politics. Hence, the way forward in recovering 
Aristotle for environmental purposes does not lie in tracing the anachronistic traces of 
environmental concern or sensibilities in his writings but in his philosophy of praxis as it 
speaks to the contemporary problematic relationship of technology with nature.  
If read from this angle, Aristotle’s philosophy has the capacity to illuminate the 
normative and ideological bases of contemporary environmentalism. Considering the recent 
debates among American and European environmentalists as to what the goals and methods 
of environmentalism should be, bringing in Aristotle might be timely. There is a growing 
feeling and recognition among environmentalists that environmentalism is losing ground 
despite sporadic victories registered in courthouses and legislatures. In the US, this condition 
is a consequence of a broader problem, namely, the loss of political vision and direction of 
environmentalism. In Europe, the situation is slightly different. There, the partial success of 
environmental reforms has led to the gradual dilution of greens’ core commitments.61 I shall 
discuss this issue in Chapter 6. 
1.4 Aristotle’s Contemporary Relevance 
 
Only a rash man would say that Aristotle’s view . . . has been refuted. But 
whatever one might think of his answers, certainly the fundamental questions 
to which they are the answers are identical with the fundamental questions 
that are of immediate concern to us today. Realizing this, we realize at the 
same time that the epoch which regarded Aristotle’s fundamental questions 
as obsolete completely lacked clarity about what the fundamental issues are.62  
 
Leo Strauss is here referring to the offhanded dismissal of Aristotle in the modern 
era by the likes of Hobbes who boldly attempted to dethrone Aristotle from his position in 
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the universities as the flaws in his natural philosophy was revealed by modern scientists. 
Hobbes claimed that we could have no benefit from following Aristotle any more as his 
works are used by the Scholastics to spread fallacies and ignorance: “I believe that scarce 
anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in 
his Politics; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics.”63 Yet, I shall argue that no 
figure in the history of political philosophy is more qualified than Aristotle to speak to the 
socio-political and normative dimension of the environment.  
Aristotle’s contemporary relevance comes out especially with respect to the 
disappearance of “quality” as an ontological category from modern scientific discourse and 
its resultant effect on social sciences. This may sound too abstruse but the everyday 
implications of this transformation can be observed in the invasion of the lifeworld by 
monetary calculations.64 We should also note that things termed as moral, aesthetic, or 
cultural “values” which are not measurable by monetary means are ultimately based on 
“quality.” Today, we are grappling with the difficulty of assigning non-monetary value (such 
as aesthetic beauty or intrinsic value) to nature because modern science tells us that the realm 
of “is” (nature) or the objective reality has nothing to do with “value” which corresponds to 
the subjective or inter-subjective realm of humanity.  
This is a major conundrum and we witness its practical implications every day 
especially in the conflict between “economics” and “ecology.” Modern discourse of progress 
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or development rests on the discipline of economics which mimics the mathematically 
oriented natural science. This view of science has become conceivable only after the 
rejection of Aristotelian teleology in the early modern era. Aristotle’s teleology primarily 
applies to the organic processes of coming-to-be or becoming. Natural beings move toward 
an “end” (telos) to come to completion (Meta. 999b9-12). For beings or processes that 
change, the end operates as a limit on them and define them (Meta. 994b8-16). For Aristotle, 
“everything that in itself and by its own nature is good is an end, and a cause in the sense 
that for its sake the other things both come to be and are.” But “in the case of unchangeable 
things this principle [of change] could not exist, nor could there be a good-itself.” For this 
reason, the mathematical sciences which pertain to unchangeable things “take no account of 
goods [agathōn] and evils [kakōn]” (Meta. 996a21-36).  
As Koyré notes, Aristotle’s account of nature is non-mathematical because 
mathematical physics abstracts from “secondary qualities” such as color and Aristotle’s 
physics is qualitative:  
Aristotelian physics is based on sense-perception, and is therefore decidedly non-
mathematical. It refuses to substitute mathematical abstractions for the colorful, 
qualitatively determined facts of common experience, and it denies the very 
possibility of a mathematical physics on the ground (a) of the nonconformity of 
mathematical concepts to the data of sense-experience, (b) of the inability of 
mathematics to explain quality and to deduce movement. There is no quality, and no 
motion, in the timeless realm of figure and number.65 
 
The mathematization of nature wrought by modern physicists has since then given rise to 
the quantitative study of human behavior as methodological debates over positivism, 
behavioralism, and rational choice in social sciences throughout the twentieth century bear 
witness to. Aristotle gives primacy to qualitative changes in explaining human behavior. 
                                                 
     65 Alexandre Koyré, “Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century,” The Philosophical 
Review 52.4 (1943): 338. See also Richard Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, from Nicolas of Cusa to the 




Human beings have ends by virtue of their being naturally generated. Their coming-to-be 
toward their ends involve qualitative modifications. Some of these are moral qualities (hexeis) 
and are more specifically called virtues (aretē) and vices (kakia): 
Virtue and vice fall among these modifications [pathēmatōn]; for they indicate 
differentiae of the movement or activity, according to which the things in motion act 
or are acted on well or badly; for that which can be moved or act in one way is good, 
and that which can do so in another—the contrary—way is vicious. Good and evil 
indicate quality [to poion] especially in living things [epi tōn empsuchōn], and among these 
especially in those which have purpose [epi tois echousi proairesin]. (Meta. 1020b18-25) 
 
Aristotle’s position here contrasts with the subjectivism of modern philosophy. Thus, Hume 
compares moral qualities to secondary qualities which are not to be found in the objective 
realm of nature: 
[W]hen you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but 
that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame 
from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to 
sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not 
qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.66 
 
It is critical to note that this passage appears right before where Hume makes his famous 
“is/ought” distinction, which is the successor to the modern “objective/subjective” as well 
as the antecedent of Max Weber’s “facts/values” distinction.  
Quantitative relationships, on the other hand, cannot institute or support immanent 
normative constraints. This is especially true for the pursuit of wealth:  
just as expertise in medicine has no limit with respect to being healthy, or any of the 
other arts with respect to its end (for this is what they particularly wish to 
accomplish), while there is a limit with respect to what exists for the sake of the end 
(since the end is a limit in the case of all of them), so with this sort of expertise in 
business [chrēmatistikēs] there is no limit with respect to the end, and the end is wealth 
of this sort and possession of goods. (Pol. 1257b25-30) 
 
The question of the environment today is ultimately an upshot of the epistemological and 
political changes which resulted in the prevalence of quantity over quality in both natural 
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sciences and economics. The convergence of physics and mathematics in the modern era has 
led to the de-emphasis of qualitative processes in natural beings.67 As Guénon points out, 
“the claim to reduce quality to quantity is most characteristic of modern science.”68 And as a 
contemporary sociologist points out, wealth is seen today as “a superior and adequate 
substitute for symbolic impoverishment” of cultural milieu. Quantity has replaced quality 
and “the answer to all questions of ‘what for?’ is ‘more.’ ”69  
This difference has become particularly salient in our era due to the increasing role 
of the modern discipline of economics. Contemporary environmentalism can be roughly 
characterized as a reaction to this distortion of perspective by quantitative economists. 
Economics since its inception in the eighteenth century has attempted to mimic the success 
of physics in discovering and prescribing the immutable laws of nature.70 In doing so, it has 
basically excluded the social relationships of quality from its scope. The view of economics 
as an exact science still prevails today as economics enjoys a privileged status as the only 
social science deemed worthy of a Nobel Prize. Since the early nineteenth century, a number 
of economy theorists such as Simonde de Sismondi have raised objections to this view.71 
Among twentieth century critics, we can count Ralph Borsodi, Karl Polanyi, E. F. 
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Schumacher, and Herman Daly. All of these figures are heavily influenced by the Aristotelian 
distinction between chrēmatistikē (business expertise) and oikonomia (household management) 
which is alluded to in the above quote by Aristotle and which I shall discuss further below.72 
Karl Marx similarly thought it to be misguided and deceptive to speak of economics 
in terms of the immutable laws of nature. He knew that human reality was changeable but 
looked for the origin of change in another abstraction which he borrowed from Hegel—
“history.” And he tried to explain this change through necessary laws of history. Both were 
major errors but his methodological critique of abstractionism in classical political economy 
was otherwise sound. At the base of this critique, which is Aristotelian to a degree, is the 
reduction of use-value to exchange-value. The Aristotelian influence on Marx is not 
incidental. It stems from the fact that Marx, like Aristotle, views human beings communally 
rather than atomistically. Marx also adds a historical dimension to human communities 
which is not found in Aristotle. Still, it is difficult to understand Marx’s critique of modern 
society without understanding the Aristotelian element in his thought.73 Marx’s critique of 
capitalism is directed at the fact that under capitalism what matters utmost is the quantitative 
measurement of exchange-values. This fixation obliterates the distinction between use-value, 
which allows for qualitative differences, and exchange-value, which does not. The result of 
living under the rule of exchange-value, according to Marx, is fetishism, commodification, 
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and alienation of life. In the end, Marx’s critique targets the modern subordination of quality 
to quantity, or more accurately, the neglect of quality in social relationships of production. 
The reign of quantity is implicated with the Baconian “great undertaking” of 
progress in the modern era “to extend more widely the limits of power and greatness of 
man” and “the effecting of all things possible.”74 The role of the Baconian creed in 
contemporary environmental problems has already been extensively discussed in the 
scholarly literature.75 What is less explored is that this technological imperative has 
accompanied the rejection and/or dilution of Aristotelian philosophy of praxis—a theme 
discussed by many German scholars such as Leo Strauss and Hannah Arendt.76 
Environmental scholars have barely explored the modern break with the ancients on the 
conceptualization of the nexus of techne, phusis, and praxis. The prevailing or invasive role of 
techne has been noticed and discussed by some environmental scholars but the implications 
of the expanding role of techne for praxis has not been adequately discussed.77  
There is an extensive literature on the critique of “progress” but not many 
considered the question of what this notion superseded in pre-modern philosophy. The 
most common line of critique developed against the notion of “progress” has been the 
charge of Eurocentrism or Western, and at times American, neo-colonialism particularly 
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toward the Third World countries and indigenous people.78 This line of argument, which is 
advanced both in and outside environmental literature, is confronted with the counter-
charge of cultural relativism—the idea that diverging prevailing standards of different 
societies are incommensurable with one another. Paul Feyerabend, for instance, deployed his 
critical skills to undermine the claims of modern science to universalism and objectivity in a 
series of writings.79 His attack on modern science led to the charge of relativism. Indeed, he 
was so as he explicitly defended this position in some of his early writings. However, he 
retreated from this position in his later writings.80  
In the midst of all these debates over his relativism, what is forgotten is Feyerabend’s 
assessment of the modern transformation of the aforementioned nexus of techne, phusis, and 
praxis. Feyerabend’s attack on dogmatism of science was motivated by his practical interest 
in undermining the privilege granted to episteme in guiding human praxis. Even though he is 
recognized as a post-modern due to this critique, he is very much different from the type of 
post-modernists who lump together all Western tradition. Indeed, Feyerabend  was very 
much influenced by Aristotle. It was Aristotle’s empiricism and qualitative approach to 
reality that particularly attracted Feyerabend:  
For Aristotle knowledge was qualitative and observational. Today knowledge is 
quantitative and theoretical . . . . Many people, without much thought, prefer 
technology to harmony with Nature; hence, quantitative and theoretical information 
is regarded as ‘real’ and qualities as ‘apparent’ and secondary. But a culture that 
centres on humans, prefers personal acquaintance to abstract relations . . . and a 
naturalists’ approach to that of molecular biologists will say that knowledge is 
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qualitative and will interpret quantitative laws as bookkeeping devices, not as 
elements of reality.81 
 
The influence of Aristotelian empiricism on Feyerabend was mediated by the studies of the 
French philosopher of science Pierre Duhem on pre-modern science: 
An overriding respect for experts tends to blur the distinction between the political . 
. . and the scientific elements of our notions of reality: we are inclined to believe that 
the pronouncements of the experts are knowledge of the purest kind, without any 
admixture. A study of Aristotle, aided perhaps by a study of Duhem’s exposition, 
restores clarity and returns to the citizens a power they relinquished by mistake.82 
 
Feyerabend then goes on to praise “the holistic features of Aristotle’s physics” against the 
“crudely reductionistic attitude” of modern physics. He notes that Aristotle’s physics is “a 
general theory of change” and allows for “qualitative change such as the transfer of 
information from a wise teacher to an ignorant pupil.”83 He then concludes his defense of 
Aristotle on the following note: “we can learn a lot from Aristotle about knowledge, 
research, and the social implications of both.”84 
Given Feyerabend’s later position, it is clear that  his critique of progress or 
development is far from a simple one of bashing the West. Unlike many Western and non-
Western critics of the West, he does not overlook the modern break with the ancients. His 
preference for Aristotle in defense of If studied closely, one can identify much common 
ground between Aristotelian philosophy of praxis and contemporary non-Western cultures 
which are not yet thoroughly modernized. This is true especially with respect to the 
importance of moral qualities for happiness. Virtue—the crux of praxis for Aristotle—has 
been replaced in the modern era by the twin notions of “progress” and “freedom” as a cure 
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for the existential angst. Contemporary understanding of morality relies heavily on the 
presupposition that there is universal progress of humanity indexed to the progress of 
science: “It is probably not too much to say that the hope of progress—moral and 
intellectual as well as material—in the future is bound up with the fortunes of science, and 
that every obstacle placed in the way of scientific discovery is a wrong to humanity.”85  
The sentiment of optimism in this statement was shaken in the first half of the 
twentieth century after the shock of two consecutive major wars. Yet, the technological 
sophistication and prosperity of the industrialized countries in the second half has certainly 
reignited the faith in progress.86 This faith is reflected primarily in technological optimism 
known in the environmental literature as cornucopianism or prometheanism.87 The most 
problematic aspect of the notion of “progress” is the comforting illusion it provides to 
many—that scientific and technological advancement translates into “moral and political 
progress” of all mankind. This can be seen in Kant: “In man . . . those natural capacities 
which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed 
only in the species, but not in the individual.”88 But Kant also knows that “progressive 
improvement” is not tantamount to “an ever increasing quantity of morality” or that “the 
basic moral capacity of mankind will increase in the slightest.”89 Kant’s ambiguity is 
anticipated among the earlier French philosophes of the Enlightenment era. Some like 
Condorcet believed in progress more single-mindedly. He came closest in confusing “the 
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improvement of techniques with advances in virtue and happiness.”90 Others such as 
Diderot recognized that “progress in one area did not automatically produce progress in all 
others.”91 Rousseau was the most ambivalent. He were both a part of and a critic of the 
Enlightenment view of progress. He brought on himself Voltaire’s ire for making the 
counter-argument against this central supposition of the “Enlightenment”: “The daily rise 
and fall of the Ocean’s waters have not been more strictly subjected to the course of the Star 
that illumines us by night, than has the fate of morals and probity to the progress of the 
Sciences and Arts.”92 But then his notion of perfectibility of man would justify, at 
Condorcet’s hands, the idea that “nature has set no limit to the perfection of human 
faculties,” that humankind is “capable of indefinite extension.”93   
A corollary of this debatable thesis—that morality improves with technological 
advancement—is the further fantasy that the progressive enlightenment of humankind can 
take the place of the ancient ideal of happiness which depends primarily on individual’s own 
resources. The discourse  of “progress” and “freedom” is employed today in almost every 
modernizing country to justify the building of large-scale development projects. It is hoped 
that the necessary destruction of natural habitats for these purposes will be compensated by 
greater material benefits and amenities of the projects once they are completed. It is 
presumed but, of course, not stated explicitly that the amount of morality in the world will 
increase with every new watt added to the stock. The consequence of abandoning the 
ancient ideal is the weakening of Aristotelian understanding of praxis in the modern era. This 
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is what Agnes Heller means when she says that “Marx designs his ‘city on earth’ without 
reference to the ‘city in the soul’. . . . he subsequently substituted the development of forces 
of production for the ‘city in the soul.’”94 Marx simply followed the pioneers of modernity 
such as Francis Bacon in replacing praxis with techne.  
The human life partakes of both techne and nature. We are at one and the same time 
natural and artificial beings. The proper relationship between techne and nature sets the 
parameters of the good life that we naturally strive for. Although the contemporary question 
of the environment has been part of this perennial philosophical question, it has not been 
always acknowledged in the environmental literature in this way.  Instead, survivalism has 
been a dominant discourse through which environmentalists understood and communicated 
their concerns to the public.95 The discourse of survivalism attempts to induce political 
action by appealing to self-preservation instincts of human beings. However, this framework 
is insufficient because human beings are not only driven by the instinct of self-preservation. 
They are also motivated by what they consider as “noble” and “good” which might at times 
conflict with the instinct of self-preservation. The discourse of the “good life” and happiness 
can accommodate and articulate these motivations much better than that of survivalism. 
As Ernest Callenbach—the author of the popular environmental fiction Ecotopia 
(1975)—notes, “We’re not going to save the world by beating on people and making them 
feel guilty and ashamed. We’re going to save the world . . . by making it clear that living 
better is the aim and not amassing goods …. This is what all religions have been telling us 
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since time immemorial about living well.”96 The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan concurs: “In the 
Western world the good life is envisaged, historically, in a limited number of ways. One of 
them is environmentalism, which sees the good life as a consequence of a special type of 
physical setting.”97 Neil Evernden, another environmental scholar, similarly notes that the 
debate between environmentalists and industrialists, which appears to be over physical 
pollution, is actually about the good life: 
To the environmentalists, what is at risk is the very possibility of leading a good life. 
To the industrialists, what is at risk is the very possibility of leading a good life. The 
debate, it appears, is actually about what constitutes a good life. The instance of physical 
pollution serves only as the means of persuasion, a staging ground for the underlying 
debate.98 (emphasis original) 
 
According to Evernden, industrialists believe that further industrialization and technological 
innovation is the key to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, whereas (certain) 
environmentalists downplay the role of material goods and technology in securing human 
happiness and emphasize the non-material dimension of happiness instead. Another scholar, 
commenting on environmentalism in France, likewise detects a broader theme behind the 
popular use of the word “écologie,” which “was not merely about protecting species and 
habitats, but encompassed a broader, more expansive meaning: the critique of industrial 
modernity itself. It entailed . . . a choice about what kind of society one wants to live in.” 99  
Hence, if there is anything new about environmental politics as “a new social 
movement” or a “new ideology” it consists in its departure from the bureaucratized and 
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centralized form of modern politics, whose only interest is to increase and/or distribute the 
spoils of economic growth, and harking back to the long-standing perennial teaching which 
has been—wittingly or unwillingly—pushed under the rug in the modern era. The theme of 
the good life is underemphasized in environmental theory literature and often remains 
buried in discussions over environmental ethics and politics. In this respect, the Aristotelian 
distinction between mere living (zēn monon) and living well (eu zēn) can be instrumental in 
bringing out this aspect of contemporary environmentalism (Pol. 1280a31-4).  
The idea of living in harmony with nature, no matter how metaphorical or unrealistic 
it sounds, inevitably brings up the question of happiness, technology, and modernity. The 
premodern societies, or contemporary societies with significant premodern elements, were 
certainly not deprived of technology. But whereas techne has been cast mostly in an auxiliary 
role in the pursuit of good life in the premodern era, the relationship between techne and 
nature has been reconfigured in the modern era in a way that favors the technological use, 
control, domination of “nature” conceived as matter. Simply put, the role of techne in the 
modern era has overshadowed those of praxis and phusis in the pursuit of the good life. We 
owe the mind-boggling speed of technological innovation to this reset in the early modern 
period. Today, technophiles hold that there can or ought to be no limits to technological 
innovation. Not only is it commonly held that technological change is impossible to arrest—
which may be true—but also that it is not right to do so—which is questionable. This implicit 
assertion of “rightness” is where technological thinking founders at, for it has no way of 
ascertaining or defending its validity. The technological imperative, “the effecting of all 
things possible,” is a normative philosophical question that cannot be treated as manifestly 
right. How to interpret “technology” and “nature” individually and in their proper 




1.5 Survey of Environmental Theory Literature on Aristotle 
 
Parallel to the renewed interest in Aristotle in contemporary moral and political 
philosophy, ancient Greeks in general and Aristotle in particular have begun to receive 
increasing attention in the environmental theory literature although the acceptance of 
Aristotle as an environmentally relevant figure is far from a mainstream position.100 The 
sympathetic interpretation of Aristotle’s thought is mostly concentrated in the growing 
subfields of “environmental virtue ethics” and “environmental political theory” although 
there are other individual authors who are not necessarily associated with either of these 
academic fields. I shall first review the individual contributions and then the academic works 
from these two fields that touch on Aristotle’s relevance and significance to the 
environment. I will point out the points that I find helpful as well as the ones I differ from 
for being either inadequate or too narrow for the purposes of this dissertation. 
This dissertation is closest in approach to an almost forgotten article by Mulford Q. 
Sibley on classical political philosophy in relation to contemporary environmental 
concerns.101 Sibley’s article contrasts the ethical and contemplative ethos of classical political 
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle with that of modernity shaped under the influence of the 
seventeenth century European philosophy. He traces the contemporary “problems of 
economy, technology, and ecology” (or “the modern crisis” as he alternatively puts it) to the 
“repudiation of much of the classical tradition” in the modern era.102 The critical turning 
point in world history, according to Sibley, was “the rejection of Aristotle in the seventeenth 
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century by the likes of Bacon and Hobbes.” The seventeenth century anti-Aristotelian 
rebellion of modern philosophers paved the ground for the ensuing “great confidence that 
all technological development was good.” Sibley’s analysis is full of insight but sketchy. 
Another environmental author who appreciated Aristotle is Murray Bookchin, who 
appropriated two particular elements of Aristotle’s philosophy. The first is Aristotle’s 
analysis of the Greek polis and characterization of human beings as “political animals.” This 
aspect of Aristotle’s analysis and the ancient Greek democracy in general underlies 
Bookchin’s political program of “municipal confederalism” proposed to overcome the 
impetus of centralization in modern nation-states. The second idea that Bookchin borrows 
from Aristotle is “potentiality” (dunamis) and “development” (entelecheia and energeia). This 
Aristotelian insight was used by Bookchin to articulate his evolutionary view of nature and 
society, which he calls “dialectical naturalism.” But Bookchin blends Aristotle with Hegelian 
historical analysis mixed with left-wing revolutionary politics. The present inquiry will argue 
that “revolutionary politics” is not compatible with Aristotle’s political philosophy.103 
More recently, Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman have proposed a thesis 
similar to mine: “the appropriate conceptual system for clarifying the aims and rationale of 
ecological politics is a modernized version of the classical ‘natural right’ tradition as 
understood by Aristotle and his successors.”104 The argument of this dissertation agrees with 
this thesis in bringing out the relevance of Aristotle to contemporary environmental 
discourse and praxis, but I depart from Hinchman and Hinchman’s analysis in three 
respects. First, I look at the question of the environment as it pertains to environmental 
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thought and action with respect to developmental concerns whereas Hinchman and 
Hinchman focuses on a single subset of environmentalism, namely, “deep ecology.” Second, 
Hinchman and Hinchman are ready to give up the hierarchical orientation of classical 
thought to reconcile it with the inter-species egalitarian principle of “deep ecology.” I take 
rank-ordering as essential to the normative perspective of Aristotle, since, as Leo Strauss 
notes, Aristotle considered “moral and political matters in the light of man’s perfection.” As 
men differ in their opportunities, desires, and accomplishments with respect to this goal, “it 
is the hierarchic order of man’s natural constitution which supplies the basis for natural right 
as the classics understood it.”105 Third, I prefer to steer clear of the language of “natural 
right” or “natural law” as they come with a certain historical baggage. I would rather 
distinguish Aristotle’s own views from later neo-Aristotelianisms and focus primarily on 
Aristotle’s own works since certain semantic refractions have taken place in the course of the 
transmission of Aristotle’s teaching, especially due to its Latin translations and assimilation 
into Christian teaching. Indeed, Martin Heidegger claims that “the rootlessness of Western 
thought” begins with translations of certain Greek words into Latin “without a 
corresponding, equally original experience of what they say.”106  
Another major difference with Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman is due 
to their recent article in which they defend the Enlightenment project and criticize the anti-
modern or anti-Enlightenment tendency in the environmental theory literature.107 Hinchman 
and Hinchman seem to have had a change of heart as they now offer Aldo Leopold’s land 
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ethic rather than “the classical ‘natural right’ tradition” as a model to follow. Leopold’s ethic, 
on their view, is “a version of environmental ethics that powerfully echoe[s] Enlightenment 
themes.”108 What Hinchman and Hinchman especially find striking in Leopold’s account of 
land ethic is its “progressive and evolutionary assumptions”, namely, Leopold’s historicist 
view of ethics. As I shall argue in Chapter 2, historicism is insufficient to generate and 
sustain concern for nature which environmentalists are calling for. 
Aristotle’s discussion of economic matters in the first book of Politics has been re-
visited by ecological economist Herman E. Daly and the theologian John B. Cobb, Jr., who  
recover the communitarian element in Aristotle’s normative conception of oikonomia 
(household management) for an ecologically oriented post-capitalist model of economics. 
Daly and Cobb contrast oikonomia with the prevailing model of modern economics which, 
they think, resemble Aristotle’s chrematistics (business expertise):  
Oikonomia differs from chrematistics in three ways. First, it takes the long-run rather 
than the short-run view. Second, it considers costs and benefits to the whole 
community, not just to the parties to the transaction. Third, it focuses on concrete 
use value and the limited accumulation thereof, rather than abstract exchange value 
and its impetus toward unlimited accumulation.109 
 
The Aristotelian distinction between chrematistike  and oikonomia, which also found positive 
reception in the Christian tradition, allows us to situate the consumptive and productive 
activities of human communities within an ethical framework according to their respective 
ends. Another environmental scholar who also found Aristotle’s conception of economic 
activities relevant and helpful for environmental purposes is the environmental scholar John 
O’Neill who similarly locates an environmentally friendly notion of human well-being in 
Aristotle’s emphasis on “living well.” He offers the “Aristotelian conception of well-being” 
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as an alternative to market-based approaches to environmental policy on the one hand and 
those who develop more radical critiques of anthropocentric human behavior, policies, and 
institutions on the other.110 In Chapter 4 I will draw on the Aristotelian distinction between 
chrematistike and oikonomia, and the centrality of the notion of “good life.” 
Another popular point of entry into Aristotle’s philosophy among environmental 
theorists has been the distinction between artifacts and natural beings. Keekok Lee employs 
Aristotle to emphasize “the crucial issue in environmental philosophy,” which is an 
ontological rather than axiological (value-oriented) one: “the systematic supercession of the 
natural by the artefactual.”111 Lee, influenced by Heidegger, emphasizes that the ontological 
question is prior to the axiological question of value discussed by environmental ethics 
scholars. She also distances herself from the virtue ethics approach.112 Trish Glazebrook 
similarly finds Aristotle’s techne-phusis distinction helpful “to conceptualize the priority of the 
natural over the artifactual” in order to evaluate human practices “on the basis of the extent 
to which they work with rather than against nature.”113 I will draw on the same distinction in 
Chapter 2, but my analysis will differ from those of Lee and Glazebrook in paying more 
attention to Aristotle’s analysis of praxis and the role of virtue in this analysis. The question 
of virtue does not feature much in these scholars’ otherwise insightful analyses. 
Aristotle’s philosophy of biology too has been appealing to environmental theorists 
despite its anti-Darwinian preference for the static and eternal existence of natural species. 
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Certain environmental scholars came to Aristotle’s defense against, on the one hand, those 
who claim that Aristotle’s biology has been superseded by Darwin and other developments 
in modern biology, and, on the other hand, those who claim that Aristotle’s teleology is not 
only hopelessly outdated but pernicious as well.114 I will leave out this discussion from the 
scope of this dissertation as I am more interested in Aristotle’s practical philosophy. 
After these individual contributions to Aristotle’s environmental relevance and 
significance, I now turn to the treatment of Aristotle in the academic fields of 
“environmental virtue ethics” and “environmental political theory.” Environmental virtue 
ethics is a relatively recent development within the academic sub-field of environmental 
ethics in the United States.115 Environmental virtue ethics scholars have examined the virtues 
that are conducive to living a fulfilling life that is at the same time environmentally 
conscious. Environmental virtues enable human beings to be protective and pro-active 
toward the environment as well as appreciative and respectful of the well-being of the 
natural environment. Some of these scholars recreate the lives of exemplary figures who 
have had major impacts in environmentalism such as Henry D. Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and 
Rachel Carson.116 Others make a case for certain character traits which are conducive to “an 
environmentally good life” like benevolence or friendship.117  
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Just as their predecessors in moral philosophy reacted to the reduction of ethics to 
law-like rules, scholars of  environmental virtue ethics react to the prevailing deontological 
approach in environmental ethics, namely, arguments defending our obligations to non-
human beings and/or their rights (or intrinsic value). A major feature of these otherwise 
diverse approaches to environmental obligations and rights has been their practitioners’ 
predilection for abstract system-building. This trend of abstractionism in the field of 
environmental ethics has put off some environmental scholars who have complained of a 
growing divide between real world environmental politics and the academic study of 
environmental ethics.118 Environmental virtue ethics scholars on the other hand attempt—
though not always successfully— to circumvent this dead-end by paying more attention to 
the rich texture of everyday life context. Instead of launching an external critique of human 
beings for their lack of environmental sensitivities, they begin with the virtues no one can 
reasonably reject. In a sense, they attempt to breathe new life into old-fashioned virtues. 
Although not all environmental virtue ethics scholars follow Aristotle’s conception 
of ethics, those who do follow it do so with some adjustments and modifications. 
Acknowledging Aristotle is in a sense inescapable for environmental ethicists who approach 
their subject matter in terms of the “good life” rather than “right action.” So Eugene 
Schlossberger looks to Aristotle’s “normative account of human nature” to ground “the 
need for a partnership with nature,”119 and Richard Shearman draws upon Aristotle’s 
conception of friendship and self-love to make a case for the protection of non-human 
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beings.120 Louke van Wensveen attempts to modify Aristotle’s ideas on temperance by 
situating them “within an ecological framework as moderation of desire for the sake of 
ecojustice,” and Lisa H. Newton stresses the role of simplicity for good life and 
sustainability.121 Still another scholar  uses Aristotle’s “biological and ethical works … to 
provide an adequate environmental ethic.”122  
A major flaw in this new area of environmental ethics is the temptation of theory 
construction. Environmental ethics scholars often seem to pass over the praxis dimension of 
virtue. Robert Hull’s recent article on environmental virtue ethics makes note of this trend 
and urges more attention to the praxis dimension of virtue.123 Aristotle’s discussion in NE, 
in which he examines several theoretical questions regarding the nature of virtue, types of 
virtue, and the relationship of virtues to the ultimate human good of happiness, is 
interspersed with reminders that ethics is not a purely theoretical matter. However important 
it may be to examine these theoretical questions, it is no less important for Aristotle to 
consider the question of how to acquire virtues. Aristotle reprimands those who lose sight of 
the praxis dimension of ethical issues: 
It is well said, then, that by performing just actions one becomes a just person and by 
performing temperate actions one becomes a temperate person, and no one is going 
to become good by not performing these actions. (NE 1105b9-13) 
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Later in the same text Aristotle brings up this practical dimension of ethical issues again: “it 
is not sufficient to know about virtue, but one must try to have it and use it, unless there is 
some other way that we become good” (NE 1179b1-4).  
Robert Hull’s similar reminder that there is greater need to make stronger 
“connections between human well-being and preserving and conserving nature” deserves 
our consideration.124 This connection can be better established if we can bring 
environmental virtue ethics into dialogue with environmental political theory which I shall 
do in Chapter 6. As John P. Anton notes, “the moral foundation of ecology in relation to the 
effective protection of the environment is a corollary of correct political theory and 
action.”125 In this sense, Laura Westra’s consideration of ethics of integrity (derived from 
Aristotle’s ideas on good life and teleology) in view of influencing public policy is right-
headed.126 However, there are different ways of influencing politics. Rather than seeking to 
make an immediate impact on present public policy makers, one can also attempt to educate 
the future generations of activists and policy makers through civic education.  
The next chapter discusses the notions of techne and nature in more detail and 
compares Aristotle’s view with the modern view. The burden of Chapter 3 is to present 
Aristotle’s conception of nature through Heidegger’s analysis. In Chapter 4 I shall adumbrate 
Aristotle’s conception of praxis. In Chapter 5 I discuss the contemporary search for a new 
environmental ethic with special attention to Hans Jonas’s work and argue that there is no 
need to invent a new ethic. Then I shall present the recent scholarly work in environmental 
virtue ethics in more detail and engage with Holmes Rolston’s neo-Kantian critique of 
                                                 
     124 Ibid., 102. 
 
     125 John P. Anton, “Aristotle and Theophrastus on Ecology,” in Philosophy and Ecology, Vol. I, eds. 
Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas Kalimtzis (Athens: Ionia Publications, 1999), 15. 
 
     126 See Laura Westra, An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 




environmental virtue ethics. Rolston targets environmental virtue ethics specifically for 
ignoring the priority of moral value over ethical virtue. I will then present another line of 
critique advanced by environmental scholars such as Avner de-Shalit and Andrew Light. 
Their critique is aimed at academic environmental ethicists engaged in abstract non-
anthropocentric ontology or axiology of nature without paying attention to the political 
dimension of environmental praxis. I argue that this criticism is sound and can be extended 
to environmental virtue ethics as well. In Chapter 6, I will discuss the twin concepts of 
ecological citizenship and civic environmentalism to suggest some practical ways that can 
bring out the praxis dimension of environmental virtue ethics more effectively. 
In Chapter 7, which is the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I will argue that 
“conservation” and “conservatism” share more than an etymological connection and that 
the ethos of ecological citizenship is closer to the spirit of traditional conservatism, which 
can be traced back to Aristotle, than that of liberal progressivism, whose origins can be 
traced back to Francis Bacon. The angle on environmental issues taken here—environmental 
virtue and ecological citizenship—can remind us of the conservative dimension of 
environmentalism. I argue that re-visiting Aristotle provides us with a richer vocabulary in 
understanding politics beyond the opposition of liberalism and conservatism, and, 
consequently, more insight into contemporary environmental political theory and praxis. 
Recovering the conservative aspect of environmentalism can be a corrective to the common 
misguided opinion that anthropocentrism is the root cause of our “ecological crisis,” and 
help in re-channeling the intellectual energy from fighting against a nebulous concept of 





Chapter 2: Nature or History? 
 
[T]he classical distinction between nature and convention, according to which nature is of higher 
dignity than convention, has been overlaid by the modern distinction between nature and history 
according to which history (the realm of freedom and of values) is of higher dignity than nature 
(which lacks purposes or values).1 
 
As has been recently noted by some environmental scholars, “the ancient 
understanding of nature as normative and prescriptive . . . seemed to have returned, even 
if through the back door.”2 A classics scholar also observes that “nature as a basic 
concern, as a power not to be disregarded, has come back with the environmental 
movement.”3 But why the “back door” or “come back”? I argue in this chapter that the 
notion of “nature” has been in exile due to a deeply entrenched suspicion and hostility 
integral to modernity. The contemporary resurgence of interest in environmental 
politics, on the other hand, justifies re-visiting the pre-modern conception of nature and 
praxis rejected by modern science and repressed by faith in technology. The grounds for 
this rejection have been twofold: (1) The pre-modern view does not fit into the new 
model of mathematically oriented science, and (2) it is an impediment to technological 
invention and scientific discovery. Both reasons bear on what we today call 
“environmental problems” stemming from zealous pursuit of technological progress and 
economic development. 
The ambiguity of “nature” as a concept has long been noted. Most question its 
coherence to open space for other purposes. For example, Robert Boyle—one of the 
pioneers of modern science—took notice of this ambiguity and recommended the 
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substitution of alternative terms for the various senses of “nature.”4 Similarly, John S. 
Mill in his essay “Nature” (1874) expressed his misgivings about the way “nature” is used 
in a normative sense by philosophers. Analyzing its multiple meanings, he concludes that 
none of these senses can be said to have moral import: “conformity to nature has no 
connection whatever with right and wrong.”5 More recently, Arthur O. Lovejoy and 
George Boas plowed through the Western literature and philosophy, and unearthed an 
“extraordinary multiplicity of meanings latent in the term in its normative uses.”6 
Influenced by these precursors as well as similar studies of the British cultural critic 
Raymond Williams,7 contemporary cultural and social theorists hold that the notion of 
“nature” is historically and culturally variable, and it is irresponsible or even pernicious to 
speak of nature at large or human nature in particular in a normative fashion.8 Its 
semantic ambiguity and historical variability are believed to show its heuristic vacuity and 
ideological threat to progressive liberalism.  
The observation that “nature” is semantically ambiguous and historically bound 
is not unfounded as its meaning is far from being self-evident. Aristotle was the first to 
discuss its several senses. Yet, he did not try to purge the Greek language of phusis (the 
Greek antecedent of “nature”) for that reason. The ambiguity of meaning or the 
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possibility of “undesirable” consequences do not prove that something does not exist in 
reality or that it is not worthwhile to understand and illuminate it if it is not 
straightforward. After all, ambiguity is not exclusive to the concept of “nature.” Every 
big concept such as “equality,” “freedom,” “justice,” or “culture” signifies multiple 
meanings depending on individual, society, culture, or historical period. In different 
periods of human history or among different contemporaneous societies or even within 
the same society, these concepts vary widely both in meaning and practical significance. 
Yet, no one apart from devoted nihilists and relativists would be willing to discard these 
concepts due to their semantic or historical variation. It is actually due to the fact that 
they are “contested” that further inquiry on these concepts is called for.  
To be sure, the category of “natural” is elusive especially in an age of 
technological hybrids. As practical and intuitive as the distinction between “natural” and 
“artificial” may appear to us, once we look into the hybrid realm of bio-engineered 
products or cloned animals we become baffled and begin to doubt the usefulness or 
validity of the distinction between the “natural” and the “artificial.” For the same reason, 
environmentalists who tend to overlook the “urban environments” for falling outside 
the scope of proper environmental concern have invited criticism—not only from 
outside environmentalism but also from environmentalists with a broader vision of what 
environmentalism should be. According to these critics, there is no reason why cities 
should not qualify as part of the “environment,” and the urban problems or social justice 
issues be excluded from environmentalism.  
These are legitimate complaints as human activity has always mixed the natural 
with the artificial. A natural park within an urban area or out in the wilderness is at one 




not carry these two qualities in the same respect. These are not either/or cases. A natural 
park with trees and animals created by human beings cannot be totally artificial simply 
because it involves human element. Borderline cases do exist but they should not blind 
us to what the border is meant to separate. Just as the categories of time and space or 
matter and energy, long held to be separate, has turned out to be a single continuum of 
space-time or matter-energy equivalence according to modern physics but are still 
experienced as distinct within the context of everyday life, we do not have to rush to 
banish the common sense categories of “natural” and “artificial” from our vocabulary 
just because we now have too many hybrid entities. 
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I lay out the 
commonalities between Aristotle’s and contemporary environmental views of nature. I 
point out two inter-related themes—harmony and limits—that stand out among these 
commonalities and are central to our understanding of the underlying claim of 
contemporary environmentalism—that “living well is the catching of certain natural 
rhythms.”9 In the second section, I discuss the nature of developmental problems and 
their broader implications for the understanding of modernity. The third section 
explores the modern trend of skepticism, denial, or hostility toward “nature.” One may 
suppose that skepticism about the concept of nature is different from the hostility shown 
to “nature” but I will argue otherwise. Interwoven with this trend is another tendency to 
circumvent “human nature.” I argue that the reluctance to speak of “nature” or “human 
nature” is due to the modern turn to “history,” “freedom,” and “progress.”  
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2.1 Nature, Harmony, and Limits 
 
Outside natural sciences, the concept of nature today figures primarily in the 
contemporary discourse of environmentalism. Although substitute terms such as 
“environment” or “ecology” are also used regularly, both of these words ultimately rest 
on the category of “natural” as opposed to that of “artificial” or “man-made.” Hence, 
environmentalists often qualify their statements on the “environment” by distinguishing 
between the “natural environment” and the “human environment.” Their concern is 
particularly with “the natural environment or natural resources.”10 The qualifier “natural” 
is considered indispensable by environmentalists to distinguish the real object of their 
concern from the kind of environment and resources that owe their existence to human 
creativity especially in urban areas.  
Contemporary environmentalists are concerned with the “natural” not merely for 
human survival—although this is certainly part of the environmental rhetoric—but also 
out of a transcendental need to connect with something not made by human beings.11 
Liberty H. Bailey, an early 20th century American horticulturalist and a precursor of 
contemporary environmental ethics, expresses this somewhat spiritual sentiment as 
follows: “Verily, then, the earth is divine, because man did not make it . . . . If the earth is 
holy, then the things that grow out of the earth are also holy. They do not belong to man 
to do with them as he will.”12 The now forgotten American naturalist Joseph W. Krutch 
similarly observes that we need nature for reminding and providing us with a context 
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larger than our lives.13 This point has been picked up more recently by the political 
theorist Robert Goodin in his argument that the property of naturalness can serve as a 
source of value for Greens in the public arena. Goodin suggests that “the products of 
natural processes” are valuable because they provide a larger context through which 
human beings can experience “some sense and pattern to their lives.”14 
The “sense and pattern” is needed in every period of history and culture. But this 
order is barely experienced when nature is merely regarded as a reservoir of energy. 
Something more than this is required for a deeper experience of meaning according to 
some environmental theorists: “We stop exploiting nature and become a member of a 
human and a biotic community, residing on a richer, more meaningful Earth.”15 We find 
an expression of this longing in John Steinbeck’s remarks on the majestic redwood 
forests of California: 
The redwoods, once seen, leave a mark or create a vision that stays with you 
always . . . From them comes silence and awe. It’s not their unbelievable stature, 
nor the color which seems to shift and vary under your eyes, no, they are 
ambassadors from another time. They have the mystery of ferns that disappeared 
a million years ago in to the coal of the carboniferous era. They carry their own 
light and shade. The vainest, most slap-happy and irreverent of men, in the 
presence of redwoods, goes under a spell of wonder and respect. Respect—that’s 
the word. One feels the need to bow to unquestioned sovereigns.16 
 
The  themes of respect, reverence, wonder, and awe toward nature, all of which 
betray the spiritual undertones of environmentalism, run through both environmental 
theory and praxis. It would not be farfetched to claim that one major driving force 
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behind contemporary efforts to protect the “natural” environment is the feeling of 
“disenchantment” brought to our attention in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century by a number of Germans.17 This is the discomforting thought that the sense of 
“sacred” or “mystery” has been irretrievably lost in the modern age under the influence 
of technological change, secularization, and modern scientific rational outlook based on 
efficiency principle. In a world increasingly dominated by artifacts, an imaginary 
untouched “wilderness” is seen as the only way of reviving the sense of awe before the 
sacred. Particular political strategies employed by environmental organizations in the 
public arena may seem to contradict this interpretation. However, all ideas when put to 
practice adopt some sort of realism to have an effect. The discrepancy between thought 
and practice in environmentalism should not deter us from looking beyond its thin 
surface. For behind “the public face of environmentalism,” there is a deeper “concern 
with humans’ relation to the universe,” which touches the “fundamental questions to 
human life.”18 The British botanist Eric Ashby expresses this concern in his reflections 
on an environmental ethic which, he thinks, can revive the experience of the “sacred” 
toward the evolutionary process—although he adds, inconsistently I believe, that it must 
be understood in a secularized sense: 
an ethic which regards as sacred (in a secular sense of that word) not the products, 
but the creative process of evolution. It would, according to such an ethic, be 
vandalism, and therefore immoral, to destroy unnecessarily something which we 
cannot create.19 (emphasis original) 
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As various environmental historians have formerly noted, contemporary 
environmentalism has diverse historical roots, one of which is the nineteenth-century 
Romantic movement to which the notion of the “sublime” was central. In an early work, 
which had a major influence on the Romantic movement, the British philosopher 
Edmund Burke suggested that nature is one of the sources for the experience of the 
sublime which is one of “astonishment” (or as some others would opt to say “awe”): 
The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes 
operate most powerfully, is astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the 
soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. . . . 
Astonishment . . . is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior 
effects are admiration, reverence, and respect.20  
 
For Holmes Rolston, a prominent figure in environmental ethics, for instance, “aesthetic 
properties in nature push the beholder toward the experience of the sublime, something 
larger than beauty.”21 Rolston further remarks that “an ecological perspective often 
approaches a religious dimension in trying to help us see the beauty, integrity, and 
stability of nature within and behind its seeming indifference, ferocity, and evil.”22  
The connection between religion and the environment has two aspects. On the 
one hand, existing religions can be and have been reinterpreted to bring out their 
environmental sensibilities.23 On the other hand, environmentalism can be seen as a new 
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neo-pagan religion. When the latter observation is made, it is made either in a critical or 
affirmative spirit. Speaking of the Earth First! organization in the US influenced by 
“deep ecology” perspective, the environmental scholar Bron Taylor notes the underlying 
religious attitude of the members of this organization:  
Indeed, in field research conducted since 1990, I have yet to find an active 
participant in Earth First! who is not animated by one form or another, one 
experience or another, of what can fairly be labelled “nature mysticism.” By this I 
mean that, deep ecology activists conceive of the natural world as a sacred place, as the source of 
all meaning and value. A central and ubiquitous exhortation by movement activists, 
consequently, is that humans must “resacralize” their perceptions of the Earth if 
they are to reharmonize human lifeways with the rest of the natural world.24 
(emphasis added) 
 
Taylor’s attitude to his observation is positive. Another environmental scholar affirming 
this link notes “the reverential thinking” of eco-philosophy and sees “ecological thinking 
emerging as quasi-religious thinking.”25  
Hence, the non-technocratic strands of contemporary environmental discourse 
must be interpreted in the light of this perennial human quest for “meaning and value,” 
if we want to understand its deeper character and its trans-historical connection to the 
premodern or not-yet-modern cultural frames of reference. These frameworks can be 
found either in real life settings in which tradition and religion set the pace of life or 
contemporary intellectual analyses that take issue with the modern worldview based on 
the promise of attaining worldly happiness by relentless acquisition of wealth and power.  
The intellectual roots of contemporary environmentalism, environmental 
historians tell us, antedate the modern era. Two particular pre-modern ideas on “nature” 
have gained currency in contemporary environmental thought: the idea of harmony and 
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the idea of limits. Both of these ideas have been either abandoned or re-formulated 
during the transition to modern science. As contemporary pursuit of technological 
progress and economic development is justified on the basis of the predictive success of 
modern science, it is important to understand the normative implications of the trans-
valuation of these ancient ideas. These ideas, which have been explored previously by 
environmental historians in a genealogical fashion, need our attention to bring out their 
philosophical significance.  
The idea of harmony and the related ideas of “organicism,” “holism,” “balance,” 
and “integrity” are generally taken to be fundamental principle of nature revealed by 
ecology—the new interdisciplinary science of the 20th century: “Ecology, as a philosophy 
of nature, has roots in organicism—the idea that the cosmos is an organic entity, 
growing and developing from within, in an integrated unit of structure and function.”26 
The organic vision of ecology also holds true for the normative ethos of 
environmentalism. Another environmental historian Clarence J. Glacken points out that 
not only “the ecological point of view”—which is “the idea of a close and interlocking 
relationship in nature”—but also the new “conservation ethic and philosophy, a moral 
and aesthetic attitude toward nature” can be “traced to the idea that nature was a divinely 
arranged harmony.”27  
The cosmological idea of “harmony” in the Western tradition, derived from 
ancient Greeks, entails two other interrelated themes: “the essential unity of man and 
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nature” and the balance of nature.28 The ancient Greek word kosmos (the origin of our 
word “cosmos”) itself meant an orderly reality with moral and aesthetic connotations of 
fitness and beauty.29 That kosmos constitutes an inter-locking order is an idea we see in 
Aristotle: “all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike—both fishes and 
fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with 
another, but they are connected” (Meta. 1075a17-19). And again the holistic view—the 
view that the emergent whole is not reducible to its constituent parts—central to the 
study of ecology or life sciences in general is a tenet of Aristotle’s philosophy of politics 
and nature: “the whole must of necessity be prior to the part” (Pol. 1253a20) and “the 
whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable” (Meta. 1041b12-13).30  
Most environmental theorists presuppose this classical idea of harmony in their 
normative critique of environmental problems. Their numerous differences 
notwithstanding, most of these critiques have targeted the radical (Cartesian) ontological 
dualism positing two substances; one strictly for humanity (res cogitans), and the other for 
nature (res extensa).31 The common criticism is that the illusion of ontological dualism are 
more likely to induce human beings to be indifferent to the natural world and/or inflict 
harm on non-human beings without scruples. Consequently, these theorists have 
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emphatically insisted on the need for recasting humankind as part of nature rather than 
above, against, or apart from it.  
As a critic of environmentalists’ uncritical use of the notion of harmony 
observes, “The central theme of modern environmentalism may well be the idea that 
humanity’s separation from nature lies at root of the ecological crisis.”32 A quick survey 
of recent environmental literature can show that the harmony or unity of “man and 
nature” is indeed a recurring motif.33 Aldo Leopold, a prominent figure in the American 
environmental movement, defines conservation as “a state of harmony between men and 
land.”34 “Modern man,” according to the economist E. F. Schumacher, “does not 
experience himself as a part of nature but as an outside force destined to dominate and 
conquer it.”35 Victor C. Ferkiss, a scholar specialized in philosophy of technology, 
proposes naturalism as a new philosophy of human existence whose central tenet takes 
human species as “part of nature rather than something apart from it.”36 Robyn 
Eckersley, a scholar sympathetic to deep ecology, defends ecocentrism for its 
“recognition that humans are part of, rather than separate from or above, nature.”37 For 
Holmes Rolston III, “a better culture” is one that is “harmonious with nature.”38 And 
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according to the “ecological humanism” that Henryk Skolimowski advances, “the human 
person” is “simply a part of a larger scheme of things: of nature and the cosmos.”39  
The philosophical thrust of contemporary environmentalism evidently seeks to 
re-establish the lost balance and harmony with nature—a project consciously pursued in 
the Western philosophical tradition at least since Goethe and Hegel.40 The idea of 
harmony expresses the intuitive sentiment that humans are natural beings or, in more 
formulaic terms, humanity is part of rather than stands apart from the order of nature. 
Yes, “the proposed solutions for reconnecting people to nature vary . . . significantly 
from one wing of the environmental movement to another.”41 Still, what do 
environmentalists’ statement of the “harmony between man and nature” actually 
amounts to? Are we here speaking of a cognitive or ideological error when we say that 
those of us who see ourselves above or apart from nature are misled by our perceptions, 
judgment, and learning? Or is it a normative judgment of a moral failure that we are 
trying to articulate through the idea of balance/harmony? The moral failure implies that 
one is fully conscious of the fact that human beings ought to be living in harmony with 
the natural world. The sin or vice of denying this reality is often expressed in the words 
“arrogance” and “hubris”—the rejection of humility and finitude.42  
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The positions held by environmental theorists often reflect a blend of both 
cognitive and normative failure. The conclusion drawn by most of these scholars from 
the thesis of the ontological unity and harmony between humanity and nature is the 
moral obligation to adjust our individual and political behavior accordingly. This 
combination suggests the synthesis of ontology with ethics: “When humans awaken to 
their presence in such a biosphere, finding themselves to be products of this process . . . 
they owe something to this beauty, integrity, and persistence in the biotic community.”43 
The theme of “harmony” seems to have an irresistible appeal in the 
environmental theory literature possibly because of our increasing dependence on 
technology. The technological penchant of modernity implies that nature is dispensable 
or at best secondary. The human species can do, if necessary, without nature or even go 
against it through infinite technological ingenuity. This counter-intuitive idea that 
humanity is artificial or apart from nature has come about through the modern 
conception of nature. The latter should not be confused with the pre-modern sense that 
human beings are somehow different from other living beings because in the pre-
modern sense human beings still occupy the same natural order.44  
But what is wrong with imbalance or disharmony? What is the normative basis of 
seeking harmony with nature? Is it our concern for the survival of the human species? 
Or is it our sense of unfairness to future generations, the contemporary poor, or non-
human beings in the world? Environmental theorists do certainly differ in their answers 
to these questions but the debate is mostly polarized between anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric justifications of environmental concern. The anthropocentric form of 
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justification foregrounds instrumental or human-specific reasons for nature’s value 
whereas the latter emphasizes the intrinsic value of non-human nature. There is growing 
dissatisfaction with this polarization, however, as it has become a major roadblock in 
environmental theory.45 The discontent is due to the insufficient attention to the 
“political” dimension of environmentalism or, as one of these critics puts it, “the public 
reception of ethical arguments over the value of nature.”46 This is particularly visible 
among anti-anthropocentric environmental theorists who operate as if in a political 
vacuum in which human aspirations do not count. The turn in environmental theory 
toward weak anthropocentrism on the other hand, which most of these critics defend, is 
consistent with the “good life” perspective of Aristotle in which “nature” figures as a 
normative concept.47 I will return to this discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Although the “balance of nature” metaphor has come under attack recently, the 
notion of balance still holds its ground within the normative analysis of 
environmentalism. According to a recent debate among ecologists, the “balance of 
nature” metaphor can be misleading both scientifically and politically. The opponents of 
this metaphor have offered alternative models to represent the ecological phenomena. 
According to one such model called “hierarchical patch dynamics,” ecological 
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phenomena are marked by temporal and spatial heterogeneity.48 A forest, for instance, is 
depicted from this point of view as “a hierarchical mosaic system of dynamic patches of 
different sizes and successional stages.”49 Despite all this heterogeneity and dynamism, 
however, a forest maintains its identity over time. The fact that the identity of a forest 
persists in the face of heterogeneity and flux is an indication of “ecological metastability, 
possibly the closest technical equivalent to ‘balance of nature.’”50 It is not that harmony 
does not exist but it is “embedded in the patterns of fluctuation,” and the “ecological 
persistence” indicates “order within disorder.”51 Hence, even the critics of this metaphor 
invoke the “harmony between humanity and nature” as a normative goal.52  
The second Aristotelian idea that runs through contemporary environmental 
thought is the moral imperative to live within ecological limits. In ancient Greek culture, 
the idea of limits appears in multiple cultural expressions of mortality and finitude. The 
myths of Prometheus and Daedalus reminded the ancients of the tragic dimension of 
life: hubris brings about nemesis.53 In ancient Greek philosophy, the ontological notion 
of “limit” (peras) and the “unlimited” (apeiron) carried ethical overtones. According to this 
view expounded by Pythagoras, the phenomena of the world are ordered and limited as 
they result from the continual imposition of a limit on the unlimited.54 Beings in a sense 
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are generated as they become delimited. Our ability to define things rests on their 
delimitation as the verb “to define” itself means “to delimit.” The late Pythagorean 
philosopher Philolaos of Croton intimates the harmony underlying this constant 
interaction between the one and the many: “Nature in the ordered universe was 
composed of [harmochthē] unlimited and limiting elements, and so was the whole universe 
[kosmos] and all that is therein.”55 These ideas were influential on the study of medicine 
both in classical antiquity and during the medieval era. According to the ancient view of 
health, the wholeness of the world and human body depend “on a right mingling (krasis) 
of the elements” of which they are composed.56 
We see the classical theme of limit, which is at one and the same time ontological 
and ethical, again in Plato’s dialogue Philebus. Socrates, the lead character of the dialogue, 
discussing the role of pleasure in the good life with a young interlocutor, is trying to 
persuade him that pleasure on its own cannot be the best thing in this world. For this 
purpose he appeals to the teaching of the ancients: “whatever is said to be consists of 
one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness.” Socrates interprets this 
teaching not only in relation to the physical coming-into-being on earth but also to the 
medical, aesthetical, and ethical conditions that we encounter in the course of everyday 
life. Measure and proportion  in these qualities are equally outcomes of the imposition of 
limit on the unlimited: “With  health there come beauty and strength, and again in our 
soul there is a host of other excellent qualities. It is the goddess herself [i.e., Aphrodite] . 
. . who recognizes how excess (hubris) and the overabundance of our wickedness allow 
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for no limit in our pleasures and their fulfillment, and she therefore imposes law and 
order as a limit on them.”57 The classical theme of limit reappears in Aristotle’s recurring 
phrase “the end is a limit.” The unlimited for Aristotle too represents an imperfection 
whereas nature ever seeks perfection and determination: “But Nature flies from the 
unlimited, for the unlimited is imperfect [ateles], and Nature ever seeks an end [telos]” 
(GA 715b14).58 The souls of complex beings put together by nature are marked by their 
limit and logos (De An. 416a15-18). 
The idea of limits figures in contemporary environmentalism in a somewhat 
different but not totally unrelated way.59 Contemporary environmentalists draw our 
attention to the physical limits of earth’s carrying capacity and to the fact that we are 
overshooting the natural resources available to us. The contemporary concern with 
ecological limits to growth has a normative tinge to it despite its scientific quantitative 
garb. Environmental scholars have drawn out the normative implications of the “limits 
to growth” thesis in one of two ways. Some have appealed to the principle of fairness to 
future generations, and others to that of global intra-generational justice. The latter 
approach has been lately revived under the name of “ecological footprints”—the idea 
that those with relatively large ecological footprints (i.e., high levels of consumption) 
must acknowledge the natural limits of the earth, and allow others with substandard 
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levels of consumption to enlarge their ecological footprints.60 The classical idea of limits 
can be instrumental in reinvigorating the normative implications of the ecological 
footprints idea, which I discuss in Chapter 6 in relation to environmental citizenship.  
2.2 Modernity and History 
 
The Aristotelian conception of nature needs re-assessment today in the light of 
the modern conception of nature which originated with the so-called Scientific 
Revolution of the seventeenth century. The rejection of telos in nature has developed 
parallel to the turn from a world of “finitude” to the quest for “unlimited” growth and 
expansion. Another way of interpreting this historical change is that moderns have 
committed themselves to the eradication of the tragic dimension of human life, which, 
according to the classical perspective, was all too human.  
Simply put, modernity is “the new civilization developed in Europe and North 
America over the last several centuries and fully evident by the early twentieth 
century.”61 One of the most distinguishing feature of modernity is the deep-seated belief 
in progress. This belief is both empirical and normative. It says equivocally that progress 
in sciences and arts occurs and this is the only way to expand in morality and happiness. 
The initiators of this re-organization such as Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, Galileo, and 
Descartes were conscious of the new era they were ushering in. They all intended, in 
their own ways, to break with the ancients and lay the groundwork for a new beginning. 
Their predilection for change and innovation has set the tone for what has come to be 
known as “modernity” in retrospect.  
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Modernity can be studied in its various aspects. In philosophical and practical 
terms, two features particularly stand out. The conscious attempt to introduce 
innovations is one of the two features which distinguishes modernity from preceding 
history. This can be called “consciousness of novelty.”62 A second feature is the 
increased interest in and appreciation of “active involvement in the world.”63 The latter 
reverses the order between theoria and praxis and produces an optimistic or, what we may 
call, an untragic view of reality which I shall discuss later in this section.64  
The fascination with the “new” can be seen clearly in Machiavelli’s proclamation 
of “a new route, which has not yet been followed by any one.”65 He explains his intent 
more explicitly in The Prince as follows: “my intent is to write something useful” by 
examining “the effectual truth of the thing.” This remark was meant to distinguish his 
worldly practical approach from that of ancient Greek, Roman, and medieval Christian 
philosophers, all of whom busied themselves, according to Machiavelli, with the 
otherworldly “imagination” of human affairs.66 What was new about Machiavelli’s 
approach was not his “realism” but his instruction of “realism.” For unscrupulous 
pursuit of power was surely common to all ages and peoples. The need for a new 
beginning was most strongly felt in natural philosophy though. Galileo’s second great 
work was entitled Discourses on Two New Sciences (1638). Most telling of all is the title of 
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one of Francis Bacon’s major works—Novum Organum (1620). Although unfinished, it 
was intended to replace the revered collection of Aristotle’s works on logic known as 
Organon. In his Preface, Bacon explicitly pits himself against the ancients: “I open and lay 
out a new and certain path for the mind to proceed in . . . . my object being to open a 
new way for the understanding, a way by them untried and unknown.”67  
It is well known that both the Cartesian rationalist and the Baconian empiricist 
methods aim at epistemic certitude. This is not radically different from the goal of 
theoretical knowledge known to the ancients, both Plato and Aristotle, as epistēmē. For 
them too, episteme is the type of knowledge which aims to discover “what is” or the 
principles (archai) and causes (aitiai) of unchanging things, both of which imply some 
high standard compared to mere “opinion.” Today, what we mean by “science” is 
comparable, if not identical, with the ancient epistemology.68  
But Aristotle, departing from Plato, argued that there is another sphere of 
knowledge applicable to human praxis which he identified as phronēsis.69 The term was 
not invented by Aristotle. It was used by Plato and others without the specific meaning 
which Aristotle assigned to it. This type of knowledge was known to the Romans and 
medieval Christians as prudential, and to us as “prudence,” or alternatively as practical 
wisdom, practical reason, or practical knowledge. But the meaning of prudence has been 
transformed after Kant’s contrast between “prudential” (calculative self-serving) and 
“moral” (showing concern for the good of others for its own sake) behavior. Hence, the 
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normative sense of phronesis has been lost along the way. It is important to note that the 
identification of science and knowledge with episteme on the one hand and the 
convergence between episteme and techne on the other has brought about the depreciation 
of phronesis. The aforementioned Kantian distinction, so as to save morality from the 
mechanistic plane of nature, has further contributed to its fall from favor. If phronesis 
indeed exists as Aristotle conceives it cannot of course disappear into oblivion but can 
certainly get obscurer. For it is an intellectual virtue which cannot be detached from 
human beings. In a society in which cleverness is recognized as wisdom, it should not be 
a surprise if phronesis becomes endangered over time.70 
The fundamental question at the heart of contemporary environmental thought 
can be broadly conceived as the proper relationship of technology with nature.71 The 
nexus of techne and nature is inadequate without considering praxis or phronesis. Restoring 
the imbalance or distorted relationship between techne and nature is the task of phronesis 
but this task in the modern era has been usurped by episteme and techne. The 
overshadowing of praxis guided by phronesis by praxis guided by the marriage of techne 
and episteme has been noted by many scholars as a fundamental feature of modernity.72  
Techne, for Aristotle, was important but ancillary to praxis in the context of 
everyday life. Although the distinction between praxis and poiesis is first clearly drawn by 
Aristotle, we can see its traces even in the Platonic dialogue Epinomis. The leading 
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character in the dialogue is openly doubtful of the depth of wisdom acquired from 
productive arts such as agriculture, building, or metallurgy: “these arts enable us to 
possess the necessities of life, but . . . none of them makes anyone wise.”73 We see 
Aristotle’s position when he states that “life [bios] is action [praxis], not production 
[poiēsis]” (Pol. 1254a6-7).74 His advice against the inclusion of the artisan class in the 
political decision-making process due to the degrading effect of these arts on their 
practitioners is also based on the fact that those who do not exercise their capacity of 
phronesis would fail to be good judges of political affairs (Pol. 1329a19-20). 
In Politics II.8, Aristotle discusses a reform proposal made by Hippodamus—an 
ambitious and flamboyant Greek intellectual who flourished about a century before 
Aristotle. His proposal was to enact laws to institute a tradition of bestowing honor on 
the inventors of a city in order to make the pursuit of invention more appealing. 
Aristotle first cautiously points to the possible risks of establishing such a tradition, and 
then moves on to a related question of changing laws to the better. Aristotle 
acknowledges that “it is not best to leave written [laws] unchanged” since it is not always 
possible to foresee the particular exigencies of praxis ahead of time (Pol. 1269a7-8). But 
he also advises caution [eulabeia] in this regard as law, unlike art, requires a framework of 
stability to hold its effect on people (Pol. 1269a20). Art, on the other hand, can afford 
constant innovation and experimentation. The analogy between arts and political 
expertise, Aristotle believes, must not be pressed to the point that progress in arts is 
taken as a model for laws. Political instability that may stem from a revolutionary 
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approach to laws can counteract the slight marginal gains to be gained from reforms. 
Aristotle shows his conservative face here but does not necessarily revere tradition for its 
own sake as he comments in the same context that what is sought after is the good and 
“not the traditional” (Pol. 1269a2).  
In the modern era, on the other hand, techne, assuming a critical position in the 
form of technical reason and poiēsis (making), has become paradigmatic, and the role of 
nature has been thereby reduced to that of “a furnisher of energy and raw materials.”75 
The shift in the respective roles of techne, praxis, and phusis has come about through the 
activist re-orientation of theory that modern science has taken following the lead of 
Francis Bacon. For so long as theōria (contemplation) and praxis were held separate from 
and superior to poiesis, as we see in Aristotle, techne could not appear in the forefront of 
human life (NE 1140a1-20). Virtue—which is the core of praxis for Aristotle—is 
“something more precise and better than any art, just as nature is” (NE 1106b13-14).76 It 
is also important to remember that the superiority of theoria to praxis for ancients was an 
indication of privileging nature over techne. “The primacy of contemplation over activity,” 
noted Hannah Arendt, “rests on the conviction that no work of human hands can equal 
in beauty and truth the physical kosmos, which swings in itself in changeless eternity 
without any interference or assistance from outside, from man or god.”77  
The productivist paradigm of modernity and the concomitant devaluation of 
nature have ultimately sprung from the “tangled and blurred” “lines separating theory, 
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action, and production.”78 Knowledge would attain a more dignified and exalted state, 
said Bacon, “if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly [i.e., tightly] 
conjoined and united together than they have been.”79 Happiness, the prime end of 
praxis according to Aristotle, is reduced by Hobbes to a transient feeling we get from the 
satisfaction of our endless desires: “Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from 
one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter.”80 
With Locke, the unlimited pursuit of wealth ceases to be a source of opprobrium to 
become the defining feature of praxis.  
The productivist paradigm has struck a blow to the ancient ideal of what it 
means to be a human. A critical casualty in this sense has been the emasculation of 
virtues within praxis. Virtues almost disappear as praxis is first reduced to poiesis and then 
ultimately to labor. Hannah Arendt identifies three steps of this momentous 
transformation. First is the reversal of the hierarchical order between thinking and doing. 
Thinking became the “handmaiden of doing” while “contemplation itself became 
altogether meaningless.”81 The second step consists of a reversal within the vita activa 
(active life)—Arendt’s collective word designating labor, work, and action. It is the 
activities of homo faber—making and fabricating—together with its instrumental 
worldview that first “rise to the position formerly occupied by contemplation” and 
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displacing praxis in the meantime. The third step, finally, is “the elevation of laboring to 
the highest position in the hierarchical order of the vita activa.”82 
A corollary of the productivist paradigm is the radical separation of man from 
nature, as its instrumental worldview and motif of mastery entail the rejection of the 
teleological or animistic view of nature: “without a common teleology that integrates 
humanity with nature, the mastery of nature becomes its own end.”83 The teleological 
view of nature associated with Aristotle and his scholastic followers was perceived as an 
impediment to the productivist paradigm. Robert Boyle, one of the pioneers of the 
seventeenth century science, questioned the teleological view on this basis: 
the veneration wherewith men are imbued for what they call nature has been a 
discouraging impediment to the empire of man over the inferior creatures of God. 
For many have not looked upon it as an impossible thing to compass, but as 
something of impious to attempt: the removing of those boundaries which 
nature seems to have put and settled among her productions. And while they 
look upon her as such a venerable thing, some make a kind of scruple of 
conscience to endeavor so to emulate any of her works, as to excel them.84 
 
The mastery of nature has been an integral part of the modern project which 
found in Francis Bacon its most enthusiastic advocate and exponent.85 The modern 
interpretation of nature as inert matter was closely related to the humanitarian spirit of 
relieving humanity from the realm of necessity. Bacon’s modern project can best be 
described as a double move: the progress of humankind through increasing control of 
nature. The theoretical re-conceptualization of “nature” as passive and inert matter—
subject to the mathematical laws of local motion—enabled the practical goal of 
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harnessing it for “charity” (i.e., the mutual benefit of humankind).86 The Aristotelian 
formal and final causes are rejected: “Matter rather than forms should be the object of 
our attention, its configurations and changes of configuration, and simple action, and law 
of action or motion; for forms are figments of the human mind, unless you will call 
those laws of action forms.”87 
The task of Bacon’s new science is the creative or fruitful disquisition of nature 
with a view to the production of useful works for human life. It is contrasted with the 
passive or barren contemplation of the ancients. We should not invoke “occult 
properties and specific virtues” in nature, Bacon prescribes, but “dissect her into parts” 
and unleash the “power of generating or transforming natural bodies.”88 The promise, 
appeal, and ultimate success of the new scientific method has lain in its potential “to 
extend more widely the limits of power and greatness of man.”89 To this purpose, 
(natural) philosophy or science is assimilated to techne in the name of humanitarian 
charity. Whereas techne and nature are complementary in Aristotle, Bacon sets them 
against each other: “among things artificial those are to be preferred which either come 
nearest to an imitation of nature, or on the contrary overrule and turn her back.” Bacon’s 
method ultimately seeks to achieve and secure “the victory of art over nature.”90  
The works of several leading figures of the modern scientific ethos—Bacon, 
Descartes, Hobbes, Galileo, and Newton—expounded the new mechanistic conception 
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of nature modeled after physics as opposed to biology.91 By leaving out the formal and 
final causes, the modern conception of nature has ignored the secondary qualities of 
nature which, on ancient perspective, had to be considered to do justice to its working.92 
The new science stopped asking “Why?” or “For what purpose?” and took upon itself 
the task of describing “How?” things happen.93 This methodological reorientation of 
natural science has paved the way to controlling natural processes. Natural scientists and 
philosophers who accomplished this intellectual transformation have unwittingly driven 
a wedge between human experience and the rest of living nature. The modern scientific 
view of nature has divested nature of its organismic elements and agency.  
An early exponent of this historic transformation, Alexandre Koyré, calls it “the 
destruction of the Cosmos.” According to Koyré, the pre-modern conception of the 
world as “a finite, closed, and hierarchically ordered whole” was replaced by “an 
indefinite and even infinite universe.” Whereas the pre-modern Cosmos was of diverse 
constitution, the modern universe is “bound together by the identity of its fundamental 
components and laws.” The consequences of this transformation was nothing but 
phenomenal. To Koyré, the new outlook brought about “the utter devalorization of 
being” by divorcing the subjective ground of “value” from the objective realm of 
“facts”: “all considerations based upon value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, 
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meaning and aim” were thrown out by the new science.94 Another critic, Alfred N. 
Whitehead, who is also one of the staunch critics of the Cartesian dualism in early 
twentieth century, used the phrase “the bifurcation of nature” to refer to the same 
transformation. Nature as an inanimate realm (Descartes’ res extensa) is thoroughly 
disenchanted and becomes “a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the 
hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.”95 The environmental consequences of the 
modern view of dead nature are bluntly drawn out by Jacques Monod. Writing around 
the time that the environmental movement was beginning, Monod observes that behind 
the contemporary protests against the destruction of nature is 
the refusal to accept the essential message of science. The fear is the fear of 
sacrilege: of outrage to values; and it is wholly justified. It is perfectly true that 
science attacks values. Not directly, since science is no judge of them and must 
ignore them; but it subverts every one of the mythical or philosophical, 
ontogenies [i.e., narratives] upon which the animist tradition, from the Australian 
aborigines to the dialectical materialists, has based morality: values, duties, rights, 
prohibitions.96 
 
It is against this reductive and dualist view of nature that most environmental scholars 
and activists, knowingly or unknowingly, are directing their critique at. This is most 
evident in the ethics of “intrinsic value” of nature which I will discuss in Chapter 5. 
To be sure, even pre-modern societies had to make use of other natural beings to 
serve their various needs and wants. However, the link between the use of nature and the 
emancipation of humanity had not been so self-consciously and forcefully asserted prior 
to the modern era. The ancient Greek myth of Prometheus and the “Ode to Man” in 
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Sophocles’ Antigone celebrate man’s ingenuity against hostile fate or nature but they are 
ambivalent as they stress “the perilous problematic of technique.”97 Varied 
environmental problems such as species extinction or global warming caused by 
population, technology, and consumption are actually an off-shoot of the surge of 
confidence in the project of human emancipation through the promethean conquest of 
nature. The modern project in a nutshell promises to “progressively” free humanity from 
“material constraints” and “the misleading servitudes of animism.”98 Yet, such 
progressive techno-optimists overlook or do not want to acknowledge that the drive 
toward emancipation may bring about an opposite effect of more oppression as C. S. 
Lewis astutely observed: “What we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a 
power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument.”99  
As noble as it may sound, the progressive emancipation of humanity comes only 
with a hefty price. The price is continually paid first and foremost by unprivileged 
members of living or future generations within the modernized or modernizing countries 
who are, for instance, obliged to make room for development projects for the greater 
good of all.100 Indeed, some environmental theorists have pointed at modernity as 
bearing responsibility for contemporary environmental problems. William Ophuls, for 
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instance, locates the ideological roots of environmental problems in the Enlightenment 
tradition.101 Joel J. Kassiola similarly brings up the theme of tragedy to draw attention to 
the “self-defeatist nature of modernity.”102 However, overcoming modernity should not 
be presented as an easy matter nor desirable before we truly understand what it entails—
especially if the diagnosis of one of the most acute observers of modernity holds true for 
today: nihilism, “this uncanniest of all guests,” standing at the door.103  
The idea that further “modernization” is necessary to resolve its undesirable side-
effects is essential to the survival of the modern project. Those who celebrate the 
benefits of modernity or progress but protest its excesses have not really come to terms 
with the antinomies of “modernity.” Certain environmental theorists, for example, 
suggested that green politics must be conceived as “an immanent critique rather than a 
rejection of modernity” so as not to abandon its democratic achievements.104 But the 
expansion of the qualitative dimension of “modernity” (i.e., universal/categorical 
freedom and equality) depends on the quantitative economic growth and constant 
technological advancement, as classical economists and old-fashioned Marxists are quick 
to point out, regardless of the extent to which this growth is shared.105 Those who ride 
on the bandwagon of modernity—the progressive camp consisting of people with 
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classical liberal or Marxist persuasion—the demand for ecological sustainability or 
preservation is nothing short of a “reactionary” or “primitivist” stumbling block 
especially when there are hungry mouths to be fed somewhere in the world. 106  
Technological innovations aimed at increasing economic productivity, curing 
diseases, lowering mortality rates, and lengthening longevity are paradoxically capable of 
producing counterproductive effects: turning poverty—the age-old adversity of human 
life—into destitution, various natural causes of sorrow—death, illness, and old age—into 
a “joyless quest for joy,” and practical wisdom into ignorance.107 Paradoxically, the 
increasing ignorance is accompanied by an increasing reliance in modern politics and 
social sciences on the scientific form of knowledge.108 The upshot of this drive toward 
technological control over fate and nature is the dismissal and marginalization of 
“traditional ecological” knowledge of human communities handed down through 
generations.109 This form of knowledge—found to be quite effective in dealing with 
                                                 
     106 We should, of course, not be misled by the so-called conservatives with a classical liberal economic 
agenda who are much more adamant about continuing “progress” than some of their contemporary liberal 
cousins. For the critique of environmentalism from a laissez-faire perspective, see Ayn Rand, The Return of 
the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution (New York: Meridian, [1971] 1999); and George Reisman, 
Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, 1996), 63-122. The left-view critique, see 
Donald Gibson, Environmentalism: Ideology and Power (Huntington, NY: Nova Science, 2002). 
 
     107 The phrase “joyless quest for joy” is used by Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953), 251. For the ethical implications of medical advances, see Leon R. 
Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New York: The Free Press, 1985).  
 
     108 See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
 
     109 See Mark Hobart, ed., An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance (London: 
Routledge, 1993); Ladislaus M. Semali and Joe L. Kincheloe, What is Indigenous Knowledge? Voices from the 
Academy (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999); and Fikret Berkes, Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge and Resource Management (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis, 1999). For a more critical 
assessment, see Roy Allen, Peter Parkes, and Alan Bicker, eds., Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and its 
Transformations: Critical Anthropological Perspectives (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2000); Roy Ellen, “Local 
Knowledge and Sustainable Development in Developing Countries,” in Global Sustainable Development in the 
Twenty-first Century, eds. Keekok Lee, Alan Holland, and Desmond McNeill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000); and John Briggs, “The Use of Indigenous Knowledge in Development: Problems 




ecological and economic issues on a local level—revives experiential knowledge whose 
two forms are techne and phronēsis in Aristotle.110 In a recent international project on 
protecting the drylands through preserving the pastoral way of life, it has been recorded 
that the pastoralists’ traditional knowledge is superior to the imported expert knowledge 
which is forgetful or ignorant of particulars: 
There is considerable experience of trying to introduce new animal husbandry 
techniques and new genetic material into pastoral systems. Most experiments 
have failed. Replacing local breeds or cross-breeding with high productivity 
stock, introducing new management systems which try to eliminate the need for 
nomadism, cultivation of fodder crops, introduction of mixed farming, and many 
other interventions have rarely brought benefits to herders. More often they have 
caused land degradation or become unsustainable, and have been abandoned. On 
the other hand, we now better understand the extensive knowledge and skills of 
herders, the genetic qualities of local breeds, and the rationality of local pastoral 
livelihood systems. Improvements can certainly be made, but the starting point 
should be existing livestock management systems, knowledge and skills, not an 
imported model.111 
 
Another pillar of modernity is the promise of “commodious living.” Yet, it is not 
obvious if human living can continually grow in comfort without limits. What we truly 
mean by inherently qualitative terms such as “commodious” or “comfortable” is in the 
end measured by indicators that always correspond to quantities.112 Statistics describing 
increases in GDP per capita cannot however tell the whole truth about human well-
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being as recent critics of this welfare indicator have pointed out.113 Conflated with 
ordinary forms of poverty—which is partially “relative deprivation”—is a peculiar kind 
that cripples those whom it afflicts. We may call this condition “destitution” comparable 
to what Ivan Illich has called the “modernization of poverty,” and which is similar in 
effect to Aristotle’s description of tyranny that produces “incapacity for activity” among 
people (Pol. 1314a23).114  
This condition has been universally experienced and is still being experienced 
around the world wherever the supportive fabric of traditional society has been 
undermined or collapsed under the pressure of increasing monetary relationships and 
technologically sophisticated devices. What goes out the window with increasing 
modernization (i.e., monetarization and technological sophistication) is a social security 
network that is capable of regenerating what has been recently discovered as “social 
capital.” The loss of social capital often follows in the wake of geographical dislocations 
caused by development projects—quite similar to the social transformation in Western 
Europe discussed by the historian of economics Karl Polanyi.115  
The preceding discussion is not meant as a denunciation of the use of technology 
in contemporary society but is directed at its uncritical celebration as if technology is the 
key to the riddle of the universe. What techno-optimists do not want to acknowledge is 
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that techne relies on praxis to be useful at all. This cannot happen however in a social 
context where techne is seen as the crown of human achievement. It is this modern ethos 
that possibly lies at the root of varied kinds of environmental destruction stemming from 
developmental projects. If it is true that we should seek the origin of our contemporary 
environmental woes in the modern break with ancient wisdom (be it of the Western or 
non-Western kinds), it would be sensible to reconsider Aristotle’s conception of the 
relationship of techne with praxis and nature, which the founders and disciples of the 
modern project from Machiavelli to Marx have, in varying degrees, attempted to reverse. 
The flagship of this reversal has been Progress and History. The modern project of “the 
conquest of nature” required the conquest of human nature because, as Leo Strauss 
points out, “an unchangeable human nature might set absolute limits to progress.”116  
2.3 Historicizing Nature 
 
Val Plumwood recently has drawn our attention to the “deep contemporary 
suspicion and skepticism” about the notion of “nature,” and speculated that this attitude 
“may play some role in the contemporary indifference to the destruction and decline of 
the natural world around us.”117 I believe this is a plausible suggestion and I will base the 
following discussion on this assumption. But I beg to differ from Plumwood’s emphasis 
on “progressive politics” as I will try to show in this section that the roots of 
contemporary suspicion toward nature must be sought in the transformation that the 
concept of nature underwent in the early modern era which eventually brought about the 
intellectual current of historicism in the late modern era. The notion of progress is a relic 
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of historicism which cannot be reconciled with an affirmative attitude toward nature—
unless we are willing to view “progress” as something local both temporally and 
geographically.118 To the nexus between the modern concept of nature and historicism I 
now turn. 
Liberals are often reluctant to speak of an independent (human) nature. Speaking 
of a fixed “nature” almost immediately raises eyebrows among those who believe that 
evoking an unchanging “nature” is reactionary. Their stock proof against it is the 
historical and cultural variability of the concept of nature and human attitudes toward 
nature. If it can be shown that our ideas of (human) nature, like all other ideas, are socio-
historically constructed, it is thought, we can always negotiate and transform them. It is 
feared that positing nature can justify an undemocratic closure of freedom.  
History is posited in the modern era as a rival to Nature as the new source of 
meaning and stability. The historian R. G. Collingwood articulates the modern historical 
spirit with the following expression at the conclusion of his book The Idea of Nature: “no 
one can answer the question what nature is unless he knows what history is . . . I answer 
the question, ‘Where do we go from here?’ by saying, ‘We go from the idea of nature to 
the idea of history.’”119 But what exactly is this thing called History? As Leo Strauss 
points out in the opening quote, the “classical distinction between nature and 
convention” was replaced by the modern antithesis of nature and history. Whereas phusis 
was commonly held to be the superior element in the classical pair, nature was 
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subordinated to the role of history in the modern worldview. A legacy of the 19th century 
historicism is the premise that we can only know what we ourselves make.120 
The influence of historicism carried onto the 20th century through disparate 
progressive intellectual currents such as existentialism, neo-Marxism, feminism, and 
postmodernism, all of which have influenced environmental theory in one way or 
another. The Hungarian Marxist scholar Lukács, for instance, defines “nature” as a 
societal category: “Nature is a societal category . . . nature’s form, its content, its range 
and its objectivity are all socially conditioned.”121 A contemporary feminist scholar 
explains the rationale behind the progressive bent toward social constructivism: “most 
feminists today are suspicious of any appeal to the notion of ‘human nature’ in 
normative or political theory” and attributes this typical feminist position to the fear that 
“appeals to nature have been used historically, and continue to be used, to rationalize 
and justify the perpetuation of oppressive gender roles.”122 
The Spanish existentialist philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, similarly, takes note 
of the modern conception of nature and discovers nothing but History beneath this 
conceptual change: 
Is it not surprising that the term ‘nature’ should have come, with unbroken 
continuity, from meaning what it meant to Aristotle to mean the law of 
phenomena? Is not the distance between the two phenomena enormous? That 
distance, be it noted, implies nothing less than the whole change in our way of 
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thinking of the universe from ancient to modern man. What then, down this 
long evolution, has remained constant in the concept of nature?123 
 
His historicism notwithstanding, Ortega y Gasset accepts the modern conception of 
nature as res extensa just as Kant does in order to save the moral dignity of man against 
the threat posed by the deterministic worldview of modern science: “Nature is a thing, a 
great thing, that is composed of many lesser things.” But humanity is not part of this 
realm of things because human beings are defined by their freedom. The thing, on the 
other hand, possesses “a given, fixed structure or consistency” accessible to physical 
examination and manipulation. Man has no such nature because “the strange reality of 
human life” is not a thing to be grasped by manual or even mental techniques: “man is 
not his body, which is a thing, nor his soul, psyche, conscience, or spirit, which is also a 
thing. Man is no thing, but a drama—his life, a pure and universal happening which 
happens to each one of us and in which each one in his turn is nothing but happening.” 
It is historical Becoming that defines man: “Man is an infinitely plastic entity of which 
one may make what one will, precisely because of itself it is nothing save only the mere 
potentiality to be ‘as you like.’” In short, human nature is ultimately protean.124  
Ortega y Gasset’s principle “man has no nature but history”—derived from the 
late 19th century German scholar Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)—is the decisive principle 
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of our times.125 Another major representative of existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, whole-
heartedly concurs: “there is no human nature . . . . Man is nothing else but that which he 
makes of himself.” Sartre opposes human freedom to the determinate influence of 
nature and professes his faith in the Kantian project: “One will never be able to explain 
one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is 
no determinism—man is free, man is freedom . . . . Our aim is precisely to establish the 
human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world.”126 
“Progressive humanism,” the French literary critic Roland Barthes similarly reminds us, 
“must always remember to reverse the terms of this very old imposture [i.e., of taking 
Nature as the ground of History], constantly to scour nature, its ‘laws’ and its ‘limits’ in 
order to discover History there, and at last to establish Nature itself as historical.”127 The 
historian Carl N. Degler summarizes the rationale behind the two-century old modern 
resistance to nature in the name of freedom which is attributed to the realm of History: 
The very emphasis upon a resistant, enduring “nature” . . . implied an 
embeddness in nature, a characteristic of all living things, of something that was 
not only beyond the will of animals but in many ways beyond the will and hopes 
of human beings, too. Human beings, along with animals, were controlled, rather 
than being in control. The very word “nature” emphasized naturalness, implicitly 
denying to a large degree humankind’s independence of the natural world. The 
very similarities between animals and human beings proclaimed the power of 
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nature even as human beings simultaneously asserted their superiority over their 
fellow creatures of nature.128 
 
The upshot of locating freedom and value in history contrasted with a 
deterministic and valueless realm of nature is the physical and spiritual distancing of 
humanity from nature.129 Karl Marx’s historical materialism is taken by certain 
environmental theorists as environmentally friendly for his considering nature as “man’s 
inorganic body” in the Manuscripts of 1844.130 This opinion is questionable however as 
Marx accepts the modern materialist devaluation of nature. This we can see in his 
criticism of Feuerbach in the German Ideology, where he says it is unrealistic to speak of a 
pristine nature. Feuerbach, according to Marx, nostalgically mistakes “the nature in 
which he lives” for an untouched “nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except 
perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent origin).” Hence, holding a romantic 
view of nature, Feuerbach closes his eyes to the reality of History, or the inescapable fact 
that Man is a collective, transformative agent. Pristine nature, “which has not yet been 
subdued by men,” notes Marx, is rapidly becoming history. It “is steadily shrinking” with 
“every new invention, every advance made by industry.” Marx then cites the case of the 
cherry-tree, which, “like almost all fruit-trees,” was “only a few centuries ago 
transplanted” into Europe to make the point that what we are left with now is merely 
“historical nature” modified by “the activity of a whole successions of generations.” 131  
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Marx’s critique of Feuerbach’s position—that “nature” exists independent of 
humanity’s material intercourse with it—has contemporary resonance in environmental 
theory. The controversy that broke over “wilderness” among environmental theorists in 
the mid-1990s can be situated within this context. Environmentalists (sympathetic to 
“deep ecology” perspective) firmly believe that patches of “wilderness” still exist in the 
world today and deserve to be protected from human encroachment, while others 
dispute the idea of “wilderness” in general and point out that natural parks that are 
touted as wilderness in the US or Africa were once inhabited by human beings. Only 
after their forceful evacuation from those lands have they become what they now appear 
as “wilderness” to ahistorical eyes.132 Steven Vogel, for instance, employed the 
historicist-constructivist position in his critique of what he takes to be the authoritarian 
tendency among radical environmentalists due to their “naturalism.” The radical 
environmentalists’ appeal to “nature” as a category outside society and history, according 
to Vogel, disguises the underlying power relationships behind environmental problems 
and shuts off the legitimate democratic process of deliberation. Vogel claims that “the 
way in which the environment that surrounds us and that we take for granted as ‘natural’ 
turns out on investigation to be the product of human labor and hence literally socially 
constructed.” To reject this view can lead to the abdication of “moral responsibility,” 
because “the social realm” is “the only source of normative justification.”133 
The position represented by historicist environmental theorists is described by 
Kate Soper as “nature-skeptical discourses” to be found not only within postmodernist 
                                                 
     132 For this debate, see William Cronon, Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York: W.W. 
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theory but also in “Marxist, socialist, or feminist positions that are highly critical of the 
postmodernist resistance to any realist or foundationalist metaphysics.”134 
Environmental theorists holding nature-skeptical arguments, who are “committed to 
postmodernist anti-realism,” nonetheless, “subscribe to the general aims of the 
ecological movement and view themselves as pursuing emancipatory projects consistent 
with it.”135 Marx’s discredited but still implicitly and widely shared progressive (if not 
dialectical) view of “History” transfers onto History the role of Nature that we find in 
pre-modern societies as a framework of order and meaning. The logical conclusion of 
prioritizing Progress or History over Nature is radical freedom and egalitarianism (i.e., 
communism) as Marx rightly understood and defended. But paradoxically more of the 
same thing can lead to the abolition of that very thing. As John H. Randall points out, 
there is no single thing or universal process that we can generalize under the name of 
History: “Histories are plural, adjectival and determinate. They are always histories of 
something, involving a selection, from the infinite objective relatedness of past events, of 
those events and relations that have been important and significant for making that thing 
what it 
specific changes with which historians deal. There are many histories—of 
                                                
is.”136  
It is by no means obvious what sort of entity can be regarded as underlying the 
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nations, of epochs, and of civilizations, of science or of industry, of the various 
arts, of legal institutions, etc.—and the question of where one can find the subject 
f history seems to be almost senseless.137 
The notion of universal history is a deeply flawed legacy of Enlightenment universalism. 
“For those who stood closer to the Enlightenment tradition, as did Comte, that which 
developed was Humanity, which transcended all national boundaries, and which shaped 
itself through progressive intellectual and moral development.”138 
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Chapter 3: Aristotle’s Conception of  Nature 
 
Aristotle’s conception of nature resonates with contemporary environmental 
thought in a peculiar way. Both Aristotle and some environmental theorists valorize 
“nature” with regard to the attainment of the good life. “Nature knows best,” according 
to a common environmentalist maxim introduced by Barry Commoner, a major figure in 
the early phase of American environmental movement.1 “Nothing contrary to nature is 
noble” says Aristotle (Pol. 1325b10). We may think that Aristotle’s nature is different 
from that of contemporary environmentalists. This is true to a certain extent but the 
underlying motives of the appeal to nature are similar. Norms are sought in both cases to 
make human life better. In both cases, “anything goes” attitude toward life is rejected. 
The most important and relevant linkage between the contemporary Western 
conception of “nature” and the ancient Greek phusis derives from the distinction that is 
immediately observable between artifice and nature. That such a distinction exists, no 
one can deny even though certain things may be both natural and artificial such as a 
bonsai tree. But what is more important it the significance and meaning of this 
distinction. In this, there is too much controversy. As Frederick J. E. Woodbridge notes, 
“the great problem of Aristotle’s system” was “how is nature to be construed so that 
both the similarity and dissimilarity between its products and the products of art to be 
understood?” This is why Aristotle’s physics is so different from modern physics:  
Modern physics with all its achievements, could not . . . modify that problem as a 
problem. It would certainly modify many of the particulars which Aristotle 
employed and modify some of them very radically indeed. But I cannot see that 
the problem itself would thereby be altered . . . . This problem . . . is just as 
                                                 




statable today as it ever was. And I doubt if we are any wiser about the solution 
of it than he was.2 
 
So what was Aristotle’s solution? There were at least two versions of the contrast 
between artifice and nature among ancient Greeks. In one case, nomos (custom, law) was 
contrasted with phusis; and, in the other, the contrasting pair of phusis is techne. In late 
modern thought, nomos and techne were merged into “culture” and “history” in 
contradistinction to nature. While the sophists of ancient Greece made much of the 
nomos/phusis contrast, Aristotle took more interest in the one between techne and phusis.3 
Aristotle observed that whereas artificial products are made by an external agent, phusis is 
an endogenous principle of motion and rest in beings that are generated. Natural beings 
are those that grow from within. Human beings on the other hand can bring about 
things into this world through their technical expertise. While some products of techne are 
purely artificial (e.g., a chair), some others are partially so. A bonsai or a garden, for 
example, is both natural and artificial. These are examples of things that come about with 
cooperation between phusis and techne. A bonsai qua tree is natural insofar as its source of 
growth lies within. To the extent its characteristic stunted growth is given by art, is 
artificial. As this example shows, Aristotle’s conception of nature does not justify the 
attempt to draw boundaries around a pristine realm of nature. But this is not because 
there is no such realm of nature left (as Marx and many other contemporary scholars 
claim), but because nature does not stand for an extended space (res extensa) within which 
human beings do not reside. The contrast between the natural and the artificial is rather 
a matter of agency that is responsible for the generation of beings enveloping us.  
                                                 
     2 Ibid., 55. 
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Human beings depend on both techne and phusis to exist. We need both culture—
whose constitutive elements are techne, nomos, ethos, and paideia—and the cooperation of 
nature to become fully human. But art and education need to be coordinated with 
nature: “all art and education wish to supply the element that is lacking in nature” (Pol. 
1337a1-2). Again in another context Aristotle emphasizes the secondary and 
complementary role of techne: “art in some cases completes what nature is unable to 
finish off, but in others imitates nature” (Ph. 199a16-7).  
Nature can be lacking in some respect because Aristotle holds a more flexible 
view of causality unlike the modern physicalist view depicting nature through iron laws 
of material necessity. In Aristotle’s teleological view, there is place for a conditional type 
of necessity in addition to the absolute or simple (haplōs) necessity at work in nature: 
“natural things . . . come about in a given way” either invariably or for the most part (Ph. 
198b35-36). Absolute necessity reigns in inanimate things that remain in the same 
condition such as the motion of the planets: “That which is necessary without 
qualification [absolute necessity] is present in the eternal things, while that which is 
conditionally necessary [hypothetical necessity] is also present in all generated things.” 
These things are explicable strictly through their antecedent causes.  
Conditional or hypothetical (ex hupotheseōs) necessity, on the other hand, operates 
in naturally generated beings as well as in techne. Living nature and techne both give birth 
to things that are yet to become (PA 639b20-640a10). Aristotle’s specific examples to the 
kind of things under conditional necessity are health and man (PA 640a5). For both 
examples, the existing condition does not pre-determine what has yet to come about in 
the future. “What will be” in relation to these can be spoken of only when certain 




the mark” in realizing their respective ends (PA 639b20-640a9; Ph. 199a33-199b5). For 
instance, a healthy body can lose its health if it is not taken care of. In the case of techne, 
if the material is flawed the craftsman might fail in producing his planned product.4  
The same hypothetical necessity must be present in the realm of praxis although 
Aristotle never explicitly states this. If a good natured child turns out to be a rogue later 
in life who is to blame? Aristotle says that we “become good and excellent through three 
things. These three are nature [phusis], habit [ethos], and reason [logos]” (Pol. 1332a40-41). 
The last two elements are clearly within the power of human beings but nature 
introduces into praxis an element in the order of hypothetical necessity. For we too are 
living beings and engage in techne. We should note that ethos here can also mean custom 
or culture, while a secondary meaning for logos is language. This reminder is necessary as 
Aristotle does not subscribe to an exclusively individualist or communitarian position in 
human affairs. He always sees human beings capable of developing their individuality 
from within the constraints of a political community rather than despite or against them. 
Hence, ethos and logos are both constraining and constitutive features of human beings. 
Aristotle does not consider human behavior purely a product of culture, for he 
believes that virtues have a natural basis in human soul, which he calls phusikē aretē 
(natural virtue) (NE 1144b1-16). Yet, these capacities have to be cultivated through 
phronesis (practical judgment) within a political setting to transform into genuine ethical 
virtue.5 In his biological works, Aristotle clearly recognizes our kinship with other living 
                                                 
     4 Aristotle elaborates the distinction between hypothetical and absolute necessity at PA 642a1-642b3 
and Ph. 199b34-200b11. For a more detailed discussion of this distinction in Aristotle’s thought, see John 
M. Cooper, “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology,” in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, eds. 
Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 243-74. 
 
     5 For an analysis of this point, see James G. Lennox, “Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue: The 
Natural History of Natural Virtue,” in Biology and the Foundation of Ethics, ed. Jane Maienschein and Michael 




beings (PA 645a3), and observes that rudimentary forms of human ethical and 
intellectual faculties are spread throughout the animate world—though unevenly: 
In the great majority of animals there are traces of psychical qualities or attitudes 
[psuchēn tropōn], which qualities are more markedly differentiated in the case of 
human beings. For just as we pointed out resemblances in the physical organs, so 
in a number of animals we observe gentleness or fierceness, mildness or cross 
temper, courage, or timidity, fear or confidence, high spirit or low cunning, and, 
with regard to intelligence [dianoian], something equivalent to sagacity [suneseōs]. 
Some of these qualities in man, as compared with the corresponding qualities in 
animals, differ only quantitatively: that is to say, a man has more or less of this 
quality, and an animal has more or less of some other; other qualities in man are 
represented by analogous and not identical qualities: for instance, just as in man 
we find knowledge [technē], wisdom [sophia], and sagacity [sunesis], so in certain 
animals there exists some other natural potentiality akin to these. The truth of 
this statement will be the more clearly apprehended if we have regard to the 
phenomena of childhood: for in children may be observed the traces and seeds 
of what will one day be settled psychological habits [hexeōn], though 
psychologically a child hardly differs for the time being from an animal; so that 
one is quite justified in saying that, as regards man and animals, certain psychical 
qualities are identical with one another, whilst others resemble, and others are 
analogous to, each other.6  
 
His well-known saying on the graduated differentiation of natural beings from the 
inanimate to the animate—scala naturae (“great chain of being”)—immediately follows 
the above statement: “Nature proceeds from the inanimate to the animals by such small 
steps that, because of the continuity, we fail to see to which side the boundary and the 
middle between them belongs” (HA 588b4-6). True, Aristotle considers human beings 
as a distinct type of animals species but “even things that differ in species are capable of 
being related as more and less” (NE 1155b15-6).  
Teleological statements attributing human characteristics or purposeful action to 
non-human beings faces the charge of anthropomorphism. The fallacy of 
anthropomorphism resides in its illegitimate attempt to interpret non-human nature 
through human categories. This stricture against anthropomorphism retains the 
                                                 




Cartesian division between an objective realm of nature which lacks subjectivity or 
agency and the human realm of subjectivity. Although teleology, anthropocentrism, and 
anthropomorphism are not the same thing, they are closely related and are often 
employed together by the modern critics of the Aristotelian view of the world.7 The 
debate over anthropomorphic language continues unabated in the contemporary study 
of animal behavior for instance.8 Interestingly, the concept of anthropomorphism, a 
product of scientific positivism, is itself norm-laden. As one scholar points out, to say 
someone’s statement is anthropomorphic is to suggest that it is primitive and naïve.9 
This type of charge meshes well with the prevailing modern scientific worldview built on 
the fact/value distinction and a physicalist picture of the world. Yet, the fact/value or 
the is/ought distinction leads to a dubious view of the world particularly in relation to 
the living world. It certainly is possible to construct abstract sentences that separate 
“facts” and “values” neatly but this abstraction is itself problematic when we confuse the 
domain of mathematics with that of animate beings. The subtleties of the living world 
can hardly be captured in abstraction. We might say the real world is not a vacuum but 
full of friction. The critics of anthropomorphism or the proponents of fact/value 
distinction are themselves guilty of being forgetful of the reality of Lebenswelt (everyday 
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life) which is ever always a “rough ground.”10 Hence, it would be ill-advised for scientists 
other than those examining the physical and chemical structure of reality to approach 
and portray the living world through deterministic causality of physics. 
3.1 Aristotle’s Anthropocentrism 
 
There is a philosophical objection to the relevance of Greek philosophy to our 
times on the grounds that ancient Greek philosophy is incompatible with contemporary 
environmental thinking. Aristotle has been largely neglected and at times criticized in 
environmental theory literature partly because of the prevalent view that Western 
philosophy in general is devoid of favorable teachings to formulate a theoretical and 
practical response to our present environmental predicament. Its roots in ancient Greece 
are typically perceived as suspect. One scholar notes, for instance, that “environmental 
philosophy is dominated by largely negative appraisals that view Greek thinking more as 
an obstacle to overcome than a source for constructive thinking” and that he himself 
previously “dismissed the relevance of Greek philosophy to these times.”11  
Negative appraisals of ancient Greek philosophy actually are made both inside 
and outside the environmental theory literature. As there are no clear-cut demarcation 
lines between academic fields, we should take note of criticisms from both 
environmental and non-environmental scholarly literature. These critics proceed in 
different ways. Some of them single out a single philosopher or a certain school of 
thought for critique. And some others make general statements as to the overall negative 
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effect of ancient Greek philosophy and/or culture on the subsequent history of 
philosophy and culture in the West. The problem with the latter kind of sociological 
analysis, looking at the impact of the whole Greek culture, is that it often results in 
sweeping generalizations and blanket judgments that fail to take account of subtle 
differences among individual philosophers of classical antiquity or the different 
competing strands within the Western tradition such as the ancients versus the moderns.  
Robert Renehan, a classics scholar, raises the stock charge of anthropocentricism 
with respect to the whole ancient Greek culture. He believes that the ancient Greek 
definition of man as a rational animal has led to the arbitrary bias against animals in the 
Western tradition: “the Greek view of man as intelligent being, set apart from the 
animals” is an arbitrary “elevation of men over animals.”12 For the adverse subsequent 
influence of this “erroneous” belief on Western culture, Renehan holds responsible first 
and foremost the ancient Greek philosophers. This deeply entrenched anthropocentric 
view, according to Renehan, is “an exceptional mode of thought in the history of man,” 
which has only recently come under scrutiny:  
The pronounced dichotomy, whereby man is rigidly opposed to other animals, 
has scarcely any rival as a characteristically Greek concept. Its significance can be 
appreciated if one reflects that only in the present century, with its increased 
interest in the scientific study of animal intelligence and communication, has a 
different attitude toward animals really begun to impose itself upon the 
consciousness of educated men.13  
 
Michael Soupios agrees with the above assessment of the ancient Greek attitude 
toward nature.14 He too discovers a “lack of ecological interest” among them so much so 
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that they “display a general philosophic indifference toward the natural environment. 
What has become a global concern for modern man appears not to have been a question 
for the Greeks.” Granting that ancient Greeks did not face serious environmental 
problems, Soupios nonetheless argues that “there was a powerful cultural idiom that 
mitigated against such orientations and . . . it may be that this same cultural perspective 
contributed, at least in part, to today’s ecological dilemma.” This cultural idiom lay in that 
the Greeks took man as “the unassailable center of their cultural consciousness” and “a 
unique and separable entity from the rest of phusis.” Aside from confusing the line 
between popular opinion and the opinion of philosophers by reducing all to one single 
culture, Soupios’ analysis also suffers from self-contradiction for he goes on to say that 
“the Greeks did not see man’s teleological involvement as unique. They recognized a 
series of such relationships at various levels in nature.”15  
David Sedley, a professor of ancient philosophy, argues more specifically that 
“Aristotle’s world is an anthropocentric world,” and concludes that “Aristotle is not a 
twentieth-century thinker.” He goes on to add that “Aristotle would not have found our 
world entirely alien” either. Behind these seemingly contradictory suggestions is Sedley’s 
view that the present “domination of the planet” to “serve man’s needs” is guided by an 
anthropocentric outlook that can be traced back to Aristotle. If Aristotle were living with 
us today, he would approve the conquest of nature and feel at home in our modern 
world. Hence, Sedley implies, our present environmental problems demand an anti-
anthropocentric vision, which cannot be found in Aristotle.16  
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Certain environmental theorists joined ranks with above scholars in blaming 
Greek philosophy or, more specifically, its course after the Socratic turn from the 
investigation of nature to human affairs. John Passmore singles out Aristotle as one of 
the major sources of the hubristic attitude toward nature. According to Passmore, the 
modern domineering attitude originates with the Greeks or, more specifically, during the 
period of the “Greek Enlightenment” “with its rejection of the concept of hubris”:  
One then finds it explicitly maintained that animal life exists purely and simply 
for man’s sake. Aristotle argues in his Politics that ‘plants are created for the sake 
of animals and the animals for the sake of men; the tame for our use and 
provision also, or for some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing us with 
clothes, and the like’. He takes this conclusion to follow necessarily from the 
premise that ‘nature makes nothing either imperfect or in vain’—as indeed it 
does follow if the test of a thing’s ‘perfection’ and ‘usefulness’ is first presumed 
to be its suitability for man’s purposes.17 
 
George Sessions, a deep ecologist, also argued that the “Socratic-Platonic-
Aristotelian counter-revolution in philosophy” led to an “exaggeration of the importance 
of man in the natural scheme of things.”18 Citing Bertrand Russell’s statement from 
History of Western Philosophy (1945)—“What is amiss, even in the best philosophy after 
Democritus, is an undue emphasis on man as compared with the universe”—Sessions 
praises the Pre-Socratic investigation of nature for avoiding anthropocentricism. Eugene 
C. Hargrove, surveying Greek philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Aristotle, similarly 
reaches negative conclusions regarding the overall Greek influence on environmental 
thinking. Their approach to natural phenomena, according to Hargrove, “prevented the 
development of an ecological perspective,” “discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of 
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     18 George Sessions, “Spinoza and Jeffers on Man in Nature,” Inquiry 20.4 (1977): 483-4. For a more 
balanced analysis of the Socratic turn from investigation of nature to human affairs, see Catherine Zuckert, 




the natural world,” and “promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature 
conceptually difficult, if not impossible.”19  
The above criticism is too hasty in attributing the “anthropocentric” bias of the 
Western tradition to Aristotle and lumping him together with the rest of “Western” 
culture or philosophy. In response, two points can be made. First, such blanket 
condemnations of the Western tradition writes off the differences within this tradition 
such as between classical and modern (political) philosophy. As the environmental 
historian Clarence Glacken noted long ago, “the historic juxtaposition of man against 
nature depends much more on modern thought and on more secular ideas.”20 The 
neglect of this critical fault line leads then to questionable generalizations such as “the 
Aristotelian-Cartesian-rationalist tradition.”21 
Leo Strauss pointed out the importance of the distinction between ancients and 
moderns throughout his writings.22 The philosophical differences between ancient and 
modern philosophers can help us to understand what is at stake in the transition from 
pre-modern to modern philosophy as well as their corresponding practical implications. 
The fundamental difference, as Strauss sees it, is that the guiding question of classical 
political philosophy for ancients was “the question of the best political order.” For 
moderns, it was “the question of method.”23 The practical implication of this change was 
                                                 
     19 Eugene Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 21. 
 
     20  “Man against Nature: An Outmoded Concept,” in The Environmental Crisis: Man’s Struggle to Live with 
Himself, ed. Harold W. Helfrich, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 130. 
 
     21 Peter G. Brown, “Are There Any Natural Resources?” Politics and the Life Sciences 23.1 (2004): 14. 
 
     22 See, for instance, “On Classical Political Philosophy,” in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An 
Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
49-62;  and The City and Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 1-12.  
 
     23 Strauss, “On Classical,” 50-2; cf. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago 




that “the questions of whether or not science is essentially theoretical and whether or not 
technological progress is in need of strict moral or political control” were set aside by 
“the modern project” “to enable man to become the master and owner of nature 
through the intellectual conquest of nature.”24  
Second, the locus classicus of Aristotle’s “anthropocentric teleology,” the well-
known passage from Book I of Politics, is often taken out of context. Aristotle notes that 
for grown [i.e., natural] things as well one must suppose both that plants exist for 
the sake of animals and that the other animals exist for the sake of human 
beings—the tame animals, both for use and sustenance, and most if not all of the 
wild animals, for sustenance and other assistance, in order that clothing and 
other instruments may be got from them. If, then, nature makes nothing that is 
incomplete or purposeless, nature must necessarily have made all of these for the sake of human 
beings.25 (italics mine) 
 
We need to first note that Aristotle’s use of the term “nature” in the last sentence similar 
to God is an exception in view of the rest of his corpus. Soupios takes heed of this fact: 
“the Greeks seem to have approached the concept of nature in a fundamentally different 
way than modern man. Specifically, the Greeks did not possess a holistic view of nature 
as the sum total of all things in time and space, i.e., nature as the entire physical universe, 
including plants, animals, and man.” But he draws a questionable conclusion: “In short, 
the Greeks had nothing analogous to the modern notion of ‘Mother Nature.’ ”26 This is 
questionable because it can be taken to mean that our modern notion of nature 
superseded the Greek notion. 
                                                 
     24 Strauss, Natural Right, 23; and Strauss, The City, 3-4, 42-3. 
 
     25 Pol. 1256b15-23. 
 




The term “nature” in contemporary usage carries “a collective sense for the sum 
total or aggregate of natural things” outside mind.27 In this regard, it is quite similar to 
Descartes’ res extensa opposed to res cogitans. Neither Aristotle nor other Greek 
philosophers used the term phusis primarily in an aggregate sense or when they seemed to 
have used it in this sense, it was meant as “the region of mutability and generation” in 
the sublunary world which included the human beings as well.28 A recent commentator 
notes that, “Nature with a capital N, a quasi-person circumspectly and wisely arranging 
the world” does not feature in Aristotle.29 Phusis was much more commonly used as a 
principle of explaining the phenomena of generation, change, and destruction that 
characterize non-artificial beings: “the noun physis . . . does not mean some object or 
material thing, but a coming-to-pass, an event, a directing activity.”30 The Greek 
philosophers disagreed among themselves in their accounts of phusis but they were at one 
in not using it in an aggregate sense. 
To qualify what I have just said, it is not totally true that the word phusis was not 
used by the Greeks in a broader sense at all. For example, in the sentence quoted in the 
previous chapter from Philolaos—“Nature in the ordered universe was composed of 
unlimited and limiting elements”—the usage of phusis has a collective and spatial 
connotation. But this was not the primary sense in which it was commonly put to use. 
For the broader sense of nature, the Greeks rather employed the word kosmos.31 Yet, 
                                                 
     27 James A. Weisheipl, Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. William E. Carroll (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1985), 2. 
 
     28 Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, [1935] 1997), 451. 
     29 Otfried Höffe, Aristotle, trans. Christine Salazar (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003),75. 
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kosmos does not render phusis irrelevant for our purposes since our notion of nature is 
still partially derived from the Greek phusis.  
Second, it is often forgotten that Aristotle makes the above statement 
incidentally within the context of his discussion of chrematistike and oikonomia. Aristotle 
observes here that nature has to “furnish subsistence for each being brought into the 
world” (Pol. 1258a35-6; see also 1256b7-15). Aristotle is here talking about the food 
chain (or web). No one can deny that all living beings including human beings are 
entitled to make use of plants and animals for their survival. Aristotle’s words must be 
interpreted as acknowledging this natural reality.32 Aristotle certainly concerned himself, 
following Socrates, with the “human things.” But in Aristotle, as Leo Strauss observes, 
“the ‘human things’ were distinguished from the ‘divine things’ or the ‘natural things’ 
and the latter were considered absolutely superior in dignity to the former.”33 Aristotle 
questions the common view that regards human beings as “the highest thing in the 
cosmos” (NE 1141a23). If anything, Aristotle’s view can be labeled as “cosmocentric” 
whereas the modern turn from the classical tradition is actually truly “anthropocentric.”34 
The classical worldview shares a lot in common in this sense with other non-Western 
pre-modern traditions. Tu Weiming, for instance, describes the Confucian tradition as an 
“anthropocosmic worldview, in which the human is embedded in the cosmic order” in 
                                                 
     32 For a more nuanced interpretation of this passage, see Richard Shearman, “Aristotle the 
Environmentalist? Reconsidering Politics I.8,” in Philosophy and Ecology, Vol. I, ed. Konstantine Boudouris 
and Kostas Kalimtzis (Athens: Ionia Publications, 1999), 163-75. 
 
     33 Strauss, “On Classical,” 60. One passage that Strauss cites from Aristotle for this interpretation is 
NE 1141a20-b9. 
 
     34 See Leo Strauss, “Progress or Return?” in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to 





contrast to “an anthropocentric worldview, in which the human is alienated . . . from the 
natural world.”35 In Plato’s Laws, the leading character defends a similar view: 
The supervisor of the universe has arranged everything with an eye to its 
preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active or 
passive roles according to their various capacities. These parts, down to the 
smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been put under 
the control of ruling powers that have perfected the minutest constituents of the 
universe. Now then, you perverse fellow, one such part—a mere speck that 
nevertheless constantly contributes to the good of the whole—is you, you who 
have forgotten that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with 
a life of prosperity [eudaimôn]. You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you exist for 
the sake of the universe.36 (italics mine) 
 
Max Oelschlaeger now rightly cautions us against neglecting the ancients: “By 
denying any constructive role to the Greeks, environmental philosophy appears to 
sunder itself from the intellectual roots of philosophy.”37 Similarly, the editors of a 
recent volume on environmental ethics note that scholars in this field actually attempt to 
revive “the ancient understanding of nature as normative and prescriptive, as providing 
material or content for moral reflection.”38 The present study follows in the steps of 
current scholarship in environmental theory that re-visits its neglected or 
underemphasized roots in the Western tradition of moral and political philosophy. As 
environmentalists deplore the loss of natural and human habitats in the countryside, they 
must likewise be concerned with this kind of intellectual amnesia. Although major ideas 
are not ultimately determined by historical incidents, nonetheless they have historical 
                                                 
     35 See “The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World,” 
Daedalus 130.4 (2001): 243-44. 
 
     36 In Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 903b-c. 
See also Hannah Arendt’s argument against the anthropocentrism of Plato in The Human Condition 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 157-59, 166-67. 
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backgrounds as they are not invented out of thin air. We do not begin to think on 
fundamental questions ab initio. We rather re-form our thinking in relation to the 
antecedent ideas we inherit from the past. The contemporary body of thought on 
environmental ethics and politics is inescapably implicated in the perennial and trans-
cultural debate over our place in the great scheme of things with respect to techne and 
nature. For clarity on the “fundamental questions” of this debate that the opening quote 
from Leo Strauss refers to, ironically, there could be no philosopher timelier than 
Aristotl
sical antiquity was, as we learn from Aristotle 
(Physics 
e.  
The word “nature,” and probably its equivalents in non-European languages too, 
clearly has different senses. One of these is “essence” or the distinctive quality of 
something. When we encounter things in the world that we are not familiar with, we 
naturally tend to ask “what is it?”. The answer that we seek for this question is an 
attempt at distinguishing the “essence” of what we are seeing. Yet, some answers may 
fail to capture the essence of our object. They may be totally off the mark or half-way 
true. In the opening quote, the German philosopher Heidegger is cautioning us against a 
less essential conception of phusis that overemphasizes its material dimension. One of the 
exponents of this sense of nature in clas
II.1), was Antiphon the Sophist.  
Heidegger hints that the materialist conception has been revived in the modern 
age by Antiphon’s successors. He further implies that there is a more essential sense 
which has been lost in the course of Western philosophy after Aristotle. The task of the 
rest of this chapter is to attempt at a recovery of this lost sense of nature through special 
attention to Aristotle’s concepts of energeia and entelecheia. Heidegger’s analysis can help 




that has gained ground in the modern era. The twin concepts of energeia and entelecheia are 
central to Aristotle’s attempt to construe nature in a dynamic and unitary fashion. They 
also hold the key to the harmony of nature and man. A clear understanding of the 
historical shift from Aristotle’s conception to that of Antiphon, as Heidegger frames it, is 
critical to our understanding of the contemporary environmental praxis. The contrast is 
not meant as an exercise in nostalgia but in understanding which, I hope, will show us 
the que
 politics needs to know in some 
way the
and politics because of the alleged “metaphysical biology” underlying or informing it.39 
stion concerning the environment at its roots.  
To retrieve Aristotle’s relevance for contemporary environmental politics, we 
need to piece together his conception of nature from his writings on ethics, politics, 
physics, biology, and psychology. What, I hope, will eventually emerge from this inquiry 
is Aristotle’s natural conception of human life that does not alienate human beings from 
the rest of nature. This conception, I argue, can be based on Aristotle’s ontological 
concepts of energeia (actuality) and entelecheia (actualization) both of which are central to 
his conception of nature as well as praxis. We can see the normative relevance of these 
concepts in Aristotle’s characteristic definition of human beings in terms of their energeia 
of the soul in accordance with virtue (NE 1098a17-8) and of soul in general as “the first 
entelechy of a natural organized body” (De An. 412b25). Their political relevance is also 
implicit in Aristotle’s remark that “one who is skilled in
 things that concern the soul” (NE 1102a18-9). 
I must say a few words regarding the objection raised against Aristotelian ethics 
                                                 
     39 This is a common interpretation in contemporary Aristotle scholarship but by no means uncontested. 
For example, Alasdair MacIntyre makes this observation in his After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 139, 152. In this influential work, MacIntyre tries to 
“supply a teleological account which can replace Aristotle’s metaphysical biology” (p. 152). He retracted 




For, there is much historical confusion around the word “metaphysics” that is needless 
to introduce into our discussion. Suffice it to say that the calls for a “post-metaphysical” 
anything in our day can have no clarity as to what this thing “metaphysics” that needs to 
be overcome is. I rather hold the minimalist position that Aristotle’s works outside ethics 
and politics—such as De Anima, Physics, and Metaphysics—can be helpful in illuminating 
his discussions of ethics and politics at certain points. But one should not go as far as 
disregarding the relative autonomy of these fields. In an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s 
“biological motivation,” another scholar points out rightly that key concepts of 
Aristotle’s theory such as potentiality and actuality, final cause, as well as the notion of 
phusis do not necessarily indicate  a strong predilection toward biology but rather 
Aristotle’s “pretheoretical interest in the characteristics of living things.”40 The fact that 
he widely makes use of these concepts in his writings does not mean that he smuggles 
biological concepts into other fields of study but that he sees the world “like an animate 
individual or a biological ecosystem.”41  
True, Aristotle holds different domains of philosophical inquiry such as ethics, 
politics, logic, physics, and biology separate so it would be a mistake to reduce Aristotle’s 
discussions in one field to those in other fields. This would violate the relative autonomy 
of each field that Aristotle himself respects and emphasizes. Two responses can be made 
to this objection. First, we should not overlook the fact that these fields are not 
completely autonomous content-wise as Aristotle’s frequent references to energeia in 
several of his writings including ethical ones indicate. So the degree of disciplinary 
                                                                                                                                           
biology to be possible” (p. x). Still, he holds to the position that Aristotle’s ethics presupposes 
“metaphysical biology.” 
(Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999): “I now judge that I was in error in supposing an ethics independent of 
     40 Daniel W. Graham, “Some Myths about Aristotle’s Biological Motivation,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 47.4 (1986): 545. 
 




autonomy is determined according to the purposes of our inquiry which is something 
Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes. Now, the burden of the present inquiry is on praxis, 
which, according to Aristotle, calls for persuasion rather than demonstration. But we live 
in an age in which we face a greater challenge in this regard than Aristotle himself faced 
in his day. Aristotle could easily assume familiarity among his audience with his other 
writings, the Greek language, other Greek philosophers, and the whole historical 
background they are situated in. As we live in a different time period, we cannot afford 
to do that however. Not only that but also Aristotle’s approach has to now compete 
against its modern rivals like those of Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Marx. To meet the 
greater challenge of persuasion then, we need to be more explicit about his discussions 
on praxis. One area that needs extra emphasis for this purpose is to explain why 
Aristotelian ethics and politics can be less alienating than its modern counterparts. The 
key to this task lies in a better grasp of his key concepts energeia and entelecheia, which are 
“at the 
                                                
heart not only of his definition of motion, but of all his thought.”42  
Understanding the role of these concepts in Aristotle’s ethical and political 
thought can be useful in other respects as well. First, we can counter the modern critique 
that neither Aristotle nor other ancient Greek philosophers were aware of modern 
morality.43 Second, these concepts can be instrumental in learning how to handle ethics 
without opposing it to “nature” interpreted as the realm of inert matter and determinism. 
 
     42 See Joe Sachs, “Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, June 
15, 2006, http://www.iep.utm.edu/.  
 
     43 See the discussion in Julia Annas, “Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality,” in James E. Tomberlin, 
ed., Philosophical Perspectives 6, Ethics (1992): 119-32. As a critic of the modern depreciation of the ancients, 
Annas observes that “there is a fairly widespread attitude that ancient theories of virtue and the good life 
are concerned not with what we take to be morality, but with something different, an alternative which can 
be labelled ethics” (p. 119). This sense of radical difference can either be employed to valorize the modern 
perspective or criticize it. Hegel, one of the early claimants of this difference, claims that the Greeks were 
“ethical without being moral” for not knowing what “conscience” is. See Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 




Third, we can gain insight into the inconclusive debate in environmental theory over 
nature’s “intrinsic value.” As one scholar notes, speaking of “nature as having intrinsic 
value” is foreign to ancients since “the separation of nature’s ‘value’ from nature is 
unintell
s own philosophy of Being or his interpretation 
of the Western tradition of philosophy. 
                                                
igible—they do not exist separately in this metaphysical landscape.”44   
Aristotle’s dynamic conception of nature founded on energeia and entelecheia is 
much more open to the qualitative dimension of nature, and can throw more light on 
our environmental sensibilities than the physicalist model of nature we have inherited 
from the modern scientific worldview. The environmental usage of the concept of 
“nature” often attributes subjectivity or agency to “nature” which is not reconcilable 
with the materialist conception of nature.45 The contemporary desire expressed in 
environmental theory to re-connect with nature is more compatible with Aristotle’s 
conception of nature. To this purpose, I will introduce a not well known essay of 
Heidegger on the concept of nature in Aristotle.46 My discussion of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle will remain limited to the notions of phusis and energeia. Hence, 
I will not try to venture into Heidegger’
 
     44 Michael Bonnett, “Notions of Nature,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 37.4 (2003): 581. This point 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
     45 Some environmental theorists insist that nature can have subjectivity or agency; see Thomas Heyd, 
ed., Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
 
     46 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of in Aristotle’s Phusis Physics B I,” trans. Thomas 
Sheehan, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also 
his Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1995); and Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, 
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20; and Trish Glazebrook, “From Phusis to Nature, Technē to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, 
and Newton,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38.1 (2000): 95-118; and Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and 




3.2 The Manifold Senses of Nature 
 
Aristotle defines phusis in Ph. II.1 as an immanent source of motion and rest in 
beings which can move by virtue of themselves as opposed to deriving their source of 
movement from an external impulse as artifacts do. It is important to note that motion, 
according to Aristotle, includes not only local motion (phora) but also qualitative changes 
as alteration, growth, and decay, and quantitative changes as increase and decrease. In 
Meta. V.4, Aristotle presents us with six inter-related senses of phusis. One of them is 
“the genesis of growing things [hē tōn phuomenōn genesis].” As Aristotle notes, the word 
phusis shares the same etymological root as the passive verb phuesthai (to grow) in the 
preceding definition as well as the transitive phuein (to bring forth, to make grow).47 It is 
also noteworthy that phusis in this sense is closest to the Latin natura (derived from nasci) 
as the latter shares the same Proto-Indo-European root g’ene- or g’nē/g’nā (to give birth, 
to be born) with the Greek word genesis.  
According to a second sense, phusis is the immanent part of a growing thing such 
as a seed. The third sense is similar to the one Aristotle provides in Ph. II.1. It refers to 
the source of the immanent movement in each natural being. A fourth and common 
sense is hulē (the primary thing out of which a natural being grows or an artifact is made). 
The fifth is ousia (beingness) of natural beings. By this, Aristotle is referring to eidos (form) 
and morphē (shape) which defines hulē into a natural being (e.g. animals and their parts). 
The sixth sense, according to Aristotle, is derived from a metaphorical extension of the 
                                                 
     47 Similarly, the Greek word phuton (plant, tree) derives from the same root. According to etymologists 
that phusis had originated from the Proto-Indo-European root bheu- which had given rise to numerous 
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fifth. According to this, every ousia is in a certain way phusis because ousia is phusis.48 In 
the end, Aristotle sums up all these six senses under a primary and governing one which 
is similar to the one he provides in Ph. II.1: “the ousia of things which have in 
themselves, as such, a source of movement.” Hence, phusis is “the source of the 
movement of natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially 
[dunamei] or in complete reality [entelecheia]” (Meta. 1015a13-19).  
                                                
3.3 Energeia and Entelecheia 
 
Aristotle often uses energeia, and occasionally entelecheia, in juxtaposition to 
dunamis— another critical concept of his philosophy rendered into English as 
“potentiality” or “potency” both of which are derived from the Latin term potentia. Both 
dunamis and energeia (or entelecheia for that matter) are central to Aristotle’s account of 
motion and change, and consequently to his notion of phusis. Aristotle frequently resorts 
to the ontological terms energeia and entelecheia in his discussions on ethics, animals, and 
beings in general. These two concepts are central to understanding the plurality and unity 
of nature at one and the same time. Aristotle scholars have taken note of the difficulties 
posed by the translation of these terms as well as their relationship to one another. Part 
of the difficulty stems from the fact that these words were Aristotle’s own coinage as 
they do not appear in the extant Greek literature prior to Aristotle. The most typical 
translations for energeia as “activity” or “actuality” and for entelecheia as “actualization”—
all of which are derived from the Latin term actus—have been found deficient or 
misleading by some scholars.  
 
     48 This last sense is the source of the much dreaded notion of “essentialism” as ousia is typically 
rendered into English as “essence” (derived from the Latin essentia) and at times as “substance” (derived 
from the Latin substantia). As we will see below, Heidegger rejects both of them arguing that the separation 




Heidegger has been especially critical of the legacy of the Latinization of the 
original Greek terms claiming that this event has shaped the subsequent 
(mis)understanding of the Greek philosophy.49 Another critic, Joe Sachs, points out that 
the word “actuality” can misleadingly suggest to English readers “reality” rather than 
“activity,” whereas the word “activity” can reduce Aristotle’s broader understanding of 
activity to one kind of activity in which only external motion is observable. Thinking, 
which appears to most of us as the epitome of passivity, is on Aristotle’s account a type 
of energeia. So Sachs renders energeia as “being-at-work,” possibly following Heidegger’s 
earlier unorthodox German translation as “Im-Werk-Stehen” (standing-in-the-work).50 
“Being-at-work,” although sounds somewhat awkward, allude to the etymological, and 
possibly the conceptual, connection of energeia to another Greek word ergon (deed, work) 
as Aristotle himself points to this derivation (Meta. 1050a21-23).  
The problem with using “actualization” for entelecheia, on the other hand, as one 
scholar puts it, is that the term “actualization” not only is unclear as to whether entelecheia 
in Aristotle’s thought is referring to the process or product of a motion, but also does 
not help our thinking through the subtleties of Aristotle’s conception of motion.51 
Unlike energeia, Aristotle does not give us a clue as to the etymological origin of entelecheia 
or its definition. Still, it is apparent that Aristotle derived it from a combination of Greek 
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words. According to one possibility, these words are en (in), telos (end), and echein (to 
have) and its translation would be “having an end within.”52 Joe Sachs, on the other 
hand, translates entelecheia as “being-at-an-end” as he believes Aristotle possibly derived 
the word by adding the adjective entelēs (complete) to the verb echein (to continue to be) 
to underlie the combined force of “completeness” and “continuity.”53 The question of 
the conceptual relationship between energeia and entelecheia similarly has been subject to 
debate in Aristotle scholarship. The prevailing view is that Aristotle uses these terms to 
signify the same thing from different aspects. At one point, Aristotle uses them within 
the same sentence: “For the ergon is the telos, and the energeia is the ergon. And so even the 
word energeia is named from ergon, and extends toward [sunteinei pros tēn] entelecheia” (Meta. 
1050a21-23). When Aristotle uses both terms earlier in the same book, he relates the two 
terms with the verb suntithēmi (to put together) suggesting their affinity (Meta. 1047a30).54  
3.4 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Conception of Phusis 
 
Heidegger’s relevance to us in this context is not directly on the ethical and 
political aspects of Aristotle’s thought. As well-known, Heidegger directed most of his 
philosophical attention to an ontological question. His primary concern was to 
understand the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiende) or the obscure unity underlying the 
manifoldness of beings which he thought was a fundamental question to be examined 
before throwing ourselves into the midst of beings. In this endeavor, he drew upon the 
Pre-Socratics as well as Aristotle. Although his fascination with the Pre-Socratics is well 
                                                 
     52 See George A. Blair, “The Meaning of ‘Energeia’ and ‘Entelecheia’ in Aristotle,” International 
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established in Heidegger scholarship, his interest in Aristotle’s thought has remained 
relatively underemphasized until recently—at least in the English speaking world. With 
the recent translation of his essays on Aristotle into English, Heidegger scholars have 
begun to pay more attention to Aristotle’s profound influence on him.55  
Heidegger’s philosophical debt to Aristotle should not come as a surprise 
though, as it is well-known that it was Franz Brentano’s work on Aristotle which set 
Heidegger on his philosophical path.56 Heidegger praises Aristotle highly so much so 
that he considers Aristotle to be the last great philosopher: “Aristotle was not followed 
by anyone greater.”57 Heidegger shows a special fondness for Aristotle’s works Physics 
and Metaphysics; the former is the “foundational book of Western philosophy.”58 And in 
his exegesis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he remarks, “With Aristotle the greatest 
philosophical knowledge of antiquity is expressed, a knowledge which even today 
remains unappreciated and misunderstood in philosophy.”59 Heidegger’s high regard for 
Aristotle stems from his view that Aristotle brought the wisdom of the Pre-Socratics to 
its completion.60  
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Heidegger prefaces his essay on Aristotle’s conception of phusis first by noting 
that the Romans translated phusis as natura, and then surveying the different ways the 
word “nature” has been put to use within the Western tradition. Immediately after these 
prefatory remarks, Heidegger warn us against being swept away by the historiographic 
pedantry of tracing the etymologies without noting fundamental shifts in meaning. The 
importance of Latin natura and its Greek predecessor phusis for us does not stem from 
our curiosity into their diverse historical usages but lies in the fact that they frame our 
understanding of, and relationship to, beings as a whole: “this fundamental word of 
Western metaphysics harbors within itself decisions about the truth of beings.”61 Here, 
Heidegger is alluding to his view that truth is a matter of ontology rather than of “logic” 
as we understand it. According to this unconventional view, which should not preoccupy 
us here, truth is not the correspondence of our statements with the outside world but the 
ever-present ground of Being. For our purposes, it is more important to note that 
Heidegger is trying to make the point that the way we understand and represent “nature” 
shapes our attitude toward other beings. For instance, technological approach to nature, 
according to Heidegger, “renounces any claim to knowing and grounding truth as 
such”.62  
Heidegger begins his painstaking exegesis by pointing out the connection 
Aristotle makes between phusis and kinēsis (motion). Heidegger prefers to render kinēsis 
into German as Bewegtheit (“state of movedness”) rather than as what one would expect, 
namely Bewegung. The latter term corresponds to “motion” or “movement” in German. 
Heidegger’s rationale in coining a new word for kinēsis is that Bewegung (or “motion” in 
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English) does not account for the fact that a living being, according to Aristotle, can still 
be at work even when it remains in state of rest.63 This point, as we will see below, is 
crucial for Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of phusis. The import of 
Aristotle’s making the connection between phusis and kinēsis, as Heidegger emphasizes, is 
that being moved (Bewegtsein) is not an external attribute of natural beings but integral to 
their mode of being. Before examining this connection in more detail, Heidegger briefly 
takes up the question of “natural beings.” How does Aristotle identify “natural beings”? 
Aristotle’s well-known quick answer is that some beings such as animals, plants, the parts 
of their bodies, as well as the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water are natural 
because their cause (aition) is phusis (Ph. 192b8-11). Heidegger points out that Aristotle’s 
word aition should not be taken lightly, especially not in terms of an efficient cause. 
Aristotle rather means by aition, according to Heidegger, something to this effect: “that 
which is responsible [verschuldet] for the fact that a being is what it is.”64 Aition in this 
broad sense refers to “the origin of things” (archē), which includes but is not reducible to 
the modern notion of causality. 
Heidegger translates and interprets Aristotle’s next sentence “all of them 
obviously differ from the things not put together by nature” in a very unusual way. He 
renders the Greek verb sunestōta (“put together”) in German through his own terms Stand 
(stand) and Bestand (stability). According to Heidegger, das Ständige (the stable)—the 
common element for both terms—is key to the Greek understanding of beings and 
suggests two things: (1) whatever, of and by itself, stands on its own, and (2) the 
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enduring. The former meaning was carried into the Latin term substantia. Das Ständige, 
Heidegger warns us, should not be confused withmodern notion of “object” (Gegenstand). 
For the latter term of ours implicated in the subject/object distinction is foreign to the 
Greek thinking of being according to Heidegger. This point is central to Heidegger’s 
analysis of modernity: “beings can be experienced as objects only where human beings 
have become subjects, those who experience their fundamental relation to beings as the 
objectification—understood as mastery—of what is encountered. For the Greeks, 
human beings are never subjects, and therefore non-human beings can never have the 
character of objects [Gegenstandes].”65  
Next, Heidegger turns his attention to Aristotle’s use of archē in his 
characterization of natural beings being moved on their own (Ph. 192b13-5). This word, 
according to Heidegger, not only means “source” or “origin,” but also “control” 
(Herrschaft) or “ordering” (Verfügung). To emphasize this interplay of meaning between 
these two sets of meaning, Heidegger comes up with the interchangeable phrases 
“originating ordering” and “ordering origin” to characterize phusis. Heidegger’s lexical 
wizardry bears fruit immediately in his acute observation that, “plants and animals are in 
movedness [Bewegtheit] even when they stand still and rest.” This is so “because rest is a 
kind of movement [Bewegung]; only that which is able to move can rest.”66 Heidegger then 
points out the richness and fullness of Aristotle’s notion of motion, which is not 
exhausted by the concept of “locomotion” (phora) as we noted earlier, and contrasts it 
with “the mechanistic thinking of the modern natural sciences” in which locomotion is 
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treated as the basic form of movement.67 Furthermore, Aristotle’s notion of locomotion 
is different from the modern conception of locomotion in that Aristotle takes note of 
the peculiar configuration of places around beings as opposed to the “infinite space” of 
Newton’s modern science “that is everywhere homogeneous and nowhere distinctive.”68 
These are interesting but preliminary discussions for what is to come in the rest 
of the essay. The decisive point Heidegger is heading toward with these points is that 
phusis, according to Aristotle, must be understood in terms of ousia as “a kind and mode 
of presencing [eine Art und Weise der Anwesung].”69 By  Anwesung (“presencing”), Heidegger 
means “coming forth into the unhidden, placing itself into the open.”70 Presencing is of 
the same nature as Being (Sein). We see this equation when he later rephrases the same 
point: phusis “is not a being [Seiende] but a manner of being [eine Art des Seins].”71 Hence, 
phusis through natural beings always points to or refers back to ousia. At this point, we 
may wonder whether Heidegger is reading into Aristotle rather than trying faithfully to 
explain him. Heidegger is ready to answer our objection. He holds the view that every 
translation is already an interpretation.72 To pretend that translation does not involve 
interpretation is worse than admitting its inevitability beforehand. Understanding cannot 
take place, Heidegger insists, if we merely carry over Aristotle’s words into our language 
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without placing ourselves into the Greek. “An interpretation must go beyond what can 
be found in the text at first glance.” 73 
Heidegger then makes a cryptic reference to Antiphon the Sophist: “The 
doctrine of Antiphon and of his successors, who have continued in an unbroken line 
down to today, seizes upon the most extreme non-essence of phusis and inflates it into 
the real and only essence. In fact, such inflation remains the essence of all nonessence . . 
. . But let us leave this nonessence to its own ruin.”74 This comment is made in relation 
to Heidegger’s understanding of phusis as ousia in Aristotle. According to Antiphon, the 
phusis of  a being is nothing but its hupokeimenē hulē—the material substratum out of 
which it grows or is made (Ph. 193a9-29). If the being in question is an artifact, say, a 
bronze statue, its phusis is bronze or if there is a still more basic element underlying 
bronze then phusis or ousia is that indeterminate element. The determinate form (eidos) or 
shape (morphē) of a being does not add anything substantial to its phusis. Likewise, the 
phusis of a natural being lies in its elemental composition rather than in its superficial 
form. Aristotle, however, argues against Antiphon by noting that if the form of bronze 
statue comes from art and is considered to be art, then the form of a human being 
comes from, and must be likewise considered as, phusis. What is noteworthy in this 
disagreement is that whereas Antiphon does not heed the distinction between an artifact 
and a natural being, Aristotle does as he recognizes Antiphon’s illegitimate move from 
an artifact to natural beings. As Heidegger notes, Antiphon’s erasure of the difference 
between artifacts and natural beings was adopted by modern metaphysics, which 
“conceives of ‘nature’ as a ‘technique’ such that this ‘technique’ that constitutes the 
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essence of nature provides the metaphysical ground for the possibility, or even the 
necessity, of subjecting and mastering nature through machine technology.”75 
Heidegger pays considerable attention to Aristotle’s disagreement with Antiphon 
as he believes this is of decisive importance. What is at stake, as Heidegger sees it, is 
nothing less than the question of the Being of beings. Heidegger points out that 
Antiphon’s position is tantamount to what we today know as “materialism.”76 As 
Heidegger notes, Antiphon misses Aristotle’s insight that kinesis is integral to natural 
beings and distinguishes them from artifacts. This neglect in turn leads to a major error 
or distortion regarding the question of the Being. This blind spot, also shared by 
Antiphon’s modern successors, is the forgetfulness of the beingness that phusis ever 
always presupposes. Both Antiphon and his modern successors try to explain (away) 
Being through beings as opposed to what Heidegger takes to be Aristotle’s correct 
reverse procedure of understanding beings through Being.77  
Heidegger then draws our attention to Aristotle’s emphatic point that morphe 
corresponds to phusis to a greater degree than hule because “a thing is more properly said 
to be what it is when it has attained to fulfillment [entelecheia] than when it exists 
potentially [dunamei]” (Ph. 193b6-8). Heidegger translates Aristotle’s key term entelecheia as 
das Sich-im-Ende-Haben (having-itself-in-its end) and points out that it is the fundamental 
word of Aristotle’s thinking.78 The same thing goes for energeia as Heidegger sees no 
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crucial conceptual distinction between the two in Aristotle other than showing kinesis 
from different aspects.79  
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of phusis in terms of kinēsis 
and ousia can appear to be stretched at times, but this should not detract from the 
significance of the refreshing interpretation he is attempting to provide us with in place 
of the long-standing ossified sedimentation of Aristotle scholarship. Heidegger’s task is 
particularly important as the rejection of Aristotle in the modern era is largely based on 
this inadequate Latin interpretation. I believe the most important insight that we can 
learn from Heidegger’s interpretation is his emphasis on Aristotle’s rich and dynamic 
characterization of phusis. As Heidegger observes, this way of understanding phusis has 
been lost or neglected after Aristotle. Although there might be exceptions to his 
overstatement judging the two-and-a-half millennia of Western philosophical tradition, it 
still rings true with respect to the modern conception of nature.  
Nature in Aristotle is not an extended realm. It can only be metaphorically 
spoken of as the domain of natural beings or natural generation (i.e., “the region of 
mutability and generation”). Yet, we can hardly set the boundaries of this domain except 
in speech. The realm of human art and nature are increasingly mixed together, but this is 
not the dreaded “end” of nature. According to Heidegger, to say that nature is 
conquered, despoiled, or destroyed is to misunderstand and misrepresent what “nature” 
truly is. If we understand “nature” the way Aristotle interprets phusis, then “nature” 
cannot be seen as a being to be changed or destroyed. Nature as ousia is indestructible 
whereas natural beings are not. Since our lives are relatively dependent on the well-being 
of other natural beings—either an individual one, say, a cow, or a collective one, say, a 
                                                 




forest or a lake—we have natural interests in taking care of their well-being. But we also 
have an interest in nature as ousia to the extent we admire and revere other natural beings 
without their immediate benefits to our physical well-being.  
The debate over anthropocentricism or the intrinsic value of nature in 
environmental theory literature can take a different color if seen in the light of Aristotle’s 
conception of phusis. What is at work in nature, according to Aristotle, is not simply 
inanimate matter moving through chance and necessity. There is rather an underlying 
order behind the way phusis unfolds or presents itself as Heidegger puts it. From this 
perspective, we are not in a position to assess the “value” of nature—be it intrinsic or 
instrumental. The importance of nature as ousia cannot be captured through the word 
“value” borrowed from the vocabulary of classical economists. We can certainly judge 
the instrumental “value” of other natural beings to us, which is not altogether possible to 
avoid if we are to survive. Yet, we should not be forgetting to pay our respects to nature 
as ousia, which is central to lead a good life. It is this forgetfulness or blindness that lies at 
the core of Heidegger’s criticism of modernity as embodied in its technological drive to 
see everything natural as ready-to-hand for production.  
Let us now briefly attend to ethical and political implications of energeia and 
entelecheia, which will be examined in the next chapter in more detail. Aristotle’s well-
known saying “man is a political animal” (zôon politikon) not only exemplifies Aristotle’s 
rejection of a radical discontinuity between the human realm and the rest of animate 
existence, but more importantly hints at Aristotle’s dynamic view of human life.80 
Despite our connection with animals, Aristotle does not ignore the distinctive nature of 
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human beings. On many occasions, he remarks that only human beings are capable of 
nous (intellect) and dianoia (thinking). Logos and nous constitute the telos of human nature 
(Pol. 1334b14-15). These qualities are superior to sense-perception and physical motion 
which we share with other natural beings. Aristotle poses the unique nature of human 
beings in terms of “the work [ergon] of a human being,” which, he believes, must 
distinguish them from other animal kinds. Aristotle claims that this special work can be 
seen in the “being-at-work [energeia] of the soul in accordance with virtue [arēte]” (NE 
1098a17-18). Aretē, which can also mean excellence, can only be achieved within a group 
of people united under the commitment of mutual benefit and justice. Hence, Aristotle’s 
characterization of human beings takes into consideration not only our natural features 
but also ethical and political ones. Both ethical and political aspects of human life are 
natural in a secondary sense, namely, human beings can complete their natures only 
through an ethical life lived within a political setting.  
The superiority of human beings vis-à-vis other animals is not unconditional for 
Aristotle. Only when guided by a true sense of justice we become truly human: “Man, 
when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the 
worst of all” (Pol. 1253a31-33). Here, we can see the role of energeia in Aristotelian 
conception of ethics. Human beings are born potentially human but they are yet to 
achieve their full actualization. This should be compared with the modern view that 
human faculty of freedom and morality makes them superior to other animals. One of 
the precursors of historicism, Johann G. Herder, in his Reflections on the Philosophy of the 
History of Humankind (1784–91), declares man as the king for his capacity of morality 




king. For he can still choose, even though he chooses the worst.”81 This statement 
reflects the modern reification of dunamis and contradicts Aristotle’s natural 
understanding of human beings through energeia.  
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Chapter 4: Aristotle’s Conception of  Praxis 
This chapter introduces Aristotle’s normative account of praxis with a special 
emphasis on his discussion of virtue.1 My goal is to lay the groundwork for next chapter 
in which I take issue with the use of “value” as a moral notion in contemporary 
environmental theory.2 The notion of virtue has been at the center of moral and political 
philosophy throughout the premodern era since Socrates. With figures in the early 
modern era such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, we witness the sidelining of “virtue” due to 
the increasing belief in the futility of virtue in conducting political affairs. Today, 
Aristotle’s conception of praxis is generally considered to be superseded by the modern 
conception of morality and politics protecting, respecting, and nurturing individual 
“autonomy.” 
The progressive historicist argument against Aristotle’s contemporary relevance 
at best acknowledges that his ideas were perhaps feasible in a bygone era which featured 
the now obsolete institutions such as city-state and repugnant customs such as slavery 
and sexism.3 A recent commentator on Aristotle has noted the contemporary skepticism, 
with which he disagrees, as follows: “We expect to find a world alien to us in Aristotle’s 
ethics and political philosophy, because we assume that the subject matter treated in it—
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morals, right, and politics—has changed radically since antiquity.”4 Part of the skepticism 
stems from Aristotle’s “outdated theoretical premises such as a teleology of nature, 
theories about the cosmos, and other ‘metaphysical’ elements.”5  
The initial departure from Aristotle, as we observed in previous two chapters, 
can be traced back to the scientific developments in the seventeenth century. It 
continued in the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment movement, and culminated 
in positivism and historicism in the last two centuries. Immanuel Kant’s work represents 
the prime example of the Enlightenment opposition to Aristotle on the basis of moral 
universalism (or cosmopolitanism) and the fact/value distinction or, in Kantian terms, 
phenomena/noumena. As we shall see later, those who subscribe to these two tenets of 
modern philosophy—universalism and positivism—are not unjustified in their 
skepticism toward Aristotle’s ethics and politics because Aristotle’s conception of praxis 
contradicts both of these views. But sidestepping Aristotle neither invalidates nor refutes 
his account of human praxis; it can rather lead to blind spots in the conduct of praxis.  
Today, progressives seem to forget that Aristotle had a comeback in the post-
Kantian period in the works of Hegel, Marx, and later, Heidegger.6 True, these figures 
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did not try to revive Aristotle in full but rather borrowed from him selectively to develop 
their own accounts of praxis. Still, the fact that they could not ignore Aristotle after a 
hiatus of almost three centuries attests to the endurance of Aristotle’s account of praxis. 
Two centuries after Hegel and Marx, it is to Aristotle’s account of praxis again that 
scholars are turning as the Hegelian and Marxist views of history have been largely 
discredited except for small pockets of resistance throughout the world.7 The blind spots 
of modern conceptions of morality and politics have been most recently discussed in the 
literature of “postmodernism” as well as in the context of the communitarian/liberalism 
debate. The critics of universalism and positivism have based their arguments on a neo-
Aristotelian conception of praxis emphasizing the role of the contingent and the 
particular in human affairs. Some of the following discussion will necessarily overlap 
with these debates but my immediate aim is to bring out the relevance of Aristotle’s 
account of praxis with respect to contemporary environmental theory.  
As the discussion of what is right has overshadowed the notion of the good in 
modern moral discourse, the notion of “virtue” has fallen through the cracks. The 
superfluity of virtue found expression in Kant’s saying, “As hard as it may sound, the 
problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils (so long as they 
possess understanding).”8  
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Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could be made secure, 
even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and 
balances. Institutional and procedural devices such as the separation of powers, a 
bicameral legislature, and federalism would all serve to block would-be 
oppressors. Even if each person pursued her own self-interest, without regard 
for the common good, one set of private interests would check another set of 
private interests.9 
 
For Aristotle, however, the attainment of good governance in politics is inseparable from 
the attainment of civic virtue: “Whoever takes thought for good management [eunomia], 
however, gives careful attention to political virtue and vice. It is thus evident that virtue 
must be a care for every city, or at least every one to which the term applies truly and not 
merely in a manner of speaking” (Pol. 1280b5-8). Aristotle puts great weight on virtue 
because, unlike Kant, he does not believe that good governance can take place “where 
the laws have been well enacted yet are not obeyed” (Pol. 1294a3-4). It can only take 
place when the institutional hardware of politics is complemented by the civic software 
of virtues.  
As one critic of liberalism observes, the “talk of ‘virtue’ immediately strikes the 
modern ear as somehow illiberal, certainly antiquated, perhaps perverse.”10 Virtue, for 
us, is at best supererogatory—something nice to have but not really mandatory to dwell 
on. This neglect has been interpreted as a major weakness of modern liberal democracy 
by its friendly critics identified somewhat crudely as “communitarians.” One 
commentator expresses the basic message of the communitarian critique of liberalism: 
“liberalism depends on virtues that it does not readily summon and which it may even 
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stunt or stifle.”11 Most communitarian critics attack liberalism because they think that the 
reluctance or resistance to “virtue” to protect individual autonomy is self-defeating. The 
resulting social problems resulting from anomie are much worse than the oppressive 
nature of character-building.  
The obedience that Aristotle talks about can be brought about through 
compulsion (fear), incentives (utility), or virtue (choice). Among them, virtue is the rarest 
possibility as Aristotle himself recognizes, and yet it would be a mistake to ignore the 
decisive role of those members of every society who are willing to take the noble route 
to attain their ends. These members, present in every human society, hold ideals or ends 
above the acquisition of wealth and power. Virtue is the guiding star for these high-
minded individuals. Without attending to the concrete virtues of individuals—whether 
public or private—a general, universal, or abstract recognition of or dedication to 
universal rights, equality, and freedom can neither guide nor illuminate human praxis. 
The modern skepticism toward virtue is understandable since there is always an element 
of hypocrisy in vacuous moralistic posturing; and hypocrisy is the surest way to bring 
discredit on ethical conduct as Aristotle himself notes: “words that concern things in the 
realm of feelings and actions are less believable than deeds are, and when they are 
discordant with what is perceived, those who say them are despised and discredit the 
truth along with themselves” (NE 1172a34-1172b2). Still, words are of “great benefit” to 
those who are willing and ready to be instructed in these matters (NE 1095a10-12). 
Virtue-skepticism is also prevalent among (liberal progressive) environmentalists 
as we witness much rights-talk but barely any serious engagement with virtue in their 
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quarters with the exception of environmental virtue ethics which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Writing on environmental virtue ethics, an environmental scholar notes 
that although environmentalism is deeply infused with “virtue language,” 
environmentalists who consider themselves as progressives are not comfortable with 
being associated with an old-fashioned tradition so much so that they express surprise to 
find themselves in the same camp with preachers of virtue: “Those of us who count 
themselves among the still largely countercultural activists who cultivate respect and love 
of nature in their daily lives—in other words, those who provide the practical base of 
environmental ethics—will more likely experience shock at this realization.”12 Indeed, 
most environmental scholars nowadays prefer to speak of “attitudes” and “values” to 
draw attention to the normative dimension of environmental issues. For instance, the 
environmental scholar J. Baird Callicott claims that “anything short of a philosophical 
overhaul of prevailing attitudes and values toward nature” would fail to the address the 
roots of ecological disease that afflicts our civilization.13 
The concepts of “attitude” and “value,” however, are merely impoverished and 
residual versions of the ancient vocabulary at the center of which lies the concepts of 
“virtue” and “vice.” This can be seen in the way the term “attitude” is commonly 
defined. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, for instance, the word “attitude” 
describes “settled behaviour or manner of acting, as representative of feeling or 
opinion.” An environmental scholar further defines it as “a cultural stance, a position 
                                                 
     12 Louke van Wensveen, Dirty Virtues: The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Ethics (Amherst, NY: Humanity 
Books, 2000), 6. 
 
     13 J. Baird Callicott, ed., Companion to A Sand County Almanac: Interpretive & Critical Essays (Madison, WI: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), ix, italics mine. The notion of “value” or “values” appear 
especially in environmental economics and sociology literatures; see Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff, 
“Environmentalism, Values, and Social Change,” The British Journal of Sociology 32.1 (1981): 92-110; and 




one takes vis-à-vis the world. . . . Attitudes imply experience and a certain firmness of 
interest and value.”14 Aristotle uses two terms that are similar to the term “attitude” in 
meaning: diathesis and hexis. The former is typically translated as “disposition” and the 
latter as “habit.” The difference between diathesis and hexis lies in that the former is a 
condition that can be easily and quickly changed whereas hexis suggests more stable and 
long-lasting behavior of a certain quality (See Cat. 8b25-9a9). According to Aristotle, 
both virtue and vice are kinds of hexis. 
The reason for contemporary predilection for the term “attitude” and “value” is 
modern skepticism toward the connotations of “virtue.” There is “the stigma of 
sounding old-fashioned, preachy, and self-righteous” and the hypocritical equation of 
virtue with (or its reduction to) female chastity throughout history.15 As we shall see 
below, Aristotle uses, in his discussion of virtue, certain terms corresponding to both 
“attitude” and “value.” The term “value” or “values,” on the other hand, is an extremely 
ambiguous one that can be a substitute for a number of more traditional terms such as 
“good,” “ends,” “mores,” “ideals,” and “norms.”  
Revisiting Aristotle’s account of praxis and recovering his vocabulary in light of 
environmentalism can help us in three ways. First, we can situate the language of 
environmentalism within a tradition. It is important to remember that environmentalism 
has a “conservative” mission even if it is spearheaded by progressives: to preserve, 
protect, and save the natural and cultural heritage. This mission can hardly be 
accomplished if we do not see ourselves as part of  an existing tradition of thought and 
practice. The second problem with adopting the vocabulary of “attitudes and values” in 
                                                 
     14 Yi-Fu Tuan, Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values (New York: Columbia 
University Press, [1974] 1990), 4. 
 




environmental discussions is not simply the fact that they render “virtue” and “tradition” 
invisible, but there is a hollow ring to them when they are employed in a survey analysis 
mode.16 Environmental scholars (mostly sociologists) attempt to capture empirically the 
fluctuation of public attitudes toward environmental issues without defending the 
normative conceptual framework of assessing whether these attitudes are sound or 
showing how they can be made sound if they are unsound.  
A third point of environmental interest in Aristotle’s analysis of praxis can be 
found in the fact that environmentalism actually promises to enact this account in a 
more fundamental way by providing meaningful real-life venues for the development of 
certain virtues such as moderation, justice, and prudence. Aristotle puts a premium on 
performing rather than preaching virtues: “by performing just actions one becomes a just 
person and by performing temperate actions one becomes a temperate person, and no 
one is going to become good by not performing these actions” (NE 1105b9-13). 
Whether it is lifestyle environmentalism or environmental activism in the public sphere, 
people do and can find opportunities to learn and enact virtues of moderation, justice, 
and prudence through informed environmental choices that they make on a daily basis. 
The fact that this aspect of environmentalism has been missed by so many 
environmental theorists, who rather insist on inventing a new environmental ethic, 
justifies the present attempt to redress the balance. Again, I shall discuss this proactive 
aspect of civic environmentalism in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
     16 See, for instance, P. Wesley Schultz et al., “Values and Their Relationship to Environmental Concern 
and Conservation Behavior,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 36.4 (2005): 457-75. Paradoxically, this 
terminology is predominantly in use in environmental studies conducted in two logically opposite 
academic fields at the same time. I have in mind the subjectivist field of psychology and the anti-
subjectivist field of sociology. A possible reason for this coincidence of opposites is the artificial separation 
between “individual” and “society” in the name of academic specialization. What falls through the cracks 




To recall the opening quote from Heidegger, the task of environmentalism 
should not be seen or set as inventing a new ethic but rather as altering the 
“relationships which actually appear regularly in living morality.” For the explicit 
normative outlook of a collective must not be treated as something that can be 
engineered or detoured overnight. It can rather be reformed from within, and this 
requires patient engagement with the “living morality” of a collective. In short, what we 
need is not a wholly new set of values for any given collective—be it a certain society, 
the West, or humanity—but re-invigoration and re-orientation of traditional virtues in 
every society. I have more to say on this topic in the following chapters. In this chapter, 
I shall start with a general overview of Aristotle’s account of praxis, and address its major 
components—ethics and politics—separately afterwards with a particular focus on their 
psychological orientation. 
4.1 What is Praxis? 
 
As pointed out in previous chapters, Aristotle is recognized as the first 
philosopher in the Western tradition to suggest certain guidelines to distinguish praxis, 
poiesis, and theōria (contemplation) from one another.17 Corresponding to these different 
domains of human activity are the intellectual faculties that these activities require: 
phronēsis (practical judgment/wisdom), techne, and sophia (wisdom), respectively.18 To be 
sure, the terminology is not Aristotle’s; it was already in use in the Greek philosophy and 
                                                 
     17 As I have briefly discussed in Chapter 2, one major contemporary political theorist who capitalized 
on this aspect of Aristotle is Hannah Arendt. For a discussion of praxis in Aristotle’s conception of 
political science, see also Stephen G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political 
Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), Ch. 2. 
 




literature before him. Aristotle’s contribution in this regard was to consider their 
distinctive purposes and relationships with one another.19  
These distinctions are essential to Aristotle’s understanding of praxis. The typical 
English translation of praxis as “action” or more literally as “practice” is merely 
preliminary to recover the rich meaning it has for Aristotle. The term “action” is more 
limited than Aristotle’s usage of the term praxis—in a way similar to the reductive 
assimilation of Aristotle’s kinesis into the modern notion of “motion” as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The term praxis carries an additional sense of “doing” or activity 
derived from the Greek verb prattein (“to do”). Hence, the activities of “living well” (eu 
zen) and “doing well” (eu prattein) would not count as “action” in current usage, but they 
do in the broader sense of praxis. 
Without going into the details of each of the aforementioned activities and their 
corresponding faculties, suffice it to say that these distinctions allow Aristotle to treat 
ethics and politics independent of the demands of scientific exactness and technical 
expertise. The faculty of episteme (science) is a part of sophia—the other part being nous 
(intuitive intellect)—seeking precise theoretical understanding of invariable things, 
whereas the faculty of phronesis (from the verb phroneō—to think) deals with “things that 
are so for the most part” (NE 1094b20; see also 1104a1-10). This quintessential 
Aristotelian phrase “for the most part” suggests that “a thing done [prakton],” unlike the 
object of episteme, can be expected to be regularly occurring but not aei (ever present) like 
planetary motion or gravity. For what is done is “capable of being otherwise” (NE 
                                                 
     19 The question of whether Plato, before Aristotle, had drawn similar distinctions and respected their 
differences is debated among Plato scholars. On this question, see Stanley Rosen, “Technē and the Origins 
of Modernity,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, eds. Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and 
M. Richard Zinman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and David Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom: 




1140b3). For instance, a certain course of action which may achieve its goal at a certain 
time may fail on another occasion due to the ever changing circumstances.20 Aristotle’s 
conception of phronesis and praxis in this manner underscores two things: (1) that human 
affairs are constituted by contingent decisions, conditions, and actions, and cannot for 
this reason be approached in a scientific or technocratic spirit, and (2) that human beings 
are willing authors of their own (non)actions: 
For what results from the necessary is necessary; but the results of the contingent 
might  be the opposite of what they are; what depends on men themselves forms 
a great portion of contingent matters, and men themselves are the sources of 
such contingent results. So that it is clear that all the acts of which man is the 
principle and controller may either happen or not happen, and that their 
happening or not happening—those at least of whose existence or non-existence 
he has the control—depends on him. But what it depends on him to do or not 
to do, he is himself the cause; and what he is the cause of depends on him. (EE 
1223a1-9)21 
 
Phronesis differs from techne in another way. Techne too is concerned with things 
that can be otherwise, but praxis carries its end or outcome within itself whereas poiesis 
seeks an external result or product: “For the end of making is different from itself, but 
the end of action could not be, since acting well [eupraxia] is itself the end” (NE 1140b6-
7; see also 1139b1-3). It is easy to envisage this difference when we think of a house built 
by an architect. House-building or architecture clearly represents a case of poisesis/techne 
for Aristotle. But what about the case of a sick doctor healing herself? Assuming the 
treatment is successful, would her recovered health still be considered an external result? 
Aristotle says, “yes, indeed, it would” (Ph. 192b22-32). In this ambiguous case, the 
                                                 
     20 Aristotle enumerates these circumstances of human action in NE III.1: “who is acting, what it is 
concerned with or consists in, and sometimes also with what (such an instrument), for the sake of what 
(such as saving a life), and in what manner (such as gently or violently) it is done” (1111a2-7).  
 
     21 To overlook this difference would be tantamount to a category mistake, possibly, with serious 
practical consequences. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason 




patient happens to be a doctor at the same time; but the cured illness or the regained 
health is external to her being a doctor and internal to her being a patient. So by 
“external” Aristotle does not necessarily mean physical separateness but one that is seen 
logically separate or held in speech. Although illness and treatment co-exist in the same 
person in this example, the state of illness is nonetheless external to the art of medicine. 
It is not due to her medical expertise that the doctor falls sick but rather for being a 
living being already vulnerable to illness. This is also partially true for the healing process. 
If nature does not cooperate, the art cannot bring about the healing on its own. 
Aristotle often connects phusis and techne in a teleological way: “For example, if a 
house were something that came into being by nature, it would come about in just the 
way it now does by art, and if things by nature were to come about not only by nature 
but also by art, they too would come about in exactly the same way as they do by nature” 
(Ph. 199a12-15). However, phusis differs from poiesis in having the source of motion in 
itself. In this regard, phusis is closer to praxis. Aristotle’s differentiation of praxis from 
poiesis with respect to the locus of its end suggests that praxis replicates phusis in a way 
that poiesis does not. To be sure, all three—praxis, phusis, and poiesis—are purposive for 
Aristotle but the first two, unlike poiesis, are identified as having their sources and ends 
within.  
We should note however that Aristotle does not observe these distinctions 
strictly throughout his work. He occasionally lumps together praxis proper and 
poiesis/techne under the broader category of intelligent human action in contrast to phusis. 
These passages especially occur in contexts when he wants to stress the goal-directedness 
of nature contra the Pre-Socratic philosophers who rather portray nature in terms of 




between praxis and poiesis in terms of where their ends are located. A relevant passage in 
this regard in which the above quote is also located is Ph. II.8-9. Arguing against 
Empedocles in this passage, Aristotle concludes that “in the way that one performs an 
action, so also are things by nature, and as things are by nature, so does one perform 
each action unless something interferes. But one acts for the sake of something, and 
therefore what is by nature is for the sake of something” (Ph. 199a10-11). After saying 
this, as an example of human action, Aristotle mentions the construction of a house, 
which clearly falls into the category of techne/poiesis. The reason for this occasional lapse 
must be sought in the irrelevance of the internal/external distinction (between the ends 
of praxis and poiesis) to Aristotle’s purposes in this context.22 Hence, this is a generic or 
broader sense of praxis in relation to phusis. 
Yet, there are further difficulties in Aristotle’s usage of praxis even when we 
consider it in the limited sense of ethical and political actions. There are at least two ways 
Aristotle uses praxis in this limited sense. Although he himself never says so explicitly, 
we can infer from his discussions that one of these uses is paradigmatic and primary for 
Aristotle, and the other is derivative of the former. Aristotle gives us a hint of 
paradigmatic actions in Meta. Θ 6. In this passage, praxis is distinguished from kinesis: 
“that movement [kinesis] in which the end [telos] is present is an action” (1048b22-23). 
Hence, praxis is subsumed under the more general category of kinesis. There are 
complete and incomplete motions. Certain forms of movement such as “making thin, 
learning, walking, building” are incomplete at any instant in the process of their coming 
                                                 
     22 Although Aristotle frequently compares techne with phusis and vice versa, his analogy is meant to 
emphasize the intelligibility underlying both nature and human action in a broader sense. See Herbert 





into being during which their end is not realized yet. These activities have to be brought 
to a terminus to attain their goals.  
Hence, all sorts of poiesis are incomplete motions for they do not possess the kind 
of internal ends that we see in the case of praxis. Productive processes are incomplete 
(atelēs), which is to say, they aim at a yet-to-be-realized product or result (1048b28-33). 
As examples of paradigmatic action, Aristotle mentions cognitive or psychic activities 
such as seeing, understanding, thinking, living well, and being happy.23 For all these 
actions, the activity is indivisible and complete at any instant. They do not have to come 
to a halt in order to accomplish something: “at the same time we are seeing and have 
seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought . . . we are 
living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy” (1048b23-27). The 
work of all these things—eye, mind, soul—is nothing more than their own activity. 
Nothing further issues from them. They have their effect immanently and 
simultaneously with their activity.24  
But what about ethical and political actions? Which category do they belong to? 
Aristotle frequently refers to ethical and political actions as praxis in both Politics and 
Nicomachean Ethics. On several occasions, Aristotle points out that for an action to be 
virtuous, it has to be chosen for its own sake: “And those activities are chosen for their 
                                                 
     23 Cf. Ronald Polansky, “Energeia in Aristotle’s Metaphysic IX,” in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy V: 
Aristotle’s Ontology, ed. Anthony Preus and John P. Anton (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), 211-25. 
Polansky notes that Aristotle’s examples all pertain to the psychical activities of living things (pp. 216-17).  
 
     24 The fact that we would hardly call Aristotle’s paradigmatic activities such as seeing and thinking 
“action” today should not count against Aristotle’s account of human action. For we, like Aristotle’s 
contemporaries, tend to think of action in terms of its concrete effects. Even back then effective erga (deeds) 
were contrasted with logoi (words) in common usage. Aristotle is not unaware of this; yet, he believes it to 
be mistaken: “the active way of life is not necessarily being in relation to others, as some suppose, nor 
those thoughts alone as being active which arise from activity for the sake of what results, but rather much 
more those that are complete for the sake of themselves, and the sorts of study and ways of thinking that 
are for their own sake” (Pol. 1325b15-20). This statement is one of the earliest expression in the history of 
political philosophy that asserts the primacy of vita contemplativa over vita activa which has retained its 




own sake from which nothing is sought beyond the being-at-work; and actions in accord 
with virtue seem to be of this sort, performing actions that are beautiful and serious is 
something chosen for its own sake” (NE 1176b6-8).25 However, in the latter parts of 
both Politics and Nicomachean Ethics, we witness a puzzling shift in Aristotle’s argument—
relatively more pronounced in NE 10.7-8 but is not absent from Pol. 1325a15-31. 
Towards the end of each text, after spending so much time with noble or beautiful 
(kalos) actions chosen for their own sake, which we today label as “moral,” Aristotle 
asserts somewhat unexpectedly the superiority of contemplation to ethical and political 
actions and the instrumentality of the latter to the former in view of the ultimate end, 
namely happiness. Aristotle’s this move has generated much debate among 
contemporary scholars. Its implications are often interpreted as contradicting the notion 
of modern morality and politics as autonomous spheres.26 
It is important to note that the puzzle can be partially resolved if we take into 
account the fact that Aristotle has two limited senses for praxis one of which is derivative 
of the other and he switches back and forth between them without warning us. Aristotle 
scholars have noted Aristotle’s use of praxis in two senses but my interpretation differs 
from them. Heinaman tries to sever the link between the two limited senses of praxis 
whereas I suggest that they remain related. Heinaman errs, I believe, when he says that 
Aristotle could not be saying that “contemplation is a praxis” because Aristotle makes 
this very assertion in Politics VII.3: “Happiness is a sort of action” (1325a31) and “is to 
                                                 
     25 See also Arendt, 153-59, 206-07; and Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in 
Modern Philosophy and Aristotle (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 262-74. 
 
     26 For commentary on this point, see, for instance, the articles by Thomas Nagel, J. L. Ackrill, and John 
McDowell on eudaimonia in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1980). Some scholars have attempted to reconcile these two seemingly conflicting 
tendencies in Aristotle. See, for instance, Amélie O. Rorty, “The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle’s 




be regarded as acting well” (1325b13) and if “acting well is the end, so it [theōrias kai 
dianoēsis] too is a certain action [praxis]” (1325b21).27 O’Connor, on the other hand, 
explains Aristotle’s referring to eudaimonia and theoria as praxis through Aristotle’s 
political purposes. According to him, Aristotle’s assimilation of activity to action is 
rhetorical as he is trying to mediate “the conflict between the ‘hyperactivist’ partisan of 
politics and the ‘quietist’ partisan of philosophy.”28 However, O’Connor ignores the fact 
that Aristotle uses this analogy even in his non-political writings.29 I am more in 
agreement with Ronald Polansky’s explanation. Polansky avers that the indivisibility and 
completeness of paradigmatic actions apply to the derivative actions as well: “Since our 
choice and action presuppose the cognition of the form of what is to be done, there is 
indivisibility and completeness as with cognitive energeiai.”30  
Ethical and political actions are derivative of paradigmatic actions on the one 
hand and resemble productive actions on the other. Although they have—unlike 
poiesis—their sources within, their ends still partially lie outside them. Although virtuous 
actions are done for their own sake, we are still moved to those actions because of 
external conditions that we find ourselves in. In a sense, we are obliged to choose those 
ends as ends. Both derivative actions and productive activities—natural and technical—
are types of coming-into-being. Unlike paradigmatic actions, such as seeing and thinking, 
these are not complete nor self-sufficient. Understanding of this point is central to make 
                                                 
     27 Robert Heinaman, “Activity and Praxis in Aristotle,” in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XII, ed. John J. Cleary and William C. Wians (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1996), 98. 
 
     28 David K. O’Connor, “The Ambition of Aristotle’s Audience and the Activist Ideal of Happiness,” in 
Action and Contemplation, eds. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 124. 
 
     29 See Ph. II.6 and Meta. Θ 6. 
 
     30 Comment on Robert Heinaman in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 




sense of Aristotle’s purpose in both works, which is ultimately to show that derivative 
actions—ethical and political ones—will always be one step short of the self-sufficiency 
or completeness of paradigmatic actions that they naturally strive after. This may not be 
happy news for us as happiness is one of these paradigmatic actions but, unlike us, 
Aristotle does not underestimate the difficulty of living a truly fulfilling life. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Aristotle’s distinction between 
phronesis/praxis and techne/poiesis. First, whereas the former pair conveniently comes under 
the rule of instrumental logic, even the derivative type of praxis does not fully abide by 
this logic. This is because they are more in tune with paradigmatic actions. Their coming-
into-being aims to partake in the energeia of paradigmatic actions. Conflating praxis with 
poiesis may result in ethical and social confusion such as seeing others as mere means to 
our ends. Now, Aristotle did not explicitly pose the Kantian categorical imperative of 
humanity in this way. He does not actually think that human beings can be considered as 
ends except on one occasion (i.e., Ph. 194a33-6). The talk about treating others as “ends 
in themselves” would be a category mistake for Aristotle. Yet, his account of human 
action discourages instrumental behavior toward others by suggesting that there is a 
social relationship of nobility in addition to that of necessity or use. To be sure, some 
degree of instrumental behavior is inevitable as most of our superficial daily interactions 
with other human beings are necessarily tinged with instrumentality. In our hectic lives, 
we seldom have the time or will to move beyond it. But we would make a major mistake, 
Aristotle would say, if we think that we would be living a truly human life without ever 
acting according to the non-instrumental logic of praxis: “life is action, not production” 




pleasure that we humanly strive after can only result from praxis rather than instrumental 
interactions. 
Aristotle registers this point when he compares three ideal-types of friendship in 
NE VIII and EE VII, which are distinguished teleologically according to what one seeks 
in a friend: utility, pleasure, or virtue. To sum up Aristotle’s rich discussion on this issue, 
as every sensible person would concur, only the friendship based on virtue must qualify 
as genuine friendship. The major feature of this type of friendship is its consistency, 
completeness, and continuity. Short of physical separation or death, there is hardly any 
reason for the cessation of this type of friendship. The one based on utility, on the other 
hand, falls farthest away from it as friends of such kind can easily get sour on their 
relationships if they realize that they are not profiting from it as much as they once used 
to. The friendship of pleasure has an element of each of the other two. It resembles true 
friendship in being motivated by pleasure that comes from an immanent energeia as 
opposed to the satisfaction dependent on an external product of utility (NE VIII.4).31  
The second important lesson of poiesis/praxis difference is that praxis in its 
immanent mode shares something in common with the natural activity of living beings.32 
As J. A. Stewart notes, it is “the relation of phusis, rather than that of technē, to the Good” 
which Aristotle examines in NE: 
Human life at its best is no mere device, or means, adopted by man for the sake 
of something beyond itself and better. The eudaimōn lives, and there is nothing 
better than his life. His nature is a logos, or organism, orthos, balanced in all its 
                                                 
     31 What is most interesting about Aristotle’s typology of friendship is that we tend to confuse today 
“morality” with what Aristotle takes to be genuine friendship. The realm of ethical action for Aristotle is 
much more qualitatively nuanced than our contemporary understanding of morality. I shall return to this 
in the next chapter. 
 
     32 Now, Aristotle compares techne to phusis in a positive manner much more frequently than he does 
with praxis (see, for instance, GA I.22, PA 639b15-, Ph. 199a10-199b34). By doing so, he does not 
however erase their differences. He is clear on the major difference between them which is the fact that 




parts, and containing like the nature of a tree, its own archē and telos within 
itself—freely initiating functions, in the performance of which it treats itself 
‘always as an end and never merely as a means.’33 
 
Praxis can be characterized as entelecheia (having-itself-in-its-end) peculiar to human 
beings. Indeed, Aristotle throughout the Nicomachean Ethics characterizes (paradigmatic) 
praxis as energeia (being-at-work), which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is a very close 
equivalent of entelecheia. Praxis is not something that animals are capable of—although 
animals too have their own entelecheia—since sense-perception (aisthēsis) on its own is not 
adequate to engage in it (NE 1139a19-20). It rather requires phronesis, which is 
discernment that is acquired from long hands-on experience concerning deed (prakton), 
and belongs to those capable of deliberating about “the sort of things that are conducive 
to living well as a whole” as opposed to a part of it such as health or strength (NE 
1140a25-30). Aristotle’s well-known sayings “man is a political animal” and “the city is 
by nature” must be interpreted in the light of this continuity between phusis and praxis. 
Man extends his entelecheia or energeia beyond the level of perception, which other higher-
level animals as well possess, into a realm that is necessitated by the human possibility of 
choice. Now I turn to a more detailed discussion of the psychological elements of 
Aristotle’s account of praxis. 
4.2 The Psychological Underpinnings of Praxis 
 
In this section, I shall address the meaning of “ethics” and “politics” for 
Aristotle and suggest that there is a psychological dimension to them that have lately 
attracted many contemporary scholars. Two initial clarifications are in order before we 
begin. Since Aristotle’s treatment of ethics has not gone unchallenged after him, there 
                                                 
     33 John A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 4; 




have come to be in the history of philosophy several models of ethics—grouped 
according to the name of the schools of thought they belong to (e.g., Stoicism, 
utilitarianism), or their founders (e.g., Epicureanism, Kantianism), or their central 
concerns (e.g., consequentialist, deontological). As a result of this proliferation, 
Aristotle’s account has become one among others, which, today, is often classified as 
eudaimonistic or virtue ethics because of the centrality of these notions to Aristotle’s 
discussion. Furthermore, Aristotle’s version of virtue ethics is one among many. There 
have been since then competing or complementary versions of virtue ethic—ancient and 
modern. The fact that there are different approaches does not, however, mean that their 
subject matter is different. They all attempt to give an account of the same thing, namely, 
what we mean by “morality.” In one way or another, they all address questions like what 
it means to be “moral” or “ethical” and why it is important. In this section, I shall 
attempt to outline Aristotle’s take on these questions.  
 In his ethical works Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle situates “the 
ethical” (ēthikos) within the context of human aspiration for good life. This aspiration was 
commonly identified by ancient Greeks as living well (eu zēn) and doing well (eu prattein).34 
This is how Aristotle also defines eudaimonia—often translated as “happiness” or 
alternatively as “flourishing.”35 He observes that there must be something sweet even in 
mere living that makes human beings desire it so long as life does not become too 
                                                 
     34 Although these two works of Aristotle cover almost the same ground, scholars have noted certain 
differences between them in terms of detail or emphasis. I will make use of both of these texts insofar as 
they can illuminate one another. I do not, however, intend to get into the contemporary scholarly debate 
over the question of which of these works represent Aristotle’s mature work and definitive statement on 
ethics. Suffice it to say that the scholarly consensus leans toward NE but the British scholar Anthony 
Kenny has lately questioned this consensus; see his The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between 
the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); and Aristotle on the Perfect 
Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).   
 




painful for them (Pol. 1278b25-30). Yet, mere living is never enough for human beings 
except under dire circumstances. Aristotle point this “extra” spice of life by repeatedly 
qualifying the activity of living (zen) and doing (prattein) with various normative adjectives 
like kalos (beautiful, fine, or noble), agathos (good), eu (well), or eudaimon (happy).36 As 
Woodbridge puts it, ethics for Aristotle is “the knowledge of that practice which 
mediates the passage from living to living well.”37  
Happiness is not an unsurprising point of departure in a treatise on praxis—
although it is for Kantianism as Kant takes “duty” rather than “natural inclination” as 
the proper focus of morality—since this is how most ordinary and wise people would 
characterize human aspirations. In this way, we are not obliged to begin our inquiry into 
“ethics” by postulating a transcendental nowhere as Kant does to save morality from the 
incursion of empiricist science. We are natural beings born into political groups with 
more or less similar desires and expectations. Hence, our beginning must not be 
estranged from such commonplace dynamics of everyday life.38 Aristotle’s dialectical 
method always begins with the reputable opinions (endoxa) of his time period and 
proceeds with successive phases of the refinement of these opinions. At the beginning of 
his treatise Topics (100a30-100b23), Aristotle describes his dialectical method as follows:  
reasoning . . . is ‘dialectical’, if it reasons from opinions that are generally 
accepted [endoxa] . . . . Those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted 
by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers—i.e. by all, or by the 
majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them.  
                                                 
     36 For the occurrence of these adjectives, see, for instance, Pol. 1252b30, 1256b32, 1278b22, 1323b1, 
1323b31-32; NE 1095a19, 1098b22-4.  
 
     37 Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Aristotle’s Vision of Nature, ed. John H. Randall, Jr. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1965), 95. 
 
     38 As Stephen G. Salkever notes, this difference from Aristotelian ethics applies not only to Kantian 
deontology but also to Benthamite/Millian utilitarianism: “the assertion of a special and autonomous 
moral point of view, a perspective quite different from the world in which we ordinarily live, one which 





Aristotle often pays respect to even the common opinions of ordinary people, as he 
believes that we learn things concerning praxis by deriving the universals from our 
experience of particulars: “one ought to pay attention to the undemonstrated statements 
and opinions of people who are experienced or old . . . for by having an eye sharpened 
by experience, they see rightly” (NE 1143b10-14). For the same reason, Aristotle says, 
the inexperienced young (in heart or in age) are not good in the actions of life with 
which ethics and politics are concerned (NE 1095a1-11, 1142a13-19). 
In NE I.4, Aristotle says that the common opinions of his time—refined or 
not—are all agreed in singling out happiness as the most desirable good that praxis can 
aim at. The agreement stops there however. Regarding what this most desirable good 
consists of or how it is attained, there are numerous conflicting versions. Even the same 
person can—knowingly or not—commit to different accounts of happiness in different 
periods of her life or even within the same time frame. Yet, leaving aside their minor 
differences, most answers—and we should add that this must hold not only for 
Aristotle’s time but all times and places that human beings have lived together—can be 
categorized into three ideal-types: pleasure, wealth, and honor.39 In NE I.5, Aristotle 
quickly knocks out wealth and honor in their claims for holding the key to happiness. 
Wealth is ruled out because money-making is clearly an instrumental activity for 
something else such as pleasure and prestige.  
                                                 
     39 Spinoza, for about two millennia after Aristotle, would make the same observation: “For most things 
which present themselves in life, and which, to judge from their actions, men think to be the highest good, 
may be reduced to these three; wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure.” See A Spinoza Reader, ed. Edwin 
Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3. In case “honor” may sound to our ears archaic—
from a bygone age of chivalry—we should only reconsider what we possibly mean today by terms such as 
“prestige,” “status,” or “recognition.” Needless to say, apart from technical nuances among them, they 
refer more or less to the same social good of one’s “standing” or “reputation” relative to others in a shared 




What about honor and pleasure? First, Aristotle notes that honor and pleasure—
compared to wealth—can more justifiably be viewed as ends. Aristotle initially has 
nothing but harsh words for pleasure-seekers. It is a slavish lifestyle that “belongs to 
fatted cattle.” Yet, Aristotle revisits the question of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics on 
several occasions but most importantly in VII.11-14 and X.1-5. I shall revisit this 
important discussion of pleasure below. Regarding honor, Aristotle remarks that among 
more refined people the pursuit of honor is believed to be the ultimate rewarding 
experience. Yet, Aristotle disagrees with them because the fact that even honor-seekers 
prefer to be honored by those who are better in virtue and wisdom betrays otherwise. 
Based on their actions, Aristotle points out, they themselves implicitly accept that there 
is still something higher than honor, namely, virtue. The cue Aristotle takes from the 
social recognition of honor as an end is aretē (virtue or excellence). From this point on, 
Aristotle leads us into an extensive discussion of what virtue is, what sorts of virtue there 
are, and their relative rank-ordering. 
Aristotle provides us with an “aretaic” definition of happiness. Happiness is the 
“energeia of the soul in accordance with arete” (NE 1098a17-18). How does Aristotle settle 
for this definition? This is the task of NE I.7. After mentioning that happiness is 
admitted to be the highest good of praxis by almost everyone, Aristotle gets more 
specific about the nature of this good. So he introduces his well-known natural 
“function” argument.40 This is an inquiry into the distinctive “work [ergon] of a human 
being” that sets human beings apart from other natural beings (NE 1097b25). After 
noting that plants are distinguished by nutrition, growth, and animals by their faculty of 
                                                 
     40 When it is translated as “function,” as it is usually done, the term ergon loses its connection with 
Aristotle’s central concept of energeia. It is important to keep this connection in mind when we try to 




sense-perception, Aristotle asks, “Is a human being by nature idle [argon pephuken]?” (NE 
1097b30).41 He then goes on to suggest that only the activity of logos can properly 
distinguish human beings from other natural beings.42 Logos is typically translated as 
“language” or “reason,” but we should not forget that its etymological root is that of 
legein (to speak). As Aristotle points out, logos serves a disclosive role in human affairs: 
“speech [logos] serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just 
and the unjust” (Pol. 1253a14-15).  
Immediately after bringing up logos, Aristotle subtly moves our attention to 
energeia. Logos is certainly important but the point of human distinction is not the 
possession of logos but rather its active use (NE 1098a7-8; see also 1098a30-1099a6). It is 
at this point that Aristotle introduces energeia and arete into his definition of happiness. 
The distinctive human way of life is the energeia of logos in the most excellent way. To be 
serious about virtue, we need to know what exactly we are trying to perform well. As we 
have said formerly, our goal is the practice of logos. But how do we enact logos? In two 
ways, Aristotle says: character (ēthos) and thinking (dianoia). Their respective virtues are 
named ethike aretē (virtues of character) and dianoētike (intellectual virtues). Human beings, 
according to Aristotle, necessarily need both types of the active states of soul to bring 
their nature to its naturally possible completion or perfection, which is happiness. 
Happiness for Aristotle is not a matter of feeling elated now and then. It is rather 
a natural end that preoccupies human beings in the course of their lives. Happiness is 
not something we can bring about like virtues. It is a paradigmatic action which is not 
                                                 
     41 Although Aristotle repeatedly provides examples, in this passage on the distinctive work of human 
beings, from different types of techne (e.g., carpentry, tannery, music) to highlight the ubiquity of ergon, the 
way he formulates his question and answers it hints at nature as the fundamental framework of defining 
human beings. 
 
     42 There is no need to settle for any of these meanings, for logos implies all of them, and it is important 




subject to choice because it is an end, and ends are not chosen or deliberated but wished 
according to Aristotle (NE 111a20-30). We rather deliberate and choose things that tend 
toward the ends that come into our horizon: “no one chooses to be in health, but to 
walk or to sit for the purpose of keeping well; no one chooses to be happy but to make 
money or run risks for the purpose of being happy” (EE 1226a8-11; see also NE 
1112b10-20).  
This wording—for the purpose or for the sake of—may suggest that Aristotle 
offers us an instrumental view of happiness contradicting what I have said about the 
non-instrumental logic of praxis. According to this objection, Aristotle is telling us that 
we set our sights on whatever means conduce to our ends. As long as our ends are good, 
are the means we employ are justified as Machiavelli says? Is Aristotle Machiavellian in 
this respect? In a way, yes. Perhaps, we should say Machiavelli is half-Aristotelian, but 
half of certain things are no good. Indeed, Aristotle and Machiavelli share the same view 
that ends justify the means. Machiavelli departs from Aristotle, however, by abandoning 
idea of standards outside the realm of politics. Unlike Machiavelli, Aristotle does not 
consider political rule as the ultimate standard of human action. In Aristotle’s view, 
political rule—as a derivative praxis—must be subject to the still higher end of 
eudaimonia—the paradigmatic praxis. This is true both individually and collectively. In this 
regard, Aristotle’s criticism of the Spartan regime for its exclusive attention to martial 
virtues can be applied equally to Machiavelli (see Pol. VII.14-15). 
Another reason why Aristotle is not a Machiavellian when it comes to happiness 
is that, as several commentators of Aristotle have noted, there are two ways of reading 
Aristotle’s words heneka and charin  (“for the sake of”): “(A) the relation x bears to telos y 




itself help to constitute y.”43 The first of these relations is instrumental or productive and 
the latter constitutive. While the former can be much more viable in technical contexts, 
the latter is the only possible way to work toward happiness. So when Aristotle says in 
his ethical works that happiness is the end of all (derivative) human actions, this is an 
immanent end and the relationship of happiness to virtues must be understood as an 
immanent rather than an external one. 
Derivative types of praxis originate from the peculiarly human capacity to choose 
among alternative ways of acting (NE 1139a32). By choice (prohairesis), Aristotle does not 
mean ‘freedom” or “free will.” These terms, as we understand them as innate capacities 
of human beings, are alien to Aristotle. Choice is not an inborn capacity of willing but is 
rather developed over the course of human life through active exercise of deliberation 
and desire guided by virtue. Aristotle defines choice as “deliberate desire [orexis bouleutikē] 
of things that are up to us” (NE 1113a11-12). Choice is made possible by our unique 
capacity of logos and animate characteristic of desire (orexis). Animals too are desiring but 
they can barely choose one course of action over another because they lack the language 
to deliberate. Of course, choice is not always present even for human beings. There is 
luck as well as necessity which, in determining human life, co-exist with choice. We may 
also desire things which do not lie within our reach—which is a wish—but we only 
deliberate about things which we can influence. Aristotle’s conception of ethics rests on 
these two legs: desire and deliberation. 
                                                 
     43 David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie O. 




Both virtues of mind and character fall into the class of what Aristotle calls hexis 
(active condition).44 Aristotle makes it clear in NE II.1 that we are not born with virtues 
as with our senses. They are not acquired from nature, but they are not contrary to 
nature either: “the virtues come to be present neither by nature nor contrary to nature, 
but in us who are of such a nature to take them on, and to be brought to completion by 
means of habit” (1103a24-25). The reason they cannot be contrary to nature is that 
virtues deal with pleasures and pains, which are somatic processes (NE II.3). Virtues of 
character are abiding qualities of soul analogous to the somatic conditions of health (Met. 
1022b12-3). They are similarly affected by excess and deficiency (NE 1104a11-20). The 
purpose of virtues is twofold: refinement of the sources of pleasure and increasing the 
endurance capacity against pains. For this reason, “the whole concern both of virtue and 
politics is about pleasures and pains” (NE 1105a10-12).  
Virtues determine how we comport ourselves towards sources of pleasures and 
pains, which may be feelings such as fear or anger, or actions such as handling wealth 
(NE II.5). Virtues are established in the soul gradually through practice as logos balances 
emotions and actions according to their specific circumstances. To develop any kind of 
hexis, one should actively seek and participate in social contexts where they are most 
likely practiced. Battlefield, politics, household, and friendship are considered by 
                                                 
     44 Here we have another case of inadequate translation at our hands. Hexis is often rendered as “habit” 
or “disposition.” I find both of them, following Joe Sachs, inadequate to capture Aristotle’s meaning; see 
Joe Sachs, “Introduction,” in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus 
Publishing, 2002), xi-xvii. Aristotle uses hexis (from the verb echein—to hold, to have) to signify an 
“abiding” or “enduring” condition in the soul (see Cat. I.8). Although its Latin precursor habitus (from the 
verb habeo) once fulfilled this meaning, the contemporary use of “habit” now implies “a doing 
unconsciously and often impulsively” (see Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary). This is far from 
Aristotle’s explanation for hexis as an informed and abiding condition. The word “disposition” is similarly 
misleading as there is a different term corresponding to it, namely diathesis, which Aristotle reserves for 
more volatile conditions than hexis (see Cat. 8b25-9a9). As Sachs notes, hexis for Aristotle imply “activity.” 




Aristotle as real life venues to provide for the growth of active conditions.45 I shall argue 
in Chapters 5 and 6 that civic environmentalism practiced in the household or public 
arena likewise offers similar occasions to practice and develop virtue. In particular, 
environmentalists’ efforts to change wasteful habits of individual consumption and 
economic production allow for the much needed opportunities for practicing the ethical 
virtues of moderation, prudence, and justice.   
For Aristotle, the meaning of ethics can be summed up as desires and pleasures 
rightly understood. He also surmises that “the active condition [hexis] belonging to most 
people” falls in between unrestraint and self-restraint (with respect to pleasures) and 
softness and endurance (with respect to pains), but most are closer to the worse side, 
that is, unrestraint and softness (NE 1150a15-16). These four dispositions of human soul 
(unrestraint, self-restraint, softness, and endurance)—discussed extensively in NE VII—
concern the same things that the virtue of temperance and the vice of dissipation are 
concerned with, i.e., bodily desires and discomforts stemming from the sensual senses of 
touch and taste. The possibility of akrasia (unrestraint but also commonly translated as 
“weakness of will” or “incontinence” in the scholarly literature), and self-restraint for 
that matter, is a significant departure of Aristotle from the Socratic/Platonic view which 
equates virtue with knowledge (NE VII.2-3).  
According to the Socratic view, one who acts contrary to what is best acts out of 
ignorance without knowing the “good.” On this view, it is not possible to draw a 
distinction between unrestrained and vicious behavior as all such behavior is spun by 
lack of knowledge, that is, ignorance of the good. According to Aristotle, on the other 
hand, the ignorance in these matters can in some case pertain only to the particulars of a 
                                                 




given situation but does not have to have an effect on the individual’s opinion of the 
good and bad on a general level. So, on Aristotle’s view, a shameful act done knowingly 
does not have to qualify as a vice if the ignorance pertains to the particulars and if the 
person in question believes in a universal counsel against it. The individual may 
nonetheless be acting contrary to the counsel because he may err in his practical 
judgment of the particular case for either not seeing it as a subset of the universal rule or 
being in a state of passion like rage. Hence, one may know on a general level a certain 
course of action is bad but does it nonetheless because of failure of judgment or 
weakness of will (akrasia). Aristotle’s difference from the Socratic/Platonic view in this 
regard is related to his giving greater latitude to the world of empirical reality and the 
intellectual faculty that corresponds to it, i.e., phronesis. More importantly, Aristotle’s 
teaching can have a moderating effect on moralistic posturing or zealotry that we are all 
susceptible to from time to time. In Christian terms, we tend to focus on the saw-dust in 
others’ eyes before or without being concerned with the plank in our own eyes. 
The challenge of being human is basically to gain a right perspective on desires 
and pleasures, and living happily within it. A distinctive aspect of Aristotle’s approach to 
praxis is the prominent role he assigns to psychē (soul) in its explanation. A serious 
student of politics, according to Aristotle, has to familiarize himself with “the things that 
concern the soul” (NE 1102a15-25). Without such understanding, neither can one 
discriminate the good from the bad nor lead others in action. The fact that the term 
“soul” carries today an archaic, religious connotation should not deter us from using the 
concept that the term itself is referring to. For we still frequently resort to substitute 
terms such as “self” or “psychology” when we feel the need to refer to the motivational 




Aristotle takes psyche as the principle (archē) of life. This means that for living 
beings the form (eidos) of their bodies is the psyche. In his famous characterization, 
Aristotle remarks that “suppose that the eye were an animal, sight would have been its 
soul” (De An. 412b19-20). Only through reference to their psyche, can we understand the 
attributes of living beings such as knowing, perception, desiring, and motion. Desiring 
(orexis) is one of the elements of psyche, and, according to Aristotle, is the most 
fundamental one possessed by all living beings capable of even the simplest sense-
perception (De An. 402a6, 414b16).46 For human psyche, however, there is also the 
presence of thinking, which makes us a compound being with diverging tendencies (to 
suntheton). So human beings are characterized by Aristotle as “either intellect fused with 
desire [orektikos nous] or desire fused with thinking [dianoētikē orexis]” (NE 1139b3-5). In 
either case, mind on its own is not the source of praxis (De An. III.9). Although mind 
(nous) itself is not susceptible to natural changes of body—since it is basically  
incorporeal according to Aristotle—the power of thinking is, as it can slip away under 
the bodily influence of drunkenness, sickness, or old age (De An. 408b18-32).47 
Aristotle bridges over the natural realm and the human realm without reducing 
one to the other through his attention to psyche. It is in this respect that he differs from 
the prevalent conceptions of ethics and politics in the modern era which purport to be 
autonomous of nature. The desiring nature of human beings shared by other animals is 
critical to Aristotle’s conception of praxis. It would not be inaccurate to say that when 
                                                 
     46 Orexis, Aristotle’s general term for “desire,” has three kinds: appetite (epithumia), passion or 
spiritedness (thumos), and wish (boulēsis) (De An. 414b2). 
 
     47 Aristotle’s discussion of nous—also translated as “intellect”—has puzzled commentators. It is an 
unanswered question whether Aristotle believes nous is separable from body or not. Some of his assertions 
characterize nous as energeia (being-at-work) of eidos (form): nous is “separable, impassible, unmixed, since it 
is in its essential nature [ousia] activity [energeia]” (De An. 2430a17-18). Aristotle’s account of nous is beyond 




Aristotle reckons with the affective and desiderative dimension of human soul and draws 
out the ethical implications of the specific human emotions such as anger, envy, fear, or 
affection, as well as, desiring in general, he is dealing, at least partially, with the natural 
basis of human beings. Not completely though because for us desires are also implicated 
with the question of meaning.  
We cannot accomplish anything without the factor of desiring, but desiring is 
blind without the deliberative function of logos. The guidance of logos is needed as there is 
always the possibility of error in our sense-perceptions. Erring is affecting things that we 
have not intended to. Just as we sometimes say things that we do not mean, we can 
similarly do things we do not mean to. Hence, one can err in praxis when one’s 
knowledge and desires stand in dissonance (De An. 433b5-10). The truth of praxis is 
established or attained when logos and orexis coincide. Aristotle calls this happy 
conjunction “truth that stands in agreement with right desire” (NE 1139a20-30). Desires 
become meaningful when they are defined, that is to say, when they are limited by and 
directed to proper ends through practical reasoning. If desiring is not limited and 
ordered, conflicting desires due to the compound nature of human beings can easily 
impede the search for order and meaning.  
Desires can be rendered meaningful only if they are right. The crucial question is 
when or how we can know whether we have the right desires. Where do we get our 
bearings from in this regard? What is the criterion of the “rightness” of desires? To this 
question, Aristotle has two answers both of which will sound arbitrary and inadequate if 
we expect too much epistemic or technical certainty from praxis.48 The first is that we get 
our desire right when we steer a middle ground according to right reason (orthos logos) 
                                                 
     48 The following discussion partially follows Leo R. Ward, “Aristotle on Criteria of Moral Good,” The 




between two possible extreme conditions of soul in relation to actions and feelings. 
Good character arises from the ordering and habituation of emotions as practical reason 
tries to make proper choices to hit the right proportion (NE II.6). This is his well-known 
doctrine that virtue is a mean between two vices in relation to an actions and emotions 
(NE 1109a20-30). 49 By actions—i.e., praxis in the limited derivative sense—Aristotle 
means things like acquisition and use of property. By feelings, he means a number of 
things that originates in our souls and affects us as well as others in our vicinity some of 
which are lust, fear, envy, anger, spite, and hostility. Although we derive these 
inclinations from nature, they are modified by each society in a certain way. Still, it can 
safely be said that they are more or less common to all humankind.  
Aristotle calls the balanced or mediated position of soul in relation to actions and 
emotions mesotēs or meson, both of which are most commonly translated as “the mean,” 
or alternatively as “the middle,” or “the midpoint.” The word “mean” has unfortunate 
secondary meanings or connotations as dull, average, mediocre, or even contemptible, 
which are quite unfitting to convey Aristotle’s meaning in contemporary English. The 
alternative renderings as “the middle” or “the midpoint” are better but they may also be 
misleading with their connotations of mathematical precision which overlook the 
experimental and dynamic nature of virtue. The most reasonable way to approach the 
meaning of mesotēs or meson is through the analogy of health that Aristotle often employs 
throughout his writings. Seen in light of this analogue, it could mean a “balanced 
condition” or “dynamic equilibrium” of opposing forces or constituents that act upon a 
                                                 
     49 The doctrine of mean was already implicit in the Greek literature and everyday life as it is attested in 
the proverbial sayings of the time such as mēden agan (nothing in excess) and metron ariston (moderation is 
the best thing) as well as in the Pythagorean philosophy and the Hippocratic corpus; see Eliza G. Wilkins, 
“Mēden Agan in Greek and Latin Literature,” Classical Philology 21.2 (1926): 132-48; and Whitney J. Oates, 




compound being.50 This meaning is more explicit in a second set of related terminology 
that Aristotle occasionally uses: metriotēs, metrion, and metron. All three words similarly 
mean the “middle condition” but they also carry the helpful secondary meanings or 
connotations of due measure, proportion, limit, and moderation that are absent from 
mesotēs or meson. Seeking proportion in virtue means seeking mental and emotional 
steadiness away from extremities in our lives. The extremes are unlimited (aperas), hence 
bad: “for what is bad belongs to what is unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and 
what is good belongs among what is limited” (NE 1106b29-30).51 
Aristotle’s second answer to the question of what is right in ethical matters builds 
on the former but admittedly appears to be circular. Aristotle raises this question again in 
NE VI.1. What is the right reason (orthos logos) according to which we determine the 
mean condition that befits us? And what does define the right reason?52 These two 
questions lead Aristotle to the treatment of intellectual virtues with special attention to 
phronesis in the rest of the Book VI. But Aristotle refuses to consider phronesis as a 
disembodied faculty the way Kant postulates a pure practical reason. For Aristotle, there 
are individuals in flesh and blood who embody this faculty. Hence, he says that only an 
exemplary figure in ethical and political matters, whom he calls spoudaios (morally serious 
person) or phronimos (someone with practical wisdom), can show us the criterion of 
rightness. This person is someone to whom the most excellent way of life belongs to  
(NE 1098a14-5). In his Poetics (1448a2-5), spoudaios appears as one of the two human 
                                                 
     50 Cf. Theodore J. Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (Chicago: 
Loyola University Press, 1969), 254. 
 
     51 J.A. Stewart notes that Aristotle is following the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) here (pp. 13-14).  
 
     52 For the latter question, Aristotle uses the word horos, which is close to the meaning of peras (limit) and 
means “boundary,” “standard,” “criterion,” or “definition” (NE 1138b33-34); see Sandra Peterson, 




characters whose actions are represented in Greek tragedies.53 It can be said that such a 
person, for Aristotle, is the avatar of the good as he alone is capable of seeing the true 
nature of things: “a thing is what it shows itself to be to a person of serious moral 
stature” (NE 1176a15-6; see also 1113a25-1113b1).54  
But how do we recognize such people? Aristotle does not provide us with any 
clue as to how we should go about identifying this unique person in our own lives. The 
only name that he gives as an example of phronimos is the 5th century Athenian statesman 
Pericles who played a major role in the democratization of Athens as well as the 
devastative Peloponnesian War with Sparta (NE 1140b8).55 Today, we may justifiably 
feel lost where to look for spoudaios because we no longer live in a tightly knit city-state 
nor in a time where the authority of our superiors is eagerly sought. Be that as it may, 
another textual clue can be found at the beginning of Aristotle’s second extensive 
analysis of pleasure: “It belongs to one who engages in philosophic inquiry about politics 
to examine what concerns pleasure and pain, for he is the master craftsman of end to 
which we look when we speak of each thing as bad or good simply” (NE 1152b1-3). 
Although Aristotle does not use the word spoudaios here, he assigns the role of spoudaios—
i.e., the criterion of goodness and badness—to the political philosopher.  
Aristotle repeatedly mentions spoudaios as an exemplar to follow. How can we 
emulate the spoudaios? Again, Aristotle does not discuss anywhere in his writings so 
explicitly the sufficient conditions of becoming spoudaios, but he usefully points at its 
necessary condition which is practicing virtue within a political setting. Good life can 
                                                 
     53 The other is someone who is phaulous (base). 
 
     54 In Pol. III.4, Aristotle uses the terms agathos (good) and spoudaios interchangeably. 
 
     55 We should note that Socrates, in Plato’s Gorgias (503c-519d), refuses to recognize Pericles as well as 
some other notable Greek statesmen, as a good citizen. The reason Socrates gives for his opinion is that 




come within reach for human beings only within a political setting (Pol. 1252b27-1253a1, 
1278b15-30, 1280a25-1281a11). We need virtue because virtue brings about the 
completion of human beings and we are not born self-sufficient: 
For just as man is the best of animals when completed, when separated from law 
and adjudication he is the worst of all. For injustice is harshest when it is 
furnished with arms; and man is born naturally possessing arms for [the use of] 
prudence and virtue which are nevertheless very susceptible being used for their 
opposites. This is why, without virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage 
[of the animals], and the worst with regard to sex and food. (Pol. 1253a30-38) 
 
What is of interest to us in the above quote is that human being [anthrōpos] is defined in 
terms of virtues to become completed. We are born with certain tendencies that can 
develop in differing ways. Just as we can be completed, we can also, under certain 
unfavorable circumstances, be arrested, stunted, or distracted in our development. 
Aristotle uses the verb teleoō (to make perfect, complete) in the above passage which is 
cognate with the word telos. Telos has several interrelated meanings. In this context, it 
basically means the end through which we can bring about the completion (i.e., 
fulfillment, perfection) of what we take to be the human form: “And excellence is a 
completion; for each thing is complete and every substance is complete, when in respect 
of the form of its proper excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude” (Meta. 
1021b21-24).56 Ethics is the practical cultivation of ends proper to live as a human being 
within a political setting. What is essential to the process of completion, according to 
Aristotle, is the awareness of the end or several auxiliary ends like prudence and virtue 
and their hierarchical relationships to one another. Something that attains its excellence 
shows itself in its natural state: “It is in things whose condition is according to nature 
                                                 




that one ought particularly to investigate what is by nature, not in things that are 
defective” (Pol. 1254a35-38).57 
It is in this sense that human beings are political animals according to Aristotle. 
Aristotle views every natural species as destined for the best possible condition of its 
capacities, and for human beings this can be achieved only within a political association. 
Hence, the end of political association cannot merely be a (Hobbesian) security alliance 
or a (Lockean) commercial compact (Pol. 1280a35-b11). The end of political association 
must be rather conceived as attaining the “good life.”58 Aristotle’s account of the origin 
of political associations is twofold. He says that a political community forms from a 
necessary desire for survival but continues to exist because of another natural striving to 
reach the end of self-sufficiency (Pol. 1252b27-1253a1). The first step toward the 
formation of the city, the household, is brought about by the natural desires of 
reproduction and preservation. The former is a natural striving (phutois phusikon) of both 
sexes “to leave behind another that is like oneself” (1252a25-b1). But self-preservation is 
not enough for human beings. The goal is rather self-sufficiency (autarkeia). The 
principle of autarky within a political community is aimed at—and this is a limiting and 
ordering factor on both the individual and the political association—because human 
beings are driven to this goal by their natural desire for a good life in accordance with 
their form and, what is the same thing, nature (kata phusin). As attaining and living the 
                                                 
     57 See also Ph. 246a15. 
 
     58 Aristotle certainly recognizes the essentially contested nature of what constitutes “good life,” but he 
also thinks that this debate does not warrant total skepticism or denial of this end. Indeed, skepticism or 
denial in this regard is not even possible. The explicit denial of ends in liberalism only masks its implicit 
ends as the critics of liberalism since Marx have pointed it out. Whatever is esteemed publicly within a 
political association automatically turns into an end for that group of people. A political association that 
esteems wealth creation implicitly sets its end as material prosperity while the one that honors military 
action chooses courage as its ideal. These ideals or ends naturally become the standard of “good life” for 




good life is impossible for individuals to accomplish on their own, they naturally form 
families and political groups. The underlying motive of state’s origin, according to 
Aristotle, must be this natural inclination of sociability even if it might get obscured to 
some or most of its citizens over time after its foundation. 
Although desire makes virtue possible, it can also be an impediment by distorting 
practical reason. Both aroused emotions and appetite can weaken our critical judgment, 
and make us susceptible to (self-)deception (De Somniis 460b9-11). Strong desires can 
impede sound reasoning, according to Aristotle, because desire is of indeterminate 
nature. There is no internal control mechanism. Aristotle thinks that desiring must be 
both limited and sublimated toward loving virtue. It can only be limited by being 
habituated to observe the right proportion in our emotions and external behavior. 
Unless practical reason rules over desires, desires are more likely to produce vices than 
virtue as it is difficult to hit the target in these respects (NE 1106b31-32). The whole 
ethical and political problem that human beings face, according to Aristotle, is the 
question of what to do with the desiring element in human nature within a political 
context. Aristotle considers these two domains of human action—ethics and politics—as 
closely related around the natural element of desiring. Ordering desires in the individual 
constitutes the domain of ethics and in the group the domain of politics.  
The troublesome aspect of desires becomes especially acute in the realm of 
wealth acquisition. Epithumia (appetite) is Aristotle’s term for the kind of desire oriented 
to the acquisition and possession of material objects as well as the satisfaction of bodily 
pleasures connected to the senses of touch and taste. When desires are channeled into 
and concentrated in this realm, people develop appetite for “what is productive of 




For the nature of appetite [epithumia] is without limit, and it is with a view to 
satisfying this that the many live. To rule such persons, then, [requires] not so 
much leveling property as providing that those who are respectable by nature 
[epieikeis tē phusei] will be the sort who have no wish to aggrandize themselves, 
while the mean [phaulous] will not be able to, which will be the case if they are 
kept inferior but are done no injustice. (Pol. 1267b4-10) 
 
This very brief statement encapsulates Aristotle’s view of the reciprocal relationship 
between ethics and politics. There are four kinds of people in Aristotle’s ethico-political 
universe three of which are mentioned here: the decent (epieikēs), the base (phaulos), and 
the many (hoi polloi). The fourth group is the morally serious (spoudaios) mentioned earlier.   
Decent people are the ones who are willing to look up to the morally serious as 
their guides. Such people can be misled, however, especially in the absence of favorable 
conditions. According to Plato, for instance, vigorous souls with philosophical 
tendencies can easily be lured into power games unless given proper training (Republic 
VI). The ambitious young people in pursuit of honor, among which we can count 
Alcibiades and Alexander from that period, are especially tempted by the prospect of 
wielding political power. The lure of power over other people is so irresistible that such 
people are not even troubled by transforming into a tyrant in the end. According to the 
joint perspective of Plato and Aristotle, the greatest injustices are committed as a result 
of this post-materialistic drive toward enjoying the pleasure of political power. As 
Aristotle points out, the feeling of power has an appeal which goes beyond securing the 
necessities of life: “no one becomes a tyrant in order to get in out of the cold” (Pol. 
1267a13-4). But the distinguishing characteristics of a truly decent person is contrary to 
the tyrannical frame of mind. It requires forbearance and mildness of temper. Such a 
person is reluctant to exercise political power and is not “rigidly precise about justice to a 




1137b34-1138a2).59 We call this person today “equitable”—someone who can rise above 
the strict rules of distributive or corrective justice especially when the issue at hand 
affects him personally.  
As we have noted earlier, political associations grow initially from natural 
desiring of individual households, but they can survive if desires are ordered through 
practical reason. But people are of different sorts as there are disparate kinds of activities 
in the city that allow people to exercise their rational capacities in varying degrees. As the 
exercise of faculties—moral and intellectual—are essential to their development, 
“different things appear worthwhile to people of a low sort [phaulois] and to decent 
people [epieikesin]” (NE 1176b24). This variation in the capacity of reasoning demands 
political rule if the end of self-sufficiency is to be attained for the city, and marks 
Aristotle’s transition from ethics based on choice to politics based on somewhat 
impersonal laws and necessary compulsion in NE X.9. 
In the larger context of the above quote, Aristotle is questioning the soundness 
of economic reform policies proposed by a certain intellectual of the time, Phaleas of 
Chalcedon, who believed that leveling the inequalities in wealth between the rich and the 
poor would end the factional strife afflicting the Greek cities of the time. Aristotle’s 
criticism of such egalitarian proposals is that they mistakenly assume that men are 
predisposed to criminal behavior—either as individuals or groups—solely on account of 
their lacking the basic necessities of life. “The greatest injustices are committed out of 
excess . . . not because of the necessary things” (1267a13-14) and “the wickedness of 
human beings is insatiable” (1267b1). As these utopian reformers overlook the 
ineradicable element of desiring rooted in human nature that extends beyond the basic 
                                                 
     59 The reluctance of exercising political power is a major theme of Plato’s Republic, noticeable in the 




necessities of life, they fail to factor into their proposals a hierarchy of goods that 
desiring points to. Aristotle’s reflections on ethics and politics on the other hand attempt 
to reckon with this hierarchy of goods. 
Aristotle is no categorical opponent of economic equality as he explicitly 
recognizes that “poverty produces factional conflict and crime,” which are great dangers 
to the stability of political community (Pol. 1265b11).60 He nonetheless considers putting 
exclusive focus on the material dimension of human life simplistic and 
counterproductive. All benevolent egalitarians would agree with Rousseau that “men are 
wicked . . . yet man is naturally good.” 61 This view stems from a shallow understanding 
of human nature ignoring the power of desiring. The depravity of human behavior, 
according to this naïve outlook, is solely due to the unjust medium of the society that 
forcefully corrupts the original goodness of man and  injustice is (primarily) a function of 
the institutional context. This has been the underlying premise of most progressive and 
left-wing agendas for political reform or revolution to modern day in every area of 
human life including the contemporary issue of the environment. It is this prevailing 
“left” outlook in environmental thinking that Aristotle can help us to reconsider.  
Aristotle, on the other hand, argues that oppressive and exploitative behavior 
stems from desiring without limits which is not something determined definitively 
according to social class positions in terms of sex, ethnicity, or wealth. This is not to 
deny the fact that the content of such behavior might partially be affected by the 
                                                 
     60 For Aristotle’s discussion of factional conflict in his Politics, see Kostas Kalimtzis, Aristotle on Political 
Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000). This middle-of-the-road view 
was commonly accepted until modern times by most philosophers who tried to moderate the class conflict 
between the poor and the rich. Another crucial representative of this view who had a substantial influence 
on subsequent republican political thought with his emphasis on social harmony (concordia) was Cicero; see 
his De Officiis II.78-85. 
 




accidental circumstances of one’s social position. Aristotle does not deny that “the rich” 
or “the powerful” are especially tempted to commit injustice by claiming more than their 
share. To come back to the above quote, the chances of oppression especially increase, 
according to Aristotle, when the potentially noble-minded members of society are not 
educated to desire with limits, and the mean-spirited are allowed to rule or induced to 
revolt because of the offenses they are subjected to. Because the unethical behavior of 
oppression and exploitation is not merely an accident of class position, the 
revolutionaries have always confronted—before or after a given revolution—the 
dilemma of what to do with the type of men who are poor in means but oppressive in 
heart. It would be foolish to overlook, as the “left” perspective tends to, the element of 
desiring among the materially unprivileged simply because these are not actively 
wreaking havoc in society. In Aristotle’s view, portraying the ethical and political 
problem simply in terms of the actively powerful oppressing the actively powerless is 
nothing but a distortion of human reality. For the unprivileged might one day come to 
power and do no less in terms of injustice as many tyrants of humble origins in history 
have shown disturbingly. 
Aristotle’s ethical insight is that “the poor” as well as “the rich” can be afflicted 
by similar psychic maladies that typically induce injustice beyond the understandable 
limits of all men to provide for themselves and their families:  
Nor do human beings commit injustice only because of the necessary things—
for which Phaleas considers equality of property a remedy, so that no one will 
steal through being cold or hungry; they also do it for enjoyment and the 
satisfaction of desire. For if they have a desire beyond the necessary things, they 
will commit injustice in order to cure it—and not only for this reason, for they 
might desire merely the enjoyment that comes with pleasures unaccompanied by 
pains.62 
 
                                                 




Leaving aside the crimes committed under the compulsion of survival, this passage 
mentions two other motivations for unethical behavior: “enjoyment and the satisfaction 
of desire,” and “the enjoyment that comes with pleasures unaccompanied by pains.” 
These two sound very similar and yet they are different. The remedies Aristotle proposes 
for these maladies gives us a clue as to their difference. The remedy that Aristotle 
proposes for the first kind is moderation (sōphrosynē). For the other who enjoys fortune, 
abundance, and leisure the cure is philosophy (1267a9-12):  
the enjoyment of prosperity [eutuchia], and leisure accompanied by peace, is more 
apt to make people overbearing [hubristēs]. A great deal of justice [dikaiosunē] and 
a great deal of temperance [sōphrosunē] is therefore required in those who appear 
to be faring exceptionally well and enjoying all that is generally accounted to be 
happiness, like those, if there are any, who dwell in ‘the happy isles’ of which 
poets sing; and the greater the leisure which these people enjoy, when they are 
set among an abundance of blessings, the greater too will be their need of 
wisdom [philosophia], as well as of temperance and justice. (Pol. 1334a25-34) 
 
In NE (1153a1-3) too, Aristotle speaks of “pleasures that are without pain or desire, 
such as those of contemplating, that belong to a nature which is not deficient.” The role 
of pleasure is very important to understand Aristotle’s psychological approach to ethics 
and politics. True pleasure stems from energeia and brings it to completion (NE X.4). He 
sees pleasure as central in driving all animate beings into an active state. In the case of 
human beings, given the fact that instincts are substituted by intelligent reflection the 
pursuit of pleasure can exceed the limits of what is naturally healthy. Animals in the wild 
are ordered to their ends through their instincts. For human beings, the task of ordering 
is delegated to thinking. But thinking often has the effect of frustrating bodily pleasure 
through repression or deferring. How can human beings be brought to the recognition 
of ends if the means to do this is antithetical to the natural impulse to pleasure? The only 




According to Aristotle and many other major figures in world history, there are 
such sources of pleasure. What is primarily pleasurable, according to Aristotle, is actually 
the enduring condition of the body rather than its being restored to this condition (NE 
VII.14). Health rather than the recovery of health is the true source of pleasure. Textual 
support for this interpretation can be found in NE VII.12 and X.4. In these crucial 
passages, Aristotle first examines the philosophical views on pleasure and then offers his 
own account of pleasure as an alternative. As an aside, Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure 
represents his typical procedure that is previously mentioned: the dialectical refinement 
of common opinions. He begins with observing a similarity between “seeing” and 
“pleasure”: 
the activity of seeing seems to be complete over any time whatever. For there is 
nothing it lacks which would complete its form by coming about at a later time; 
pleasure is like something of this sort. For it  is something whole, and there is no 
time at which one could take a pleasure, the form of which would become 
complete after it went on for a longer time. Hence pleasure is not a motion, since 
every motion is in time and directed at some end, as housebuilding is, and is 
complete when it brings about that at which it aims—that is, in the whole of the 
time, or at that time. But all the motions that are in parts of the time are 
incomplete, and are different in form from the whole and from one another . . . . 
but the form of a pleasure is complete in any time whatever.63  
 
Aristotle certainly subordinates ethical virtues to intellectual ones, but this should not 
suggest that his understanding of ethics devalues morality. We can draw two conclusions 
from this hierarchy. First, ethical virtues alone do not guarantee ultimate happiness but 
provides only glimpses of it. Contemplation comes closer to attain it, yet, one cannot 
even dream about happiness if ethico-political life were not to exist in the first place. 
Second, ethical virtues depend on certain forms of thinking in order to come about: 
phronesis, and two other types—sunesis (astuteness) and gnōmē (thoughtfulness)—that 
Aristotle mentions in NE VI.10-11. Unlike deontology, no foolish person can be 
                                                 




consistently moral according to Aristotle. They certainly can appear to act with virtue 
(i.e., morally) but fall short of being virtuous. An act of virtue or a moral act is different 
from being virtuous or moral as the latter demands a considerable period of time for the 
proper development of hexis through energeia. 
The ethical and political problem all human societies face, as Aristotle sees it, is 
what to do with the human reality of desiring within a political community. As we have 
noted before, according to Aristotle’s four-fold division of human temperaments there 
are four kinds of human beings. The most common (hoi polloi) can be satisfied by a 
“minimum of property and work.” But those respectable by nature (epieikeis tē phusei) 
must become truly decent and the base (phaulous) must not be given an opportunity to 
gain the upper hand in society. The task of educating the respectable belongs to the 
public but the exemplary role of the serious members of society (spoudaioi) must not be 
forgotten. This is a difficult task, and given the numerous structural factors that are 
involved there is no one recipe for success. Yet, the prerequisite to the possibility of 
success, as Aristotle sees it, is the proper education of those “respectable by nature” so 




Chapter 5:  Virtue and Nature 
This chapter introduces “environmental virtue ethics” as a new subfield of 
environmental ethics literature, and responds to the internal critique that “environmental 
virtue ethics” is not an adequate “environmental” ethic. Although “environmental virtue 
ethics” is far from being perfect—as my friendly critique will make clear shortly—the 
stress on “virtue” is promising in its potential to re-orient contemporary 
environmentalism toward a political (as opposed to a technocratic) direction. I have 
briefly discussed in Chapter 2 that “environmentalism” can be viewed, at the ideational 
level at least, as a revival of certain perennial sensibilities (such as harmony and limits) 
overshadowed in modernity. I shall pursue this line of thought here and in the following 
chapters by further pointing out that the stress on “virtue” alerts us to the 
“conservative” and “political” dimension of contemporary environmentalism which 
stems from its uneasy relationship with “modernity.” My argument defends the political 
significance of the concept of “virtue” for its drawing salutary attention to this neglected 
but essential aspect of environmentalism. It is through “virtue” that we can bring out the 
true conservative and political character of non-technocratic environmentalism.1  
This argument takes issue with the position popular among certain 
environmental scholars who have found the theoretical orientation of environmental 
virtue ethics inadequate to meet the practical challenge of nature protection. This 
inadequacy stems from the conformity of environmental virtue ethics to traditional 
                                                 
     1 The phrase “non-technocratic environmentalism” refers to all sorts of “environmentalists” who 
believe that technical solutions or “fixes” to the so-called “environmental problems” are subordinate to 
ethical, political, philosophical, or spiritual responses that need to be taken. By “technocratic,” I mean 
something close to “managerial” or “command” as in “command economy” both of which ignore or 
dismiss the inescapable and irreducible “human condition of plurality” which Hannah Arendt considers as 
the primary characteristic of “all political life” in The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1958), 7-8. Arendt owes this insight to Aristotle who opens his Politics with a statement on the 




ethics of the West. Since the early 1970s, environmental theory scholars have been 
arguing that we urgently need a “new” environmental ethic that can guide and restrain 
our precarious relationship with nature. This plea often comes along with the wholesale 
criticism of pre-existing morality in the Western tradition—both classical and 
Christian—either for letting us down in this task or for contributing directly to 
environmental problems, particularly because of its anthropocentric bias. Although the 
current literature contains a whole array of—somewhat diverging—positions on what 
this “new” ethic might be, most of them find the default anthropocentric attitude of 
human beings, practices, and institutions toward non-human beings as morally wrong.2 
Central to their non-anthropocentric critique is the classic philosophical distinction 
between instrumental means and intrinsic ends, or, in other words, between what is good 
for something else and what is good in itself. Instead of using the term “good” however, 
the literature has picked up the term “value.” A recent study in environmental ethics 
presents the questions central to the environmental ethics literature of the last few 
decades as follows:  
Ethics of nature is an inquiry into the value of nature: Is nature’s value only 
instrumental value for human beings . . . or does nature also have intrinsic value . 
. .? Can traditional anthropocentrism be defended or must we move to a new, 
physiocentric moral position?3  
 
One long-standing position in environmental ethics arguing for a new non-
anthropocentric ethic centers on the “intrinsic value in nature” argument—the idea that 
                                                 
     2 For a schematic overview of various positions in contemporary environmental ethics literature, see 
Angelika Krebs, Ethics of Nature (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999); and J. Baird Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric 
Value Theory and Environmental Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 299-309. We should 
note that there are also “anthropocentric” and/or “anthropogenic” arguments within environmental ethics 
literature which defend the protection of nature in the name of basic human needs or higher aspirations 
such as concern for future generations or aesthetic appreciation. However, these arguments are 
questionable from a non-anthropocentric point of view for advancing “prudential” as opposed to “moral” 
reasons in defense of nature.  
 




non-human natural beings (individual animals, plants, species, or ecosystems) possess an 
intrinsic value irrespective of their usefulness to the needs and wants of present or future 
generations.4 The recent emergence of “environmental virtue ethics” on the 
environmental ethics scene is perceived as an unnecessary distraction from this “radical” 
or “revolutionary” position. Holmes Rolston III, a major proponent of a new ethic of 
“intrinsic value,” flatly warns us that we would be ill-advised to pursue virtues at the 
expense of values in environmental ethics. “Environmental virtue ethics,” according to 
Rolston, if  “taken for the whole, is a misplaced ethic, a displaced ethic.”5 Rolston sees 
the emphasis on “virtue” to be a distraction from (intrinsic) “value” arguments in 
environmental ethics. His concern is that if human beings do not recognize the “intrinsic 
value” of non-human beings, our efforts to protect wilderness or endangered species 
would have no moral force or legitimacy. Curiously, Rolston deems it “unexcellent—
cheap and philistine—to say that excellence of human character is what we are after 
when we preserve these endangered species.”6 What are we after then? Rolston would 
probably say that the task of a proper environmental ethic is the recognition of the 
“autonomous intrinsic value” in nature irrespective of its usefulness to human purposes.  
Similar opinions have been expressed by other liberal environmental scholars. 
According to one environmental scholar, “the prospects of a virtue-based environmental 
ethic seem dim.” The main reason is that the discourse of virtues and vices toward 
                                                 
     4 The proponents of the “intrinsic value in nature” argument such as Holmes Rolston III, J. Baird 
Callicott, and Robert Elliott hold different versions of this argument. Their differences basically revolve 
around the question whether “values” are objectively residing in nature or subjectively created by human 
beings. 
 
     5 Holmes Rolston III, “Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole,” in 
Environmental Virtue Ethics, eds. Philip Cafaro and Ronald Sandler (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2005), 70.  
 




nature presupposes but does not explicitly acknowledge the fact that “nature in itself is 
of intrinsic value.”7 Another scholar, James Sterba, sees the prospects a little bit better 
for “Aristotelian environmental ethics” but nonetheless finds it inadequate on its own: it 
“needs to be supplemented by certain liberal, Kantian or biocentric-inspired constraints 
and arguments if it is to be morally defensible.”8 Sterba’s worry is that the prohibition or 
prevention of certain morally reprehensible behavior or policies that can endanger 
“nature” cannot be effectively achieved in the public sphere simply by relying on virtue. 
What is rather needed is some kind of unwavering public commitment to the inviolable 
“value” of non-human beings. Leaving aside Rolston’s narrow conception of 
environmentalism, limiting it to species extinction, his position that the recognition of 
“intrinsic value” in nature is more fundamental than nurturing virtue for environmental 
purposes is problematic. This problem, I shall argue, stems from the residual Kantian 
elements in his position which has turned the axis of moral philosophy from virtue to 
value in the last two centuries. To the extent this shift is accomplished, environmental 
“politics” remains within the orbit of a managerial or technocratic approach.9   
Much of what goes on in environmental ethics literature in relation to the notion 
of “value,” presented as the ground of a “new” environmental ethic, can be rather 
viewed as the rehashing of old debates in the history of philosophy. The notion of 
“virtue,” in contrast, has no claim for novelty for it explicitly continues the tradition of 
ethics (not only of the West but of the non-Western world as well, if only we can look 
                                                 
     7 Robert Elliot, “Normative Ethics,” in A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, ed. Dale Jamieson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 190.  
 
     8 See James P. Sterba, “A Morally Defensible Aristotelian Environmental Ethics,” Philosophy in the 
Contemporary World 8.2 (2001): 64. 
 
     9 Such an approach is not bad per se, for it is inevitable given the state of complexity that modernity has 
brought about in all spheres of human life, and yet it is not without its own problems. Willful ignorance or 




beyond the linguistic and other surface-level cultural differences).10 I will specifically 
argue that the invention of “value” in modern moral philosophy is due to the modern 
scientific worldview that drains nature of meaning, and the “values-talk”—the roots of 
which can be traced back to the neo-Kantian theory of values in the 19th century—
actually perpetuates this very worldview when trying to counter it by re-injecting 
meaning into nature through the notion of “intrinsic value.” The language of “values” 
must be seen as part of the alleged separation of facts and values in modern philosophy. 
For this reason, we cannot reasonably expect that it can bridge the gap between 
humanity and nature which environmentalism at a philosophical level is trying to 
accomplish. Hence, the notion of “values” would be a poor and wrong-headed substitute 
for “virtues” both in (environmental) theory and in (environmental) practice.  
What follows is first a brief discussion of the history of the filed of 
environmental ethics, particularly its claim to break with the pre-existing conceptions of 
ethics. The second section introduces the new subfield of environmental virtue ethics 
briefly, and discusses the political weakness that it inherits from the rest of the 
environmental ethics literature. In the third section, I will present an objection made 
against environmental virtue ethics by Holmes Rolston III. The final section is a 
response to his objection and discusses what, I believe, is wrong with the use of the 
terminology of “value” or “values” when we discuss issues of morality in general or 
environmental ethics in particular.  
                                                 
     10 See, for instance, Roy W. Perrett and John Patterson, “Virtue Ethics and Maori Ethics,” Philosophy 
East & West 41.2 (1991): 185-202;  Donald N. Blakeley, “Neo-Confucian Cosmology, Virtue Ethics, and 
Environmental Philosophy,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8.2 (2001): 37-49; and Yon Huang, “Cheng 
Brothers’ Neo-Confucian Virtue Ethics: The Identity of Virtue and Nature,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 




5.1 A New Environmental Ethic? 
 
The fact that daily and even hourly we move within and encounter half-truths, lies, and even 
worse things (indeed at times we seem to encounter nothing else) is well known, too well known 
to be used as an occasion for proclaiming to our contemporaries a new philosophy.11  
 
The above quote from an unpublished early work of Heidegger cautions us 
against attempting to set up a new philosophy just because we feel dissatisfied with the 
way world appears to us. This may sound too conservative to some. After all, innovation 
is inevitable for human survival and perhaps even for the sake of mere pleasure to avoid 
ennui. Be that as it may, it is something most applicable in the field of technology, 
natural science, jurisprudence, as well as fine arts and literature. Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, for instance, is novel compared to the Newtonian physics and the latter with 
respect to the Aristotelian physics. But how plausible is innovation in moral and political 
philosophy? There can certainly be different approaches to the same questions or ideas. 
But philosophical arguments on praxis cannot be considered as constituting a self-
contained theory. The calls for “new philosophy” or “new ethic” often make the mistake 
that they will be superior to the older versions by virtue of their historical novelty.  
The infatuation with “novelty” in praxis and the presumption that one can 
construct or discover a new “theory” or “philosophy” is peculiarly modern and stems 
from confounding the activity of theorizing or philosophizing with its content. There is 
an intimate relationship between “radicalism” and “innovation.” As conservative author 
Russell Kirk notes, “the radical . . . is a neoterist, in love with change.”12 We do not see 
this interest among the ancients although they too disagreed with one another and were 
                                                 
     11 Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 124, italics mine. 
 




dissatisfied with the actuality of ethics and politics.13 Aristotle’s ideas differed from Plato 
in certain respects (e.g., eidos and phronesis) but Aristotle did not claim to have a different 
philosophy or theory than Plato. One might even say that the Epicureans and the Stoics 
differed from the earlier schools—the Academics and the Peripatetics—and we can duly 
assign each philosophical school a distinct “philosophy.” But the word “philosophy” is 
used here metaphorically to mean “account” or “explanation.” What differs among these 
schools are the competing accounts for the same thing or question such as “justice.” 
Today, when someone offers a new theory of justice it is more often than not assumed 
that it is to be implemented to change the world based on the assumption that there is a 
radical gap between the theory and the practice of justice.  
This distinction may sound pedantic but it basically relates to the most 
fundamental philosophical question, namely, the relationship between theory and 
practice. To see theory or philosophy as a category separate from everyday praxis 
reinforces the impression that philosophy is a non-activity, and this leads to the false 
view that the philosophical way of life is parasitic or unmanly.14 Philosophy for the 
ancients is primarily an activity or a way of life which is better thought of as a verb, 
“philosophizing.” One cannot have a philosophy or construct one but only engage in it. 
Certain modern political philosophers and contemporary political scientists, in contrast, 
have approached “theory” or “philosophy” like a construction project. An example to 
this hubristic language from environmental theory literature is the following assertion: 
“Aristotle’s framework does not supply sufficient tools for the construction of . . . an 
                                                 
     13 See, for instance, Aristotle’s strictures against some of the reigning practices of his time such as the 
mistreatment of females as slaves, the despotic treatment of slaves on the assumption that they are 
irrational, the political regimes which glorify domination, and the practice of private education (Pol. 
1252b5-10, 1260a5-8, 1324b2-1325a5, 1333b5-1334a10, 1337a21-31). For his critique of Plato in matters 
of ethics and politics, see Pol. II.1-6 and NE I.6. 
 




adequate environmental theory of action.”15 The problem here is not that Aristotle’s 
“framework” is found inadequate; it is rather the false promise of “constructing an 
adequate theory” in its place. This language popular in the academia is deeply flawed as it 
reifies what is essentially an activity. The academic who sees his task as theory 
construction forgets, in Heidegger’s terminology, his or her being-in-the-world.  
A corollary of this presumption in environmental theory is forgetfulness of the 
relationship to the pre-existing intellectual tradition.16 This modern temptation of 
innovation has been at work in environmental ethics since its inception in the early 
seventies.17 As one critic of this trend observes, “one general view” in environmental 
ethics “is that ecology and the awareness of nature . . . necessitate the development of a 
fundamentally new ethic, a new, non-human-centered, nature-centered morality.”18 The 
environmental ethics literature in its first decade debated the question of whether there is 
a need for a new environmental ethic in response to environmental problems. What we 
need, according to one exponent of this view, is “a new metaphysics, epistemology, 
cosmology, and environmental ethics of the person/planet.”19 Such calls have subsided 
since then but the “newness” or the alleged difference of the true “ecological” or 
“environmental” thinking from the “traditional” or “mainstream” line can still be 
                                                 
     15 See Toshio Kuwako, “The Possibility of Environmental Discourse in Aristotle,” in Philosophy and 
Ecology, Vol. I, eds. Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas Kalimtzis (Athens: Ionia Publications, 1999), 113. 
 
     16 See Andrew Brennan, “Philosophy,” in Environmental Thought, eds., Edward Page and John Proops 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), 16. 
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Landscape of Reform: Civic Pragmatism and Environmental Thought in America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2006), 190-1. 
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detected as a subtext even in more recent environmental publications. Environmental 
ethics, according to one account, 
moves ethics for the first time from a personal and interpersonal context to a 
physical and global one. With that move a new unprecedented player, the 
physical world, appears on the ethical stage. The physical world itself takes on 
ethical significance and plays a moral role.20  
 
Environmental ethics, according to Hart, “is a discipline with few precedents and less 
history.”21 I will hereafter provide a brief background of this view in environmental 
literature to prepare the groundwork for my discussion of environmental virtue ethics in 
the next section. 
The first major influence on the proponents of a new ethic is Aldo Leopold’s 
“land ethic” which Leopold discusses in an essay with the same title in his widely read 
book A Sand County Almanac.22 Leopold explains his aim in this book as bringing out the 
ecological and cultural value of land and to influence “a shift of values” so that “land is 
to be loved and respected.” The term “land” is used by Leopold in reference to both the 
biotic and abiotic natural environment—“soils, waters, plants, and animals.”23 An 
appreciation and conservation of land requires, according to Leopold, an extension of 
traditional ethics since this goal is incompatible with the “Abrahamic concept of land” 
which treats “land as a commodity” of human beings.24 This plea for expanding our 
moral circle or family to include non-human beings is not as far-fetched as it may first 
                                                 
     20 Richard E. Hart, ed., Ethics and the Environment (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992), 6, 
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sound, on Leopold’s view, if only we would consider how the boundaries of our current 
moral community have expanded through history to include previously outcast social 
groups. This historicist belief in “moral progress” is implicit in Aldo Leopold’s proposal 
for re-appraising our relationship to the natural environment:  
The first ethics dealt with the relation between individuals; the Mosaic Decalogue 
is an example. Later accretions dealt with the relation between the individual and 
society. The Golden Rule tries to integrate the individual to society; democracy 
to integrate social organization to the individual. There is as yet no ethic dealing 
with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. 
Land, like Odysseus’ slave-girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly 
economic, entailing privileges but not obligations. The extension of ethics to this third element in 
human environment is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an 
ecological necessity. It is the third step in a sequence. . . . I regard the present conservation 
movement as the embryo of such an affirmation.25 
 
Despite his objections to the modern creed of “salvation by machinery,” Leopold 
upholds here the quintessential Enlightenment view of “moral progress,” that is, 
morality improves through history.26  
A second major influence on the advocacy of a “new environmental ethic” was a 
highly influential and widely circulated essay by an American historian, Lynn White, Jr. 
titled “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis.” Published in the prestigious Science 
journal in 1967, White’s article argues that the modern technological conquest of nature 
has been sanctioned and even sanctified by the anthropocentric creation dogma of 
Judeo-Christianity, and points the finger at the Western European strand of Christianity 
(as opposed to the Eastern Christianity which, according to White, is more 
contemplation-oriented) for providing the intellectual and religious basis for today’s 
                                                 
     25 Ibid., 223-24, italics mine. 
 
     26 For Leopold’s phrase “salvation by machinery” by which he means the modern view that the good 
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impending “ecological crisis.”27 According to White, the immediate cause for the 
“ecological crisis” is modern science and technology. But modern science and 
technology itself derives its assertive attitude toward nature from “the Christian dogma 
of man’s transcendence of, and rightful mastery over, nature.”28 Removing the pre-
Christian animist inhibitions to the exploitation of nature, mainstream Christianity has 
established a rigid man/nature dualism and, by doing so, has given free rein to the 
mastery of nature first in the West and later wherever modernization has taken hold in 
other parts of the world. Expressing his skepticism over using more or better science 
and technology to resolve these issues, White instead entertains the options of creating 
“a new religion” or re-thinking the old one.  
Ruling out the “viability” of foreign beliefs and practices such as Zen Buddhism, 
White concluded his article with a paean to the medieval Christian saint Francis of Assisi 
for his exemplary ecological teaching of humility toward creation. By proposing St. 
Francis as a patron saint of ecologists—which was fulfilled by Pope John Paul II in 
1979—White evidently preferred the second route, that is, of re-thinking the Western 
tradition, but his blanket incrimination of Judeo-Christian dogma due to its fundamental 
axiom that “nature has no reason for existence save to serve man” has stuck in the 
minds of most people. It has reinforced the widespread impression and suspicion among 
the anti-systemic radicals (from which the Greens emerged during the seventies) that the 
Western tradition is corrupt from its beginnings and the Western world should turn to 
non-Western traditions instead of trying to reform itself from within. “This was ironic, 
                                                 
     27 See Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (1967): 1203-7.  
 




for White thought there were currents in the Christian tradition that could provide solid 
ground for environmental ethics.”29 
After Lynn White, a major push for a “new environmental ethic” came from an 
Australian scholar, Richard Sylvan (formerly Routley), who, in a brief but influential 
essay, rhetorically asked if there is “a need for a new, an environmental ethic” and 
answered in the affirmative: “as the important Western traditions exclude an 
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic . . . would be new all right.”30 
Although Sylvan doesn’t make it quite clear in his essay what this new ethic entails, he 
faults the Western traditions of Greco-Roman and Biblical origins for their bias toward 
the human species, namely, their “species chauvinism.” Sylvan begins his essay with a 
review of Leopold’s call for a new land ethic. As I have briefly mentioned above, the 
prevailing ethics, according to Leopold, is insufficient to order our interaction with the 
natural world. Hence, he called for “extension of ethics” to cover these relationships. 
Sylvan agrees with Leopold’s diagnosis but disagrees with his timid solution: “If Leopold 
is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in 
attitudes, values and evaluations.” Hence, Sylvan argues for a more “radical” position to 
overcome what he calls the “human chauvinism” of Western morality.  
Despite his radical rhetoric, Sylvan does not say more than that we need to 
respect non-human species. His argument relies on a hypothetical “last man” scenario in 
which a single human survivor of a global catastrophe would have done an obvious 
wrong on “environmental grounds,” if he deliberately destroyed the surviving non-
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human species. By this hypothetical example, Sylvan claimed to have demonstrated that 
our intuitions imply that we deep inside care for the well-being of non-human species on 
non-anthropocentric grounds. Hence, a true environmental ethic must not appeal to 
anthropocentric reasoning. Sylvan’s reasoning not only turns out to be question-begging 
but more importantly historicist, which can be seen in the reason he provides for the 
wrong-doing of the Last Man. As he claims, “Mr. Last Man” would be “behaving badly” 
because “radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance 
of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles.” That is 
to say our theoretical formulation of what morality demands has to catch up with this 
historical shift in radical thinking and values.31 This view presupposes the Hegelian view of 
reality that theory can only catch up with praxis only after “the falling of dusk.” It falls 
short of explaining of course why theory is needed if praxis is already there. 
A fourth proponent of a new environmental ethic, the German scholar Hans 
Jonas, is an outsider to the Anglo-American circle of environmental ethics to which the 
previous figures belong. In an article on technology, originally written in 1973, Jonas 
defends on historicist grounds the need to conceive a “new ethic,” which has to justify 
“man’s duties toward himself, his distant posterity, and the plenitude of terrestrial life 
under his dominion.”32 Historicism, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, is a modern way of 
understanding human reality. But Jonas’ “new ethic” has also an explicit metaphysical 
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dimension. It is purported to be an ontological ethics, based on “a doctrine of general 
being,” that is, metaphysics. Jonas aims to re-unite metaphysics with ethics, and derive 
the “objective imperatives for man in the scheme of things.” This project has to 
overcome the Humean problem by bridging “the alleged chasm between scientifically 
ascertainable ‘is’ and morally binding ‘ought.’” 33 In other words, the “good” or “value” 
needs to be grounded in being.34  
Putting it thus, we may think that Jonas is harking back to the pre-modern idea 
of teleology whose major spokesperson was Aristotle. He indeed does appeal to Aristotle 
to a certain extent.35 But it would be difficult to identify Jonas’ “new ethic” as neo-
Aristotelian, for Jonas believes that “all previous ethics” including Aristotle’s is 
ineffective in view of “modern technology,” which unleashes on earth an unprecedented 
magnitude of power with unforeseeable consequences. Jonas is rather trying to reach a 
new synthesis that contain elements from both pre-modern and modern philosophy. His 
synthesis certainly goes against the grain of modern science in its attempt to recover 
“metaphysical teleology” from pre-moderns but the modern element in his synthesis, the 
historicity of being, is much more essential for his “new ethic.” I will skip over for now 
the “metaphysical teleology” part and briefly discuss what makes the historicist view so 
important for his purposes.36  
Jonas brings to our attention the growing gap between the exponential increase 
of technological power at our disposal and our collective capacity of foresight into the 
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possible effects of this power. This de facto discrepancy in modernity between an 
increasing magnitude of power and a shortening range of human foresight, Jonas 
believes, calls for a new ethic of responsibility and foresight: “Our thesis is that the new 
kinds and dimensions of action require a commensurate ethic of foresight and 
responsibility which is as novel as the eventualities [that arise out of the works of homo 
faber in the era of technology] which it must meet.”37 According to Jonas, the concept of 
“responsibility” has largely been ignored in traditional ethical theory—both modern and 
pre-modern or religious and secular—because of these obsolete premises: “that the 
human condition, determined by the nature of man and the nature of things, was given 
once for all; that the human good on that basis was readily determinable; and that the 
range of human action and therefore responsibility was narrowly circumscribed.”38  
All three premises point to one single truth: the triumph of homo faber over homo 
sapiens. The aforementioned premises are no longer tenable in our technological age 
because “the nature of human action” has changed with “the realm of making [i.e., 
technology]” invading the space of human action.39 This statement, which has an 
Arendtian ring to it, reflects a deeply historicist view of reality despite the occurrence of 
the word “nature” in it. An indication of this is Jonas’ repeated use of the phrase 
“human condition” in place of “human nature.” The choice of word reveals Jonas’ 
understanding of being in terms of “historicity,” that human beings can no longer claim 
to have a definite nature but only an evolving history increasingly shaped by techne. With 
our increasing use of and reliance on technology, we have “opened up a whole new 
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dimension of ethical relevance for which there is no precedent in the standards and 
canons of traditional ethics.”40 Jonas is not a champion of the Baconian dynamism 
wrought by modern technology, but believes that it will last for an indefinite period of 
time with increasing influence on the human condition. For this reason, its effects 
cannot be left out of “ethics.” Traditional ethics cannot help us with its emphasis on 
virtue because it took for granted that the category of “man” is “constant in essence and 
not itself an object of reshaping techne.”41 An unchanging “human nature” can no longer 
be spoken of in our age, the defining feature of which is “the law of perpetually self-
generating change”42 or, put differently, “the idea of potentially infinite progress.”43  
Jonas’ analysis of the modern condition is quite insightful but his “new” theory 
of responsibility reflects the inescapable circular reasoning on which all proponents of 
“new ethics” must rely. For the recognition of a new dimension of being as ethically 
relevant has to presuppose what constitutes “ethical relevance” under traditional ethics. 
One cannot radically stand outside the received categories of thinking inherited from the 
past. Indeed, Jonas’ “ethics of responsibility” is merely a historicized version of the 
Kantian categorical imperative. Jonas’ neo-Kantian take on “ethics” is evident in the title 
of his work. Not only that, Jonas explicitly brings up the Kantian “categorical 
imperative” throughout his work on several occasions. Some of these references are 
meant to distinguish the forward-looking dimension of his approach from Kant’s but it 
is clear form his emphasis on “categorical imperative” that Jonas sees “ethics” through 
Kantian lenses.  
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The Kantian conception of categorical imperative is modified in two respects. 
First, it need only to be reconsidered in light of the fact that in the technological age the 
lasting imprint of human action will be carried into “the indefinite future.”44 Our new 
“duty” is hence future-oriented; it is to assure that “man’s presence in the world” is not 
imperiled, that is, “to preserve this physical world in such a state that the conditions for 
that presence remain intact.”45 This time-horizon aspect of categorical imperative differs 
from Kant on two points. Jonas believes that “Kant’s categorical imperative” is outdated 
because it “was addressed to the individual, and its criterion was instantaneous.” The 
new imperative, on the other hand, “addresses itself to public policy rather than private 
conduct” and “adds a time horizon to the moral calculus which is entirely absent from 
the instantaneous operation of the Kantian imperative.”46  
Jonas thinks that correcting Kant on these two points can justify his “new ethic.” 
But he does not tamper with the most distinguishing features of the Kantian conception 
of “morality”: “duty” or “imperative” and its universalistic scope. Jonas’ falling back on 
previous conceptions of morality indicates that the “new ethic” that he is seeking cannot 
be all that new after all.47 In a critical section of the book, Jonas distinguishes the 
substantive sense of responsibility from a formal sense of responsibility (pp. 90-93). The 
latter is simply “being accountable ‘for’ one’s deeds, whatever they are” (i.e., the 
                                                 
     44 Jonas, The Imperative, 10-2. Hans Jonas, in an interview, reveals that Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten (Foundation of Metaphysics of Morals) had a “determining influence” on him in his fixation with the 
idea of “a philosophical ethics,” moderated only by his later introduction to Aristotle. See Harvey Scodel, 
“An Interview with Professor Hans Jonas,” Social Research 70.2 (2003): 339-68. 
 
     45 Jonas, The Imperative, 10. 
 
     46 Ibid., 12, italics original. 
 
     47 Jonas’ reliance on traditional ethics is also clear from his statement that “ethics is concerned with 
action”—an incomplete reference to Aristotle who delimits the scope of the “ethical” as “feelings and 
actions” (NE 1106b16). Leaving out natural “feelings” from among the objects of ethics follows from 





presupposition of free will) and the former is for “particular objects that commits an 
agent to particular deeds concerning them” (p. 90). The ethic of responsibility that he 
advances for the technological age refers to the substantive sense. It is clear however 
from his exposition that the substantive sense does not add anything to the venerable 
“duty” or “obligation.” The latter concepts are derived from the Latin word officium 
(which is Cicero’s translation of the Greek word kathekon—appropriate action, befitting). 
According to Cicero’s usage, duties presuppose virtues and virtues are derived from 
human nature of sociability and innate desire for perfection. Scholars point out that there 
is a change of meaning from kathekon to officium in that the latter reflects the existence of 
a variety of social relationships better than its Greek equivalent. Such change of meaning 
is also likely from Latin officum to Kantian Pflicht (duty/obligation) and from the English 
duty/obligation to responsibility. The subsection discussing “Substantive Responsibility” 
on page 93 is subtitled “The Positive Duty of Power” and in this subsection Jonas 
repeatedly uses the words “obligating,” “commanding,” “binding,” and even “duty,” all 
of which are indicative of the Kantian conception of duty.  According to Kant, duty is 
constraining, limiting, and necessitating. Its function is to restrain the arbitrary exercise 
of our willing which is a strong possibility due to our natural propensity to give priority 
to our desires.48 
Second, What Jonas is trying to find an answer to is how “obligation” or an 
“ought” (Jonas’s expressions) can possibly arise out of human “willing.” His answer is 
that “this transition is mediated by the phenomenon of power” (p. 129). In a convoluted 
                                                 
     48 See Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
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argument, Jonas is trying to say that our power over nature is accompanied by duties. 
The reason that he says this in so many words is his attempt to bridge “the alleged chasm 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’” according to the “reigning theory” of ethics without resorting 
to either human or divine fiat (pp. 130-31). Jonas claims to have found an “ontic 
paradigm” that promises to connect the two realms and finds an instance of this 
paradigm in “the newborn” (pp. 131-35). I am not going to get into details further, but 
suffice it to say that Jonas’s argument at this point is more relevant for the abortion 
debate than technology. 
Although Jonas remained outside the Anglo-American circle of environmental 
ethics throughout his career, his approach nonetheless resonates with this literature. 
Jonas too finds “all traditional ethics” limited in scope for its “anthropocentric” focus 
and believes that the ethical change must be more radical than a mere application of 
“received rules of conduct;” it should rather consider “the condition of extrahuman 
nature” “for its own and in its own right.”49 These ideas bear striking similarity to those 
of Holmes Rolston III, who is widely recognized as the founder of the environmental 
ethics field. Rolston is a major advocate of a new environmental ethic as well and 
stresses the same point that Sylvan and Jonas make: what is needed is not merely an 
extension  or recycling of old ethic but the construction of a new one. In an early article, 
Rolston rhetorically raises the question of whether there is an ethic that we can truly call 
“ecological,” and reviewing the environmental writings in the late sixties and early 
seventies, he comes to the conclusion that there is none yet worthy of the name.50 
Turning to Leopold’s “land ethic,” Rolston draws out the radical implication in 
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Leopold’s writings: “What is proposed here is a broadening of value, so that nature will 
cease to be merely ‘property’ and become a commonwealth.”51 In a later work, Rolston 
admits that what he is proposing goes against the existing views of what ethics is: 
This is perhaps not what ethics normally is, but that protest is not enough, 
because the question is whether ethics as normally conceived covers the whole 
field that properly belongs to it. Appeal to normal or familiar usage does nothing 
to settle revolutionary claims. We may want to change the meaning and scope, 
the connotation and denotation, of ethics.52  
 
My skepticism of the idea of a new ethic is clear in the above remarks for I 
believe that inventing or designing a theory or system of morality anew not only is 
impossible but also highly deceptive and misguided. What is philosophically possible is 
merely a re-interpretation of what passes as “morality” or “ethics” in the living world or 
among the learned. This is what, for instance, Kant did despite his radical disagreement 
with pre-modern ethics. Rather than inventing a wholly new ethic, Kant tried to reveal 
the true bounds and nature of “morality.” For this reason, Kant remarks that it would be 
false to say that there can be more than one “ethic.”53 That codes of conduct vary 
according to different times and societies is no proof to the contrary. What differs from 
one individual, community, or period to another is the particular delimitation of the 
“ethical” domain from unethical and non-ethical domains. The historically or culturally 
varying scope of inclusion in the ethical domain (i.e., the question of who or what 
deserves moral consideration) does not justify the conclusion that there can be different 
forms of ethics. That conclusion may be justifiable only under the assumptions of 
“historicism,” “constructivism,” or “conventionalism” all of which deny the constants of 
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human nature. What the proponents of a “new ethic” may be trying to say is that we 
need a new way of thinking or conceiving what constitutes “ethics” or “morality.” If this 
were so, there would be not much of a problem in speaking of a “new ethic.” But this is 
not so because underlying the call for “new ethic” is historicism, which contradicts the 
idea of a single ethic that can be valid despite historical change and cultural difference.  
Some environmental scholars have already questioned the idea of conjuring up a 
new ethics. John Passmore pointed out that almost all ethical codes of conduct in the 
world—whether religious or philosophical—have been established on the basis of pre-
existing ones by extending or slightly modifying them rather than rejecting them totally. 
An ethical vocabulary must have its seeds in the already existing praxis and teachings of 
the past and now. The literati can at best nurture these seeds selectively and, we may add, 
prudently. Passmore argues that recovering the fertile aspects of existing ethical 
traditions is a much more feasible option for effective social change than pursuing a 
completely new environmental ethic:  
Important changes in moral outlook can occur, have occurred; in producing 
some of these changes, individual reformers, whether statesmen or prophets, 
have played an important part. But the degree to which their reforms have been 
in the long run successful depends on the degree to which they have been able to 
appeal to and further develop already existing traditions. The fact that the West 
has never been wholly committed to the view that man has no responsibility 
whatsoever for the maintenance and preservation of the world around him is 
important just because it means that there are ‘seeds’ in the Western tradition 
which the reformer can hope to bring into full flower.54  
 
Another environmental scholar also agrees that devising or inventing a new ethic from 
scratch is not a viable option. Rather than demanding a complete break with the past, an 
extension of the existing patterns of moral thought should be sought: “The case for a 
new ethic should rather consist in exhibiting principles which have not always been 
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recognized but which are nevertheless implicit in our moral traditions, or, perhaps, in 
morality itself, and which it is important now to acknowledge.”55  
The British writer C. S. Lewis’s polemical remarks in his well-known book The 
Abolition of Man are noteworthy in this regard. Lewis opposes, in this book, what would 
later be known as “emotivism”—the subjectivist view in contemporary moral 
philosophy that describe the statements on morality or moral judgments in terms of 
personal feelings, preferences, and attitudes. Lewis claimed that this view would 
eventually bring about “the destruction of the society which accepts it.”56 This view 
mistakenly implies in its emphasis on universalism and progressivism that received 
traditional morality (which he curiously calls the Tao for convenience) is simply one 
among “a series of possible systems of value.”57 The Tao, according to Lewis, is rather 
the sole origin of “all value judgements.” One cannot ignore it and then try to replace it 
with a completely new theory of value: 
The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-
contradictory. There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in 
the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) 
‘ideologies’, all consist of fragments from the Tao itself, arbitrarily wrenched 
from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their isolation, 
yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. If my duty 
to my parents is a superstition, then so is my duty to posterity. If justice is a 
superstition, then so is my duty to my country or my race. If the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge is a real value, then so is conjugal fidelity. The rebellion of 
new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if 
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the rebels could succeed they would find that they had destroyed themselves. 
The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of imagining 
a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to 
move in. (emphasis added) 
 
I do not necessarily agree with Lewis’ use of the term “value” or “objective value” but I 
find his questioning the radical aspirations of “progressive” thinking as salutary. Lewis 
helps us to see that what passes as a “new” doctrine, ideology, or ethics appears so only 
after the “difference” part of (social) reality is isolated and overemphasized, ignoring 
thereby the dialectical interplay of the principle of “unity-in-difference.” The quote from 
Heidegger above similarly reminds us that we cannot will a new “ethic,” “philosophy,” or 
even “ideology” de novo. We always build on and work within the ideational framework 
we have inherited from the past. What some may deplore as “conformism” or 
“reformism” in matters of ethics is not only inescapable but desirable as well. In other 
words, what we need in the study of “ethics” is not an outright rejection but a careful 
revision of the received opinions in an Aristotelian manner.58 It is true that what is 
proposed here is in the spirit of traditional conservatism which takes notice of the need 
for inter-generational continuity for the health of social relationships: “As the sanity of 
the individual lies in the continuity of his memories, so the sanity of the group lies in the 
continuity of its traditions; in either case a break in the chain invites a neurotic 
reaction.”59 The revival of interest in virtue that we witness in the literature of 
“environmental virtue ethics” is a much needed correction to the penchant for 
innovating ethics. 
                                                 
     58 This is the venerable dialectical method that Aristotle explains at the beginning of his treatise Topics: 
“reasoning . . . is ‘dialectical’, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted [endoxa] . . . . Those 
opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the 
philosophers—i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them” (100a30-b23). 
 




5.2 Environmental Virtue Ethics 
 
Environmental virtue ethics is a newcomer in the field of environmental ethics, 
which is a nascent subfield of the contemporary moral philosophy itself. Although the 
tradition of virtue ethics goes back to Aristotle and the Christian Aristotelianism of 
Thomas Aquinas, environmental virtue ethics scholars have also found inspiration in the 
lives and writings of more contemporary nature loving visionaries such as Henry D. 
Thoreau, John Muir (founder of the Sierra Club), Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson 
(author of Silent Spring).60 These figures embody virtues such as simplicity, frugality, 
humility, compassion, and integrity. Although environmental virtue ethics is a new 
synthesis, the major element of this synthesis, “virtue ethics,” is  relatively an established 
strand within contemporary moral philosophy along with the other two main 
approaches—deontology and consequentialism.61 What follows is a brief account of 
environmental virtue ethics followed by a discussion of its weakness in addressing the 
political task of environmentalism. 
Several contemporary students of moral philosophy have stressed Aristotle’s 
praxis-oriented and agent-centered discussion of ethics to call attention to the 
weaknesses in the act-centered and/or rule oriented moral perspectives of the two 
predominant schools of modern moral philosophy, namely deontology and utilitarianism 
associated with Immanuel Kant and J. S. Mill respectively. A major weakness of these 
otherwise divergent perspectives has been found to be in their common emphasis on 
                                                 
     60 See, for instance, Philip Cafaro, “Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue 
Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 23 (2001): 3-17.  
 
     61 Deontology, coined from the Greek term deon (duty or obligation), is one conception of ethics often 
associated with Immanuel Kant, but its origins go back to the Roman antiquity. Consequentialism is a 
recent term coined by G. E. M. Anscombe to distinguish the modified version of the British utilitarianism 




capturing the procedural criteria of morally right conduct in a simple formula like the 
categorical imperative of Kantian deontology or the greatest happiness principle of 
utilitarianism. Such emphasis leads to formalist viewpoints with tenuous contact with the 
pre-philosophical lebenswelt (everyday life) in which most human beings spend their lives. 
The contemporary English philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, argued in a significant 
essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958)—which has been quite influential in reviving 
interest in virtue ethics—that moral philosophers should turn their attention away from 
abstract and indefinite expressions such as “morally right” or “morally wrong” in 
explaining ethical behavior to concepts such as “just” or “unjust” which are more fruitful 
due to their thicker descriptive content..62  
A similar motive—dissatisfaction with abstractionism and formalism of academic 
moral philosophy—can be observed in the emergence of environmental virtue ethics. 
The concern with formalism and abstractionism in environmental ethics stems from the 
widespread feeling that environmental ethics is failing to connect with people outside the 
academia.63 The critique of the environmental theorist John O’Neill in this regard is 
quite similar to that of Anscombe. O’Neill points out that the emphatic focus on the 
“intrinsic value” of non-human beings in environmental ethics literature diminishes the 
political relevance of environmental thought by overlooking the motivational sources of 
“environmental concern” in public as well as by reducing the richness of normative 
vocabulary stemming from a diversity of situations in ordinary experience: 
                                                 
     62 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33.124 (1958): 1-19. This essay is 
considered as a major stimulus for and influence on the contemporary school of virtue ethics. Other 
prominent figures in this school are Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre.  
 
     63 See Lisa H. Newton, Ethics and Sustainability: Sustainable Development and the Moral Life (Upper Saddle 




A feature of a great deal of theorizing in environmental ethics of which the 
search for “intrinsic value” is typical is that it loses sight of what moves 
environmental concern. There is a stark contrast between the richness in the 
normative vocabulary that informs our appraisal of the environments with which 
we live and the austerity of the vocabulary that environmental philosophers 
employ to theorize about it . . . . References to intrinsic value only have power 
insofar as they call upon more specific reason-giving concepts and corresponding 
claims about the ways in which natural objects are a source of wonder, the sense 
of proportion they invoke in us of our place within a wider history, the care we 
feel called upon to give as we develop our understanding of the lives of fellow 
creatures, the diversity of forms of life of which we respond, and so on. Robbed 
of that more specific content, one is left with concepts adrift that lend 
themselves to the kind of abstract metaphysics of value often to be found in 
environmental philosophy.64   
 
Just as the recent revival of interest in “virtue ethics” has been in reaction to the 
gridlock between deontology and consequentialism over speculative ethical dilemmas, 
the interest in environmental virtue ethics is also motivated by  a practical concern to 
turn scholars’ attention from the arcane question of “the intrinsic value or moral 
considerability of non-human nature” to the more practical “questions concerning 
human happiness and flourishing.”65 This is no surprise as both Kantian and utilitarian 
perspectives have been a staple of environmental theory literature since its inception in 
the 1970s. Modified Kantianism figures in non-anthropocentric environmental views 
such as eco-centrism and intrinsic value of nature. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is 
most common in environmental economics and policy-making which weigh competing 
social interests. The emergence of the literature of environmental virtue ethics is a 
response to the gridlock of environmental discourse between these two opposing 
alternatives.  
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An early attempt in relating “virtue ethics” to environmental issues was made by 
Thomas Hill in a 1983 article taking issue with the “intrinsic value” argument in 
environmental ethics literature.66 Hill justifies his objection to the “intrinsic value” 
position on practical grounds by noting that the task of determining the “wrongness” or 
“rightness” of human conduct toward the natural environment through the alleged 
“rights” or “value” of non-human nature embroils us in endless difficulties. A more 
fruitful way of conceiving our normative relationships with the natural environment 
could instead be found in “the ancient task of articulating our ideals of human 
excellence.”67 In the context of the environment, it has to be shown how being 
concerned with the destruction of the natural environment on non-instrumental grounds 
can be related back to human virtues such as humility and gratitude. Hill presents his 
thesis on this question of establishing a link between virtue and nature as follows: 
“though indifference to nonsentient nature does not necessarily reflect the absence of 
virtues, it often signals the absence of certain traits that we want to encourage because, 
they are, in most cases, a natural basis for the development of certain virtues.”68 Hence, 
according to Hill, showing indifference (as opposed to sensitivity or concern) to the 
abuse, misuse, or destruction of natural beings other than animals is not a vice in itself 
but a great impediment to the cultivation of certain virtues. 
                                                 
     66 Thomas Hill Jr., “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments,” Environmental 
Ethics 5 (1983): 211-24. Reprinted in Environmental Virtue Ethics, eds. Philip Cafaro and Ronald Sandler 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 47-59. The subsequent references are to the reprinted 
version.  
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     68 Hill, 51, italics original. Hill’s thesis bears striking resemblance to Kant’s position on this matter in 
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 6: 443: “A propensity to wanton destruction of what is beautiful in inanimate nature . . . is opposed 
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itself moral, is still a disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality or at least prepares the way for 
it: the disposition, namely, to love something (e.g., beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of 




I will not evaluate the merits of Hill’s thesis here.69 Instead, I want to point out 
an aspect of Hill’s his essay which, I believe, exemplifies  a certain general weakness in 
environmental (virtue) ethics, namely, paying scant attention to the political implications 
of normative theory. Hill believes that those who do not show sincere “environmental 
concern” must be lacking in receptivity to virtues such as humility and gratitude. Those 
who lack these virtues would not only risk their relationship with other human beings 
but would also be impeded in understanding their place in the great scheme of things. 
Hill wants to suggest that since we do not want to live among arrogant and ungrateful 
people, we should see to it that the other people that we share our lives with also foster a 
sense of appreciation for nature. Supposing it is true that gratitude and humility are 
desirable moral virtues, and they naturally flow from one’s proper sense of finitude, what 
follows?  
Hill raises this question himself: “Suppose these conjectures prove to be true. 
One may wonder what is the point of considering them? Is it to disparage all those who 
view nature merely as a resource?”70 He goes on to reject this negative conclusion and 
offers a more positive interpretation: “The point is not to insinuate that all 
antienvironmentalists are defective but to see that those who value such traits as 
humility, gratitude, and sensitivity to others have reason to promote the love of 
nature.”71 But is this not a case of preaching to the converted? Those people who value 
humility, gratitude, compassion must already be leading more or less virtuous lives, and if 
“the love of nature” is a prerequisite of these virtues, then they must already be lovers of 
                                                 
     69 A critical discussion of Hill’s argument can be found in Geoffrey B. Frasz, “Environmental Virtue 
Ethics: A New Direction for Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 15 (1993): 259–74. 
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nature. To whom are they going to sell the virtues of loving nature? Certainly to those 
who are lacking in this regard. But how can one communicate effectively with those who 
lack such virtues? In this brief article, Hill does not address this crucial political question.  
In the only book-length discussion of environmental virtue ethics currently 
available, Louke van Wensveen raises this question but her response is far from being 
satisfactory.72 Before discussing this issue, however, I shall briefly explain the framework 
in which van Wensveen approaches the question of environmental virtue. She observes 
that although the terms virtue and vice seem to be conspicuously absent in the 
environmental theory literature, they have always been implicitly at work therein. Two 
books from this literature are selected for analysis: Murray Bookchin’s The Ecology of 
Freedom (1982) and Thomas Berry’s The Dream of the Earth (1988). So we are told by van 
Wensveen that although these eco-authors seldom use the terms “virtue” and “vice” in 
their works and have not attempted to develop a “theory of virtue,” their writings 
nonetheless champion certain positive attitudes, and warn against certain negative others 
which can best be understood in terms of traditional virtues and vices respectively.  
For instance, Bookchin writes about “cooperation, mutual support, and love” 
approvingly, and criticizes “domination, self-interest, and exploitation” in human history 
and modern society.73 If anything, on van Wensveen’s view,  the former should be 
identified as “virtues” and the latter as “vices” appropriate for the ecological age we are 
                                                 
     72 Louke van Wensveen, Dirty Virtues: The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Ethics (Amherst, NY: Humanity 
Books, 2000). Her explanation for why she calls the ecological virtues is as follows: “dirty” because “this 
language expresses a preoccupation with the earth (read: dirt = soil), and also because many ecological 
virtues would have been considered not particularly praiseworthy, or even vicious, during most of Western 
history (read: dirty = bad, taboo)” (p. 4). 
 
     73 Ibid., 48. On van Wensveen’s view, Bookchin’s book mentions 44 virtues and 39 vices. The list of 
virtues and vices she comes up with, apart from a few true ones, has ideas which actually has nothing to do 
with virtues or vices. To give an example, she counts interdependence, spontaneity, or rebelliousness as 
virtues, and elitism, blindness, alienation as vices (pp. 48-49). The same confusion goes for her list of 




living in. Putting aside the fact these things cannot by any stretch of imagination stand in 
for virtues and vices as we know them—they at best describe human interactions like 
ruling and being ruled except “love” which is a passion—how do van Wensveen 
determine that these things are substitute terms for “virtues” and “vices,” if Bookchin 
himself does not identify them as such? Is it simply because of Bookchin’s approval of 
some and disapproval of others? How can the preferences of a single author pass as 
virtues and vices for the whole human race?  
Van Wensween errs, I believe, because of her enthusiasm to reform the 
traditional virtue language to make it acceptable to the “progressives” among us. As she 
herself observes, the language of virtue has remained obscure within environmental 
theory literature because those environmentalists who identify themselves as 
progressives are uneasy with this old-fashioned tradition so much so that they would be 
shocked to hear that they share a common language with their ideological polar 
opposites: “Those of us who count themselves among the still largely countercultural 
activists who cultivate respect and love of nature in their daily lives—in other words, 
those who provide the practical base of environmental ethics—will more likely 
experience shock at this realization.”74 Van Wensveen is aware of the “progressive” 
misgivings about virtue, but she nonetheless believes that it is high time to call a spade a 
spade. So far, so good. However, in trying to moderate the skepticism and opposition to 
“virtue” among progressive environmentalists, she waters down the traditional 
understanding of virtue greatly. This may be considered a pragmatic move to make 
“virtue” more acceptable to our constituency, but we also need to consider the internal 
coherence of the revisions made to the traditional understanding of virtue lest it all falls 
                                                 




apart. Indeed, the center does not hold, if there were a center to begin with. I believe van 
Wensveen’s efforts (and this can be said of many other scholars of environmental virtue 
ethics as well) are ultimately vitiated by the temptation of “constructing” an ethic or a 
theory of virtue, though, unlike the proponents of a “new ethic,” it is one with 
traditional roots.75  
The lack of political perspective mars van Wensveen’s efforts of reconciling the 
questions virtue and the environment even though she is explicitly critical of this gap in 
the rest of the environmental ethics literature. The problem she finds in this literature is 
the inability or unwillingness to connect a social change program on an institutional or 
structural level with a stress on personal transformation of consciousness. At the outset, 
she distinguishes how “ecologically minded people” differ from “Aristotle and many of 
his followers” with respect to their interest in teaching virtue. Whereas the latter is 
“interested in character development for the sake of achieving personal harmony within 
an existing social system,” the interest of the former in virtue lies in their commitment to 
“a social vision for the future, a vision of ecologically sustainable societies.”76 In other 
words, whereas Aristotle’s use of virtue serves the status quo, environmental visionaries 
such as Bookchin appeal to virtue to produce social change: “Even though virtue ethics 
may have acquired an image of conservatism, a virtue ethic based in the lived discourse 
of the environmental movement could have surprisingly radical effects.”77 So our author 
believes that Bookchin aptly focuses at the same time on “social change” and “social 
                                                 
     75 Van Wensween is well aware of the futility of previous attempts to break with tradition in 
environmental ethics (pp. 22-42), so she repeatedly emphasizes the “roots and wings” of ecological virtue 
language, which stands for “its connections with the past and its promises for the future” (p. 22). And yet, 
the “ecological virtue discourse” is “more like a bird than like a plant” though it feeds off “familiar plants” 
(p. 36). 
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ethic” without opting for one or the other. Bookchin’s approach, unlike that of Berry, 
does not put all its eggs in one basket but operates simultaneously on both individual 
and institutional levels of change.78   
But what method does Van Wensveen’s propose for achieving the social change 
that she believes is necessary? Her only response in this respect centers on cataloguing a 
list of virtues which she claims to have discovered in the writings of major 
environmental authors, and reforming the traditional virtues for the ecological age. But 
why is there a need to write a whole new book to recommend these two books of 
Bookchin and Berry to other people? We get a hint to this question from van 
Wensween’s interest in the “veritable revaluation of values” that she attributes to the 
ecological literature.79 The first half of her book (Chapters 1 through 4), as she notes, is 
descriptive; it describes the emergence of virtue language within contemporary 
“ecoliterature” as a new phenomenon. The second half of the book (Chapters 5 through 
9) explores the “practical problems” or “goals” that underlie this language.80 What are 
these problems? It is the fact that this language shows so much “richness and diversity” 
that we may get lost in its maze. So “we need to be able to get back to some basic 
criteria, some clear reminders of what the whole exploration is all about.” Indeed, we 
need a compass for the table of virtues and vices, which she presents in an appendix, 
with 189 virtues and 174 vices collected from the “post-1970 environmental literature.”81 
For this purpose, she admits that she has to “construct elements of an ecological virtue 
theory.” Then she qualifies her intent:  
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elements, not a complete theory, as practical questions tend to arise in a 
haphazard manner and it seems more worthwhile to stay close the practical 
questions than to risk losing touch with reality for the sake of systematizing 
(much as I admit loving the latter).82 
 
Van Wensveen is well aware of the intellectuals’ penchant for “theory 
construction” as she explicitly assures us that her efforts to bring coherence to the 
emerging ecological virtue language stems from “a desire to achieve greater moral clarity 
rather than from a desire to build the ultimate intellectual system.”83 But her constant 
reminders of “the dynamism of ecological virtue ethics” notwithstanding, she does 
present us with a theory of ecological virtue.84 Yes, she does not go down the route of 
inventing a radically new ethic, as she claims that she does not “see the process of 
constructing ethical theory as a creation ex nihilo, but rather as a creative correlation of 
existing moral resources.”85 Yet, she describes her task in the end as follows: “I will 
critically select and connect, weaving threads of theory that I hope will have practical 
value as we search to live out an ecological virtue ethic.”86 So she proposes some 
“boundary conditions” or “tests” that can function as a guide in our ecological age to 
distinguish genuine virtues and vices from fake ones. These  criteria can be gleaned, 
according to van Wensveen, from Bookchin’s The Ecology of Freedom—a work which does 
not discuss virtue and vice—as well as from some contemporary feminist teachings and 
experiences which are opposed to traditional “virtues” for their patriarchal bias.  
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The criteria put forth by van Wensween in response the “practical problems” of 
“modern critical consciousness” actually amounts to a political program along the 
Nietzschean or Machiavellian lines—re-evaluating all values—as we learn that “in 
ecological virtue language, traditional virtues may be treated as vices, and traditional vices 
may be treated as virtues.”87 So, for instance, in place of  the virtue of temperance 
prescribed by the ancient Greeks as a safeguard for prudence, “a modern critical 
consciousness would prescribe self-examination, informed by critical social 
consciousness and followed by therapeutic as well as social corrective measures.”88 
Similarly, “from the vantage point of ecological consciousness, the Seven Deadly Sins of 
pride, envy, anger, sloth, greed, gluttony, and lust no longer mean what they used to 
mean.”89 Consequently, some emotions such as anger (wrath) and lust should not be 
considered exclusively as productive of vice as they can now be put usefully into the 
service of the progressive struggle against internal repression and external oppression.90 
Van Wensween’s alchemical operation turns “courage” into “a virtue of benevolence” 
for instance.91 The motive for being courageous is no longer that of the noble, as we find 
in the Western tradition that goes back to Aristotle, but “our being comfortable with our 
animal characteristics.”92 And then there is “the creation of new virtues and vices.” An 
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example of a new virtue would be “attunement”—adapting to the needs of the 
“other”—that has been neglected in “the history of western ethics.”93  
Now, I have remarked above that van Wensveen seems to lack a political 
perspective, but then I have claimed to have uncovered a Nietzschean theme in her 
writing. This is not a contradiction for I do not think our author is a conscious executor 
of Nietzsche’s legacy of the reevaluation of all values. Second, she, like Hill, directs her 
remarks to the converted: “the practical base of a viable ecological ethic is the 
environmental movement.”94 If, as she claims, she has derived her table of virtues and 
vices from environmental movement, then her constituency is not in need of any change 
in behavior or thinking. This is why I believe she lacks a true political perspective. She 
does not explain how it is possible that this new ecological table of virtues and vices will 
be accepted by those outside the core base of environmental movement, which remains 
to be a small minority in every country. Despite her constant reminders to the contrary, 
van Wensveen shares the political naiveté of the “modern critical consciousness” which 
confounds “social critique” with “politics.”  
The neglect of, or the failure to bring out, the “political” significance of “virtue” 
in relation to the question of the environment in environmental (virtue) ethics literature 
has been subject to criticism lately.  In a recent article, Robert Hull submits the 
environmental virtue ethics literature to a reconstructive critique in this regard.95 Hull 
points out that almost all scholars in the environmental virtue ethics literature have 
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emphasized that environmental virtue ethics must have “some practical function.”96 
Invoking Aristotle from the Nicomachean Ethics on the practical dimension of ethics, Hull 
agrees with this view.97 Yet, as he observes, “thus far the potential EVE [environmental 
virtue ethics] has for ‘teaching us our duty’ remains somewhat unfulfilled.” One reason 
for this failure, according to Hull, is that “EVE theorists tend to reduce human 
excellence to green virtue or to ignore or misinterpret its connection to other 
excellences.”98 This we have seen clearly in van Wensween as she is almost anxious to 
transform every traditional virtue into something unrecognizable.  
The rush to develop and focus on a number of new “environmental” or 
“ecological” virtues at the expense of traditional virtues restricts the possibilities of 
environmentally active people to engage people with different priorities or convictions 
such as religious people, the unemployed, or people who might have a particular stake in 
developing the natural environment. As it has been noted by recent critics of 
environmental ethics, environmental activists must be able to speak to “the opposition in 
the opposition’s own largely anthropocentric terms or fail to be granted a hearing at 
all.”99 Yes, “courage” in its traditional sense does not have much to offer in addressing 
environmental issues, but this does not mean that it is obsolete or can safely be 
disregarded. As I see it, the virtues of temperance, justice, and prudence can be 
recovered in relation to environmental issues, but not by casting off their traditional 
interpretations, rather by getting into conversation with them. Hull comes closer to truth 
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when he comes up with a new virtue that he calls “ecocitizenship” and the vices of 
which is, on the excess side, “ecomisanthropy,” and, on the defect side, “bad 
ecocitizenship”: 
A person who possesses this excellence recognizes clearly the close connection 
between human flourishing and appreciating and understanding wild nature, and 
a portrait of her fundamental values must reflect this awareness. Thus the core 
values embraced by a person who possesses this excellence begin with the 
recognition that we are all plain citizens of our planet, that we for our own 
physical, intellectual, and moral benefit share it with other forms of life. Further, 
to flourish we must cultivate at least a generalist’s knowledge of the natural 
world, particularly the bioregion in which we live.100    
 
Now, the problem with Hull’s view is that “ecocitizenship” cannot be the name of a 
single virtue. What is described with it is a more comprehensive political vision because 
Hull suggests that human beings, as civic members of their societies, should come to 
adopt this wider perspective of ecological view. This vision cannot be attained at the 
beginning but through a political process. Second, citizenship—whether ecologically 
oriented or not—is not a virtue but a political activity in itself. And yet, it is supported by 
a number of virtues such courage, prudence, and justice. The practice of ecologically 
responsible citizenship requires paying particular attention to the virtues of temperance, 
justice, and prudence.101 To be fair, Hull is aware of the overarching nature of 
“ecocitizenship” as he refers to other virtues such as generosity and moderation which 
are implied by “ecocitizenship.”102 Still, Hull’s view is suggestive for its due emphasis on 
the practical dimension of “virtue” in relation to the question of the environment, and 
specifically for its tying “virtue” into the notion of citizenship. 
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In the remaining part of this section, I shall introduce a recent critique raised by 
environmental theorists Avner de-Shalit and Andrew Light against the apolitical 
approach of environmental ethics scholars to environmental issues.103 Their critique will 
ease us into the next section in which I shall elaborate on the aforementioned critique of 
environmental virtue ethics by Holmes Rolston III. Rolston’s exclusive focus on 
“intrinsic value” represents the tendency that de-Shalit and Light submit to critique. The 
apolitical propensity of environmental ethics scholars, according to de-Shalit and Light, 
is largely due to their categorical rejection of “anthropocentrism” and upholding an 
uncompromising stance vis-à-vis human interests, that is, the insistence on the non-
instrumentalist recognition and valuation of nature. They maintain that environmental 
philosophers have been preoccupied exclusively with the arcane issue of ascertaining the 
moral grounds of an environment-friendly attitude or the meta-ethical questions of 
“intrinsic value theories” and “bio-centrism.” Due to this narrow focus, they have failed 
to work out the political ramifications of their ethical doctrines. And yet the divide 
between ethics and politics is problematic “since the types of problem discussed are 
mostly public and policy-related, environmental philosophy is, ultimately, a political 
philosophy.”104 
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The gist of their joint criticism is that environmental philosophers spend most of 
their time speaking to one another and thereby completely ignoring the question of how 
their discussions can effect behavioral and institutional change in relation to the 
environmental issues.105 To address this lacuna, de-Shalit and Light propose an 
intellectual device which they call “public reflective equilibrium” patterned after the 
earlier reflective equilibrium models of contemporary political theorists John Rawls and 
Michael Walzer.106 This model departs from Walzer’s by opening the scope of the 
engaged scholar’s constituency to national and global communities of environmental 
activists. To attain the “public reflective equilibrium,” the political philosopher must 
attend to “the intuitions and theories” commonly held in his or her society, and analyze 
them “with a view to refining them.” After critical scrutiny, the philosopher must then 
“search for an equilibrium between the intuitions, principles, or theories.”107 
The weakness that de-Shalit and Light uncover in environmental ethics or 
philosophy ultimately stems from the split of “moral” from “political” philosophy after 
Kant. The main characteristic of this divorce is that “moral” and “prudential” reasons 
belong to different spheres, that is, ethics/morality and politics respectively. This view is 
to a certain degree understandable as we tend to associate “politics” with social 
phenomena which includes conflict, compromise, power, or self-interests, and “ethics” 
with social phenomena characterized by opposite tendencies such as cooperation, 
principled conduct, humility, self-sacrifice, and altruism. When we view human reality 
                                                 
     105 Light and de-Shalit, 5-10.  
 
     106 Ibid., 10-8. The reflective equilibrium models used by Rawls and Walzer, according to de-Shalit and 
Light, are instructive but nonetheless fail to give due consideration to the intelligent voices of the public 
outside the academia. The problem with Rawls’ “private reflective equilibrium” is that it is exclusively 
directed at philosophers whereas Walzer’s more promising model of “contextual reflective equilibrium” 
takes into account the national intellectual context only.  
 




through these dualisms, it is not much of a surprise that we end up with two separate 
domains of human action. Accordingly, our systematic study of moral and prudential 
phenomena are organized under different disciplines, that is, moral philosophy and 
political (or social) science. This view of human reality owes much to the break of the 
moderns with the ancients in removing prudence from its ethical framework: “Only with 
incipient modernity . . . prudential came to be understood technically as mere knowledge 
of the proper means. Therewith it came in the end to be indistinguishable from that 
which according to Aristotle is not aretē, but rather a dubious capacity (deinotēs).”108 
Inheriting this artificial split, environment (virtue) ethics scholars do not go 
beyond a superficial discussion of which virtues are conducive to environmental 
awareness or who among environmental pioneers exemplify these virtues. They do not 
follow Aristotle’s transition from ethics to politics in NE X.9. As I have mentioned 
earlier, Aristotle issues repeated reminders in his ethical treatises that “it is not sufficient 
to know about virtue, but one must try to have it and use it, unless there is some other 
way that we become good” (NE 1179b1-4). Aristotle’s point warns us against reducing 
ethics to intellectual exercises such as casuistry. Hypothetical reasoning or persuasive 
speech may be necessary in philosophical discussions but we cannot afford to ignore the 
need for the sustainability of the political context in which such reasoning and speeches 
can find a hospitable environment. Seeing this need, Aristotle turns his attention to 
politics which is basically the whole set of activities through which various groups in a 
society decide and contest the distribution of power and goods through laws and 
institutions with an eye on what justice requires.  
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In the midst of competing loyalties and ever-shifting opportunistic alliances that 
characterize politics in all times Aristotle is not unaware that there is little room left for 
virtue and virtuous people. Since “most people are more obedient to compulsion than to 
argument, and are persuaded by penalties than by what is beautiful” (NE 1180a3-4), 
philosophers cannot merely concern themselves with discourses directed to the 
receptive: “discourses appear to have the power to encourage and stimulate open-
natured [eleutherious] young people, and would make a well-born [eugenes] character that 
loves what is truly beautiful be inspired with virtue, but they are unable to encourage 
most people what is beautiful and good” (NE 1179b6-11).109 Hence, Aristotle refers to 
Plato’s views on laws affirmatively. Both see two major roles for laws. One is to inspire 
the love of virtue among the potentially decent people and encourage them toward 
virtuous actions, and the other is to restrain “those who are disobedient or lacking in 
natural capacity” through punishments and penalties, and banish the incurable altogether 
(NE 1180a5-10). 
5.3 The Critique of Environmental Virtue Ethics 
 
In this section I discuss and criticize Holmes Rolston’s critique of environmental 
virtue ethics in a recent article.110 In this article, Rolston gradually reveals what he 
believes to be the inadequacies of constructing environmental ethics on the concept of 
“virtue.” He first seems to be open to the idea of employing the concept of virtue in 
                                                 
     109 One may think that Aristotle is defending the rich and the powerful here as these Greek words—
eleutherious and eugenes—were especially used for the established families back then. Aristotle’s position is 
not that simple however. In his discussion of the virtue of greatness of soul, he explicitly rejects the 
unwarranted claim of the rich to virtue: “those who, without virtue, have the sort of good things that come 
from fortune consider themselves worthy of great things unjustly, and are not rightly called great-souled, 
since there is no worth or greatness of soul without complete virtue” (NE 1124a20-30). These terms 
rather describe all those “people whose lives are conducted with some intelligence and right ordering” 
(NE 1180a17-8). 
 




environmental ethics but eventually believes that “value” rather than “virtue” must be 
the organizing concept. Rolston gives two main reasons in support of his misgivings on 
the usefulness of the concept of virtue. First, emphasizing virtue ethics may inadvertently 
disguise the natural prerequisites of human flourishing. This is undesirable because 
human life is normally shaped in a dialectic of nature and culture: 
An inclusive moral virtue, well-rounded excellence of character, comes in 
significant part, although by no means in the whole, from . . . natural attunement. 
Here living well requires that we be properly sensitive to the flow of nature 
through us and its bearing on our habits of life. Otherwise, life lacks propriety; 
we do not know our place under the sun. We need caution. Human virtues are 
multileveled. That nature builds character is but half the truth and absurd if taken 
for the whole. That would omit all the civic virtues, without which we could not 
be human. Character is developed in a dialectic of nature and culture.111 
 
Hence, on Rolston’s view, an adequate environmental ethic must put equal emphasis on 
the natural and cultural bases of character and virtue. The flawed common tendency, 
according to him, is to overstate the cultural superiority of human virtue over its natural 
elements. Hence, Socrates was wrong in the Phaedrus 230d to ignore the instructive role 
of “nature” in its contribution to our understanding the good life.112 “The good life is 
lived in a place of symbiosis between humankind and nature.”113 Human life to be worth 
living must be embodied in its natural surroundings: 
Human virtues lie in defending the self, aloft and transcendent over nature, but 
they also lie in fitting ourselves into the natural environment that transcends us. 
If we wish to call this an environmental virtue ethics, then we have to recognize 
that any such virtues, lodged in humans, require for these humans to be well 
placed in their worlds. The better name for such an ethic might be an ecological 
virtue ethics, for human virtues of this kind always require an ecology.114 
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A second indispensable feature of an adequate environmental ethic, according to 
Rolston, is respect for the “other,” that is, the non-human denizens of nature: 
A human virtue is generated, actualizing a uniquely human capacity and 
possibility for excellence, when a person respects a wild animal’s life for what 
that life is in itself, a different and yet related form of life. This triggers awareness 
of otherness and feeds back into our own sense of identity and integrity.115 
 
Rolston is telling us here that showing respect for an animal for its own sake allows for a 
“human virtue.” It is not clear what virtue Rolston has in mind. Does he mean 
“awareness of otherness” or “integrity”? We cannot answer this question because 
Rolston is not interested in a careful exposition of virtues at least in this article. At this 
point in the article Rolston begins to assert more explicitly the priority of “value” over 
“virtue.” His reasoning goes as follows. If caring for non-human beings for their own 
sakes must count as an integral part of being virtuous, then the ground of this duty of 
“caring” or respect must be something other than their utility to us—be it as resources 
or its positive contribution to human character. This something else is the “intrinsic 
value” of natural beings qua species according to Rolston. In reference to an endangered 
species of desert fish, Rolston insists on the priority of “value”: 
Excellence of human character does indeed result from a concern for these fish, 
but if this excellence of character really comes from appreciating otherness, then 
why not value that otherness in wild nature first? Let the human virtue come tributary 
to that. It is hard to gain much excellence of character from appreciating an 
otherwise worthless thing . . . . To prohibit the needless destruction of fish species 
seems to depend on some value in the species as such, for there need be no 
prohibition against destroying a valueless thing. The excellence of human 
character depends on a sensitivity to excellence in these marvelous fish flourishing 
in the desert. The human mind grows toward the realization of its possibilities 
(excellences) by appropriate respect for nature (fish), but that respect is the end 
and the growth is the by-product.116 
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Rolston eventually concludes that “such an ethic is best called a value-based 
ethic, not a virtue-based ethic.”117 Rolston’s objection is a familiar one in the history of 
moral philosophy: the presupposition of “value” or “duty” in the concept of virtue. The 
Kantian elements of Rolston’s conception of environmental ethics is clear from his 
privileging the notions “value,” “duty,” and “respect” to define the domain of the 
“moral” phenomena separate from an extra-moral domain characterized by “expedient,” 
“instrumental,” and “prudential” human behavior. Rolston departs from Kant only on 
the point of Kant’s exclusion of non-human beings from the moral domain.  
According to Rolston, a proper environmental ethic, or any ethic for that matter, 
presupposes intrinsic “value.” All duties, including the ones we owe to non-human 
beings, are derived from an objective source of value: “Whatever has such resident value 
lays a claim on those who have standing as moral agents when they encounter such 
autonomous value.”118 For Rolston, the recognition of an independently existing value 
(i.e., good) in non-human natural beings is the fundamental step toward thinking of a 
new environmental ethic. “Nature is an objective value carrier; humans cash in on, and 
spend, what is naturally given.”119 Rolston believes that “the anthropocentric, 
personalistic ethics now prevailing in the Western world” unjustifiably denies the 
intrinsic value of nature, and consequently is ignorant of the duties we owe to nature.120 
So the prerequisite of human virtues and the fulfillment of duties toward nature is the 
recognition of intrinsic value in nature.  
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Against Rolston’s attempt at prioritizing the concept of value, I argue that his 
neo-Kantian construal of environmental ethics/morality in terms of intrinsic value has to 
rely on the question of what is good for human beings. The italicized terms in the above 
quote, “needless” and “sensitivity,” give away the unwarranted step that Rolston takes in 
his claim that the source of our attempt of extending morality to nature resides in the 
“species” rather than in human virtue. The term “sensitivity” clearly implies a distinct 
quality or capacity of soul. There are people with different degrees of sensitivity to their 
place in the great scheme of things. This type of sensitivity arises only in the pursuit of 
virtue. And what is to be done with people—whom I suspect is the majority—lacking in 
this particular sensitivity? Rolston cannot get around the question of how to nurture this 
capacity among human beings in the first place. His proclaiming the objectivity of 
“intrinsic value” of animal and plant species in itself does not address the political 
question of what to do about it and how. As I have argued in the previous section, the 
political implications of “morality” in environmental issues can neither be ignored nor 
taken care of properly without an eye on its reciprocal connection with morality. In other 
words, ethics and politics are linked but they are not the same thing. We can neither 
reduce ethics to politics nor politics to ethics. They are yin and yang of human reality. 
However, Rolston skips over the political question too easily by relying on legislation 
and enlightened policy-making.121 Both of these are necessary instruments of politics and 
yet there is a third dimension that has become prominent in the democratic age: civic 
participation. It is in this crucial dimension of politics that Rolston’s neo-Kantian 
approach falters for it abstracts from the highly complicated psychological and political 
                                                 




dimension of ethics as found in Aristotle, and reduces it to a narrow moralistic point of 
view to be enforced by public law.  
Rolston’s reliance on the qualifier “needless,” on the other hand, implies that 
human beings can make use of animals and plants to the extent that they thereby meet 
their essential needs. Where basic needs end and where superfluous wants begin is 
certainly another controversial issue. But the fact that the “prohibition” against the 
instrumental use of animals and plants can never, realistically speaking, be unconditional 
shows that the relevance of morality is tied to the human purposes that these beings are 
put to. It is the “wanton” destruction that is judged as immoral. Reasonable 
environmentalists would agree with Eric Ashby’s view in this regard: 
a distinction needs to be made between vandalism—the wanton and unnecessary 
destruction of living things or natural objects or ecosystems—and the disciplined 
exploitation which is necessary to sustain society.122  
 
If it is the “unnecessary” harm and suffering to non-human beings that we are obligated 
to avoid, then the parallel between human beings and non-human beings breaks down, 
for we are not allowed to make exceptions to the categorical imperative of treating 
humans as ends in themselves within the framework of Kantian morality.123 Implicit in 
Ashby’s related phrase “necessary to sustain society” is the notion of human flourishing 
at the center of which lies the questions of human good and virtue. Without a 
teleological understanding of what constitutes the good life for human beings, one 
cannot make a meaningful distinction between “necessary” and “unnecessary” use of 
non-human natural beings. It is the teleological understanding of the good life that 
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allows Aristotle to assert the distinction between oikonomia (the household-management) 
and chrematistike (the art of acquisition) in Politics I.8-13: “household management gives 
more serious attention to human beings than to inanimate possessions, to the virtue of 
these than that of possessions (which we call wealth), and to the virtue of free persons 
rather than that of slaves” (Pol. 1259b18-21).124 
When environmental ethics scholars such as Holmes Rolston urge us to expand 
our moral community to include non-human beings through “bio-centrism” or “intrinsic 
value,” we are asked to grant “dignity” or the status of “personhood” to them.125 These 
(Kantian) modern notions imply the “absolute,” “unconditional,” or “categorical” duties 
as opposed to the “empirical,” “hypothetical,” or “contingent” aspects of human life. 
Human dignity is not, according to the widely accepted (Kantian) modern view, 
conditional on the social status or relative virtues and vices a person may happen to 
possess. It is rather transcendental (i.e., noumenal) and non-negotiable: 
a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical 
reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be 
valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as 
an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by 
which he exacts respect from all other rational beings in the world.126  
 
Mimicking Kant’s defense of human dignity above any prudential calculation is the 
Rolstonian line of argument which sees the objectivity of “intrinsic value” in nature as 
the necessary pre-condition of protecting natural beings:  
Because the intrinsically valuable is that which is good as an end in itself, it is 
commonly agreed that something’s possession of intrinsic value generates a prima 
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facie direct moral duty on the part of moral agents to protect it or at least refrain 
from damaging it.127  
 
One leading scholar in environmental ethics acknowledges the paradigmatic role of the 
Kantian principle concerning the “intrinsic value” of human beings: “Human beings, we 
believe, have intrinsic value. Therefore, we think that to enslave human beings is wrong . 
. . . Similarly, other species, we are beginning to believe, are also intrinsically valuable.”128 
Kant himself would balk at the suggestion of granting moral standing to non-human 
beings for they are not free to obey the moral law to begin with. The lack of autonomy 
deprives them of the status of a moral being or intrinsic value. Non-rational beings can 
only have instrumental worth to human purposes for Kant: “Beings the existence of 
which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without reason, still have 
only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things.”129  
 Hence, Kant would consider extending moral “dignity” or “value” to the rest 
of nature—no matter how noble it may sound—as a serious mistake, for that move 
would abolish the whole ground for morality. When Kant speaks of the “dignity” of 
persons, it is always contrasted with “things” which cannot have this privileged status as 
it is evidenced in his elevating human “dignity (prerogative) . . . over all merely natural 
beings.”130 In other words, the contrast between “persons” and “things” is vital to the 
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coherence and viability of the Kantian view of “morality.”131 Against Kant’s objection, 
the proponents of “intrinsic-value-in-nature” position often argue that we should not be 
burdened by Kant’s anthropocentric bias, for it is a contradiction on Kant’s part to 
banish non-human beings from the universal kingdom of “ends.” Hence, there is no 
reason that we cannot or should not expand the scope of Kantian morality. As Callicott 
observes, “Kant’s intellectual descendents in environmental ethics” believe that they 
“can do better than the master himself.”132 This attitude, however, conveniently ignores 
the Kantian ground of morality—autonomy (i.e., being the sole author of the rules one 
follows in life) and makes use of its universalistic dimension.133  
 Callicott himself does not subscribe to the thesis of the objectivity of “intrinsic 
value” as Rolston does, but his analysis of the Kantian dimension of Rolston’s position is 
illuminating for our purposes. According to Callicott, Kantian environmental ethicists 
believe that “[t]o possess ‘objective’ intrinsic value . . . according to Kant, seems to 
require that a being be capable of (1) valuing itself as an end in itself and (2) realizing that 
other beings value themselves in the same way.”134 This interpretation is a serious 
                                                 
     131 Domesticated animals can and must be treated humanely in Kant’s view not because of our direct 
duties to them but because of “a duty of the human being to himself” (The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 443). For 
a discussion of these issues, see Allen W. Wood “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature: Allen W. 
Wood,” Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 72.1 (1998): 189-210; and Onora O’Neill, “Kant 
on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature: Onora O’Neill,” Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian 
Society 72.1 (1998): 211-28. 
 
     132 Callicott, “Intrinsic Value in Nature.” 
 
     133 According to Kant, “autonomy is . . . the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational 
nature” (Groundwork, 4: 436). How is the Kantian autonomy different from the Aristotelian prohairesis 
(choice)? After all, Aristotle too considers the capacity of making choices the most essential human 
attribute distinguishing us from non-humans. The major difference, I believe, is this: whereas Kantian 
morality presupposes the potentiality of autonomy in human beings, Aristotle takes a developmental 
approach and claims that the potential capacity of making choice becomes active with the growth of the 
active condition of character (hexis). The possibility of this growth in turn depends on the political context 
in which the individual is born into. Hence, Aristotle is more awake to the existence of numerous inherited 
constraints that are beyond the individual’s control in its natural aspiration toward autonomy.  
 




misunderstanding of Kant’s grounds for assigning the “end-in-itself” status to human 
beings however.135 Kant would not hold either of these two propositions. Humans are 
intrinsically valuable for Kant not because they are capable of valuing themselves, but 
because they are capable of acting from duty, that is, following universal maxims in their 
actions irrespective of the possible self-disadvantages that these actions might bring 
about. This autonomous capacity of action—contrasted with acting from “inclination,” 
concern for reputation, or in obedience to an external authority such as God or state, all 
of which would result in “heteronomy” rather than “autonomy”—confers incomparable 
“value” on humanity. In other words, it is the exclusive human capacity of “willing” 
duties freely that deserves the privileged status of “intrinsic value.” This status 
necessarily implies the contrasting “instrumental value” of things as means to human 
purposes. It would be a sign of naivety to argue that we should not consider other 
natural beings as “things” or “means” while trying to hold onto the Kantian morality in 
other fundamental respects. 
5.4 Values or Virtues? 
 
The argument of this section is that the notion of “value” in Rolston’s “intrinsic 
value” argument is a poor choice in conceptualizing the ethical relationship between 
human beings and nature. The notion of “value” is not totally irrelevant to ethics but is 
subordinate to “virtue.” The problem with the notion of “value” is that it is often used 
as a generic term for so many disparate things that not only it borders at vacuity. It 
impoverishes the rich vocabulary available to us in examining and expressing diverse 
ethical and social relationships that characterize human life. So, for instance, different 
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concepts such as “democracy,” “friendship,” “goodness,” “truth,” “beauty,” “freedom,” 
and “equality” can all be named as “values” today because they are valued by some, 
most, or all people.136 The exclusive reliance on “values” impoverishes our ethical 
resources so much so that we cannot even awake to the problem we are facing. With 
“value” replacing all these disparate aspects of human life, we may be unknowingly going 
through the nihilism that Nietzsche saw at the end of the course of Western civilization.  
Interrelated to this is the second but more important problem that the notion of 
“value” is inextricably entangled with the premise of “fact/values” distinction underlying 
modern (social) science. If “values” merely function as the mirror image of “facts,” it is 
possible that, as one critic observed, “the destiny of the language of values . . . is to 
reproduce the nihilistic will-to-will of technology.”137 The acceptance and use of the term 
“values” (either by conservatives or progressives alike) in place of “virtues” reinforce and 
inescapably reproduce the message of modern science that “truth” and “morality” have 
become divergent “values.” 
We need to be first clear on what we mean by the word “value.” It can be used 
as a noun both in the singular and in the plural to mean the “object” of our valuing. It 
can be used as a verb—“to value.” It can also be used in the plural in relation to 
different objects such as cultural, aesthetic, social, and moral. Are these related usages? 
How is the singular use of the word “value” in the phrase “intrinsic value” related to its 
plural use in “moral values”? These are not separate but interrelated usages connected by 
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the modern perspective that sees human beings as creators of values. Let us begin with 
the dictionary definition of “value” to figure out what this too familiar word means. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in one of its senses that is of immediate 
concern to us here, the word “value” suggests “the relative status of a thing, or the 
estimate in which it is held, according to its real or supposed worth, usefulness, or 
importance.” The dictionary further adds that when used in the plural, for instance, in 
philosophy and social sciences, in relation to an individual or group, it means “the 
principles or standards of a person or society, the personal or societal judgment of what 
is valuable and important in life.” These are actually two connected senses of “value” 
which exist in reciprocal relationship. Individuals typically learn to esteem the implicit 
and explicit valuations that they are exposed to. Collective standards are in turn shaped 
and changed in the long run by cumulative effect of individual valuations. 
Today, the word “values” is the first thing that comes to mind when we speak of 
morality in both popular and academic contexts. In a public discussion of his book, the 
political scientist Alan Wolfe affirms the disappearance of the word “virtue” from 
American everyday life.138 For his book Wolfe conducted more than two hundred 
nation-wide interviews with Americans posing them questions such as “What does virtue 
mean to you? Is this a word that is important? How do you try to live by it?” Interview 
results, notes Wolfe, confirm the conservative social diagnosis and critique that “the 
word virtue is no longer in American vocabulary.” He humorously relates his personal 
experience as follows:  
The word virtue has indeed disappeared from people’s vocabulary. When I sat down with 
people and I said, “Well, there is this word ‘virtue’ that people use a lot. What 
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does it mean to you?” I would get just absolute blank stares. The very first 
person I interviewed scratched his head and said, “I don’t know. What does it 
mean to you?” And then he sort of coughed and said that he wasn’t a very 
literate person and so he didn’t know the meaning of the word. He actually was a 
literate person. The interviews didn’t get off to a good start. “Virtue is returning 
library books on time,” someone said, which is actually not a bad way to begin. 
But vice got a little better response. People knew about “Miami Vice.” Students I 
interviewed in the University of North Carolina at Greensboro—that was the 
first thing that came into their mind was the television program “Miami Vice.” 
The people—mostly gay and lesbian—that I interviewed in San Francisco, they 
knew what vice was. Vice was vice squads, and they didn’t have those any more 
in San Francisco so they were glad about that. But virtue and vice were just not at the 
center of people’s vocabularies. 139 (italics mine) 
 
The historian Gertrude Himmelfarb—whom Wolfe mentions as one of the 
conservative critics of these trends in American society—similarly observes that the 
word “virtue” has dropped from public discourse. She notes that “virtues” are being 
replaced by “values,” and traces the origins of the popularization of “values” discourse 
to the election campaigns in England during the mid-eighties and in the US about a 
decade later.140 Underlying the discursive shift from “virtues” to “values” in the Western 
world are the deeper currents of moral relativism and subjectivism:  
“Values” brought with it the assumptions that all moral ideas are subjective and 
relative, that they are mere customs and conventions, that they have a purely 
instrumental, utilitarian purpose, and that they are peculiar to specific individuals 
and societies . . . . Values, as we now understand that word, do not have to be 
virtues; they can be beliefs, opinions, attitudes, feelings, habits, conventions, 
preferences, prejudices, even idiosyncrasies—whatever any individual, group, or 
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society happens to value, at any time, for any reason. One cannot say of virtues, 
as one can of values, that anyone’s virtues are as good as anyone else’s, or that 
everyone has a right to his own virtues. Only values can lay that claim to moral 
equality and neutrality.141 
 
Himmelfarb notes that the concept of “virtue” has an overtone of “gravity and 
authority,” whereas a sense of indifference or neutrality accompanies the notion of 
“values.” Lamenting the loss of “values” as conservatives typically do or regretting the 
substitution of “virtue” with “values” will not take us far enough in making sense of 
what goes in the world today. The concept of “value” is linked to the modern eclipse of 
“quality” by “quantity,” which I have discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The talk about 
values actually reflects the human concern with qualities which are irreducible to 
quantification and manipulation. Values are the sort of things that can induce personal 
and social conflict by stirring human emotions such as anger, envy, and hatred. It is not 
possible to elicit such emotional reaction from disputes over quantifiable “facts” as 
Socrates brings to our attention in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro (7b-d). But disputes over 
“the just and the unjust, the beautiful [kalon] and the ugly [aischron], the good and the 
bad” easily cause hostility among men. The stakes are commonly perceived as higher 
with respect to these spiritual intangibles of human life, and the language of “values” is 
trying to give expression to these things, which we often presuppose in our everyday life 
to continue to live as human beings. 
Does it matter which generic name we use to refer to the intangible goods of 
human life? I believe it does as the term “values” obscures the nature of human 
relationships that we collectively bring under the name of “ethics” or “morality.” The 
nature of these relationships are already variegated and convoluted enough. Although 
there is need for an organizing concept such as “virtue” or “duty” to bring some order 
                                                 




to their multiplicity and complexity, “values” seem to bring more incoherence than 
coherence to the table. “Values” can be used almost for anything that is not fact-based 
or materially present in human  life. According to one account, for instance, “value” can 
be a substitute for all these things: preferences and avoidances, desire-objects and 
aversion-objects, pleasure and pain tendencies, goals, ideals, interests and disinterests, 
right and wrong, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, useful and useless, approvals and 
disapprovals, criteria of taste and standards of judgment.142 But what is the basis of these 
things called “values”? Is it the fact that humans “value” them in word and/or deed? 
Both of these possibilities are problematic. An individual or collective valuation in 
speech on its own cannot conjure up a “value.” Then, there would be no end to the 
proliferation of “values.” How about the “valuation” implicit in the actual pursuit of 
certain things? This leads to absurdity too. As we all know, hypocrisy is something 
human beings commonly practice but seldom admit to themselves or others. Shall we 
infer from this widespread practice that hypocrisy is a value? This would go against our 
common sense, which suggests to me that what we call “values” actually relies on the 
traditional concept of the “good.” We have to conclude that we cannot affirm anything 
as a “value” simply because it is valued by someone or some group of people.  
This particular problem with the notion of “values”—its semantic vacuity—may 
be a harbinger of a more serious problem though. There is a possible connection 
between the prevailing “values-talk” today (whether coming from the camp of 
conservatives or progressives) and nihilism as we see in Nietzsche’s repeated and 
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conscious use of the term “values” in the context of nihilism.143 The terminological shift 
from “virtue” to “value,” clearly visible in Nietzsche, for instance, is no small matter 
according to Himmelfarb. It rather represents “the great philosophical revolution of 
modernity, no less momentous than the earlier revolt of the ‘Moderns’ against the 
‘Ancients’”144 Unlike the earlier revolt, Himmelfarb observes, this most recent one has 
been attempted without an awareness of its full implications—with the exception of 
Nietzsche who was among the first to use the word “value” in the plural to refer to 
“moral beliefs and attitudes of a society” and for whom the “transvaluation of values” 
was the single most worthwhile project to undertake.145  
Heidegger too took notice of Nietzsche’s role in the rise of the language of 
“values”: “It was in the nineteenth century that talk of values became current and 
thinking in terms of values became customary. But only after the dissemination of the 
writings of Nietzsche did talk of values become popular.” Heidegger further adds that 
“value and the valuable become the positivistic substitute for the metaphysical. The 
frequency of talk about values is matched by a corresponding vagueness of the 
concept.”146 I will return to Nietzsche’s role and Heidegger’s discussion of this 
connection later. 
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Apart from this quibble with the current state of moral discourse, there is a more 
important reason for concern. This has to do with the challenge of modern science to 
the human understanding of reality. When we raise the perennial question of the nature 
of reality within the framework of modern science, we get an answer that is likely to 
create and reinforce a split reality. What we get with the acceptance of modern science is 
not merely a dispassionate differentiation between the objective and subjective realms of 
reality corresponding to facts and values respectively. What is at stake is the 
questionability of this whole subjective realm of human reality for its being non-real. To 
recall Alexandre Koyré’s assessment of the impact of modern science from Chapter 2, 
the modern scientific thought discarded “all considerations based upon value-concepts, 
such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim.” For the outcome of this quantitative 
reduction of reality has been “the utter devalorization of being, the divorce of the world 
of value and the world of facts.”147 But it is not, as one commentator claims, that 
modern science avoids “the normative aspect of values.”148 It is the reality of “values,” 
anything that is not measurable, which is actually being denied by modern scientific 
worldview. “The scientist’s world was not a world of values . . . . He dealt with a world 
of mass and motion—things that could be measured and predicted.”149  
                                                
Although this conclusion is not explicitly drawn out by modern science, bold 
spokesmen for positivism have not been in short supply. The “essential message of 
science,” according to one champion of modern science, is nothing short of “sacrilege” 
to values. Its effect is the subversion of mythical or philosophical narratives on which 
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moral notions (values, duties, rights, prohibitions) are based.150 Curiously, the objective 
realm devoid of “meaning” and “value” is considered superior to the subjective realm 
housing “meaning” and “value.” This is so because modern (social) science values what is 
accessible to measurement and quantification. The notion of “intrinsic value” in nature 
must be seen basically as a desperate attempt at the re-enchantment of the world, making 
it meaningful again. As long as we live by the premises of modern science, however, 
these theoretical attempts will come to naught.  The present modern condition cannot be 
countered by holding onto one side of the dichotomy—values—and elevate it to the 
prestigious status of “facts” as is implied in the coupling of “value” with various 
descriptors such as “objective,” “universal,” or “absolute.” Such moves would implicitly 
recognize the priority and superiority of “facts” and reinforce the assertive modern 
impulse of observing and manipulating “facts” in nature.  
The concept of “values” presupposes the modern scientific break with the pre-
modern (teleological and metaphysical) view of the world. Under the pre-modern view, 
there are neither independent “facts” nor “values” residing in reality prior to their 
analytical separation.151 Modern science departed from this understanding in ascribing 
the status of “reality” only to “objectivity.” The “objective” was defined in terms of 
accessibility through systematic observation, experiment, and mathematical 
representation. The primary qualities of natural bodies such as “number, figure, 
magnitude, position, and motion” constituted the objective reality. What could not fit 
into objectivity—the transient features of natural bodies such as colors, tastes, sounds, 
and odors—was abandoned to the sphere of “subjectivity” as they are “relative, 
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subjective, fluctuating, and sensible.”152 Hence, the use of “subjective” as a qualifier has 
come to gain the connotation of unreliability. This partition of reality or Being was the 
beginning of the “value problem” that has taken a few centuries to sink in. The historian 
of science E. A. Burtt notes that the Galilean distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities had two inter-related effects.153 First, it has led to the radical separation of 
humans from nature as the subjective world of humanity has been considered to belong 
predominantly to the realm of secondary qualities and the external world (res extensa) has 
been taken as the sole constituent of objective reality. Second, the external world has 
been given “greater dignity and value” due to its “reality.” This may appear to be 
contradicting the preceding remarks but the external world assumes its value only in its 
quantitatively measurable respects, i.e., objectivity.  
A major question on “values” is whether we re-cognize the “value” as an 
objective quality that independently inheres in things or we ourselves confer “value” on 
them. There is an allusion to this dilemma in the above dictionary definition. Are we 
speaking of the real or supposed value of things? This has been the decisive, and the 
divisive, question of axiology which emerged as a new field of philosophy in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century.154 This question is merely a continuation of the older debate in 
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the history of philosophy between realism and idealism with respect to the nature of 
reality. The “intrinsic value” position of Rolston sides with (moral) realism and claims 
that “humans value Earth because it is valuable, and not the other way round.”155 
Rolston’s original contribution to this debate lies in his interpretation of biological 
striving of living beings as some sort of “valuation.” Hence, when they show desire for 
certain things and turn away from others they are valuing their lives. The fact that they 
are capable of valuing themselves render them valuable regardless of human opinion: 
“the organism is an axiological system, an evaluative system . . . the physical state the 
organism seeks . . . is a valued state. Value is present in this achievement. . . . the living 
individual . . . is per se an intrinsic value.”156 So “values” in nature would be objective 
qualities independent of human cognition and perception. On the one hand, Rolston 
wants to revive the Aristotelian teleological view of organisms as his explicit reference to 
Aristotle’s “formal and final causes” suggests and his conclusion that “each organism has 
its own good.”157 Aristotle would agree with this conclusion. On the other hand, the 
resemblance of Rolston’s view of the creation of values to that of Nietzsche, as we will 
see shortly, is striking.  
If we accept the metaphysical foundations of the modern scientific view, then 
the phrase “objective values” must be a contradiction in terms.158 For how can the 
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“values” be in the order of “facts” which acquires their “objective” status from their 
predictable and reversible relationships of determinism? One possible answer is that the 
term “objective” in this phrase is meant to apply to the society of human beings only, 
i.e., inter-subjectivity.159 According to this view, the objectivity of a given value derives 
from its practice among past and present humankind. The phrase “objective values” in 
this sense is intended to draw attention to their universally valid and binding character.160 
We can count, among others, freedom, equality, justice, and humanity as examples of 
such universal values. Yet, if we further ask “where do these values derive their original 
value from?” we shall face the original difficulty of the opposition between the 
“objective” and the “subjective.” We want to claim (deep down in our hearts perhaps) 
that these values merit our respect objectively, that is, not because they are valued 
subjectively by a collective group or an individual but because of their intrinsically 
necessary quality. The status of their value must differ from that of the value of external 
goods. Money or gold possesses extrinsic and contingent value whereas these “objective 
values” must have intrinsic and unconditional value. One must be obliged to affirm their 
value unconditionally and act in accordance with them. They must be, in Kantian terms, 
“ends-in-themselves” rather than “means-to-ends” as gold and money are. Just as the 
objective laws of nature possess necessity, these values are objective because they 
command obedience out of universal and absolute necessity. 
The history of the philosophical debate over the “objectivity” of values is 
certainly more complicated than this brief outline but I do not intend to get into this 
                                                 
     159 See, for instance, Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 
     160 George R. Geiger, “On the Meaning of Objective in Ethics,” The Journal of Philosophy 34.11 (1937): 
292-301. “just as subjective has seemed to imply individual and limited, with the resulting need for some 
correction, so objective in ethics has traditionally suggested universal and—going a short step farther—




objectivity/subjectivity question here, for we would get entangled in the modern 
scientific paradigm by trying to answer it. The dialectic between the real good and the 
apparent good in human life is not a matter to be settled theoretically and non-dialectically 
once and for all. The question is a living one and has to be continually raised and 
addressed under particular circumstances. As Aristotle notes, “different things appear 
worthwhile to people of a low sort and to decent people” (NE 1176b24). The 
differentials of “valuation” cannot be resolved by philosophical fiat. It is this discrepancy 
of valuation—which has both natural and conventional roots—that gives rise to politics. 
We should rather turn our attention to the question of why “value” has come to replace 
“virtue” in contemporary moral philosophy. How can we explain the relatively recent 
discovery of this concept that has fast become an essential part of our moral vocabulary? 
If “value” is so central to morality, how can we explain the fact that such an important 
category has been missed by millennia of philosophical activity? If we are not ready to 
ascribe blindness to so many past philosophers for overlooking an essential aspect of 
ethics, we should seek a different answer. 
Actually, the concept of “value” was not unheard of in the premodern era. 
“Values” are , for instance, taken to mean “ideals,” and are found by Nicolai Hartmann 
to be akin to the Platonic Ideas.161 What happened in the nineteenth century was 
basically the recognition and assertion of “value” as the central concept of ethics or 
morality. The term “value” is translated from the Greek term axios (worth).162 We see 
Aristotle using the term axios in the sense of “worthy of,” for instance, while discussing 
the virtue of greatness of soul: “the person who seems to be great-souled is one who 
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considers himself worthy of great things, and is worthy of them” (NE 1123b3-4). This 
remark indicates the agent-centered dimension of “value.” Another remark Aristotle 
makes in the same context is more crucial for understanding why today’s use of “value” 
remains shallow: “worth [axios] is spoken in relation to external goods” (NE 1123b16). 
This observation, though made in passing, is suggestive as to why Aristotle would not 
place the term “value” at the heart of his ethics. For if “value” is indexed to external 
goods instrumentally rather than intrinsically, they must have a fickle nature. External 
goods are valuable but their values are largely conventional and conditional on 
circumstances.163  
More significantly though, the concept of “value” is affiliated with the older 
philosophical terminology of “good” and “end.”164 When Aristotle asks, for instance, at 
the outset of Nicomachean Ethics (1094a18) whether there is “some end of the things we 
do that we want on account of itself,” he is calling attention to what we would today call 
the activity that is “intrinsically valuable.” The act of “valuing” or “valuation” from 
which “value” and “values” are derived also exist in Aristotle as kataphasis (aversion) and 
apophasis (attraction) (NE VI.2). These are the two fundamental modes of “desiring” that 
we share with all natural beings. It is only natural that we value certain things by pursuing 
them and disvalue others by avoiding them. It is common to all natural beings which 
pursue pleasure and refrain from pain. But does this  mean that pleasure is a value (i.e., 
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something perceived as valuable) and pain is a disvalue? At the surface, yes. But the 
simple fact that certain things are pursued and avoided by certain individuals and groups 
is only a beginning of the inquiry into the true “worth” of these things. All philosophical 
inquiry into human things is actually a deliberation of the relative worth of what is 
valued. Aristotle’s inquiry into ethics is prompted by the “three ways of life” that are 
valued differently by different people (NE I.5). So the concept of “value” is not totally 
irrelevant or meaningless in ethics because of its disguised connotations of “good” and 
“ends,” but should not be allowed to dominate our understanding of the domain of 
praxis for the sake of intellectual clarity. As I have argued above, the notion of “value” is 
too vague and circular to provide this clarity. 
Let us now turn to the early period at the turn of the twentieth century when the 
notion of “value” made its public debut, and try to understand the possible reasons 
behind the gradual eclipse of “virtue” in the course of the last century. According to one 
scholar, the increase of interest in axiology can be attributed to the following reasons: 
“the divorce of ontological and valuational questions, the ever-widening gap between 
physical and humanistic studies, the vogue of relativistic beliefs, and the literary influence 
exercised by Brentano, Ehrenfels, and Meinong.”165 We have briefly discussed the first—
the split of reality into the objective and subjective realms—above. The latter three 
reasons are historically related. These three figures cited in the quote were influential 
Austro-German psychologist-cum-philosophers of the late nineteenth century. They 
found the subjective act of “valuing” critical to the discovery of the domain of 
subjectivity. One of the early leading figures of value theory in America, from the 
                                                 




Deweyan school of progressive pragmatism, draws attention to the subjectivist aspect of 
“value” in his account of the origins of value theory: 
The problem of goods, good and the Good, is an ancient one for philosophy, 
but it was not until comparatively recently that psychology became interested in 
it. Apparently it did not like the terms “good” and “goods,” perhaps because of 
their metaphysical and theological connotations, perhaps because of their 
“objectivity,” so it adopted and adapted terms which were better suited to its 
purposes, namely, “value” and “worth.”166 
 
What is noteworthy in this account is that the notion of “value”—which was originally 
used by economists in the late modern period as in the Marxist contrast between the 
“use” and “exchange” value of commodities—was of psychological interest because of 
its subjectivist association. As Hans Joas notes, “attached to the concept of ‘value’ [is] an 
ineradicable reference to the valuing subject.”167 The shift toward “values” in the 
understanding of morality must have something to do with the nineteenth century 
subjectivist turn in the human/moral/social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften in the German) 
which found itself in the shadow of the naturalistic causality of natural sciences.  
Philosophical controversies erupted soon after Descartes as the implications of 
the Cartesian dualism was drawn out for the study of human beings. Two kinds of 
related problems have emerged. What could be the source of freedom in a realm of 
causal determinism? This is basically the revival of the venerable question of free will and 
morality which was raised in previous times in the context of religion. The second 
problem was methodological. How could we best study human beings—in terms of their 
primary objective qualities or secondary subjective ones? Can the latter approach provide 
us with a definitive knowledge of human reality? These questions became pressing 
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especially in the nineteenth century. Kant tried to address the first problem. His 
motivation was to protect the sphere of “freedom” and “morality” from the threat posed 
by modern science. His notion of human dignity was an attempt to save the reduction of 
human life to the deterministic causality of natural objects or things.  
If the original source of the “intrinsic value” notion was Kant’s response to the 
first problem with his secularized notion of “dignity,” the immediate origin of the 
contemporary “values” discourse was the neo-Kantian response to the methodological 
problem posed by the increasing prestige of natural sciences felt in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The rapid progress of natural sciences in this period discredited 
much of previous philosophy, including Hegel’s most ambitious philosophical attempt to 
synthesize human knowledge early in the century, and struck a fatal blow to the 
philosopher’s traditional claim to wisdom.  As natural scientists have committed 
themselves increasingly to the pursuit of “is” or what “exists,” traditional philosophical 
speculation has come to be perceived deficient in scientific “rigor” and the technological 
imperative of “efficiency.” Pressured also by the exigencies of socio-economic 
“modernization,” “science” slowly but firmly drifted away from “philosophy” while at 
the same time assuming its authoritative mantle. It is in the context of this mid-century 
crisis of philosophy that the neo-Kantian “philosophy of value” intervened to recover 
the dignity of humanity in the spirit of Kant.168  
Another clue as to why the term “values” might have gained recognition at the 
expense of “virtue” in recent times can be gathered from our current understanding of 
the ontological roles of “subject” and “object.” Strangely, although the “subjective” 
ranks lower than the “objective” in science, it is believed to be better to be a “subject” 
                                                 





than an “object” in real life because the latter implies manipulation and no one would 
want to be in such a position. Being on the active rather than the passive side of life has 
its counterpart in Aristotle in the preference for energeia over dunamis. In modern 
philosophy, however, activity is defined in terms of efficiency. The revolutionary changes 
in natural science have been extrapolated to the historical realm in which humankind 
could take an active role to decide its destiny. In this activist sense of subjectivity, the 
ambiguity of “values” can play an important role.  
The Deweyan pragmatist Herbert Schneider further remarks that “values” have 
served and must continue to serve progress: “Values are instruments of progress, and 
without change in the direction of progress they lose their function and meaning.”169 
Values serve progress, according to Schneider, when individuals are taught how to 
evaluate the social affairs rather than are indoctrinated with the pre-existing values of 
society: “Education must not merely impress and impose on the individual ready-made 
social valuations as standards; it must seek to develop in him the technique of true 
valuation.”170 What is meant by “true valuation” is what Aristotle would call “hitting the 
mark.” But there is a major difference here. For Aristotle, the desire must be of the right 
kind to reflect truth that pertains to human action (NE VI.2). Schneider and others 
progressives of his view believe that the rightness of desires are irrelevant to the truth of 
the matter: “If an object desired as a value turns out upon reflection or experience to fail 
to measure up to the situation, it is recognized as valued falsely. Strictly speaking values, 
like facts, are neither true nor false, they simply are; it is valuation which is true or 
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false.”171 If “values” are meant here as “ends,” then Aristotle would also say that we do 
not deliberate ends but only means to ends. Still, ends are comparable with respect to 
their intrinsic desirability and contribution to living well according to Aristotle. 
Formalistically speaking, Schneider’s “true valuation” has more of an echo of 
Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values. His statement exemplifies the essence of 
progressive liberal individualism which represents human beings as individuals who have 
a right to choose and change their values as they please. The rejection of the pre-modern 
hierarchical Cosmos by modern science, the Protestant Reformation, and the rise of 
capitalism in the period between fifteenth to nineteenth centuries have been instrumental 
to the emancipation of the “individual” or the “self.” As Alasdair MacIntyre notes, the 
“loss of traditional structure and content” was seen from an Enlightenment point of 
view necessary for achieving individual autonomy casting off the shackles of tradition, 
prejudice, necessity, and authority: “The self had been liberated from all those outmoded 
forms of social organization which had imprisoned it simultaneously within a belief in a 
theistic and teleological world order and within those hierarchical structures which 
attempted to legitimate themselves as part of such a world order.”172 This traditional 
conservative critique of “individualism” brings us to the Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the 
nihilistic implications of modern science.173 
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Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism and his project of the trans-valuation or re-
valuation of values is based on the success and widespread acceptance of modern natural 
science.174 Nietzsche defines nihilism in terms of lacking of meaning and value: “the goal 
is lacking; an answer to the ‘Why?’ is lacking. What does nihilism mean?—That the highest 
values devaluate themselves.”175 We should note that nihilism is not something Nietzsche 
deplores after the Romantics, but accepts as a necessary stage of the Western history 
given its initial conditions. Nietzsche argues that nihilism has come about as a necessary 
consequence of the Socratic and the subsequent Christian quest after “truth” and 
“truthfulness.” Modern science is driven by the will to truth derived from the example set 
by Socrates who contributed to the dissolution of the hold of art and tragedy in Greek 
society. The trace of Socratic influence could still be found in Christian valuation of 
“truthfulness.”  
As Nietzsche sees it, the Socratic seeds of Western culture could not but clash at 
some point in history with another ancient element of the Western heritage. This second 
element of the Western heritage was the postulate of another world or afterlife. Both 
Platonism and Christianity rested on the presupposition of a transcendental realm 
separate from this world in which we live. The teachings based on the presupposition of 
this imaginary world, according to Nietzsche, were devised to shield the weak in their life 
struggles against pessimism, despair, and the violence of oppressors. But as modern 
science from Galileo to Darwin have debunked the existence of another world, the sole 
                                                 
     174 It is commonplace among left-leaning intellectuals to condemn or criticize Nietzsche for his 
irrationalism. See, for instance, George Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, [1962] 1980), Chapter 3; and Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, [1985] 1990), 83-105. 
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origin of meaning and value for this life appeared to be merely a comforting fiction. This 
world or existence can no longer be interpreted in terms of the categories of “aim,” 
“unity,” “truth,” or “being,” all of which refer to the non-existent fictitious world in 
providing the comfort of meaning and value: 
All the values by means of which up to now we first tried to make the world 
estimable to us and with which, once they proved inapplicable, we then devaluated 
it—all these values are, calculated psychologically, the results of particular 
perspectives of usefulness for the preservation and enhancement of human 
formations of rule, and only falsely projected into the essence of things. It’s still the 
hyperbolic naivety of man, positing himself as the meaning of things and the 
measure of their value. . .176 
   
It was from this inevitable conflict between the valuations of “truth” and “other-
worldliness” that nihilism, which is world-weariness for Nietzsche, arose. Nietzsche 
concludes that this outcome is no surprise as the Christian morality was flawed from the 
beginning for denying the will to power that gave rise to Christendom, and teaching a 
doctrine that negated it. So nihilism is a product of Christianity’s own making, and 
modern science, humanism, socialism, and all types of modern democratic movements 
are simply the estranged children of Christianity. All life including human, according to 
Nietzsche, is nothing but the product of the will to power. This instinctual movement of 
life is not satisfied with mere survival or existence but wills continual growth and 
enhancement. The will to truth of philosophers, scientists, and scholars, and the piety of 
priests are merely masks for the fundamental will to power that drive them subconsciously. 
The denial of this most basic drive, according to Nietzsche, brings about cultural 
decadence and exacerbates nihilism. 
With the loss of an ultimate ground, “morality” was left without rational 
justification or foundation. Hence, the ring of Gyges reappears in the decisive question 
                                                 




of our times “Why ought I be moral?”—the answer to which has turned into the Holy 
Grail of contemporary moral philosophy. Nietzsche claims—and MacIntyre agrees with 
him on this point177—that outside the pre-modern socio-political and metaphysical 
framework, it is not possible to give a (rationally) defensible answer to this question. All 
attempts since Kant to prove otherwise have failed to advance the understanding of 
morality beyond the Christian emphasis on “conscience” and the imperative form of 
Biblical injunctions.178 Instead of beating a dead horse, Nietzsche presents his active 
nihilism of Umwethung aller Werthe (revaluation of all values) in overcoming the passive 
nihilism of the Western civilization induced by Christian morality. This task is self-
consciously driven by  the will to power: “values and their changes stand in relation to the 
growth in power of the value-positer.”179 With this aphorism, Nietzsche gestures at the 
connection between enhancing power and positing values.  
In his commentary on Nietzsche’s pronouncement of “the death of God,” 
Heidegger draws our attention to this connection.180 According to Heidegger, thinking in 
terms of values (Wertdenken) is problematic not only because of its subjective relativism 
but also especially noteworthy for the nihilism implicit in the subjectivist ground of 
value-positing as will to power. Heidegger agrees on a fundamental level with 
                                                 
     177 See MacIntyre, Chapter 2. 
 
     178 See Notebook 9 [43], Autumn 1887. One recent attempt to provide rational justification for moral 
conduct was made by Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978); and 
The Community of Rights (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). In these works, Gewirth argued that a 
supreme moral principle (of generic consistency) can be shown dialectically necessary given the purposive 
nature of human agency, and consequently must be held obligatory for all moral agents. As of today, 
Gewirth’s argument is yet to gain wide acceptance from the philosophical community. For objections to 
Gewirth and a defense of his position against these objections, see Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical 
Necessity of Morality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991). 
 
     179 Notebook 9 [39], Autumn 1887. 
 
     180 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, translated by William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 53-112. The following discussion 




Nietzsche’s account of nihilism emerging immanently from the historical course of the 
Western philosophy. He also agrees with Nietzsche in not taking nihilism lightly but as a 
phenomenon that will determine the course of world history for centuries to come. He 
disagrees with Nietzsche, however, in the explanation of the specific historical roots of 
nihilism, its essence, as well as Nietzsche’s recipe for the overcoming of nihilism.  
Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche’s critique of the Platonic metaphysics (which 
was inherited by Christianity) does not do away with metaphysics in itself. Nietzsche’s 
emphatic denial of a transcendental realm inverts rather than overcomes Platonism. 
Hence, the central motif of Nietzsche’s thinking—the will to power—underlying the 
project of revaluation of values, according to Heidegger, is still indicative of residual 
metaphysics. Heidegger interprets Nietzsche’s expression of will to power as a response to 
“the ancient guiding question of philosophy, ‘What is being?’”181 This interpretation 
represents at the same time Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche as well as the Western 
tradition to which, Heidegger thinks, Nietzsche is tied to on a fundamental level. In 
contrast to this guiding question of the Western tradition, Heidegger raises the 
grounding question of the essence of Being. As I have briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, 
Heidegger’s main philosophical claim is that there is an ontological difference between 
Being (Sein) and beings (Seinde). Although Heidegger has been very elusive and enigmatic 
about what this Being is, he insists that it cannot be known through the received 
categories of logic (i.e., Aristotle) or mind (i.e., Kant), i.e., reason.182 For Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s notion of “will to power” remains within the framework of post-Socratic 
                                                 
     181 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. I, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFranciso, 1991), 3-4. 
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philosophy in passing over this greater question, and consequently contributing to the 
grand forgetfulness and withdrawal of Being in Western history. The thinking that gives 
precedence to beings and turns away from Being is what the metaphysics of Western 
tradition basically is.  
Although Heidegger associates Nietzsche with the whole Western tradition of 
metaphysics from Plato onwards, he also thinks that Nietzsche’s characterization of 
being or what is in terms of “willing” defines the essence of modernity in a peculiar way. 
Hence, this grand critic of modernity was unknowingly in the company of the moderns. 
The will to power constitutes “the metaphysical ground of the consummation of the 
modern age.”183 Nihilism enters into its activist/subjectivist phase with modernity 
culminating in Nietzsche. Needless to say, it is not necessary for Heidegger that 
Nietzsche’s doctrines are consciously and affirmatively accepted by public. Nietzsche 
rather gives voice to the past, present, and the future of world history without necessarily 
being the agent of history’s unfolding in this peculiar way.184 In this sense, Nietzsche 
becomes “the last metaphysician of the West.”185 Heidegger understands the metaphysics 
of modern science in terms of “willing” and “power.” The ambitious 
Cartesian/Baconian project of the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate is 
closely related to the object/subject distinction and the subsequent rise of “values” 
discourse out of the anthropocentric subjectivism that this distinction gives rise to. This 
project necessarily assigns the title of the “subject” exclusively to human beings and 
views things as passive “objects.” Consequently, human life assumes a “subjective” and 
                                                 
     183 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. II, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFranciso, 1991), 7.  
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things an “objective” character. Heidegger interprets this transformation in metaphysics, 
which he characterizes as “objectifying” or “representing,” as man’s “insurrection” 
against 
establishes itself as 
nconditional objectification. Nature appears everywhere—because willed from 
 
f whatever is.”188 At this point 
of mod
 a willing. That 
eans: to posit values and to ascribe worth to everything in keeping with values. 
 
                                                
Being:  
Man enters into insurrection. The world changes into object. In this 
revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, that which first of all 
must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the 
midst of human positing and analyzing. The earth itself can show itself only as 
the object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, 
u
out of the essence of Being—as the object of technology.186 
Heidegger does not deny that the Latin word subjectum was derived from the ancient 
Greek notion of hypokeimenon (literally, underlying). But the moderns, beginning with 
Descartes, have reinterpreted it as exclusively indexed to human beings: “the ousia 
(beingness) of the subjectum changes into the subjectness of self-assertive self-
consciousness, which now manifests its essence as the will to will.”187 The modern 
project, according to Heidegger, is now becoming “conscious of its own truth about 
itself” and is now “willing the will to power as the Being o
ern metaphysics, comes the relevance of “values”: 
In the willing of this will, however, there comes upon man the condition that he 
concomitantly will the conditions, the requirements, of such
m
In such a manner does value determine all that is in its Being.189 
Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche was mistaken in his expectation that the revaluation of 
the old values and the creation of new values would hold and ultimately reverse the tide 
of nihilism. The thinking in terms of values (Wertdenken) makes things worse because it 
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degrades Being into a value and completely obliterates “every way to the experiencing of 
Being.”190 The “values” serve as the “objectification of needs as goals” to sustain the 
modern
 yet 
at very value is the impotent and threadbare disguise of the objectivity of 
 
” has deep 
significa
ld change 
to a doctrine of man, into anthropology. . . . The modern freedom of 
 
                                                
 project: 
Value appears to be the expression of the fact that we, in our position of 
relationship to it, act to advance just that which is itself most valuable; and
th
whatever is, an objectivity that has become flat and devoid of background.191 
As I have remarked earlier, the modern project values the role of “subject” on 
the one hand and devalues that of “object” on the other. Strangely enough, however, the 
“subjective” point of view is considered unreliable whereas the “objective” point of view 
is glorified in natural and social sciences today. What shall we make of this discrepancy? 
Heidegger takes note of “the necessary interplay between subjectivism and objectivism” 
of modernity, and thinks that “this reciprocal conditioning of one by the other
nce for understanding the anthropocentric character of modern age:  
the more extensively and the more effectually the world stands at man’s disposal 
as conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more 
subjectively, i.e., the more importunately, does the subjectum rise up, and all the 
more impetuously, too, do observation of and teaching about the wor
in
subjectivity vanishes totally in the objectivity commensurate with it.192  
On a collective level, Heidegger suggests, human beings try to better their conditions by 
projecting their subjectivity forcefully onto the world, but only at the price of turning 
themselves into objects in the very process. If value-positing is inescapably tied to the 
modern project, then insisting on the “intrinsic value” of nature may not be the best way 
to approach human relationship to the world. For even if we assume that there is such a 
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thing, it is obvious that not everyone sees and appreciates the intrinsic value of nature. 
Their theoretical formulation would still need the constant protection of policies and 
laws. We may indeed manage to do that for certain reserves or species in each country 
but as human beings and their needs multiply there will be growing pressure even on 
these last refuges. Another problem with “intrinsic value” is that it is less applicable to 
the kind of environmental issues that stem from the nexus of economy and ecology. As I 
will discuss in the next section, virtues find their practical implementation in the context 
of “environmental citizenship.” This praxis-oriented concept is much more promising in 
bridgin
alues, virtues are not entangled in the 
objectiv
what virtues there are, their relative importance, and how best to attain them, but we 
                                                
g over ethics and politics that “values” fail to achieve on their own. 
Although Heidegger never spoke of “virtues” or “ethics” in his works, his 
analysis of “values” is nonetheless illuminating to understand what is dormant in the 
prevailing “values” discourse both in and outside the academia. Heidegger is notorious, 
however, for his fateful resignation toward history through which, he thinks, Being 
reveals itself: “Man cannot, of himself, abandon this destining of his modern essence or 
abolish it by fiat.” One rather must wait patiently the passing of this “fleeting cloud” 
shadowing over “a concealed land.”193 I believe “virtues” occupy a middle ground 
between the assertive value-positing of Nietzsche and Heidegger’s passive resignation to 
the historical unfolding of nihilism. Virtues in Aristotle’s conception allow human beings 
to fulfill their potential nature. Unlike v
e/subjective or fact/value dualisms.  
Most importantly, one cannot posit or impose virtues willfully. We can debate 
 




cannot posit or impose virtues the way we do posit or impose values.194 The reason for 
this is that whereas “values” correspond to nothing more than desires or interests, 
virtues are products of deliberated desires. The process of virtue cultivation is not as 
whimsical as the process of “valuing.” The deliberation requires not only individual’s 
input but also the people he is connected to in everyday life—family, peers, neighbors, 
colleagues, and various fellowships from other spheres of life. To give an example, we 
often see the kinds of following statement (made in the context of “nature restoration” 
projects) on the premise that there is no single, neutral, or interest-free scientific 
definition of “nature” or “naturalness”: 
Because many possible natures exist, which nature is chosen to serve as the goal 
of restoration requires imposing human values and preferences for one time 
period and one set of initial, perhaps random, conditions. Such a decision may 
not be arbitrary, but it will no doubt reflect the values and preferences of the 
decision maker.195 
 
The authors are equivocating here as a result of their commitment to the metaphysics of 
“becoming” in lieu of that of “being.” Their argument is that since everything in nature 
or nature itself is in flux, there is not an original or authentic condition to restore spoiled 
or degraded landscapes to. What are the implications of admitting “randomness” but not 
“arbitrariness” of such a decision. The authors want to suggest that which form of 
natural conditions to choose in restoration projects is not given outside public 
negotiation. The decision reached will not be arbitrary because it will be based on the 
equal participation of stakeholders. This approach sounds democratic in contrast to the 
dreaded elitism of scientists and experts. But why should it not be arbitrary? Because the 
                                                 
     194 This needs some qualification though. To call anything we like as virtue makes a mockery of virtue. 
One is rather obliged to show how a specific virtue contributes to human perfection and why its lack is a 
serious matter. 
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notion of “arbitrary” connotes the exclusive exercise of the “will” of the decision-maker. 
If the “will” is generalized to include all others (but whom exactly?), it will cease to be 
“arbitrary.” We hear the voice of “social contract” here. The problem is in the 
globalizing world, nothing short of including all humankind in the decision-making 
process can satisfy this democratic rule of general will. The language of “imposing 
values” in the above quote implies the radical separation of humanity from nature (hence 




Chapter 6:  The Civic Approach to the Environment 
 
This chapter examines the nascent discourses of “civic environmentalism” and 
“environmental citizenship” in contemporary environmental theory literature.1 I aim to 
accomplish two things. First, I will bring out the partial indebtedness and commitment 
of these discourses to an Aristotelian conception of praxis, which is especially discernible 
in their common emphasis on justice, civic virtue, the common good, and civic action. In 
reference to this Aristotelian dimension, I will show how these two discourses share a 
common ground and can be considered as a complement to environmental virtue ethics 
explored in the previous chapter. Rendering the Aristotelian influence on these 
discourses more explicit will support the overall argument of this dissertation that 
Aristotle is not only relevant to contemporary environmental thinking but can also 
clarify our thinking through the question concerning the environment.  
Second, I will examine these discourses with an eye to the discursive context in 
which they have arisen and argue that their context-dependence is integral to understand 
them. To understand, for instance, why the terms “citizen,” “citizenship,” or “civic” are 
attached to the terms “environmentalist” and “environmentalism,” we should consider 
the recent debates in contemporary environmentalism taking place primarily in the 
United States but also in Western Europe to a lesser extent. An increasing number of 
environmentalists in both contexts are dissatisfied with the current state of 
environmentalism and are apprehensive about its future prospects. This is despite the 
environmental gains made over the last three decades and the evidence of high 
                                                 
     1 Hereafter, I shall use the expressions “the civic approach” (to the environment) or, alternatively, “the 
civic environmental approach” to refer to their common ground. While referring to the relevant scholarly 
literature, however, I shall retain the terms “civic environmentalism” and “environmental citizenship.” We 




environmental concern and awareness in Western societies. The discontent concerns the 
widely shared opinion that mainstream environmental groups in the United States have 
long treated the environment narrowly and independent of other spheres and concerns 
of human life. This narrow focus has given rise to a disconnect between 
environmentalists and everyday life concerns both materially and discursively. The civic 
emphasis of “civic environmentalism” and “environmental citizenship” is related to 
these debates by virtue of their intent and their promising potential to bridge this gap.  
Before we get to this common ground, we should attend to the particular 
emphases in these discourses. We should consider their specific conceptions and the 
particular issues they are directed to. We will then note that the parameters and the terms 
of these discourses are colored by specific theoretical and historical influences important 
to their proponents. But more importantly, we shall see that both discourses are 
essentially put forth to address the inadequacies of environmental movement in 
spreading its gospel. In what follows, I shall first discuss the contingent differences 
between “civic environmentalism” and “environmental citizenship” based on how they 
are conceptualized in their respective scholarly literatures.2 The second section situates 
these discourses in the context of contemporary environmental debates. 
6.1 Civic Environmentalism and Environmental Citizenship 
I shall argue in this section that, despite some differences, civic 
environmentalism and environmental citizenship are not two separate discourses. Before 
we get to their more important common ground, however, we should first attend to the 
contingent differences between them. It is important to first note that the phrase “civic 
                                                 
     2 Due to their short history, it would be too early to speak of them as “concepts.” In exploring their 
meaning, I will rather refer to them interchangeably as “discourses” and “projects” since they are 




environmentalism” is mainly used among American scholars, whereas the phrase 
“environmental citizenship” has been the preferred idiom in the rest of the English-
speaking world.3 Admittedly, this geographic difference might appear insignificant, and 
this is true to a certain extent as I shall argue shortly but this difference is not irrelevant 
to their other contingent differences. 
The fact that scholars writing on either discourse share a common perspective 
may give the impression that the two discourses pursue different objectives. For 
instance, most scholars of civic environmentalism typically emphasize the importance of 
the local scale of environmental praxis whereas the proponents of environmental 
citizenship highlight the global context of environmental problems. This difference 
would suggest that each discourse is offering us a different path to environmental 
protection or is interested in different environmental issues. This impression is not fully 
accurate, however, as there are critical differences even among authors commenting on 
the same discourse. For instance, there are two versions of civic environmentalism. One 
is more private market-oriented and the other is more community-oriented.4 Similarly, 
                                                 
     3 This terminological variance is also noted in Julian Agyeman and Bob Evans, “Justice, Governance 
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there are localist and globalist interpretations of environmental citizenship.5 There is no 
point in trying to define either of these two discourses in abstract terms by privileging 
one interpretation. A better approach to the ideas advanced by these discourses can be 
obtained by paying attention to their practical purposes. Both discourses can be 
interpreted in more general terms elucidating the broader empirical and conceptual 
frameworks of analysis in which they are situated and the practical goals of their 
proponents in advocating these frameworks. I shall return to this common ground in the 
next two sections.  
As I have remarked earlier, civic environmentalism is peculiar to the American 
context with a bent toward local solutions to environmental problems. The historical 
trajectory of the United States vis-à-vis federalism and the vast land it occupies has 
certainly shaped the local focus of American civic environmentalism. One major source 
of inspiration must be the Jeffersonian and Tocquevillian vision of decentralized, self-
governing small communities and civic associations.6 The main claim repeated in this 
literature is that a decentralized, community-based, participatory approach to certain 
environmental issues such as land conservation, preservation of endangered species, or 
                                                 
     5 The localist interpretation of environmental citizenship—by which I mean authors discussing the 
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nonpoint pollution prevention can be more effective than the prevailing command-and-
control model that both federal government and mainstream American 
environmentalism have relied on.7 The civic approach in this sense reflects the 
characteristic populist or libertarian aversion to bureaucratic centralism and technocratic 
regulation. Most civic environmentalists view the role of the predicate “civic” as one of 
signifying the importance of self-governance at the state and local levels as they view the 
exercise of political power at the federal level with suspicion.8 
Another point of criticism in this literature is the litigious approach used by 
environmentalists preoccupied with finding faults with the political system but less 
willing to come up with a positive vision. It is claimed that the lack of a positive program 
that can systematically produce pragmatic anticipatory solutions to problems prevents 
environmentalism’s being an integral part of the political culture. The conventional 
approach of regulation and litigation is not rejected by civic environmentalists outright 
but deemed insufficient since certain type of environmental problems are impervious to 
                                                 
     7 In addition to the previously cited works by DeWitt John and William A. Shutkin, the literature on 
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the conventional methods of environmental activism.9 The ineffectiveness of regulation 
and confrontation is clear, for instance, in the case of non-point pollution—the principal 
remaining cause of water pollution in the US and Europe.10 This type of pollution occurs 
when runoff water washes off the dispersed waste particles on the soil surface and 
introduces them into rivers, lakes, or groundwater. The challenge of preventing this type 
of pollution is that it has no distinct origin.11 This pollution is basically an aggregate 
result of our day-to-day consumptive habits as well as the prevailing industrial and 
agricultural production patterns. Due to its diffuse, unidentifiable origins, conventional 
means such as regulation, litigation, or even protest that environmentalists typically rely 
on prove ineffective. Proponents of civic environmentalism claim that grassroots or local 
efforts have a comparative advantage in modifying behavior and practices for 
environmental problems such as this one and in making better use of local skills and 
knowledge for similar environmental problems.12  
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Environmentalism in Action: A Field Guide to Regional and Local Initiatives,” Progressive Policy Institute 
Policy Report,  January 1, 1999, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Civic_Enviro_Full_Report.pdf. 
 
     10 Environmental Protection Agency, “Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation’s Largest Water Quality 
Problem,” http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/facts/point1.htm. See also Carmen Revenga and Greg Mock, 
“Dirty Water: Pollution Problems Persist,” http://earthtrends.wri.org/features/ view_feature.php? 
fid=16&theme=2. 
 
     11 As the EPA website points out, the responsibility is shared: “We all play a part. Nonpoint source 
pollution results from a wide variety of human activities on the land. Each of us can contribute to the 
problem without even realizing it.” Environmental Protection Agency, “What is Nonpoint Source (NPS) 
Pollution?: Questions and Answers,” http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/qa.html. 
 
     12 A major theme in this and affiliate environmental literature is local knowledge and skepticism of 
expert knowledge. See, for instance, Frank Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics of Local 
Knowledge (Duke University Press, 2000). In their epistemological critique, civic environmentalists come 
very close to the traditional conservative criticism of social engineering and technocracy. This critique, 
which can be found in the works of Edmund Burke and, more recently, Michael Oakeshott, has been 
reinvented by contemporary scholars of different persuasions as varied as libertarianism, 
communitarianism, and postmodernism. See, for instance, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain 




Some scholars have suggested caution for civic environmentalism because “its 
touted benefits are likely to materialize only in particular circumstances.”13 Unfavorable 
conditions for civic approach exist, according to Layzer, especially when the disparity of 
power relations between local communities and economic developers is exacerbated by 
financial constraints faced by local governments. Although this view might be valuable in 
cautioning us against embracing the civic approach overenthusiastically as a panacea to 
all kinds of environmental ills, it suffers from overlooking the fact that financial 
difficulties and the power disparity, which allegedly puts the weaker environmental 
interests at a disadvantage, is true for all levels of government. Layzer claims that this is 
not the case at the regional and state levels but she does not provide any evidence for her 
position: “Collaborative approaches to ecological problem solving may be more likely to 
succeed at the national or regional level, where the resource disparity among interests is 
less profound and the political-economic context less limiting than at the community 
level.”14 The contestation of interests among political actors with unequal material 
resources—regardless of the level of authority—will naturally produce varying outcomes 
depending on the contingent circumstances in which it takes place. Such empirical 
variation from one case to another does not in itself justify a serious objection to the 
civic approach for, as I shall discuss next, it receives its justification essentially on 
practical rather than technical grounds. 
Civic environmentalists also claim that delegating environmental responsibility to 
local communities contributes to the political capacity of communities by increasing the 
opportunities of attaining self-sufficiency (e.g., farmer’s markets, community gardens, 
                                                 
     13 See Judith A. Layzer, “Citizen Participation and Government Choice in Local Environmental 
Controversies,” Policy Studies Journal 30.2 (2002): 193.  
 




and city farms) and neighborliness. They emphasize the civic returns in protecting open 
urban spaces and paying heed to city design in general because these structural aspects 
are important to the experience of living together in cities.15 Civic environmentalists aim 
at building public trust and sense of place in the process of addressing environmental 
concerns. These constructive sentiments—typically expressed through the notion of 
“social capital”—are seen as both valuable side-products and essential ingredients of 
civic environmentalism: “The more social capital a community possesses, the greater is 
its ability to solve problem and achieve positive environmental outcomes.”16 In short, 
the civic approach to environmental issues brings together people and provides them 
with a feeling of security, confidence, joy, partnership, and achievement that their 
otherwise isolated lives would fail to (re)generate for them. 
                                                
It would be a mistake, however, to put too much weight on this particular 
historical background of American civic environmentalism. For the underlying spirit of 
American civic environmentalism—the valuation of the local in dealing with 
environmental problems—is far from being limited to the American environmentalism 
or the American context in general. For one thing, what is at stake between the political 
tug-of-war between the pull of localism and the push for centralism is something of 
more universal character. The emergence of the themes of the local, difference, diversity, 
culture, history, beginning with the early nineteenth century, and most recently in the last 
 
     15 See Randolph Hester, Design for Ecological Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
 
     16 Shutkin, 76. The term “social capital” is often attributed to Robert D. Putnam, particularly his Bowling 
Alone (2000), but Putnam actually borrows it from Jane Jacobs as he himself credits her in a footnote. (The 
first use of the term in this sense dates back to 1916). Jacobs was an influential urban planner whose first 
book The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, [1961] 2002) offered a harsh 
critique of the government-run “urban renewal” projects aimed at clearing slum dwellings in inner cities. 
Her writings gave rise to the “new urbanism” movement in city planning which aims to make cities more 
hospitable to social interactions by diversifying the social functions and structural components of cities. 
For a comparative analysis of “new urbanism” to ancient political philosophy, see Philip Bess, Till We Have 




three decades in post-modern as well as globalization literatures can best be understood 
as reactions to the universalizing and homogenizing drive of modernization. Although 
never mentioned explicitly, civic environmentalism belongs to this conservative reaction 
to modernity and attempts to enact the ambivalent principle of “subsidiarity” or 
“devolution” which prescribes that social functions must be delegated to the lowest 
possible level of authority. This principle, which at the same time has both libertarian 
and communitarian supporters, emphasizes the interlocking order of communities, their 
proper relationships to one another, and the need of community for human flourishing, 
and cautions against the threat of homogenization and centralization that may result 
from either political or economic motives. 17  
That civic environmentalism is not peculiar to the American context can also be 
seen in the fact that the term “civic environmentalism” has been borrowed by some to 
conceptualize environmentalism in the developing world.18 There are close similarities 
between the communitarian conception of civic environmentalism in the American 
context such as that of William Shutkin and a certain strand of environmentalism in the 
                                                 
     17 The principle of “subsidiarity” is traced back to Edmund Burke’s “little platoons,”  Tocqueville’s 
civic analysis of early nineteenth-century American democracy, and ultimately to Aristotle. It has been 
given serious consideration by Catholic social thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
as a third way between the totalistic socialism/nationalism and individualistic liberalism. For the lineage of 
this idea, see Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley, and Robert P. Hunt, eds., Catholicism, Liberalism, and 
Communitarianism: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral Foundations of Democracy (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1995); Jonathan Chaplin, “Subsidiarity: the Concept and the Connections,” Ethical 
Perspectives 4.2 (1997): 117-30; and Yves Soudan, “Subsidiarity and Community in Europe,” Ethical 
Perspectives 5.3 (1998): 177-87.  
 
     18 See, for instance, Paul F. Steinberg, Civic Environmentalism in Developing Countries: Opportunities for 
Innovation in State-Society Relations (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002). The term “civic 
environmentalism” has not been used consistently to characterize the environmentalism practiced in the 
developing world. Alternative names such as “livelihood approach,” “popular environmentalism,” or 
“environmentalism of the poor” are also in use. See, for instance, Bron Taylor, ed. Ecological Resistance 
Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995); 
Ramachandra Guha and Juan Martinez-Alier, Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South (London: 
Earthscan, 1997); Ranjit Dwivedi, “Environmental Movements in the Global South: Issues of Livelihood 
and Beyond,” International Sociology 16.1 (2001): 11-31; Ching-Ping  Tang , “Democratizing Urban Politics 
and Civic Environmentalism in Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 176 (2003): 1029-51; and Joanne Bauer, ed., 




developing world.19 Shutkin, for instance, uses the term “civic environmentalism” to 
refer to the kind of American environmentalism which “fundamentally entails a holistic 
approach to environmental problems in that those problems and their solutions are seen 
as inextricably linked to social, political, and economic issues.”20 Scholars of developing 
world similarly observe that people partaking in environmental struggles often “forge 
[ties] between the values they attach to nature and the values they attach to historical 
tradition, communal identity, meaningful work, and other aspects of their lives.”21  
Environmental citizenship, on the other hand, is theorized mainly by scholars 
responding to the academic discussions of citizenship in liberal, republican, and 
cosmopolitan schools of political thought. 22 Environmental citizenship borrows from 
both republican and cosmopolitan conceptions. The dissatisfaction with the instrumental 
                                                 
     19 According to Paul F. Steinberg, the author of Civic Environmentalism in Developing Countries, civic 
environmentalism in the developing world differs from American civic environmentalism due to the 
libertarian overtones of the latter, defending minimal state and private enterprise. Steinberg appropriates 
the term “civic environmentalism” for the developing world context without presupposing a stark 
state/society dichotomy and prima facie antagonism between civil society and state. Steinberg argues that 
civic environmental initiatives in the developing world does not really run against governmental regulation. 
He rather uses the concept to emphasize the potential of synergistic relations between state and non-state 
actors in environmental governance. Steinberg cites DeWitt John’s Civic Environmentalism (1994) as an 
example of American civic environmentalism from which he distances himself. But despite the strong 
subtitle of DeWitt John’s book—Alternatives to Regulation in States—John too conceives civic 
environmentalism as a complement to, rather than a full substitute for, governmental regulation. However, 
Steinberg’s assessment applies more to the market-oriented and libertarian conception of “civic 
environmentalism” mentioned earlier. 
 
     20 Shutkin, 22. 
 
     21 Clark A. Miller, “Framing Shared Values: Reason and Trust in Environmental Governance,” in 
Forging Environmentalism: Justice, Livelihood, and Contested Environments, ed. Joanne Bauer (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2006), 377-394, p. 380. 
 
     22 For this growing literature, see Mark J. Smith, Ecologism: Towards Ecological Citizenship (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 1998), 91-100; Peter Christoff, “Environmental and Ecological Citizenship” in 
Rethinking Australian Citizenship, eds. Wayne Hudson and John Kane (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); Deane Curtin, “Ecological Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, ed., Engin F. Isin 
and Bryan Turner (London: Sage, 2002), 293-304; Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell, eds., Environmental Citizenship 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Andrew Dobson and Ángel Valencia Sáiz, eds., Citizenship, 
Environment, Economy (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Sherilyn MacGregor, Beyond Mothering Earth: 




and atomistic view of citizenship inherent in the liberal contractarian view of society has 
led some contemporary scholars in the last few decades to seek an alternative tradition in 
the history of Western political thought. They claim to have located this alternative 
conception of citizenship in various periods of Western history such as ancient Greece, 
Roman Republic, Renaissance Italy, seventeenth-century England, and the American 
founding in which the civic duty to the fatherland and collective liberty is cherished and 
individualism is downplayed.23 The cosmopolitan tradition, on the other hand, conceives 
moral duty, human belonging, and loyalty in universal terms. These noble sentiments 
must be extended to all humanity regardless of the contingent accidents of birth such as 
geography, nationality, and religion.24 This current debate among contemporary scholars 
of liberalism, republicanism, and cosmopolitanism forms the backdrop of the growing 
scholarly literature on environmental citizenship.25 Cosmopolitanism is of particular 
interest to environmental citizenship, unlike the decentralist focus of civic 
environmentalism, as so many environmental issues such as global warming physically 
and politically transcend the territorial boundaries of states.  
The central themes found in environmental citizenship literature are duty and 
belonging to a larger entity. According to one definition, “Environmental Citizenship is 
an idea that each of us is an integral part of a larger ecosystem and that our future 
                                                 
     23 See, among others, Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds., Republicanism: A Shared European 
Heritage, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
 
     24 For an overview of cosmopolitanism in the Western tradition, see April Carter, The Political Theory of 
Global Citizenship (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
 
     25 See, for instance, Elizabeth Jelin, “Towards a Global Environmental Citizenship?” Citizenship Studies 
4.1 (2000): 47-63; Sherilyn MacGregor, “Reading the Earth Charter: Cosmopolitan Environmentalism or 
Light Green Politics as Usual?” Ethics, Place and Environment. 7.1–2 (2004): 85-96; Ángel Valencia Sáiz, 
“Globalisation, Cosmopolitanism and Ecological Citizenship,” in Citizenship, Environment, Economy, eds. 
Andrew Dobson and Ángel Valencia Sáiz (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7-22; and Patrick Hayden, 




depends on each one of us embracing the challenge and acting responsibly and positively 
toward our environment. It’s about making changes in our daily lives to be 
environmental citizens all day, every day.”26 What is new in this definition in relation to 
the environmental literature of the past is neither the notion of “unity” (being an 
“integral part of a larger ecosystem”) nor “acting responsibly” but “citizenship.” 
Environmental scholars have conceptualized the agents of transformation as anything 
but citizens until recently. They have considered “the new middle class, the working 
class, the unemployed, new social movements or universal agency” but not ordinary 
people qua citizens.27  
The following statement expresses the instrumental interest in citizenship for 
environmental purposes: “environmental citizenship is about the active participation of 
citizens” to move “society from unsustainability towards greater sustainability.”28 In this 
educational primer on environmental citizenship, it is also claimed that “environmental 
citizenship is not a new concept.” It is rather “a simple reiteration of a known fact—that 
the preservation of the environment is an obligation entrusted upon everyone and all 
governments by virtue of the inherent relationship between people and nature and 
between citizens and their governments.”29 For instance, as the primer further points 
out, the 1992 Rio Declaration states in its Tenth Principle that “environmental issues are 
                                                 
     26 The Center for Environmental Philosophy, “Environmental Citizenship,” 
http://www.cep.unt.edu/citizen.htm. 
 
     27 See Luke Martell, Ecology and Society (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994), 184.  
 
     28 Sherilyn MacGregor and Simon Pardue et al., “Environmental Citizenship: The Goodenough 
Primer,” May 2005, http://www.environmentalcitizenship.net/pdf_files/environmental_citizenship_ 
primer.pdf, 1. 
 
     29 Ibid. This statement is quoted with approval from a UNEP document. See United Nations 
Environment Programme, “Environmental Citizenship: An Introductory Guidebook on Building 
Partnerships between Citizens and Local Governments for Environmental Sustainability,” Integrative 




best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.”30 It may 
be true that the documents crafted in international negotiations during the 1990s have 
acknowledged the role of citizens in protecting the environment. Environmental 
theorists, however, are only recently taking up the theme of “citizenship” because they 
have been for long reluctant to refer to an undiscriminating entity, “citizen,” which they 
associated with unjust power relationships upheld in the Western tradition.31 Now that 
environmental scholars are interested in relating environmental protection to citizenship, 
they need to conceptualize the content of the relationship “between citizens and their 
governments.” That the content of environmental citizenship is not self-evident is clear 
from the following statement from the same document: environmental citizenship 
“challenges the model of the ‘self-interested rational actor’ which pervades policy, 
government thinking and economic modeling—by acknowledging that the rational 
citizen has wider social and environmental interests and concerns.”32 The authors of this 
document apparently disagree with centuries of liberal political theory and practice in the 
                                                 
     30 Quoted in MacGregor and Pardue et al., 5. 
 
     31 See, for instance, Curtin, 293. Curtin attributes the lack of interest in “citizenship” discourse at the 
margins of contemporary theory to its affiliation with Western colonialism, capitalism, or patriarchy. This 
is also true for environmental theorists most of whom follow in the footsteps of Marxist and feminist 
analysis of the Western intellectual history, attributing the ills of contemporary society to the historical 
legacy of a biased ideology of anthropocentrism dominating the Western tradition. Because “citizenship” 
was considered to be at the center of this discriminatory legacy, environmental theorists kept their distance 
from it and looked for a more definitive transformation of the misguided worldview prevailing in the 
West. The locus classicus of the radical skepticism of bourgeois “citizenship” is Karl Marx’s essay “On the 
Jewish Question.” In this essay, Marx criticizes the liberal conception of citizenship (as found in the 
American founding and the 1789 French Revolution) which creates an abstract opposition between civil 
society and political state or between individuals as men and as citizens. Marx concludes that political 
emancipation or attainment and protection of civil rights is rife with contradiction: “Human emancipation 
will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as 
an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-
being.” See The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 46. Marx 
borrowed his view of citizenship partially from Hegel’s analysis of “civil society” and bourgeois citizenship 
in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in which Hegel considered the bourgeois citizen as a “private person” and 
“civil society” as the realm of particularity. 
 




Western tradition based on self-seeking individuals since Hobbes. This surely needs 
more argument which is not provided in this short document. So I will turn to a more 
detailed discussion of environmental citizenship in Citizenship and the Environment (2003) 
whose author Andrew Dobson has written much on the subject and is also one of the 
organizers of  the academic seminar series leading to this document as a summary report. 
6.1.1 Environmental Citizenship 
 
The main purpose of Dobson’s book is to enlist the concept and praxis of 
citizenship to improve “democracy’s chances of producing sustainable outcomes.”33 
Dobson claims that democratic citizenship and environmental sustainability are 
compatible goals and this can be seen in a new form of citizenship emerging under the 
influence of globalization. Post-national environmental politics, according to Dobson, 
signals a new praxis and conception of citizenship.34 The practical basis for this new 
form of citizenship—which Dobson calls “post-cosmopolitan”—is being prepared by 
the asymmetrical processes of globalization. Transnational material exchanges (as in 
commodity chains) which sustain “the material production and reproduction of daily 
life” in the wealthy industrialized societies result in uneven global distribution of 
ecological and economic benefits and harms. Most of these exchanges bring about some 
kind of “actual harm” to those in the developing world who lack negotiation or decision-
making power over global policies affecting their lives. Citing Vandana  Shiva’s critique 
of the uncritical celebration of globalization, Dobson stresses the uneven outcomes of 
                                                 
     33 Dobson, Citizenship, 7. 
 
     34 Environmental politics is considered by many as post-national due to the fact that many 
environmental problems overflow the territorial boundaries of nation-states. For a discussion of how 
environmental politics transcends the state boundaries and its implications for state sovereignty, see 
Thomas Kuehls, Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996); and Karen T. Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” Mershon International Studies Review 




globalization: “some states and agents are globalizing while some are globalized.”35 A 
typical example of this material asymmetry is the fact that the poor nations carry an 
unfair share of the environmental burden because of the material problems caused by 
the rich nations (e.g., global warming).36  
Dobson claims that this asymmetry in power relationships “always already” 
generates non-reciprocal duties for people who benefit more from globalization. The 
discharge of these non-reciprocal duties, according to Dobson, would constitute their 
“post-cosmopolitan citizenship” and “ecological citizenship” is a specific conduit of this 
new form of citizenship. “Post-cosmopolitan” or “ecological citizenship” exists today 
“both logically and in actual political fact.”37 Ecological citizenship differs from the two 
competing models of citizenship in the Western tradition: the civic republican and 
liberal. Dobson points out that despite their differences both liberal and civic republican 
citizenship share some core features which are challenged by the nascent ecological 
citizenship: they are similarly territorial or state-centric, exclusively public sphere 
oriented, and conceive rights/duties in contractual or reciprocal terms.  
Ecological citizenship modifies each one of these elements. First, the community 
of citizens occupies a non-territorial space rather than a contiguous territory.38 Second, 
the context of civic obligation is no longer between citizens and states but among 
                                                 
     35 Ibid., 21. Dobson criticizes a certain kind of globalization literature exemplified by David Held’s 
work for its one-sided description of globalization (pp. 10-22). Dobson’s objection is that Held depicts 
globalization predominantly in neutral terms as “the widening, intensifying, speeding up and growing 
impact of world-wide interconnectedness” without showing its darker side (Held quoted in Dobson, 10). 
Although he does not cite, Dobson would also be critical of the cozy term “global village” and Thomas 
Friedman’s relatively enthusiastic account of globalization in The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-
First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 
 
     36 Dobson, Citizenship, 17-9, 24, 30-1. 
 
     37 Ibid., 39. I will explain later why Dobson prefers the term “ecological citizenship” to “environmental 
citizenship.” 
 




citizens who cohabit an ecological space by virtue of the effects of their actions. So 
ecological citizenship brings in parts of the private sphere and civil society excluded 
completely from the scope of others.39 Third, the obligations of ecological citizens are 
neither contracted as in liberal citizenship nor owed in reciprocity as in republican 
citizenship but are “unreciprocated and unilateral.”40 This is to say that A may owe 
certain duties to perform for B without B being responsible to reciprocate.41  
Dobson’s ecological citizenship borrows heavily from republicanism, especially 
the latter’s emphasis on duties but departs from it in so far as the republican view relies 
on the reciprocity of obligations between citizens and states. A second similarity between 
the two is the common emphasis on civic virtue. The difference in this regard is that 
whereas republicanism emphasizes “masculine” virtues such as “courage, leadership, 
service, sacrifice” aimed at “saving cities,” ecological citizenship promotes “feminine” 
virtues such as care and compassion practiced “in the relations between citizens 
themselves.”42 Despite their differences, civic and ecological forms are unified in their 
opposition to the rights-centered focus and the underemphasis of virtue in liberalism.43 
Ecological citizenship is inspired by civic republicanism’s commitment to “the idea of 
                                                 
     39 Ibid., 51-6; see also 116. 
 
     40 Ibid., 47. 
 
     41 It is clear that the only domain where this can be possible is unconditional love which is what 
Dobson seems to have in mind as I shall discuss shortly. 
 
     42 Ibid., 59-61, 62. Feminism, according to Dobson, furnishes post-cosmopolitanism and ecological 
citizenship with its ideological framework. Of particular importance to Dobson is the feminist emphasis 
on “the ethics of care, such as attentiveness, responsiveness and responsibility” which rests on the premise 
of the interdependence of private and public spheres (p. 64). 
 
     43 Ibid., 40-3. The target of Dobson’s criticism is the prevailing account of citizenship in political theory 
based on T. H. Marshall’s conception of social citizenship which became influential in Britain after 1945 




the public and, more specifically, to the idea of the common good.”44 This ideal has been 
wanting in the liberal tradition: “What is mostly absent from the liberal conception of 
anything, including liberal citizenship, is the ideal of a common good beyond that which 
emerges from the essentially uncoordinated actions of masses of individuals.”45 
Differentiating ecological citizenship from liberal and republican versions, 
Dobson further distinguishes it from cosmopolitan citizenship with which he thinks it is 
likely to be confused.46 As mentioned earlier, “post-cosmopolitanism” or “ecological 
citizenship” shares the post-national orientation of contemporary “cosmopolitanism” in 
challenging the territorially defined nation-state model. Dobson defines the post-national 
character of ecological citizenship as “non-territoriality.”47 Unlike the liberal and 
republican citizens, ecological citizens are not marked by their “membership to a 
defined, usually contiguous, political space.”48 Still, Dobson stresses that ecological 
citizens cannot be subsumed under the two main conceptions of cosmopolitanism—
                                                 
     44 Ibid., 59, 95-6. Aristotle is the first philosopher who is credited with the notion of “the common 
good.” In his Politics, he remarks, “The Political good is justice, and this is the common advantage” (Pol. 
1282b16-17). Admittedly, attaining the common good in real life is elusive, but this should not lead us to 
the conclusion that it is not possible to discern or want the common good. Aristotle has no illusions about 
the fact that the common good is difficult to attain short of the best regime in which decisions are made 
on the basis of virtue. However, even in a less-than-perfect regime, the common good can be discerned 
and factored into deliberation by contrasting it with private gain. The latter is less difficult to see. One 
need only look at the difference in the historical accounts of the reigns of Caligula and Aurelius. For the 
pluralist interpretation of Aristotle on “the common good” and its reception in contemporary political 
theory, see Bernard Yack, The Problems of Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political 
Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
 
     45 Dobson, Citizenship, 58. To be fair to liberalism, Dobson, citing contemporary liberal theorists such 
as Stephen Macedo, Will Kymlicka, and Amy Gutman, agrees that liberal citizenship is not inherently 
rights-oriented as it has its own set of virtues such as “public reasonableness” (i.e., giving reasons for one’s 
political demands) or tolerance (pp. 56-7). 
 
     46 Ibid., 31.  
 
     47 Ibid., 67-80. Except that Dobson thinks ecological citizens would not share the deracinated 
characteristics of “the global manager and the global capitalist” who belong to nowhere (pp. 98-9). 
 




dialogic and distributive—both of which, he thinks, is unsuitable for accommodating the 
transient and indeterminate political community of ecological citizens.49  
This is primarily due to the cosmopolitan presupposition of an undifferentiated 
common humanity with certain fixed characteristics on which rest a thin, non-material 
“account both of the nature of the transnational community and of the obligations at 
work in it.” In contrast, ecological citizenship is produced by “historical obligation” of 
actual harm and the scope of its obligation “varies with case.”50 A primary implication of 
the non-territoriality of ecological citizenship is the issue of non-contractual duties 
incurred among transnational agents who affect one another through their material 
relationships of consumption and production.51 The prefix post- is meant to draw 
attention to this difference in the formation of the political space/community of 
ecological citizenship and its emphasis on the non-contractual character of responsibility 
stemming from the asymmetrical relationships of power across national borders.  
Proponents of cosmopolitanism, according to Dobson, regard every human 
being on planet as entitled to equal rights and bound by similar duties. By being 
undiscriminating, they fail to give sufficient consideration to the differentials of 
globalization implicit in the political space of ecological citizenship. Ecological 
citizenship treats human agents differentially by observing their differentiated 
responsibility in causing ecological harm. Hence, Dobson distinguishes ecological 
citizenship from cosmopolitanism primarily in terms of the political space it occupies. 
Whereas the political space of cosmopolitanism is the whole world as its ideal 
                                                 
     49 Ibid., 9, 80-1. 
 
     50 Ibid., 81. 
 




community is the whole humanity, that of ecological citizenship is “the ecological 
footprint” due to its relevant community of only the “globalizing and globalized 
individuals.”52 By “globalizing,” Dobson means those individuals in predominantly rich 
countries who exceed their fair share of earth’s biological capacity and the “globalized” 
refers to those predominantly in the developing world who fall short of their equal share. 
The ecological footprint is an increasingly used sustainability indicator for measuring the 
absolute and relative environmental impact of individuals, cities, regions, and countries 
by calculating the amount of land and water (measured in hectares) needed to produce 
the natural resources that support them and assimilate the wastes they create.53 The 
asymmetry in the usage of biocapacity gives rise to the “the principal ecological 
citizenship obligation” which “is to ensure that ecological footprints make a sustainable, 
rather than an unsustainable, impact” on the “daily lives of strangers near and far.”54 To 
those who might ask him what this obligation actually “means in terms of individuals’ 
daily lives,” Dobson responds that “the obligation is evidently radically indeterminate” 
                                                 
     52 Ibid., 99, 115. 
 
     53 The idea of ecological footprints has been formulated by Mathis Wackernagel and William E. Rees in 
early 1990s; see their Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth (Gabriola Island, BC: New 
Society Publishers, 1996). There are many websites that calculate individuals’ ecological footprint; see, for 
instance, http://myfootprint.org/. The primary achievement of this very popular tool is its ability to make 
a very abstract idea such as sustainability concrete and measurable to ordinary people, policy makers, and 
especially children. Ceteris paribus, the more a certain unit of analysis eats food, buys commodities, and uses 
electricity or gas in a given period, the larger its ecological footprint will be. But in addition to these 
consumptive activities that most people engage in, what matters is the type of food one eats. Animal based 
diet, and food that is packaged, processed, or transported from long distances create larger footprints. 
According to the latest report, the world consumption exceeds the regenerative capacity of earth by about 
25 per cent. The United Arab Emirates has the largest footprint at 11.9 gha (global hectares per capita) 
currently followed by the United States of America at 9.6 gha. The biological capacity of earth is believed 
to fluctuate around 1.8 gha depending on the annual productivity of land. By comparison, China’s 
footprint is 1.6 gha and that of India is 0.8 gha. The prospect of these two countries to increase their 
consumption rates to the lowest footprint of a European Union member, Latvia, at 2.6 gha can have 
serious consequences for the planet. See Living Planet Report, 
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and it is important that it remains so because the more important lesson of ecological 
citizenship is to recognize the normative dimension of sustainability.55  
Dobson is aware that his account of ecological citizenship can run against the 
prevailing liberal ethos in liberal societies which is suspicious of the idea of constraining 
individual preferences on the basis of a single blueprint of the good life. To overcome 
this stumbling block, he claims that the liberal neutrality vis-à-vis the good life debate 
does not exclude commitment to keeping open a variety of options for future 
generations to pursue their own plans of good life.56 Part of what needs to be protected 
for this task is “material wherewithal” which is “the environment that provides the 
physical context through which views of the good life come to be determined, and 
through which they are enacted.”57 The task of achieving sustainability for present and 
future generations will depend on the availability of ecological citizens. Dobson hopes 
that formal education systems in liberal societies will be conducive to producing 
ecological citizens through experiential learning.58 There are serious problems with 
Dobson’s account of ecological citizenship of which I shall consider three. The first is 
his historicism. The second is his understanding of the “moral” and the “political” and 
their proper relationship. The third is the account of ecological citizens. 
Dobson’s ecological “post-cosmopolitanism” suffers heavily from its historicist 
premises which he is forced to cast aside to recover some elements of civic 
republicanism (such as duty and civic virtue) for ecological citizenship. Let me first 
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discuss his commitment to the historicist view. In order to make his conception of 
ecological citizenship realistic against the tide (as he is well aware), Dobson needs to 
shake the foundations of the prevailing liberal praxis and conception of citizenship in 
liberal societies. The primary motive to appeal to historical change is to show the 
increasingly historical obsolescence of the nation-state and the corresponding 
conception of citizenship held by both liberals and republicans in terms of exclusive 
membership to a territorial entity. Dobson wants to argue that the changing social and 
material conditions driven by globalization today are taking us away from this old world 
toward the practice and idea of ecological citizenship.  
It is not difficult to see the similarity between Dobson’s view and Marx’s 
historical materialist analysis of capitalism heralding the birth of the proletariat and the 
next phase of history as socialism. The justification for the new world is premised on the 
historical obsolescence of the old world. Of course, Dobson is not Marxist but he clearly 
adopts the materialist view of history as his multiple references to his “material approach 
to defining the community of ecological citizenship” indicate.59 The feasibility of 
ecological citizenship is based on deploying “historical sensibility when considering the 
shape—and particularly future shape—of citizenship.” If we do so, he says, we can see 
“the evolution of republican forms of citizenship into what we now regard as the liberal 
form of citizenship, in which rights-claiming comes to take precedence over civic 
virtue.”60 We similarly must be open to the idea that the liberal view will be replaced by 
something else, which, according to Dobson, is ecological citizenship. 
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Later, however, Dobson rejects the progressive historicism that he relies on to 
destabilize the commitment to the national citizenship: “In fact what we find in the 
historical record is not so much evolution, as the coexistence of competing views as to 
the proper realm or sphere of citizenship practice.”61 Why is this change from historical 
evolution to the perennial co-existence of historical possibilities? This is because Dobson 
needs to recover certain elements of civic republicanism (civic virtue and duty) for 
ecological citizenship which to many would sound defunct. Dobson knows this so he 
appeals to the possibility of recovering “the idea of citizenship virtue—a notion that may 
not be present in most contemporary understandings of citizenship, but which has most 
certainly been a feature of historical citizenship experience.”62 So Dobson tries to have 
recourse to two strategies in constructing his conception of ecological citizenship and 
making it look as a realistic option: to appeal to (1) the past historical record, and (2) the 
changing conditions.63 These are two different approaches to the study of ideas. The 
former treats ideas as having trans-historical validity whereas the latter sees ideas as 
reflections of the historical reality.64 The former strategy is similar to the approach taken 
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in this dissertation and I am quite sympathetic with it but the latter is equally critical to 
Dobson’s project. 
The latter strategy is questionable because, as Dobson is well aware, this may lead 
to the outcome of emptying the content of citizenship.65 If a concept starts to mean 
anything to anyone, there is really no analytical or practical value left to defend. We see 
Dobson grappling with this question throughout the text when he tries to sift through 
the unessential (i.e., historically limited) components of citizenship and refill it with the 
new ones that he says are traceable in historical record and observable in present 
actuality. He claims to be only capturing the practical transformation of citizenship 
which is already happening in the real world: “the conditions in which we find ourselves 
‘demand’ this new and additional articulation.”66 This is implied in his emphatic 
insistence that the community or political space of ecological citizenship is prepared by 
transnational material processes. But material processes by themselves cannot mean 
anything without preconceived ideas of harm, duty, and justice which are not self-
evident. For instance, it is not clear whether the following statement is describing the 
actuality or an ideal definition: “The ecological citizen does the right thing not because of 
incentives, but because it is the right thing to do.”67 Given his earlier claim that 
“ecological citizenship” exists today “both logically and in actual political fact,”68 one 
would think that this is how anyone who qualifies as an ecological citizen in the world 
actually acts. But the next sentence indicates that Dobson actually wants to say that this 
is how they ought to act logically: “In this sense the idea of ecological citizenship is one 
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of the resources on which a society might draw to make itself more sustainable.”69 
Dobson is certainly free to conceive ecological citizenship in ideal terms in this manner 
but this is exactly what he denies to be doing throughout the book and criticizes other 
scholars for doing it and thus remaining “in the idealist tradition.”70 
The second problem with the book is Dobson’s accounts of the “moral” and the 
“political” both of which are extremely ambiguous. At the heart of Dobson’s 
contradiction lies his attempt, at one and the same time, to unite morality and politics  
and keep them separate. There are suggestions that support both intentions but an 
explanation as to how they might cohere is absent. Let me begin with the textual 
evidence that indicates his intention to bring morality and politics closer. In the context 
of his discussion of liberal and civic republican forms of citizenship, Dobson states his 
purpose thus: 
A defining feature of the post-cosmopolitan citizenship towards which I am 
working here is that it swims against the tide in this respect. This citizenship is 
part of the palpable shift taking place in the Western world regarding the 
‘remoralization’ of politics. Fundamentally, this remoralization has to do with the 
rehabilitation of virtue in the image and practice of politics.71 
 
The word “tide” here is referring to the dominant liberal conception of citizenship in 
liberal democratic countries emphasizing rights, and the word “shift” is referring to the 
Third Way of previous Clinton administration in the US and the Blair government in 
Britain both of which tried to inject more “social duty and responsibility” into their 
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policies.72 Dobson goes on to cite approvingly Will Kymlicka’s explanation of the recent 
resurgence of interest in citizenship among liberals. One of the reasons for this revival is 
the growing awareness that the unadulterated pursuit of self-interest undercuts 
the kinds of conditions that make a reasonable pursuit of self-interest possible, 
and that some commitment to the intersubjectivity of social life is desirable: “the 
health and stability of modern democracy depends, not only on injustice of its 
‘basic structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens.”73 
 
I should note that these two statements explain the previously quoted statement 
at the end of the previous subsection that environmental citizenship “challenges the 
model of the ‘self-interested rational actor’.” Dobson seems to be suggesting that the 
dominant liberal interpretation of citizenship and politics divorces morality from politics 
by excluding the notions of “virtue” and “obligation” from public sphere and reducing 
citizenship to the activity of securing social entitlements from the state.74 He intends to 
show that post-cosmopolitan or ecological citizenship rides on the coattails of the recent 
trend toward connecting morality with politics. His lengthy discussion of “citizenship 
virtues” follows in the footsteps o this trend.75 I have no objection to this project but 
there is another parallel strain in Dobson’s argument which undermines it. 
 Dobson seems to be also advocating the separation of morality from the realm 
of citizenship and politics as he repeatedly refers throughout the book the difference 
“between the moral community and the community of citizens.” This is a difference 
“between the Good Samaritan and the Good Citizen.”76 The former stands for 
humanitarian “obligations that it would be benevolent to fulfil” and the latter for civic or 
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political ones “that it would be wrong not to fulfil.”77 One wonders why benevolence is 
characteristic of moral community without any relation to the public sphere of 
citizenship. This view also goes against his own objections to the liberal exclusion of 
virtues of care and compassion from the public sphere. Why is there such a double 
standard between benevolence and compassion which are actually very close to one 
another? It seems that Dobson’s primary objection to charity or benevolence is its 
unreliability contrasted with the demanding character of justice.78 But are they mutually 
exclusive? Why can we not keep them both? The answer seems to be that Dobson wants 
to keep the obligation of ecological citizenship minimal and realistic. But this is exactly 
what liberalism calls for. The political concern of liberalism is, to borrow from 
Kymlicka’s allusion to the Rawlsian view, primarily with the injustice of its “basic 
structure” in the public sphere. As we shall see, Dobson unwittingly replicates the liberal 
Rawlsian view in spite of his explicit intention of remoralizing politics in a manner the 
liberal communitarian critics of Rawls want to. 
We may explore these difficulties by looking into the distinction that Dobson is 
trying to retain “between the moral community and the community of citizens.” This 
distinction has two important references in the history of philosophy other than 
Machiavelli: Aristotle and Kant. In another related passage, Dobson approvingly cites 
Aristotle’s discussion at Politics III.4-5 to support his distinction “between the Good 
Samaritan and the Good Citizen”:  
Aristotle is quite clear that the condition of citizenship is different from the 
condition of ‘humanity’, and this is reflected in the distinctive virtues associated 
with each condition. This has its analogue in my conception or the different 
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kinds or relationship that give rise to humanitarian obligations on the one hand, 
and to citizenship obligations on the other.79  
 
Now, Aristotle’s discussion in the cited chapters is not tantamount to a distinction 
between ethics/morality and politics for Aristotle clearly thinks that these two domains 
of praxis are neither separable nor reducible to one another.80 Yes, Aristotle thinks that 
the virtue of the good man (aretēn andros agathou) does not necessarily overlap with that of 
the serious citizen (politou spoudaiou) and this is primarily because there is a number of 
different political regimes each of which has different expectations of its citizens. The 
deviant regimes particularly would not allow for complete virtue (aretēn teleian) to arise 
(Pol. 1276b30-5). Neither is it possible for all citizens of the best regime to be virtuous as 
men for “it is impossible for all citizens to be similar” (Pol. 1277a1). But being ruled as a 
citizen is not exhaustive of the political praxis since its more consequential component is 
being a ruler and Aristotle reminds us that “the virtue of the good ruler and the good 
man is the same” (Pol. 1277a21-2).81 This suggests that anyone who aspires to be a good 
ruler in politics must also acquire the virtues that constitute a good man—the complete 
opposite of what Machiavelli would later advise in The Prince. The implication of his view 
is that the failure to possess those qualities would cost him the title of ruler regardless of 
whether he or anyone else is aware of it. Hence, Aristotle’s discussion of the relationship 
between ethical/moral and political excellence with an eye on the type of regimes and 
political role is far from the absolute distinction that Dobson is trying to make. 
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Dobson’s differentiation of moral obligation from political obligation is closer in 
spirit to Kant’s discussion of imperfect, wide duties of virtue/ethics and narrow duties of 
right/justice even though Dobson does not quote or cite Kant in this relation.82 To 
repeat, the moral obligation, for Dobson, “would be benevolent to fulfil” but the 
political one “would be wrong not to fulfil.”83 This is very similar to how Kant 
distinguishes the external and internal dimension of morals (between right and virtue): 
“Fulfillment of them [imperfect duties of virtue] is merit . . . but failure to fulfill them is 
not in itself culpability . . . but rather mere deficiency in moral worth.”84 The implication of 
Kant’s distinction is that whereas duties of right can coercively extract obedience from 
citizens, the duties of virtue cannot. For the former kind of duties, external legislation or 
coercion is both possible and permissible but this is not the case for ethics/morality as 
we understand it.85  
It is the domain of ethics or virtue that Dobson is referring to with the 
symbolism of the charitable act of the Good Samaritan from the New Testament: “A 
moral relationship is like that between the Good Samaritan and the poor unfortunate on 
the side of the road. The Samaritan had nothing to do with the man’s plight, but he was 
in a position to alleviate it. This is a neighbourly act, not an act of citizenship.”86 The act 
of citizenship comes into play if there is an injustice which cannot be ignored. Charity on 
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the other hand is a supererogatory moral obligation which is often unreliable and, worse, 
paternalistic:  
Charity is a notoriously weak basis for obligation—it is easily withdrawn . . . and 
the structure of giving contained within it both cements and reproduces the 
vulnerability of the recipient. Contrast this with justice. The actual act of 
compensation or the avoidance of justifiable harm can be halted, of course, but 
the obligation to do justice remains. Similarly, relations of justice are relations 
between putative equals.87  
 
Hence citizenship is based on “more binding and less paternalistic forms of obligation” 
between “the causers and the victims of harm.”88 
 This distinction between “right” or “justice” and “virtue” or “good” has been 
revived in contemporary political theory with John Rawls. Dobson seems to be 
unwittingly in agreement with the drift of Rawls’ neo-Kantian conception of justice as 
“the first virtue of social institutions.”89 It is telling that Dobson repeatedly emphasizes 
the fact that “the first virtue of ecological citizenship is justice.”90 By this, Dobson means 
that “ecological citizenship virtue aims at ensuring a just distribution of ecological 
space.”91 He is also forced to admit that there are correlative rights to these duties: “The 
duty to reduce the size of an overlarge footprint is, however, driven by the correlative 
right to sufficient ecological space.”92 Dobson also believes that “accounts of ecological 
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virtue expressed in the Aristotelian idiom” as “disposition of character” are not 
appropriate to “the political context of citizenship.”93 As he continues to explicate what 
he means while raising objection to John Barry’s work, he claims that “the dispositions 
of character of which commentators on green politics often speak are usually more 
appropriately predicated of the former [the Good Samaritan] than they are of the latter 
[the Good Citizen].”94 The real remedy is “more justice as well as more democracy.”95 
This move of course forces him to retract much of what he previously argued in 
regard to the unwarranted relegation of the feminist ethics of care to the private 
sphere.96 To avoid this contradiction, Dobson announces that “candidates such as care 
and compassion, might be regarded as ecological citizenship virtues in the second instance. 
This is to say that they might turn out to be important to the effective exercise of the 
first virtue, justice.”97 One wonders why justice would need these secondary virtues. 
Dobson does not answer this question directly but gestures at an Aristotelian conception 
of praxis. According to Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in Book VIII of Nicomachean 
Ethics, “when people are friends there is no need of justice, but when they are just there 
is still need of friendship, and among things that are just, what inclines toward friendship 
seems to be most just of all” (1155a27-8).98 And it turns out that Dobson has “love” and 
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“friendship” in mind when he referred earlier to “unreciprocated and unilateral” 
obligations owed by ecological citizens: 
We do not love our children because we want something in return from them, 
any more than we stop buying gifts for friends because they do not buy us one in 
return. The connection between this and ecological citizenship should be clear. I 
argued earlier in the chapter that a characteristic feature of the obligations of 
ecological citizenship is their non-reciprocity. Since this is also a definitional 
feature of relationships normally associated with the private sphere, the 
relationship between ecological citizenship and the private sphere is a tight one.99  
 
But voluntary friendly relationships cannot be “wrong not to fulfil”—which is 
Dobson’s characterization of political or citizenly obligations. It is clear that Dobson’s 
argument is torn between premodern and modern conceptions of praxis. The dilemma is 
that when the priority of “right” or “justice” is given prominence, the rest of virtues are 
relegated to the private sphere. This inevitably leads to the impoverishment of politics 
and citizenship. Hence, Dobson’s project of remoralizing politics conflicts with Rawls’ 
neo-Kantian insistence on the “priority of the right over the good.”100 Dobson is aware 
of this difficulty (without mentioning Rawls) as he tries to show that the liberal neutrality 
vis-à-vis the individual plans of good life requires, by its own logic, protecting the 
environment for future generations so that they can freely pursue their own plans of 
good life.101 This is to show that liberalism’s focus on procedural justice can be used to 
produce substantive outcomes such as environmental protection. That this would be a 
weak argument in practice is obvious for two reasons. In order to protect whatever is 
worthy of protection, one must put into effect an elaborate system of management 
which is already partially in place both in the US, Europe, and in parts of the world. But 
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this type of environmental policy has a tenuous connection with civic participation 
which spurs the recent revival of interest in citizenship. Second, the liberal social system 
is also obliged to preserve the hedonist way of life and the life committed to the pursuit 
of wealth which can easily conflict with the environmental way of life marked by 
simplicity and moderation. Political compromises among these plans of life will certainly 
be tilted toward policies that answer to stronger desires so long as they remain within the 
bounds of law.  
These two difficulties, I believe, stem from the attempt to come up with a 
radically new concept of citizenship. This brings me to the third difficulty with Dobson’s 
argument: his account of ecological citizenship. Not only is he not satisfied with the 
liberal, republican, and cosmopolitan conceptions of citizenship but also with, what he 
calls, “environmental citizenship.” Dobson controversially reserves the term 
“environmental citizenship” for “the discourse and practice of rights-claiming into the 
environmental context.”102 According to Dobson, environmental citizenship can be 
accommodated within the modern liberal conception of citizenship as the latter’s 
primary feature is its emphasis on securing individual rights within a territorially defined 
state. Environmental citizenship simply adds a new category of right (to a clean and 
healthy environment) to the existing rights in civil, political, and economic spheres. Even 
though Dobson assures us that environmental citizenship and ecological citizenship can 
be politically complementary, he clearly privileges the latter due to its potential of 
transforming the Western tradition of citizenship.103 As an example of an account of 
“environmental citizenship,” Dobson has in mind especially but not exclusively Tim 
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Hayward’s work on constitutional enshrinement of environmental rights.104 He also 
refers to the environmental justice movement in the United States as “environmental 
citizenship.” Referring to an academic article which interprets this movement as an 
example of ecological citizenship, Dobson objects to the language used: “Apart from a 
quibble with their vocabulary—I regard environmental justice activists as ‘environmental’ 
rather than ‘ecological’ citizens—I endorse Reid and Taylor’s view that the 
environmental justice movement is a form of environmental citizenship.”105  
Is it warranted to draw clear-cut theoretical distinctions based on an ambiguous 
practical reality which is at best embryonic? Are there really environmental and 
ecological citizens in the world the way Dobson defines them? Dobson might reply that 
he is engaged in an ideal-type reconstruction of one form of civic activity. But how 
coherent is his conception of ecological citizenship? After all, it is in fundamental 
agreement with the quintessential liberal view of society too. Furthermore, Dobson’s 
ecological citizens are not only strangers to one another as he himself admits but also 
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rootless: “By definition, then, ecological citizenship is a citizenship of strangers.”106 
Ecological citizenship is “an unbounded citizenship.”107 At one point, Dobson assures us 
that ecological citizens will not resemble the estranged rootless businessmen who travel 
around the world without belonging anywhere: “The earth citizen possesses a sense of 
local and global place, while world citizens [i.e., businessmen] make their deracinated way 
around an undifferentiated globe.”108 This is not convincing however. For how will 
ecological citizens acquire their “sense of local and global place”? Dobson takes up 
environmental education which must have a serious experiential component but this is 
exactly what American civic environmentalism is championing which he distances his 
conception of ecological citizenship from.109 
Upon closer scrutiny it becomes clear that these ecological citizens that Dobson 
has in mind are really strange. Who are the ecological citizens? Dobson would say that 
ecological citizens are those who incur debt in ecological footprints mostly in the 
industrialized world and want to (or “ought to”?) either pay back by direct or indirect 
payments or try to scale back their consumption to the world average. In his view then, 
no one who has an ecological footprint lower than the world average can be an 
ecological citizen: “People who occupy less than their quota of ecological space have no 
such duty, except as a general injunction against wanton harm.”110 This is indeed an 
asymmetrical form of citizenship which does not necessarily paint the state of 
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environmental stewardship in the developing world fairly. Dobson seems to be putting 
the cart before the horse by turning the focus of citizenship to the global domain. It is 
certainly conceivable that individuals can care about faraway lands or the future but this 
concern would hardly arise among those who do not care about their local attachments 
or environments. The practice of citizenship must begin with one’s immediate circle. 
Without growing such affectionate ties to place or people, individuals cannot develop a 
sound understanding of the political dynamics behind globalization and environmental 
damage. Any one of the two dimensions of environmental care—global and local—
cannot be forsaken but care must be first practiced at home to develop as an enduring 
sensitivity with global reach. 111  
The question of privileging either the local or the global domain is not as decisive 
as the question of agency as we have seen Dobson’s post-national ecological citizens 
need to go through an environmental education that cannot bypass the local orientation 
of civic environmentalism.112 The proper relationship between local and global domains 
of environmental action has been debated for long. It is basic knowledge that global 
environmental changes such as global warming or transnational ones such as acid rain 
can and does affect distant habitats regardless of how well those places are taken care of 
by people dwelling in them. We know that any feasible environmental program of action 
must incorporate both global and local aspects of environmental problems. The question 
is how to go about it. Shall we promote “unbounded citizenship” as Dobson suggests or 
one that begins with a “sense of place” as the following alternative suggests? 
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Democratic ecological citizens are . . . persons who think in regional terms, 
meaning that they understand that their neighborhoods, locales, and cities, and 
any and all aspects of them, are nested in a larger reality of meaningful exchange; 
and they are persons who, recognizing existing inequalities of wealth and power, 
work to extend more fully and more equitably both the opportunities to 
experience nature and the opportunities to shape the way humans exist in 
nature.113 
 
Are post-nationalism and localism mutually exclusive? If both are needed, what is the 
best way to conceive their relationship? The core issue that these discourses raises is 
what discursive practices can mobilize and energize environmental awareness and 
sensitivity to address environmental problems. I turn now to William A. Shutkin’s book 
The Land That Could Be at the center of which lies this theme of “sense of place” lacking 
from Dobson’s book. 
6.1.2 Civic Environmentalism 
 
It is important to note at the outset that Shutkin’s discussion of civic 
environmentalism is tailored to the American context. Hence, part of what he says might 
not be applicable outside the American experience. Still, the general drift of his 
argument—that there is an essential linkage between civic and environmental health—is 
a universal claim that can be observed and even tested outside the United States. Shutkin 
begins by drawing our attention to the reality of the “adverse societal conditions” 
affecting America today. Among them are the much recorded indicators such as 
“declining social capital, political disaffection, rising economic inequality, racial 
segregation, and excessive privatization.”114 His observations in this regard are based on 
the work of civic-minded American scholars such as Robert Putnam, Christopher Lasch, 
Michael Sandel, and Benjamin Barber, all of whom lament in different ways the decline 
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of civic engagement and interactions in contemporary America, and warned about the 
threat that withdrawal from public life poses to the well-being of American democracy.  
Shutkin agrees with the premise of Putnam and Barber that the ills of democratic 
regimes are solvable through more democratic participation. This is of course an article 
of faith, or an assumption that can never be conclusively demonstrated, but perhaps a 
last hope for the recovery of democracy in America. Shutkin’s contribution to this 
scholarship lies in his recognition that one major reason for American civic decline is 
“the deterioration of the American environment, both built and undeveloped.”115 His 
thesis is based on the premise that there is an “inextricable bond between nature and 
nation,”116 between “nature and culture,” and between “the idea of democracy and 
environmental protection.”117 According to Shutkin, the environmental deterioration is 
brought about by aggrandizing technological and commercial forces that have corroded 
“our sense of place and self” by dividing communities and preventing their access to 
“safe, unspoiled places.” But “the physical condition of America’s communities is a 
critical factor in the nation’s success as a robust democratic republic.”118 
As a result of these destabilizing forces, the American society has lost its 
“traditional moorings and the accompanying sense of confidence about who we are as a 
people and where we are headed.”119 This is how the American environment and society 
look at the beginning of the twenty-first century according to Shutkin. He finds these 
conditions unacceptable fundamentally because it falls apart from the promise implicit in 
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the American founding: “America was founded on the belief that the health of 
democracy is inextricably bound up with the bounty and extent of the nation’s physical 
environment.”120 He also observes an irrepressible yearning for community: “One of the 
many ironies of American life at the end of the twentieth century is that the disaffection 
so many Americans feel is increasingly being matched by an aroused longing for 
community and a strengthened value of place, for attachment to people and the 
environment that can restore a sense of purpose and meaning to their lives.”121 
So Shutkin wants to fulfill the unrealized potential of American democracy. This 
can be achieved according to him through civic environmentalism as environmental 
issues “provide an opportunity to realize the ideal of community” to individuals who are 
moved by “a vision for the common good.”122 Civic environmentalism can provide what 
elitist and bureaucratic environmental managerialism cannot: a vision of ecological and 
civic renewal co-dependency. Shutkin’s civic environmentalism “represents a response to 
the failure of traditional environmentalism to articulate and act on a democratic social 
vision.”123 Traditional environmentalism could not contribute to civic renewal because it 
relied “overwhelmingly on legal and policy tools to address environmental problems, 
dismissing the need for and rich history of grass-roots organizing and constituency 
building.” This managerial approach “rendered it largely irrelevant to the day-today lives 
of most ordinary Americans.”124 
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Shutkin’s views are in line with other environmental critics who have wanted to 
broaden the scope of the environment and environmentalism.125 On this view, there 
should be no distinction between urban places and wilderness:  
the environment is the sum of all those places in cities, suburbs, and rural areas 
that play an essential part in constituting our sense of ourselves as individuals and 
members of a community and that demand our care and attention if they are to 
enhance, rather than diminish, that sense.126  
 
A second point of critique is that the task of securing a healthy environment belongs to 
all “ordinary citizens.” Environmentalism “is nothing less than about our conception of 
ourselves as a social and political community.” Shutkin’s view is clearly communitarian 
and contains an explicit critique of contemporary liberalism: 
Liberalism lends itself to privatization; its core precept is the priority of the 
individual to the state and the notion that the state must remain neutral among 
competing conceptions of the good held by its citizens.127 
 
The connection between land and people that Shutkin draws our attention to is 
not new but a recurring expression of a trans-cultural and trans-historical experience. 
Most recently, in the American context, this connection (“sense of place”) has been 
discussed by Wendell Berry an other neo-Agrarians.128 Shutkin acknowledges his debt to 
Berry as his book opens with a quote from Berry’s Unsettling of America (1977). We should 
note that despite Shutkin’s attempt to reclaim “sense of place” for the communitarian 
strand of liberalism, Berry’s thought is in more harmony with traditional conservatism. 
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Considered to be a neo-Agrarian, Berry has continued the conservative American 
tradition of Southern Agrarianism.129 Similar pastoral sentiments can also be found in 
Nazi Germany as well as among ethnic nationalist politics in contemporary Europe.130 
“Ecology” certainly had a history before it acquired a name for itself as.131 
The connection between land and culture is a trans-cultural and trans-historical 
motif fundamentally because the typical effects of commerce and industry inhibit and 
undermine the noble aspirations of the soul and social stability. As Aristotle reminds us 
in the context of his discussion of citizenship, “In Thebes there used to be a law that one 
who had not abstained from the market for ten years could not share in office” (Pol. 
1278a24-5). Needless to say, neither commerce nor industry is peculiar to modernity but 
both activities and the technological application of natural science merged in the modern 
era to create industrial capitalism and became the defining feature of modernity as 
numerous critics since Rousseau have observed. Consequently, this theme (“sense of 
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place”) is often accompanied with a critique of modernity. The effects of commerce and 
industry are perceived as “unsettling,” “uprooting,” and “alienating.” More often than 
not, these effects add to the natural anxieties accompanying the human condition. In the 
rest of this chapter, I will engage more with their commonalities, making only occasional 
references to their differences when these differences are of particular significance.  
6.1.3 The Civic Approach to the Environment 
 
It is clear from above discussion that both discourses are influenced by 
contemporary critique of liberalism affiliated with republicanism or 
communitarianism.132 The political theorist Richard Dagger, for instance, maintains that 
“civic environmentalism is better understood as part of a more comprehensive theory 
than as free-standing, self-sufficient philosophical position . . . it borrows its emphasis on 
the civic environment from the tradition of classical or civic republicanism.”133 Other 
scholars too offer a “classical republican” conception of environmental citizenship due 
to its emphasis on obligations to community and expectation of citizens to actively 
participate in community affairs.134 Yes, each discourse and each author may address 
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some specific questions and come up with somewhat different proposals but their 
surface differences should not be overrated to the point of treating them as separate. 
Despite their varying emphases, we can speak of a shared conceptual and practical 
ground between civic environmentalism and environmental citizenship. Some 
environmental scholars even prefer to use them interchangeably.135 To begin with, 
scholars who have advanced these concepts draw upon similar themes on civil society, 
republicanism, and participatory democracy. 
The terms “civic” and “citizenship” betray an ancient conception of politics 
which foregrounds virtue more than the classical liberal conception of politics allows for. 
According to the premodern tradition of Western political thought going back to the 
ancient Greeks, and above all to Aristotle, politics is constituted by collective striving of 
citizens to attain the common good of their communities through civic or political 
virtue.136 Good laws and institutions, according to Aristotle, are not enough by 
themselves. Their effectiveness fundamentally depend on citizens who are committed to 
live together in accordance with virtue. In Book III, where Aristotle discusses the 
notions of “city” and “citizenship” at length, he says, “Whoever takes thought for good 
management [eunomia], however, gives careful attention to political virtue and vice. It is 
thus evident that virtue must be a care for every city, or at least every one to which the 
term applies truly and not merely in a manner of speaking” (Pol. 1280b5-8). Aristotle’s 
teleological conception of praxis is often contrasted with an instrumental approach 
which Aristotle mentions in the same context. The city can be alternatively conceived as 
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providing security and/or protection of property for its members. These two goals 
underlie Hobbes’ and Locke’s social contract positions respectively. Aristotle is aware of 
these possibilities but thinks that the political regime cannot be defined either as a 
military or trade alliance (Pol. 1280a35-b11). For these functions do not account for the 
ultimate purpose of political association, which, for Aristotle, is providing its members 
the conditions of living well.137  
Behind a façade of contingent differences, I suggest, we can discover a common 
underlying practical concern uniting these two discourses: to make environmentalism 
more relevant to the lives of ordinary people beyond a small coterie of committed 
environmentalists/ecologists so that intractable environmental problems can be handled 
more systematically in ways that can at the same time improve the living conditions of 
people. As I shall discuss in the next section, I take the emphasis on “civic” or 
“citizenship” in both discourses as an indication of a growing awareness among 
environmental scholars for the need to formulate a new strategy which is less “radical” 
and more “pragmatic.” This can be seen, for instance, in Dobson’s distancing himself 
from the radicalism of deep ecology. As I have remarked earlier, ecological citizenship is 
patterned after Dobson’s earlier account of ecologism except that the former is 
anthropocentric and the latter is ecocentric. Whereas Dobson defended ecocentricism of 
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deep ecology as characteristic of green ideology (or “ecologism”) in his earlier work,138 
he now seems to think that we need a more pragmatic discourse: “One argument for 
making ecological citizenship an anthropocentric idea . . . is expedience.”139 By 
“expedience,” Dobson probably means to refer to “prudence” associated with Burkean 
conservatism with classical origins which can generate discourses that are “action-
orientated” or can supply “reasons for action.”140 Ecological citizenship, according to 
Dobson, if interpreted in an ecocentric direction can be impractical: “For all its 
superficial radical attractions, then, I do not endorse explicitly ecocentric accounts of 
ecological citizenship.”141  
To recall from previous chapter Andrew Light’s critique of environmental 
ethicists who refuse to consider anything short of “intrinsic value” as worthy of 
environmental consideration, Light believes that this supposedly principled stance on the 
intrinsic value of the natural world leads to the widening of the gap between theory and 
practice in environmental matters. Just because intrinsic value can be defended 
rhetorically on paper does not guarantee its application in real life. Moral philosophy has 
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to reach over to political philosophy to secure its relevance in the real world.142 It is 
important to consider, according to Light, what reasons and practices motivate people to 
change their behavior to minimize their environmental impacts or to be more actively 
involved in environmental efforts.143 The civic discourse, as Light and many others 
suggest, can be used as a moral discourse to broaden and spread environmental 
sensibilities as it banks on moral-psychological experience of community, belonging, and 
care.144 Encouraging community participation in local projects such as nature restoration 
in urban areas (as opposed to contracting these projects to private business) can enhance 
the sense of stewardship among people. Getting to know what is going around them 
first-hand will decrease the chances of people’s apathy or resistance toward such 
environmental plans.  
The praxis-oriented civic approach favors more community involvement in 
responding to environmental issues. The civic approach creates a “proactive” (as 
opposed to “reactive”) vision for environmentalism by allowing ordinary people, 
especially the young, to learn and exercise the skills of active citizenship. Instead of being 
passive subjects of what the political system delivers or does not deliver to them, people 
learn to direct their lives through civic environmentalism. The diminishing returns and 
impoverishing effects of technological progress are noted in the following testimony by a 
civic environmentalist: 
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The modern technological world has made its people its subjects; it has made 
them ignorant and keeps them in ignorance. We are basically ignorant, ignorant 
of the basics—where does our food come from? Where does our water come 
from? And importantly, where do our wastes go? We live cut off from ourselves 
because of this lack-of-touch with the natural things. And our foundation is 
weakened, and there is no way we can build onto the self in such a state.145  
 
A young environmentalist recognizes the positive aspect of civic environmental 
initiatives: “volunteering makes you feel better about yourself . . . Your self-esteem 
builds and you grow in front of other people.”146 The India scholar Richard Franke, 
describing the environmental/developmental activities of village communities in the 
state of Kerala, similarly points out the creative potential of the civic approach as 
opposed to the confrontational methods: 
One aspect of this [civic approach] is that it generated a tremendous amount of 
enthusiasm and activity, all kinds of projects. A lot of people became involved. 
But at another level, it really signals the process of transforming previously class-
based and caste-based protest organizations—trade unions, associations of all 
kinds, workers’ organizations, and so forth—from being protest organizations, 
primarily, trying to win things from the state, to becoming actual actors in 
carrying out the development of their own communities.147   
 
Concerned over the slow progress of environmental agenda or the urgency of 
environmental problems, some environmentalists have begun to emphasize the need to 
weave “environmental sensitivity” into all spheres of life to make it an enduring part of 
the political culture. They have realized that it would be better to induce deep-rooted 
cultural changes at individual and collective levels rather than to treat the environment as 
a separate technical issue-area. The latter impression whether caused by marginal 
“radicals” or mainstream “reformists” reinforce the popular image of environmentalism 
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as a special interest of privileged classes or nations who are exempt from the day-to-day 
struggles of low socio-economic groups.  
This partially inaccurate representation of environmental concern is also found in 
developing countries.148 There too environmental concern is typically perceived and 
portrayed as “luxury” especially when more serious problems like war and poverty are 
continuing.149 Although environmental movement—both in the US and Europe—
appeared as a popular cause holding out the promise to unite conflicting interests around 
it, in the ensuing decades environmentalism has come to be seen as another special issue. 
This is especially true in the United States. Although they have not yet explored the full 
potential of these two discourses in this respect, the civic-minded environmentalists can 
play a critical role in overcoming the image of environmentalists as distanced from 
everyday life issues. This image hinders the understanding of the question concerning the 
environment as it reinforces the committed environmentalists’ reluctance to 
communicate with conservative and religious cultural symbolisms that ordinary people 
cherish. The following section explores this failure of communication in more detail. 
6.2 The Political Conjuncture of the Civic Approach 
In this section, I shall explore in more detail the growing discontent among 
environmentalists as to the purpose and direction of environmentalism both in the 
United States and Western Europe. It would not be farfetched if we liken these debates 
to an identity crisis or alternatively as the birth pangs of a perhaps more mature form of 
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environmentalism. I shall argue that these concepts, or the civic approach in general, 
must be understood within this strategic context. Although they are not directly linked, 
they nonetheless speak to the on-going debate among environmentalists over practical 
and conceptual matters. The civic approach is indirectly related to a continuing practical 
and theoretical debates within contemporary environmentalism—taking place both in 
the United States and Western Europe. On the practical side, the debates reflect the 
erosion of purpose and loss of direction among environmentalists who are dissatisfied 
with the business-as-usual methods of organized mainstream environmentalism.150 On 
the conceptual side, the terms “environment” and “nature” are contested. These debates 
have been going on since the onset of environmentalism in the seventies but they have 
peaked recently with much publicized debates over the “death” of environmentalism. 
There are two main sides of the debate. First, there are “essentialists” or 
“objectivists” who believe that “nature” exists independent of human projects, politics, 
and interests, and, second, there are “constructivists” who denies that the discourse of 
nature can be separated from its politics.151 According to the objectivist view, “the 
environment” designates basically the natural world outside human culture or 
civilization. The primary concerns of this group of environmentalists are related to the 
protection of endangered species, or biodiversity in general, protecting or restoring 
ecosystems such as rivers, wetlands, forests, and preserving or expanding natural parks. 
Their efforts to protect the environment are informed by life sciences such as zoology, 
botany, and conservation biology. Members of this group are either scientists in these 
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fields or NGOs who rely heavily on these sciences.152 “Environmentalism,” on this view, 
serves the well-being of the natural world either for its own sake or for its subsidiary 
benefits to human beings.  
The proponents of this view are often criticized for being insensitive to the 
needs of human beings, especially the economic needs of social groups situated low on 
the ladder of economic and political clout, such as labor, Third world, indigenous 
people, peasants, and minorities living in inner cities.153 This insensitivity implicit in 
misguided ideology (such as ecocentrism) and practices (such as natural park 
preservation) is considered to be both rooted in the history of environmentalism and a 
continuing bias of the socio-economic background of mainstream environmentalists, 
namely, their affluent, white, middle-class, and Western origins.154 If the critic comes 
from or identifies with the Third world, the cultural aspect of the bias is noted as well. In 
his critique of “deep ecology,” the Indian scholar Ramachandra Guha notes that 
equating “environmental protection with the protection of wilderness” is a “distinctively 
American notion, borne out of a unique social and environmental history.”155 Many 
studies in environmental history have similarly argued that the colonial roots of 
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environmentalism can explain the current penchant for wilderness protection and 
accompanying insensitivity.156 Protests from environmental justice groups have forced 
big environmental NGOs like Sierra Club to reconsider their priorities. A former 
president of the Sierra Club conceded, for instance, that the environmental movement is 
“not just about rocks and trees anymore.”157 According to the second view, “the 
environment” must be conceived broadly in terms of both geographical space and issue-
areas to include in the industrialized world the urban places where the poor or ethnic 
minorities are most concentrated. These critics also argue that social (in)justice issues 
facing these groups such as unfair distribution or imposition of environmental damage 
and hazards—both nationally and globally—must be given more attention.158  
This debate is a special instance of the History versus Nature debate covered in 
Chapter 2. Some of the contemporary critics of the essentialist view of nature argue that 
all attempts to protect some supposedly “natural” place are actually ideological or 
political in character. They would agree with Marx that an untouched nature today “no 
longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent 
origin).”159 One recent critic, for instance, criticizes nature development projects in 
Netherlands advanced by ecologists subscribing to an essentialist view of nature: “The 
ideal behind the large-scale production of new nature is old nature. Everything revolves 
around the original, unspoilt nature, around ‘primeval nature’ in which there is no place 
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for man or his technological artefacts.”160 According to the constructivist view, 
knowledge claims of ecologists made in favor of protecting/restoring species and places 
have to be evaluated according to their social consequences. One should look at who 
wins and who loses from such projects. The same critic continues to unmask the 
disguised (“ideological”) effects of such projects: “nature development can be seen and 
described as an (implicit) form of cultural politics which manages to engage certain social 
groups while at the same time threatening to sideline other groups to the point where 
their interests and needs can no longer be voiced in politics.”161 
6.2.1 Environmentalism in Crisis?  
 
The misgivings about American environmentalism is not restricted to a few 
renegade environmentalists whose writings have sparked the most recent episode which 
I shall discuss shortly. Similar observations that there is a disconnect between 
environmentalists and ordinary people have been made for more than a decade. Already 
in 1992, it was observed that “environmentalist groups with broad social programs” fail 
“to capitalize on the growing public concern about the environment and thereby to set 
their programs permanently in motion.”162 The authors further stress that this is not only 
a problem for mainstream but also for radical environmentalists:  
What is true for the government-sponsored social engineers that grew up in the 
conservation movement at the beginning of this century is . . . true also for 
newer groups like the deep ecologists, wilderness preservationists, eco-anarchists, 
and green politicians: They have been unable to create strong communicative 
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links with the mass public, links that would support a strong power base for 
reformative actions.163  
 
It is ironic that this failure of communication exists despite the fact that environmental 
awareness in the US and many other advanced industrialized countries has been 
consistently on the rise since the 1970s.164 Not that environmentalists are not ordinary 
people, but they are commonly perceived either as privileged “managers” or spoiled 
“rebels” without a cause:  
Thirty years after Earth Day, the common image of the environmental 
movement is that of large, national, and highly political organizations focused on 
the transgressions of corporations and the shortcomings of federal agencies and 
dedicated to preserving the intent and integrity of existing environmental law. A 
more extreme image is tree huggers—or even tree dwellers—engaged in acts of 
civil disobedience against timber companies and developers.165 
 
The New York Times columnist and author Thomas Friedman confirms this 
image problem when he portrays with humor what he takes to be the mainstream 
America’s image of environmentalists as “liberal, tree-hugging, sissy, girlyman, 
unpatriotic, [and] vaguely French.”166 The same image appears in a recent popular book 
on conservative environmentalism. Its author, Rod Dreher, a conservative intellectual, 
remembers of his childhood years in rural Louisiana and how his father and hunter 
friends held a low opinion of environmentalists: “Those men—my father and his 
friends—considered themselves conservationists; as far as they were concerned, 
‘environmentalists’ were citified liberal pantywaists, uppity sentimentalists who didn’t 
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understand a thing about the woods and the creatures who lived there.” 167 He also 
confesses that he shared their opinion until very recently: “Every time I heard the word 
“environmentalist,” I’d think of the sanctimonious cultural elitists who seemed to have 
such worshipful regard for trees and owls, but so little concern for people.”168 Dreher’s 
book Crunchy Cons is an expression of a new growing group of conservative leaning 
educated Americans who have sympathies with some of the concerns of the American 
environmental movement. I have more to say on this topic in the next chapter. 
This stereotypical impression of environmentalism among the public is far from 
peculiar to the conservative opponents of environmentalism however. One of the 
earliest critique of the environmental movement was delivered by the German Marxian 
essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger affiliated with the German Frankfurt School. In his 
essay, Enzensberger stresses the “class character” of environmentalists as “middle class” 
and “new petty bourgeoisie,” and the radicals are “eco-freaks” hostile to civilization.169 
The academic secular left holds similar views which zero in on the charge of anti-
humanism and misanthropism:  
During its first one hundred years, the environmental movement has been 
concerned, almost exclusively, with preserving pristine places. This narrow, class- 
and race-based perspective of what counts as nature leads the environmental 
movement to neglect people and the places they inhabit, thus isolating the 
movement from labor and civil rights concerns and rendering it vulnerable to 
charges of elitism and misanthropism.170 
 
A number of national or international controversies over (endangered) species such as 
whales and owls have certainly contributed to this impression. Reckless statements made 
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about humanity in general or Hispanic immigrants by radical environmentalists in the 
United States must have also contributed to it.171  
There is also another dimension to this image problem. The language used by 
environmentalists is predominantly scientific with only scattered references to values 
such as “responsibility.”172 Scholars who study environmental discourse have noted that 
environmental organizations “have always sought to demonstrate a scientific basis for 
their perspective.”173 Mark Sagoff believes that using a purely scientific rhetoric is not a 
wise choice: 
those who wish to protect the natural environment rarely offer ethical or spiritual 
reasons for the policies they favor. Instead they say we are running out of 
resources or causing the collapse of ecosystems on which we depend. Predictions 
of resource scarcity appear objective and scientific, whereas pronouncements 
that nature is sacred or that greed is bad appear judgmental or even embarrassing 
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in a secular society. Prudential and economic arguments, moreover, have 
succeeded better than moral or spiritual ones in swaying public policy. These 
prudential and economic arguments are not likely to succeed much longer.174 
 
Sagoff’s skepticism of environmentalists’ public strategy is shared by others as 
well. One scholar observes that “after several decades of environmental campaigning, 
the long-desired ecological U-turn has still not been achieved and does not seem to be 
imminent either.”175 John Barry, whom I cited earlier, acknowledges this situation and 
hopes that civic environmentalism or environmental citizenship can be a remedy: 
Since the provision of knowledge and information about the ecological crisis has 
failed to encourage sufficient numbers of individuals to become environmental 
(never mind sustainable) citizens and alter their behavior accordingly, a 
republican view would be that what is needed is the creation or cultivation of 
such citizenly virtues and behavioral changes.176  
 
Over the last decade, several other environmental journalists have drawn 
attention to the same disorientation and unpreparedness for what is to come. Dianne 
Dumanoski observes that “despite growing recognition of . . . environmental crisis over 
the past three decades, a profound confusion persists about the ultimate stakes.”177 
Another prominent environmental journalist and author, Philip Shabecoff, noted as well 
that “the environmental movement, despite its great achievements, had not yet 
adequately prepared itself to meet the current and coming challenges, to transform a 
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future that now seems filled with danger.”178 Bill McKibben likewise indicated more 
recently that contemporary environmentalism has failed “when it came time to deal with 
global warming.”179 All three authors see the remedy in broadening the social vision of 
contemporary environmentalism to relate it to all spheres of social life and this is what 
the civic approach promises to accomplish according to its advocates.  
The feeling of disarray among environmentalists suggests that the innovative 
concept of “sustainability” must have lost its initial appeal as an animating vision. The 
sustainability discourse might still be one of the rhetorical weapons in the environmental 
arsenal but, as the environmental scholar Dale Jamieson recognizes, “we need a 
discourse that permits deeper discussion of aesthetic, spiritual, religious, cultural, 
political, and moral values.” Without using the notion of “environmental citizenship,” 
Jamieson draws our attention to the need to develop “a richer set of positive visions 
regarding the proper human relationship to nature”: 
These visions must go beyond the bloodless futures of scientific forecasters, the 
technological futures of cornucopians, and the single focus futures of those who 
are interested only in rainforests, women, or American family incomes. What is 
needed are simple and compelling stories that show us how to practically 
participate in creating the future in our daily lives, and how to engage in ongoing 
dialogue with others about how our everyday actions help to produce global 
realities. Articulating these visions is not the job of academics alone, but also 
requires the efforts of writers, artists, and people from all walks of life.180 
 
Three points in this quote need to be noticed. First, the new environmental 
discourse must be inspiring and accessible by people who do not spend much time in 
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reading about the intricacies of environmental problems. To do so, the audience and 
constituency of environmentalism must be broadened by connecting with other 
concerns of ordinary people which are not strictly “environmental.” Third, this new 
discourse must make use of the connection between the micro level individual behavior 
and the macro level environmental outcomes. In response to the recent debate over the 
“death” of environmentalism, the environmental author Bill McKibben arrives at a 
similar conclusion. He draws attention to the need to add a rhetorical appeal to 
environmentalism so that it can resonate with public more effectively: 
Environmentalism isn’t dying. In fact, the need for it has never been greater. But 
it has to transform itself into something so different that the old name really 
won’t apply. It has to be about a new kind of culture, not a new kind of filter; it 
has to pay as much attention to preachers and sociologists as it does to scientists; 
it has to care as much about the carrot in the farmers market as it does about the 
caribou on the Arctic tundra.181 
 
The need for raising environmental awareness and participation is most evident 
in the case of global warming, which now looms large as the most comprehensive 
environmental challenge that we have faced in our evolutionary history. Global warming 
touches the very logic of modernity which continues to drive most nations in the world 
today: securing and/or maximizing happiness and freedom on a mass level through 
growing material prosperity. As Blühdorn provocatively observes, economic growth is so 
central to the legitimation of late modern societies that, structurally speaking, they are 
not only incapable but also reluctant to turn sustainable.182 Still, environmentalists reject 
this sort of fatalism and want to do their best to transition to a more sustainable ways of 
living. The willing participation of large segments of public is central to the success of 
                                                 
     181 McKibben, “A Deeper Shade of Green.” 
 
     182 Ingolfur Blühdorn, “Unsustainability as a Frame of Mind-and How We Disguise It,” Trumpeter 18.1 
(2002), http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v18.1/bluhdorn.pdf, 2; see also Ingolfur Blühdorn’s Post-




their attempts in a democratic age however. As Dale Jamieson points out, the active 
cooperation of people outside the politically active cadre of activists, scientists, and 
policy-makers is essential to tackle this particular problem at its source, that is, the US—
the heartland of global warming at least for the next few decades:  
What’s obvious is that you don’t really get energy taxes without people having 
some value change. Part of why . . . we are not going to get significant reductions 
in the use of oil in the United States is that, in order to do that, you have to have 
predictable, steady increases in price . . . . But the only way you get that is when 
we as a society say that what we want to do is to become less reliant on fossil 
fuels. Because once we have those values, then, we will not punish politicians 
who put in place a new set of incentives.183 
 
The kind of environmental value changes—“people having some value change” as 
Jamieson puts it in the above quote—however, cannot be manufactured, as it were, from 
a single control room, especially when in a democratic system there are numerous groups 
biding their time to get at the helm to give the ship a direction they think is right. Liberal 
democracy—the political paradigm of our age—allows for the peaceful turnover of 
power or fair participation in representative political institutions but it does not 
guarantee the substantive changes that environmentalism aims at nor can it guarantee the 
effective adoption of environmental “values” on a mass level. The best it can do is to 
allow for environmental groups to compete for a slice of public’s attention. In this 
endeavor, the civic approach can play a key role in the coming decades but whether it 
can stem the overall environmental degradation no one can tell in advance.   
As I have said earlier, the civic approach must be interpreted in the light of the 
recent debates over the future direction of environmentalism. Environmental scholars 
on both sides of the Atlantic have almost simultaneously begun to talk about the “death” 
or “end” of environmentalism. Whether there was mutual influence between these two 
                                                 





debates is not clear.184 The debate in Europe is over the “end” (in both senses as “goal” 
and “final point”) of environmentalism.185 What has prompted it is ironically the relative 
receptiveness of European societies to environmental concerns and issues. The editors 
of a recent book on this subject cautiously point out the question that this state of affairs 
poses for environmental scholars: is there any “reason why environmentalism as an 
independent school of thought should continue to exist” or do “environmentalist still 
have a reason to be environmentalists.” They explain that this is a question for political 
theory: “whether environmental political theory’s ideas are (still) valid.” 186 The individual 
responses to these questions compiled in this book vary but the common tone is that to 
avoid irrelevance environmentalism has to reinvent itself. One particular blind spot of 
environmentalism that many contributors to the volume point out is the naïve 
supposition that “the facts speak for themselves, and the Greens are there merely to 
point to facts.”187 Another contributor ties the lack of change to this misconception: 
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“environmental policy research has shown clearly that the mere provision of information 
will never be sufficient to bring about decisive change.”188 Based on these reassessments, 
most authors point toward the importance of finding fresh ways of engaging ordinary 
people. More attention to citizenship and culture is recommended by most authors.189 
The following moderate conclusion can be taken as representative of the rest of the 
collection:  
The old type of environmentalism which used to be directed at goal-setting, 
technical planning and general policy design will be replaced by a new form 
which will have to balance ecological considerations against arguments in favour 
of freedom of action, individual desire for pleasure and craving for luxury.190  
 
Martha C. Nussbaum has noted the convergence among Aristotle, environmentalism, 
and conservatism in the “radical environmental and anticonsumption thought” of recent 
times. She warns, however, against the possible authoritarian implications of this strand 
of thought, which, according to her, is inclined to see “the role of the state in curbing a 
wasteful lifestyle.” Instead, she prefers to adopt Aristotle for her liberal project of 
enhancing the capabilities of individuals as citizens.191 
In America, the most recent episode of the debate was sparked by an essay co-
authored by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus—environmental strategists and 
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organizers who are well informed about the world of environmental NGOs.192 As they 
chose the meeting of the Environmental Grantmakers Association as a venue for their 
paper, they were able to get much publicity for their opinion. Their papers have been 
widely circulated and received much response since then.193 A similar view was defended 
shortly after the November 2004 election by another environmental insider Adam 
Werbach who was president of the Sierra Club between 1996-98.194 Both papers show 
clear signs of frustration with business as usual within the environmental movement.195 
Their common complaint is that there is lack of comprehensive and inspiring political 
vision, too much preoccupation with technical fixes, and much denial about the 
deteriorating state of affairs among leading environmental groups in the US. This 
poverty of vision makes it difficult to overcome the public image of environmentalists as 
merely another special-interest group. Shellenberger and Nordhaus attributes the failure 
to the conventional wisdom among environmentalists that technical fixes are adequate.  
I do not necessarily agree with the critics’ attempt to recharge environmentalism 
with progressive zeal but much of their diagnosis echoes the points made by the civic 
approach proponents that I have discussed earlier. I want to point out these 
commonalities and suggest that their diagnosis warrants taking a harder look at the tenets 
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of liberalism and the modern project of progress. Since both papers has much in 
common, I will refer to both papers interchangeably. The problem of environmentalism 
is situated within the broader liberal culture: 
The failure is not unique to environmentalism. Our death is a symptom of the 
exhaustion of the liberal project. Having achieved its goals of basic economic 
rights, liberalism and its special interests now fail to speak to the modern need 
for fulfillment of the American people.196 
 
This statement suggests that the “fulfillment of the American people” goes beyond 
securing the “basic economic rights.” This point is important because, as we shall see, 
the critics fail to say anything that actually goes beyond them but remains within the 
progressive liberal framework. Still, their honest critique is important. At the center of 
this critique is what we have seen above that environmentalism does not reach the 
ordinary people. This stands in stark contrast to the grip of political right on people. 
Hence, environmentalism has to invent a new competing vision to become politically 
effective: “Environmentalism is dead in no small part because it could never match the 
right’s power to narrate a compelling vision of America’s future.” To do so, 
environmentalists must “step outside the confines of the environmental discourse to 
articulate a more expansive, more inclusive and more compelling vision for the future . . . 
[to become] American progressives.”197  
This sounds good but what could that vision contain as new other than the 
existing stock liberal issues such as gender, labor, race, and the environment. It seems 
that the authors complain of the lack of a single narrative that can relate all to one 
another. They suggest that it is the balkanization of liberal issues that sap their synergistic 
power: 
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For 30 years American liberals have defined themselves according to a set of 
problem categories that divide us, whether they be racial, gender, economic or 
environmental. We have spent far less time defining ourselves according to the 
values that unite us, such as shared prosperity, progress, interdependence, 
fairness, ecological restoration and equality. We can no longer afford the laundry 
list of “-isms” to define and divide our world and ourselves.198 
 
The critics further underline the need to pool together the seemingly different issues 
under a unifying framework without losing their “web of connections.”199 I am not going 
to dwell on the vacuous term “value” in the above statement here which I have 
discussed at length in the previous chapter. It is important to note however that the 
adoption of “values” discourse cannot resolve the nihilism of contemporary times. The 
conservatives who apply the term “values” almost promiscuously should not be 
imitated.200 
Putting aside this critique for a moment, how is a unifying vision possible to 
create around values which we know vary from one subject to another, or one period to 
another, or one culture to another? The values of black culture, for instance, are different 
from the values of Hispanic culture in the United States and both from the white culture. 
One might say that, the critics are speaking of moral values rather than cultural values. 
My first response to this objection would be that these two sets of values cannot be held 
apart in reality. Cultural values are not about the fact that whether one listens to Rap 
music, Britney, or Tango but the commonly shared meaning and practices derived from 
them. An example of a cultural value is whether “personal expression” or “deference to 
authority” is encouraged in a group setting. It is well known, for instance, that the 
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Hispanics predominantly value the latter. They also put family rather than the individual 
first. Much has also been written on the fact that values of “freedom” and “equality” do 
conflict given certain interpretations of each. Freedom to own the fruits of one’s own 
labor conflicts with the policies aiming at national or international economic equality. If 
it is true that values are irreducible, then conflict among these values has to be 
perpetually disguised for the sake of a unifying vision. But this is exactly what Marxists 
and Marxism-inspired intellectuals denounce as “ideology,” that is, masking and 
artificially repressing competing interests.    
 But the analysis of our critics is still helpful to confirm the contradictions of 
environmentalism as this diagnosis will make it easier to acknowledge the complicated 
nature of the question concerning the environment. For the question has not easy or 
self-evident answer. To continue, the critics confirm what I have suggested above that 
these debates are connected to the meaning of the basic categories such as the 
“environment” or “nature.” They speculate that “this lack of vision for the American 
people was connected to conservation’s darkest side: its misanthropic nostalgia for a 
‘natural’ past that didn’t include human beings.” 201  
Within environmentalists and environmentalism reside both a love for and a 
hatred of humanity. Because misanthropy at a political level is suicidal, it merits 
remaining private. But over the years, ordinary Americans have sensed it, the 
media has magnified it, and during the springtime of the environmental 
movement, the keenest conservatives saw an opportunity to exploit it.202  
 
The critics conclude that “environmentalism” as an independent category is 
obsolete. One of them even boldly announces that “I am done calling myself an 
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environmentalist.”203 Both papers repeat the points made in earlier debates such as the 
technological fascination of environmentalists and the need to a more heterogeneous 
conception of the “environment” and “environmentalism.”204 The same ambiguity is 
true for the more exotic terms “green” or “ecological” since these ultimately rest on the 
notion of the environment and nature.  What these terms signify in meaning is clearly 
not something straightforward. Despite the fact that the terms “environment” and 
“environmentalism” draw attention to the “real,” “urgent,” “practical,” or “material” 
problems that exist in the world apart from us, environmental problems and issues can 
be imagined only through preexisting, more familiar concepts such as “citizenship” as 
opposed to “sustainability.” A greater part of the legitimacy that the question of the 
“environment” enjoys actually derives from the fact that it touches these long-standing 
conceptual issues and the empirical-practical phenomena they are intended to 
conceptualize. “Conservatism, properly understood, is the perspective most congenial to 
an acceptance of the complexity of our political inheritance.”205 
The civic environmental approach is of increasing interest to scholars, journalists, 
policy-makers, and non-governmental groups in the environmental field.206 An 
environmental research center at a prestigious American university, for instance, has 
been giving out for the last few years annual “global environmental citizen awards” to 
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public figures who have contributed to environmental protection efforts at the global 
level.207 Although the award itself is of symbolic significance and its scope is global, it is 
telling that the term “citizen” is used in the title. For the term “citizen” and its cognate 
“citizenship” are pregnant with normative import and rich in rhetorical resonance. Both 
draw upon  the tradition of citizenship, evoking a sense of moral duty that competes 
with individuals’ withdrawal to private lives.  
The civic approach to the environment is far from being a panacea for all sorts 
of environmental ills which are simply too diverse and multifaceted to admit a one-size-
fits-all approach. Although civic initiatives may not replace the niches of governmental, 
legislative, judicial, technological, scientific, and market approaches, the reverse is also 
true. These technical methods cannot succeed in the absence of voluntary public 
support. Nor can these instruments ensure against the possibility of policy reversals by 
future governments with different agendas in liberal democratic societies. Hence, we 
should be willing to welcome the strengths and advantages of the civic approach without 
necessarily closing our eyes to its possible inadequacies under specific circumstances or 
with respect to certain environmental issues. It is true that the civic environmental 
approach might fall short with respect to environmental problems on a large scale 
transcending national borders such as global warming but they are neither totally 
irrelevant nor a lot worse than its technical cousin. The civic approach can be valuable in 
forming political alliances, motivating the active core of environmental activism, and 
broadening the larger support base of environmentalism. I have more to say on this 
point in the next chapter. 
                                                 
     207 The most recent recipient of this award—bestowed by “The Center for Health and the Global 
Environment” at Harvard Medical School—has been Prince Charles. Past recipients include other well-




In thinking through the question concerning the environment, we should expect 
that the theoretical debates in environmentalism over its future cannot move forward 
without recognizing the connections between environmental theory and the history of 
political and moral thought. The extent to which the Aristotelian element is incorporated 
into these discourses certainly varies. Since these discourses  are put forth by individual 
scholars, we should naturally expect differences in the way they are framed and 
presented. Despite their differences, the common emphasis on “citizenship” and “civic” 
duties betray the critique of the classical liberal conception of citizenship. As is well 
known, the classical liberal conception of citizenship in Hobbes prioritizes security or 
survival and that of Locke emphasizes private ownership of property. Both conceptions 
are individualist due to their similar explanation of society as an outcome of voluntary 
(or “artificial” as Hobbes puts it) process that not only took place in the mythical past 
but is ever renewed in the present. The “civic” emphasis in these environmental 
discourses are specifically aimed at countering this conception of politics. Civic 
environmental scholars need to posit a goal different from those of security/survival and 
wealth for this task. Strangely, however, the civic environmental literature is seriously 
inadequate in this regard. Still, the civic approach as well as environmental virtue ethics 





Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters have argued that Aristotle’s integral thinking on praxis, nature, 
and art is critical to make sense of the contemporary question concerning the environment. 
My presupposition all along has been that what we mean by the “environment” when we 
regularly invoke it in everyday or academic discourse within a normative framework is not 
self-evident. Upon deeper reflection, it can be seen that it signifies much more than its 
immediately visible aspects. Basically, the question in its non-material dimension touches the 
perennial philosophical and religious debates about the good life. Hence, Aristotle’s 
relevance to contemporary thinking on the environment can be best seen in the context of 
the contrast between the premodern and the modern understanding of the human condition. 
Much of the normative analysis of environmental scholars sides with the premodern view of 
things. This premodern influence is at times explicit and at times is less obvious. 
In Chapter 2, I emphasized two of these. One is that Aristotle offers us an integral 
picture of reality from which human being is not alienated. Human beings are distinct among 
species by virtue of their superior intellectual capabilities but this potential superiority does 
not translate into active superiority “without virtue.” For without it, “he is the most unholy 
and the most savage [of the animals], and the worst with regard to sex and food” (Pol. 
1253a35-38). I have noted that this integral vision is quite compatible with the recurring 
environmental longing for wholeness or integrity by which not only the physical reality of 
human dependence on nature but also our spiritual connection to something greater is 
meant. Such unifying vision may sound unscientific or impossible to hard-headed positivists 
given the advancement of scientific understanding of reality in our age but these two reasons 




living, which shows itself in active yearning for happiness and completion. I will have more 
to say on this point later on. Second, Aristotle’s account of politics does not sever its link to 
ethics the way modern political science does in pursuit of deterministic causality (or more 
humbly “correlation”) in human affairs. This would be a crucial mistake in Aristotle’s view 
because it distorts the “truth” pertaining human condition which is changeable in one sense 
but invariable in another. What does not change is the psychological constitution of human 
reality—the need for friendship for well-being for instance. My subsequent remarks will 
speak to this particular example. 
I have noted before that there have been scholars who have studied Aristotle in this 
connection. The political theorist Mulford Q. Sibley, for instance, argued more than thirty 
years ago (in an article now almost forgotten) for the relevance of classical political 
philosophy to contemporary environmental concerns.1 Sibley’s article discussed the issues of 
economy, technology, and ecology by contrasting classical political tradition (by which he 
not only meant Plato and Aristotle but also later figures such as More and Aquinas who 
followed either Plato or Aristotle) and “modernity” that is founded on the rejection of the 
classical tradition both in natural and political philosophy. This dissertation has followed 
Sibley’s lead but I have expanded on his article by taking into account more recent 
scholarship on this topic. 
In recent scholarship, Aristotle’s relevance has been discussed in three different 
environmental fields—environmental ethics/philosophy, environmental political theory, and 
environmental economics. Environmental philosophers have shown interest in Aristotle 
primarily in relation to the theme of “virtue” and, to a lesser degree, his biology as well as his 
                                                 
     1 Mulford Q. Sibley, “The Relevance of Classical Political Theory for Economy, Technology, and Ecology,” 
Alternatives: Perspectives on Society and Environment 2.2 (1973): 14-35; see also Mulford Q. Sibley, “Utopian Thought 




account of the relationship between nature (phusis) and art (techne). Among environmental 
political theorists, Aristotle’s political naturalism (or the relationship between phusis and 
praxis) and attention to civic virtue was of primary interest. In environmental economics, 
Aristotle’s distinction between chrematistike (business expertise) and oikonomia (household 
management) received much attention. So there is growing interest in Aristotle-environment 
connection so much so that Aristotle is now considered by some as one of the fifty key 
thinkers on the environment.2 The contribution of my dissertation to this literature was to 
pull together these disparate strands and respond to the skeptical environmental scholars 
who have either explicitly criticized and dismissed Aristotle or neglected his potential 
contribution. 
Max Oelschlaeger noted, for instance, about a decade ago that “environmental 
philosophy is dominated by largely negative appraisals that view Greek thinking more as an 
obstacle to overcome than a source for constructive thinking” and acknowledged that he 
himself previously “dismissed the relevance of Greek philosophy to these times.”3 Aristotle’s 
relevance to the issue of the environment has not been obvious to environmental scholars 
such as Oelschlaeger for two main reasons. First, the category of the environment, as I have 
discussed in the last section of the previous chapter, is too narrow to represent a variety of 
themes that have family resemblance to one another, say, community gardening, renewable 
energy, and asthma. The second reason for missing the Aristotelian connection is the fact 
that environmentalism has been predominantly interpreted as a self-contained ideology. The 
ideological approach tends to narrow down the scope of environmental thinking and creates 
                                                 
     2 See David E. Cooper, “Aristotle,” in Fifty Key Thinkers on the Environment, ed. Joy A. Palmer (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 12-6. 
 
     3 Max Oelschlaeger, foreword to The Greeks and the Environment, eds. Laura Westra and Thomas M. Robinson 




unnecessary holier-than-thou types of exchanges among environmental scholars. Similar self-
righteous views are also expressed toward non-environmental scholarship. This dissertation 
has been a call to be wary of this narrow ideological framework. I shall return to this topic 
after a brief overview of previous chapters. 
I began with a survey of the existing scholarly literature on Aristotle’s relevance and 
significance to contemporary environmental thought. I have found this literature to be 
unfairly critical of Aristotle for his established place in the anthropocentric tradition of 
Western civilization. Then, I offered my own account of how best to relate Aristotle to 
current environmental discussions combining the insights of aforementioned fields of study. 
I suggested that seeking external limits to consumption or growth is a normative ideal that 
can be derived from an Aristotelian understanding of ethics conceived in relation to human 
ends. I also argued that the way Aristotle conceives ethics and politics as inter-related 
domains of praxis is hospitable to environmental political objectives in the public sphere 
opposing the prevalence of instrumental rationality embodied in the policies of technological 
prometheanism and economic growth. I specifically argued that Aristotle’s teleological 
understanding of (human) nature and praxis, and the way he relates nature and praxis to 
productive arts is of considerable significance to contemporary environmental thought. 
“Virtue is something more precise and better than any art, just as nature is” (NE 1106b13-4). 
This Aristotelian viewpoint—foregrounding nature and praxis—captures the “conservative” 
spirit of contemporary concern over the environment as I shall discuss shortly. 
I delved into the question of techne and nature in Chapters 2 through 4 in more detail 
and  compared Aristotle’s view of the relationship between techne and phusis with the modern 
era. In Chapters 5 and 6 I critiqued some of the academic works in the fields of 




in these research fields has been that scholarship in environmental virtue ethics, for the most 
part, has not paid sufficient attention to the “political” aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy and 
that of environmental citizenship has failed to incorporate the “ethical” dimension of 
Aristotle’s thought adequately. In Chapter 6 I examined two inter-related areas of the current 
environmental literature—civic environmentalism and environmental citizenship—to argue 
that these visions support and in turn are supported by an Aristotelian understanding of 
praxis which puts virtue, justice, and community before individual autonomy or freedom. In 
the rest of this chapter, I will briefly discuss why “conservation” and “conservatism” share 
more than an etymological connection in light of the preceding remarks. 
7.1 Reconciling Conservative and Environmental Sensibilities 
 
A practical implication of bringing Aristotle into dialogue with contemporary 
environmental thought is the recovery and accentuation of the conservative spirit of 
environmentalism. The extent and feasibility of this reconciliation must be explored in future 
research but a few brief remarks are in order. I shall shortly elucidate what I mean by 
“conservative” and how it is derived from a study of Aristotle but before this let me say a 
few words on why it is important to seek a common ground between conservatism and 
environmentalism and why there is skepticism about this enterprise. Getting in touch with 
the conservative spirit of conservation is important for environmentalism to grow out of its 
current crisis. As my discussion in previous chapter shows, there is widespread 
misunderstanding of the significance of the question of the environment both within and 
without the contemporary environmental movement. Although I have only mentioned the 
cases in the US and Western Europe, I can tentatively claim that there is a similar situation in 




in the developing countries among the political and educated groups is that environmental 
concern is a luxury. The most urgent task of politics and economics is to feed people and 
provide for their security. The means to do this to invest in developmental projects such as 
transportation, energy, and mining, especially by attracting foreign capital.  
The low opinion of the issue-area of the environment is also common among 
political and academic intelligentsia who subscribe to the vision of realism. For them 
environmental politics is either a non-issue or an issue of “low politics.”4 This judgment 
results from lack of deep reflection on the set of normative questions entangled with the 
environment. What is at stake in the question concerning the environment, as I have argued 
hitherto, is the vision of the good life and the interpretation of modernity in contemporary 
societies in an increasingly globalized world. The theoretical framework of the question of 
the environment goes well beyond the practical problem of finding technological solutions 
and even engaging in courthouse or legislature battles against anti-environmental interests. 
What we need first and foremost is a philosophical understanding that the relationship 
between human species and non-human nature is bound with the way human beings and 
societies conceive and build the conditions of happiness and excellence, namely, the good 
life. Environmentalists cannot succeed in their attempts to unravel the logic of 
unsustainability unless they tackle the broader framework of which the environmental 
question is a part. The conservative critique of modernity based on individual autonomy and 
material progress can be helpful to see this big picture. 
                                                 
     4 The contrast between low and high politics is often made in IR literature in the context of the larger 
debate between realism and idealism. Security issues are often regarded as the archetypal form of politics by 
realists whereas the issues of environment and development are considered as secondary or derivate. For a 
discussion of low and high politics in IR literature, see Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and 




The conservative dimension of environmentalism can be instrumental to see through 
the ideological thicket of modernity. We can better appreciate the nuances of the world of 
praxis if we go beyond the dichotomous thinking imposed by the conventional left/right or 
liberal/conservative dualities. The ideological labels which are arisen in the Western world in 
the post-1789 era is increasingly becoming obsolete in our globalizing era. The binary logic 
of left and right or the more nuanced gallery of ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, 
conservatism, and fascism (which are again ordered along the continuum of “left” to “right”) 
are proving inadequate to understand the varied intellectual and political positions that havee 
been in the making in the last few decades. The rise of new social movements such as 
feminism and environmentalism since the early 1970s have challenged ideological categories 
interpreted solely in terms of political and economic interests. The new ideologies are 
interpreted as cross-cutting the private and public spheres and dealing with non-economic 
issues such as identity and culture. However, there is a fake sense of radicalism 
accompanying the ideologues of these new social movements. They often forget or ignore 
that their radical edge over old ideologies of material interests (and this is true only for 
liberalism and socialism rather than conservatism and fascism) is owing to the inadequacies 
of modern philosophy and natural science. This is particularly true for environmental 
intellectuals who oppose the logic of modernity to quantify the lifeworld. The expansionist, 
quantifying, calculating forces of technology, science, corporations, developers, engineers, 
and economists are opposed by practitioners and intellectuals of environmentalism in the 
name of “values” that cannot be quantified or measured. It is this very sentiment deep at the 
heart of every environmentalist, whether they articulate it or not, that make it possible to 




Environmentalism is often regarded as a democratic, liberal, or progressive cause 
because the environmental institutions have been staffed by people with liberal or 
progressive opinions and habits. The progressive image of the issue of environment also 
prevails because environmentalists try to change conventional practices, laws, and 
institutions contributing to environmental problems. Among their targets is the free 
operation of the economic actors. The conservatives who put their faith in capitalism often 
attack or dismiss environmentalists by charging them of having ulterior motives of 
establishing collectivism. Environmentalists are often likened to a watermelon—green on the 
outside, red on the inside.5 But if we turn to the substantive goals then we can notice the 
overlap with traditional conservatism.  
The literature that explores their relationship and suggesting that a reconciliation is 
both possible and desirable is growing. Some of these authors come from conservatives and 
some others from environmentalists. If “consistently applied,” according to the 
environmental author David Orr, conservation and conservatism become “natural allies.”6 
Similarly, according to the conservative scholar Roger Scruton, “conservatism and 
environmentalism are natural bedfellows” but he laments that “so few environmentalists 
seem to see this.”7 The reason for this oversight seems to be the misunderstanding of 
conservatism both by environmentalists and self-identified conservatives alike. 
                                                 
     5 See George Will, “Environmentalism as a Cover for Collectivism,” December 15, 2005, 
http://realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-12_15_05_GW_pf.html. 
 
     6 David W. Orr, “Conservation and Conservatism,” Conservation Biology 9.2 (1995): 242. See also C. A. 
Bowers, Mindful Conservatism: Rethinking the Ideological and Educational Basis of an Ecologically Sustainable Future 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
 
     7 Roger Scruton, “Conservatism,” in Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, eds. Andrew Dobson and 
Robyn Eckersley (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8, 9. See also John A. Gray, “An 
Agenda for Green Conservatism,” in Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 124-177; Gordon K. Durnil, The Making of a Conservative Environmentalist 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); John R. E Bliese, The Greening of Conservative America (Boulder, 




Environmentalists  often consider “conservatism as the ideology of free enterprise, and free 
enterprise as an assault on the earth’s resources, with no motive beyond the short-term gains 
that animate the market.” But conservatives too are partially responsible for their image: 
“For they have tended to see modern politics in terms of a simple dichotomy between 
individual freedom on the one hand, and state control on the other.”8 
To explore the common ground between environmentalism and conservatism, it is 
important to distinguish different strands of conservatism. In a recent article written on this 
subject by Nadivah Greenberg, five strands of American conservatism are identified: 
Classical, Theological, Free-market, National Security, and Sierra Club Republican.9 Apart from the 
last one, the first four strands are prevalent among the conservatives. Greenberg examines 
the prominent ideas and intellectual figures in each strand and locates small pockets of pro-
environmental conservatives in all five strands. Although they hold pro-environmental 
positions for different reasons, Greenberg suggests that there is a window of opportunity for 
“the possibility of an emerging, authentic environmental conservative compatibility.”10 In 
practical politics too, there are developments to this effect.11 The collaboration of the 
Republican Party senator John McCain with the formerly Democratic Party senator Joe 
Lieberman to curb global warming is a well known example.12 More recently, Mark Sanford, 
                                                 
     8 Ibid., 7. 
 
     9 Nadivah Greenberg, “Shop Right: American Conservatisms, Consumption, and the Environment,” Global 
Environmental Politics 6.2 (2006): 85-111.  
 
     10 Ibid., 89. 
 
     11 A small organization called “Republicans for Environmental Protection” or “Green Elephants” was 
established in 1995. They “appreciate the common roots of ‘conservatism’ and ‘conservation.’ ” See 
http://www.repamerica.org/.  
 
     12 The Lieberman-McCain bill “Climate Stewardship Act” was first introduced in the Congress in 2003, 
voted in the same year but failed by a vote of 43 to 55 in the Senate. In January 2007, a new version of the bill 
was reintroduced with bi-partisan support. The new bill, which is pending, gained support from the National 




the Republican governor of South Carolina, urged his fellow conservatives in a Washington 
Post article to embrace the cause of conservation.13  
My understanding of “conservative” point of view is neither restricted to the Anglo-
Saxon countries nor the modern era. I also have in mind the rest of Western countries as 
well as non-Western countries. Most contemporary critics of modern times as well as 
premodern intellectuals would count as conservative. In this sense, Gandhi, for instance, is a 
conservative. For the Anglo-Saxon context, I am referring to the strand associated with the 
British statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke (who ironically was a Whig rather than a 
Tory), and which had to be labeled “traditional(ist)” in the post-World War II era to 
distinguish it from its other variants which defend strong national security, free 
market/trade, and individual liberty above all.14 Among its contemporary representatives are 
Russell Kirk and Michael Oakeshott. This strand is also named as “cultural”15 or 
“philosophical.”16 Kraynak notes that “cultural conservatives . . . question the basic 
assumption of historical progress” and believe  that “modernity does not constitute unmixed 
‘progress’ over the past because the advances in freedom, material prosperity, and 
technology that we presently enjoy are offset by a decline in the highest aspirations of the 
                                                 
     13 Mark Sanford, “A Conservative Conservationist? Why the Right Needs to Get Invested in the Search for 
Climate Change Solutions,” The Washington Post, February 23, 2007, A19. See also other public voices from the 
conservative intellectuals: Fred C. Ikle, “Growth Without End, Amen?” National Review,  7 March 1994;  Jeremy 
Beer, “A Greener Shade of Right: Who says Conservatives Can’t Be Conservationists?” re:generation quarterly, 
March / April 2003, http://www.utne.com/issues/2003_116/promo/10361-1.html; and Steven F. Hayward, 
“Is ‘Conservative Environmentalist’ an Oxymoron? How to End Environmental Policy Gridlock,” August 2, 
2005,  AEI, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.22934/pub_detail.asp. 
 
     14 The two other main variants in the US are known as neo-conservatism and libertarianism. See Peter 
Berkowitz, Varieties of Conservatism in America (Hoover Institution Press, 2004). In Europe, the latter is known as 
neo-liberalism or simply as liberalism.  
 
     15 Robert P. Kraynak, “Conservative Critics of Modernity: Can They Turn Back the Clock,” The Intercollegiate 
Review 37.1 (2001): 31-9.  
 
     16 See C. A. Bowers, Mindful Conservatism, 12-4. Bowers advocates an ecologically informed conservative 
approach which he calls “mindful conservatism”—a revised version of philosophical conservatism represented 




human soul—in the aspirations for heroic virtue, spiritual perfection, philosophical truth, 
and artistic beauty.”17 In the sense that Kraynak defines it, cultural conservatism is not in the 
monopoly of the Western intellectual tradition but non-Western societies too have 
traditionalist conservatives as well. Kraynak’s list of cultural conservatives includes 
intellectual figures such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Henry Adams, Leo Strauss, Richard 
Weaver, and Southern Agrarians, and groups such as traditional Catholics, Eastern 
Orthodox believers, and Orthodox Jews.18 We can also add to this list American literary 
figures such as Irving Babbitt and T. S. Eliot. 
Under this strand falls also the Catholic intellectual tradition derived from Thomas 
Aquinas with its stress on community, justice, and subsidiarity. Among them are 
contemporary intellectuals who are directly engaged with environmental issues as well as 
others whose ideas are reconcilable with them.19 Pope John Paul II’s writings on the 
environment are well known.20 We can also include among cultural conservatives certain 
communitarian critics of contemporary liberalism such as Robert Nisbet. Radical critics of 
technology such as Ivan Illich and George P. Grant too by virtue of their premodern visions 
must count as “cultural conservative.”21 A crucial chain in the link between conservatism 
and environmentalism is the American farmer and author Wendell Berry whose writings are 
appreciated both by environmentalists and conservatives. Another important figure is E.F. 
                                                 
     17 Kraynak, 31, 32. 
 
     18 Ibid., 32. 
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Schumacher—the author of The Small is Beautiful (1973)—who explicitly draws on Aristotle’s 
emphasis on limits.22 
Why would the political goals of environmentalism be of conservative character? To 
answer this question, we need to understand the nature of traditional conservatism and its 
opposite stance progressivism in the light of the project of modernity: the improvement of 
the lot of humankind through increasing control of nature. To this is later added the 
improvement of society by social engineering. The following distinction regarding the 
question of technology is illuminating for the difference I want to emphasize: 
Those who hold that the biggest obstacles to human happiness are material, arising 
from scarcity and the stinginess and violence of nature, from the indifference of the 
powers that be, or (within) from disease and death, look to the arts. On this view, the 
inventors and bringers of the arts are the true benefactors of mankind, and are 
revered like the gods. The supreme example is Prometheus . . . bringer of fire, with 
its warming and transforming power, and, through fire, all the other arts. In contrast, 
those who hold that the biggest obstacles to human happiness are psychic and 
spiritual, arising from the turbulence of the human soul itself, look instead to law (or 
to piety or its equivalent) to tame and moderate the unruly and self-destroying 
passions of human beings. On this view, the lawgiver, statesmen, and prophets are 
the true benefactors of mankind—not Prometheus but Lycurgus, not builders of 
Babel but Moses.23 
 
Using an ideal-typical taxonomy, we may safely characterize the former camp as 
progressive and the latter as conservative. The substantive ethos of environmentalism is 
more justifiable from a traditional conservative rather than a progressive viewpoint. 
Environmental figures such as E. F. Schumacher, Ivan Illich, David Orr, and Wendell Berry 
who openly raise the question of virtue and the good life and locate them in the non-material 
dimension of human life beyond the spheres of productive and consumptive activities are 
                                                 
     22 See, for instance, the recent defense of Schumacher’s vision by a British conservative author: Joseph 
Pearce, Small is Still Beautiful (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006). 
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conservatives according to the above distinction.24 By emphasizing the role of human psyche 
in ecological crisis, Vaclav Havel represents the common ground between conservative and 
environmental sensibilities:  
It is my deep conviction that the only option is for something to change in the 
sphere of the spirit, in the sphere of human conscience, in the actual attitude of man 
towards the world and his understanding of himself and his place in the overall order 
of existence. It cannot suffice to invent new machines, new regulations, new 
institutions. It is necessary to understand differently and more perfectly the true 
purpose of our existence on this earth, and of our deeds. Only such a new 
understanding will allow the development of new models of behaviour, new scales of 
values and objectives in life, and through these means finally bind a new spirit and 
new meaning also to the specific regulations, treaties and institutions. 25  
 
The compatibility between conservative and environmental sensibilities can be made 
from a number of angles three of which I shall discuss here briefly.26 The first is the 
adoption of a precautionary stance toward technological innovation and human 
interventions in the natural world. The Aristotelian virtue of prudence is resuscitated.27 
David Harvey, for instance, notes that:  
In some of the ecological literature the principle of prudence and respect for 
tradition plays a leading role. Human adaptations to and of natural environments 
have been arrived at over centuries and should not be unnecessarily disturbed. 
Conservation and preservation of existing landscapes and usages, sometimes argued 
                                                 
     24 Certainly not all environmentalists qualify as conservative in this ethical/moral sense. Some strands of 
environmentalism regard environmental problems as stemming from structural factors outside the individual 
human choice such as over-population, socio-economic institutions, policies, religions, or ideologies. There is a 
partial truth to this view but the oversight that these ultimately depend on agency lead one eventually to 
gridlock. Given these external factors, they reach conclusions which downplay the role of individual human 
choice or ethics in the creation and resolution of environmental problems. Without going into the merits of 
framing the environmental discourse this way, I will only make the observation that this type of analysis 
circumvents the question of individual character or ethics that has been central to a venerable type of 
philosophical conservatism observed in many cultures in history. 
 
     25 Vaclav Havel, “A Statement Delivered at Forum 2000,” September 4, 1997, 
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     27 See Bliese, 64-6; Pilbeam, 493-94; and “Arne Naess: Green Conservatism,” in The Green Reader: Essays 




for by explicit appeal to esthetic judgments, give such a framework a conservative 
ring.28 
 
The following remarks of a conservation biologist, made in reference to a species 
endangered because of urban sprawl, illustrate the  conservative environmental stance in this 
respect: “Those of us in favor of their preservation are often motivated by a deeply 
conservative feeling of distrust of irreversible change and by a socially atypical attitude of 
respect for the components and the structure of the natural world.”29  
A second common point of interest is the desire for vibrant, organic, and self-
sufficient communities. Both environmentalists and conservatives value intergenerational 
continuity and the integrity of socio-physical environment out of reverence for community 
and continuity.30 This is the real meaning of tradition which, as C.A. Bowers notes, is 
unfairly denigrated in the contemporary world especially among progressive liberals.31 The 
environmental historian Clarence J. Glacken observed long ago the underlying psychological 
dynamics of the interdependence between conserving cultural and natural heritage: “The 
same belief that is the basis of the traditional Chinese family system is also the philosophical 
basis of much of the literature on the wise use of the natural environment. It is this belief in 
historical continuity and the values it enshrines that also inspires movements for the 
preservation of man’s creations like the Parthenon and natural phenomena like the 
redwoods. Few want and few could tolerate a disembodied present.”32 More recently, a 
China scholar confirms this observation by emphasizing the desirability of looking at the 
                                                 
     28 David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 178-79. 
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environment from a broader perspective: “The embeddedness of environmental values 
suggests that the promotion of a certain set of environmental values has to entail a whole set 
of other values. For example, to promote environmental protection also entails the 
promotion of protection of communities, lifestyles, and traditions.”33 
A third area of convergence between conservatism and environmentalism is the 
critique of materialism and the common emphasis on the moderation of consumerist 
appetites. The teaching of modern view has encouraged the pursuit of happiness through 
individual autonomy secured by mobility and freedom from constraints. The most common 
strategy in this pursuit has been to accumulate status symbols (i.e., success or career) and 
experience of pleasure (fun). It is this pursuit that is commonly called “consumerism” or 
“consumption culture.” If increasing environmental dilemmas are seen as by-products of the 
modern era by virtue of inducing growth in population, technology, and consumption, we 
can see more clearly the reasons for the convergence and compatibility between conservative 
and environmental sensibilities. Following Russell Kirk’s conception of conservatism, we 
should perhaps consider “environmentalism” in terms of having and spreading 
environmental sensibility as opposed to subscribing to a coherent ideology.34 Discerning 
conservatives such as Russell Kirk was well aware of this aspect of ideological thinking 
which prompted him to define conservatism as an anti-ideology: “conservatism is the 
negation of ideology: it is a state of mind, a type of character, a way of looking at the civil 
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social order.”35 By “sensibility,” I mean awareness of and responsiveness toward 
environmental problems. Environmental sensibilities can be coupled with other sensibilities, 
one of which is concerned with conserving cultural heritage.  
It has been suggested that ideologies are truncated descendants of modern political 
philosophy and their prevalence in the late modern era is characteristic of the intellectual 
malaise of our times: “As regards modern political philosophy, it has been replaced by 
ideology: what originally was a political philosophy has turned into an ideology. This fact 
may be said to form the core of the contemporary crisis of the West.”36 We may also see it, 
to borrow Nietzsche’s metaphor, as an illness just as pregnancy is an illness. According to 
another account, the meaning of the word ideology is analogous to that of the Greek word 
doxa (opinion).37 If this comparison is reasonable, then the Aristotelian method of dialectic 
to refine doxa must be open to us.  
Andrew Dobson, a major exponent of ecologism as a distinct ideology, shows 
awareness of the danger of ideological simplicity. In response to the criticism that his work is 
guilty of this simplistic approach, Dobson concedes in a later edition of his work on green 
ideology that “the demands of ideology and the demands of theory are . . . different.” He 
believes that “ideologies are useful”  by virtue of their “enlisting the big theme rather than 
the theoretical detail.”38 Another environmental scholar confirms Dobson’s view of ideology 
but reaches a different conclusion: “Political ideologies that guide approaches to addressing 
environmental problems tend to oversimplify reality . . . . This oversimplification has the 
benefit of assisting the process of recruiting and maintaining adherents to a cause through 
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easily interpretable messages, but it imposes a high cost in terms of diminished effectiveness 
of environmental campaigns.”39 Our understanding of the question of the environment is 
assisted by a philosophical as opposed to an ideological discourse which tends to erase 
certain significant differences and exaggerate some others.40 One must rather examine the 
opinions of individual authors or actors on their own merits as opposed to fitting them in 
rigid, pre-existing categories. The ideological mindset often induces false agreement or 
disagreement of positions within and among schools of environmental thought.41  
The flaws of ideological mentality can be seen in the fact that the conservative 
environmental scholar William Ophuls has often been misunderstood and misrepresented by 
environmental scholars whose political sympathies lie with liberalism, socialism, or 
progressivism. His first work published in 1977 was revised fifteen years later in 1992.42 In 
the earlier version, Ophuls relied on the neo-Malthusian “Limits to Growth” argument as 
well as Garret Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) article to make his case for 
restraint. This can be either voluntarily imposed or outsourced to a Hobbesian government. 
The latter could effectively supply the needed political coercion to enforce compliance with 
environmental limitations. Most environmental scholars have immediately seized on his 
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draconian tone and declared him as one of the terrible trio of eco-authoritarianism.43 In the 
revised version, Ophuls protested the misinterpretation of his argument he laid out in the 
1977 edition: “the overall spirit of the work is . . . far from Hobbesian.”44 Despite this bold 
denial, it is clear that Ophuls in the first edition was overly sympathetic with Hobbes’s 
Leviathan. But we can note the following in his favor. Authoritarianism is not peculiar to 
Hobbes if by this word we understand the threat of the legitimate use of force in case of 
noncompliance with laws. Moreover, the authoritarian framework of Hobbes’s social 
contract is ambivalent as it presupposes individual consent even though it is premised on 
fear. This is a far cry from Aristotle’s authoritarian argument that the relationship between 
ruler and ruled is a natural one.  
Still, based on his revised work and his latest work, Ophuls appears to have clarified 
his ideas and thereby changed his mind on Hobbes and has come to reject him as a model. 
This realization is most evident in his latest work but not absent from the 1992 revision 
since, in an afterword, he states that “far from being the solution, Hobbes is rather the 
essence of the problem.”45 “Hobbes’s fundamental error,” according to Ophuls, was to 
believe that “politics could ever be separated from virtue.”46 “The current environmental 
problematique is a direct outgrowth of the system of individualistic and economic politics 
that evolved out of the social contract theory elaborated in Leviathan.”47 His new model is 
now the Social Contract of Rousseau which, some may argue, is not a long distance from 
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Hobbes.48 This is noted actually even by Ophuls himself: “Rousseau’s answer . . . is not 
much different from Hobbes’s: Man must be “forced to be free”—that is, protected from 
the consequences of his own selfishness and shortsightedness by being made obedient to the 
common good or ‘general will,’ which represents his real self-interest.”49 Yet, Ophuls 
dissociated himself from Hobbes over time either because of the negative criticism he had 
received or because he had realized that Hobbes was part of the problem of modernity 
rather than its dissolution.50 
 Ophuls is better understood as an environmental conservative or conservative 
environmentalist as he, like Havel, prioritizes moral rejuvenation rather than political 
struggle or institutional reconstruction: “the most critical need is for a change of heart, or 
‘metanoia,’ [“fundamental transformation of world view”] because until we have embraced 
ecological ethos, we cannot possibly have a genuinely ecological politics.”51 By “metanoia” 
and “ethos,” Ophuls means “temperance and virtue needed for the ecological survival of a 
steady-state society.”52 In this, Ophuls gestures at a Burkean type of conservatism as well as 
classical political philosophy: 
the questions raised throughout this book are scarcely new but in fact are modern 
variations on ancient themes . . . the values of a steady-state society would have to 
resemble pre-modern values in many important respects, but steady-state values bear 
a particularly uncanny resemblance to the ideas of the British conservative thinker 
Edmund Burke, the last great spokesman for the pre-modern point of view.53  
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 Ophuls appears at times muddleheaded though. Even though he acknowledges 
Burke as an influence, he also appeals to anarchism. First he states: “Ecology broadly 
defined is thus a fundamentally conservative orientation to the world . . . . Burke will surely 
have much to teach us.”54 Immediately after this, he claims that “modern anarchist tradition 
may also contain valuable lessons” for the environmental movement as “to the extent that 
the environmental movement shares a common political ideology, it is predominantly 
anarchist.”55 I am not aware of any anarchist tradition which would count Burke or Hobbes 
as an influence. So what does Ophuls want to mean? One reason for this panoply of names 
and ideologies is the eclectic nature of Ophuls’s exposition. Another possible reason for this 
apparent contradiction is that Ophuls actually appreciates the “decentralization, local 
autonomy, modesty, community” in the anarchist tradition. These are surely compatible with 
conservative sensibilities.56 But this compatibility is conceivable vis-à-vis the centralized 
nation-state framework coupled with rampant free market individualism which offends both 
anarchists and traditional conservatives. Despite Ophuls’s occasional lapses, his work is 
conservative in spirit when he says, for instance, that “not all values are equal and that virtue 
matters” against “the modern liberal-democratic orthodoxy.” The latter “holds that people 
have an inalienable right to create their own values.” Ophuls is acutely aware of the liberal 
(and we can add the confused conservatives who are actually the cousins of liberals) 
resistance to any appeal to “common interest” other than “the clash of personal and 
factional interest . . . devoted almost exclusively to the utilitarian satisfaction of desire or 
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appetite.”57 Nonetheless, Ophuls sees “the crisis of ecological scarcity . . . fundamentally [as] 
a moral and spiritual crisis.”58  
Two implications of this rapprochement between conservatism and 
environmentalism should be emphasized. One is the recognition that religion must be seen 
as an ally of environmentalists. The other is that happiness must be sought in intangibles. 
The first is visible in the increasing spread of environmental sensibility among religious 
groups both in the US as well as in other countries.59 I have noted above that the Catholic 
Church has long taken a pro-environment position (except perhaps its stance on birth 
control). In the US, a splinter group of Evangelicals came out recently in support of stricter 
climate change policies by calling on the Bush administration to do more on carbon dioxide 
emissions.60 There is much to be gained from cross-fertilization of conservative and 
environmental sensibilities but the standing distrust has to be overcome through mutual 
communication and collaboration. Gary Gardner at the Worldwatch Institute point out the 
need to overcome this mutual distrust: 
The effort to build a sustainable world could advance dramatically if religious people 
and institutions, on one hand, and environmentalists and advocates of sustainable 
development, on the other, were to embrace each other’s central concerns. But to do 
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so, the longstanding distrust between the two communities would need to be 
overcome.61 
 
One area where the marriage of religion and the environment can make an impact, 
according to Gardner, is the issue of consumption. Due to their predominantly secular 
outlook, environmentalists are not able to influence ordinary people: 
Consumption is the one issue on the sustainability agenda where we seem to be 
making very little progress. Yet it’s an issue that religion has a long history of 
experience with, in terms of warning people of the dangers of excessive attachment 
to the corporeal world. When an environmentalist talks about consumption, he or 
she could make a strong case for the impact of our consumption habits on the 
natural world. A religious person could make the same case, but could take it further 
and say that consumption is bad for us as human beings, for the human spirit and 
for community—that excessive consumption can be a corrosive influence in our 
lives.62 
 
What Gardner points out here is the perennial teaching of almost all pre-modern religious 
and philosophical traditions in the world. Only modern philosophy evades it. The question 
of “excessive” consumption is basically one of psychological dissatisfaction and is 
immediately related to that of happiness. The most accessible ways of dealing with the 
experience of what is known in Buddhism as “dukkha” (suffering or “that which is difficult 
to bear”) is to seek “wealth, goods, power, reputation, and all such things . . . to excess 
without limit” (Pol. 1323a36-38). It has been the foremost role of religion and myth to act as 
a palliative against the fact of human suffering. “How are we to be consoled for the misery 
of living?” is the religious question that runs through all times and cultures.63 Marx’s 
characterization of religion as “the opium of the people” is sensible as far as the reality of 
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suffering goes but his suggestion for “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of 
men” and “demand for their real happiness” is questionable.64  
Now, as the religious interpretation of reality has lost significant ground to science in 
the industrialized and industrializing nations, its place is being filled by a series of addictive 
consumptive activities with a serious social, psychological, and ecological toll. Some 
psychological analysts locate the roots of “addiction” (including but not restricted to drug 
use) in psychosocial “dislocation” mass-produced by the free market economy. The mobile 
and competitive lifestyle of free markets dissolve the “traditional family, community, and 
religious ties” which integrate individuals into their societies psychosocially. The free-floating 
individuals of modern mass society are then compelled to develop substitute lifestyles in 
which they seek comfort. These non-conventional forms of addiction and lifestyles can be as 
diverse as internet use, casual sex,  compulsive shopping, binge eating, and gang 
membership.65 Civic-minded environmentalists are increasingly concerned about the 
ecological and social impact of consumption in the industrialized countries and its spread to 
developing nations. Seeing the interdependence of ecological well-being and civic well-being, 
they advocate normative constraints on the consumption of natural resources and energy.66 
But how this can be done without compromising the most cherished fruit of modernity, 
namely, individual freedom, is a question that future research might look for an answer. The 
evocation of virtuous behavior to limit consumption and production voluntarily for the sake 
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of the good life is something shared by traditional conservatives. Traditional (or cultural) 
conservatism, observes Russell Kirk, rejects “the reduction of human striving to material 
production and consumption”67 or the idea that “the ends of existence are production and 
consumption merely.”68  
In addition to the scientific neo-Malthusian take on the discourse of “limits,” we may 
then identify a culturally conservative environmental ethos which can be characterized as a 
modern-day revival of concern for the spiritual corruption or distraction of the human soul 
by pleasure, money, and power.69 The well-known environmentalist principle of the “three 
R’s” (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle)—a fourth “R” such as Repair, Restore, or Recover is 
occasionally added to this list—is the most succinct expression of the venerable 
environmental principles of moderation, frugality, sufficiency, and voluntary simplicity to 
live aright. David Orr, for instance, observes that achieving sustainability requires the virtue 
of moderation and limiting consumption:  
[S]ustainability will require a reduction in consumption in wealthy societies and 
changes in the kinds of things consumed toward products that are durable, 
recyclable, useful, efficient, and sufficient . . . . If we are not to turn the earth into a 
toxic dump or bankrupt ourselves by expensively undoing what should not have 
been done in the first place, moderation must eventually replace self-indulgence.70 
 
This conservative ethos in Orr’s critique of consumption also underlines much of 
environmental literature on technology and economics—E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful, 
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Ivan Illich’s “convivial life,” and Herman Daly’s “economics for the common good” all of 
which privilege “quality” over “quantity” in the pursuit of the good life and happiness. 
Theirs is at the same time a harsh critique of modern science and culture in which “quantity 
has become quality.”71 The same debilitating effect of industrial civilization on the loss of 
freedom was observed by the economist Ralph Borsodi. We are transformed “from a self-
helpful individual into a self-helpless individual . . . . They consume what others have 
produced, and are dependent for existence and happiness upon things about the making of 
which they know nothing.”72  
Today, it is no longer possible to speak of “quality” and be taken seriously by natural 
and social scientists who are in constant search of more precise measurements. As a result, 
“the answer to all questions for ‘what for?’ is ‘more.’ ”73 The disappearance of “quality” as a 
scientific category is the single most important feature of “modernity.” The widespread talk 
about “quality” time, education, or health-care that we hear today is nostalgic of a forgotten 
wisdom but nonsensical to the modern scientific view of reality. Parallel to the abandonment 
of “quality” is the confusion surrounding the goal of “happiness.” For Aristotle, one sort of 
quality (poiotēs) was the active condition (hexis) and disposition (diathesis) (Cat. VIII). As I 
have noted in Chapter 4, our words for these are values and attitudes. The displaced 
vocabulary of virtues and vices are enduring hexis-type qualities. Without careful attention to 
these qualities, happiness will not only be elusive but misunderstood as well.  
As I have argued in Chapter 4, Aristotle defines the ultimate goal of human 
endeavors as “being-at-work [energeia] of the soul in accordance with virtue” (NE 1098a17-
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18). In Politics I.9 concerning the role of economy and material goods in human life, for 
example, Aristotle takes issue with a prevalent view of his time that sees owning and getting 
wealth as an end in itself to be pursued ad infinitum. He criticizes this view for failing to 
discern the proper means-end relationships of human life. Those who overvalue wealth 
acquisition and see its increase as the primary goal in life are either intent on “living,” 
according to Aristotle, hence unaware of “living well” as an end, or seek the latter in the 
wrong place, in the pleasure they get in and through material possessions. In either case, 
ordering one’s life around riches, reputation, power, or pleasure leads to insatiability: “Since 
that desire of theirs is without limit, they also desire what is productive of unlimited things” 
(Pol. 1258a1-2). Every thing or activity conducive to living or gratification is pursued as an 
end, which Aristotle considers as going against nature (kata phusin). What was true in 
Aristotle’s time is also true for today. There is a growing body of research suggesting that 
after a certain threshold material affluence does not contribute to a subjective sense of well-
being.74 We see a return to Aristotelian thinking at the margins of academic scholarship on 
technology, economics, urban planning, and education.75 These are promising signs that 
Aristotle’s insights may be revived in the future. 
This study has aimed at expanding the intellectual horizon of contemporary 
environmental politics. An encounter with Aristotle is important today not only because it 
can illuminate our response to a crucial contemporary social issue but also because it can 
help us to situate contemporary environmental thought in the tradition of Western political 
philosophy—a vital project that has been vastly neglected in environmental scholarship until 
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recently.  Although environmental concerns are unique to the late modern era, the 
underlying socio-political causes of environmental problems, as commonly acknowledged, 
cannot be restricted to the late modern era. By bringing up the classical perspective of 
Aristotle’s political philosophy, my intention is not, as Stanley Rosen put it in another 
context, “a return to the wisdom of ancients,” but “the transmission of ancient wisdom into 
the contemporary terrain.”76 
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